

Directorate of Distance Education

UNIVERSITY OF JAMMU

JAMMU



REFERENCE / STUDY MATERIAL

FOR

M. A. SOCIOLOGY

Semester - IIIrd

Title : Sociology of Change and Development

COURSE NO. : SOC-C-303

LESSON NO. 1 – 22

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<http://www.distanceeducationju.in>

Printed and Published on behalf of the Directorate of Distance Education, University of Jammu, Jammu by the Director, DDE, University of Jammu, JAMMU-180 006

M.A SOCIOLOGY

Semester IIIrd

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Printed at :- Chenab Printer/20/700

SYLLABUS OF SOCIOLOGY

M.A IIIrd Semester for the examination to be held in the year

December 2019, 2020, 2021 (NON CBCS)

Course No. : SOC-C-303

Title: Sociology of Change and Development

Credits : 6

Maximum Marks : 100

Duration of Examination : 2½ hrs

a) Semester Examination : 80

b) Sessional Assessment: 20

OBJECTIVES : Social change has always been a central concern of sociology study. It has gained in greater salience due to its unprecedented rapidity and planned character in recent time. Consequently, development has emerged as a pronounced concern and as a remarkable feature of our times. The course is designed to provide conceptual and theoretical understanding of social change and development as it has emerged in sociological literature and to offer an insight into the ways in which structure and development impinge upon each other. The course also intends to prepare the students for professional careers in the field of development planning.

Unit-I Meaning and Forms of Social Change and Development

Concepts: Evolution, Diffusion, Progress & Development, Human Development and Social Development, Sustainable Development.

Unit-II Theories and factors of Social Change

Theories: Linear, Cyclical, Dialectical

Factors: Demographic, Biological, Economic, Technological and Cultural

Unit-III Modernization and Development/Underdevelopment

Modernization and Development, Center-Periphery, World System, Development of Underdevelopment Thesis-G-Frank, World Modern System Theory-Wallerstein.

Unit-IV Post -Development Perspectives

Critique of Modernization and Development, Alternative Development , Development as Discourse , Culture and Development, Post-Modernist Perspective

NOTE FOR PAPER SETTING:

The question paper will consist of three sections A,B and C

Section A will consist of eight long answer type questions: two from each unit with internal choice. Each question will be of 12 marks. The candidates will be required to answer four questions, one from each unit.

Total weightage will be of $12 \times 4 = 48$ marks

Section B will consist of eight short answer type questions: two from each unit with internal choice. Each question will be of 6 marks. The candidates will be required to answer four questions, one from each unit.

Total weightage will be of $6 \times 4 = 24$ marks

Section C will consist of eight objective type questions of one mark each. The candidates will have to answer all the eight questions.

Total weightage will be of $1 \times 8 = 8$ marks

CONTENTS

UNIT-I

MEANING AND FORMS OF SOCIAL CHANGE AND DEVELOPMENT

<u>Lesson No.</u>	<u>Topic</u>	<u>Page No.</u>
<u>MEANING AND FORMS OF SOCIAL CHANGE AND DEVELOPMENT</u>		
1.	Evolution, Diffusion	3-34
2.	Progress	35-41
3.	Development	42-62
4.	Human Development and Social Development	63-68
5.	Sustainable Development	69-95

UNIT-II

THEORIES AND FACTORS OF SOCIAL CHANGE

6.	Social Change : Meaning and Definition	96-107
7.	Theories of Social Change	108-116
8.	Linear and Cyclical Theory and Dialectical	117-126
9.	Demographic Factor of Social Change	127-135
10.	Technological Factor of Social Change	136-149
11.	Economic Factor of Social Change	150-160
12.	Biological Factor of Social Change	161-171
13.	Cultural Factor of Social Change	172-179

UNIT-III

MODERNIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT /UNDERDEVELOPMENT

- | | | |
|-----|--|---------|
| 14. | Concept of Modernization and Development | 180-198 |
| 15 | Centre-Periphery | 199-224 |
| 16. | The Development of Underdevelopment | 225-231 |
| | Thesis-G. Frank | |
| 17. | World Modern System Theory | 232-236 |
| | Wallerstein | |

UNIT-IV

POST-DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVES

- | | | |
|-----|---|---------|
| 18. | Critique of modernization & Development | 237-258 |
| 19. | Alternative Development | 259-261 |
| 20. | Development as Discourse | 262-280 |
| 21. | Culture and Politics | 281-290 |
| 22. | Post-Modernist Perspective | 291-332 |

**MEANING AND FORMS OF SOCIAL CHANGE AND
DEVELOPMENT :**

STRUCTURE

- 1.1 Objectives
- 1.2 Introduction : What is Evolution.
- 1.3 Cultural and Biological Evolution.
- 1.4 Typology of Cultural Evolution.
- 1.5 Classical Evolutionary School
- 1.6 Neo Evolutionary School
- 1.7 What is Diffusion
- 1.8 Conditions Related to Cultural Diffusion
- 1.9 Criticism.

1.1 OBJECTIVES

The main objective of this lesson is to equip you with :—

- The Meaning of evolution
- Conditions related to cultural diffusion.
- Various types of evolution.
- Schools of evolution
- Meaning of Diffusion

1.2 INTRODUCTION :

WHAT IS EVOLUTION?

The term evolution comes from the latin word “evoluere” which means ‘to develop’ or to ‘unfold’ evolution literally means gradually ‘unfolding’ or ‘unrolling’. It indicates changes form ‘within’ and not from ‘without’ ; it is spontaneous, but not automatic. It implies continuous change that takes place especially in some structure. The concept of evolution applies to the internal growth of an organism.

MEANING OF SOCIAL EVOLUTION

The term ‘evolution’ is borrowed from biological science to sociology. The term ‘organic evolution’ is replaced by ‘Social Evolution’ in Sociology whereas the term ‘organic evolution’ is used to denote the evolution of organism, the expression human society. Here the term implies the evolution of man’s social relations.

Therefore, Evolution may be defined as a process in which different forms are produced or developed orderly in a system. It is concerned with the continuous progress in a system that brings complexity in simplicity, heterogeneity in homogeneity and certainty in uncertainty. In other words, evolution reveals changes in a system in course of time, which can be shown stage after stage or period after period in continuous sequence from past to present. It never deals with change of system, as revolution attempts to do, but it discusses changes in a system. The direction of evolution is always from simple to complex, similarity to dissimilarity and indefinite to definite. This can be shown by establishing stages of development in which simple things developed into a complex ones.

Evolutions have used evolution as a methodology to reconstruct the history of mankind from past to present. Thus, it can also be defined as a methodology or approach which compares the present to past and establishes sequences of development.

Herbert Spencer, a British Sociologist and anthropologist, who was a follower of revolutionary approach, has defined evolution as follows:

“Evolution is integration of matter and concomitant dissipation of motion during

which matter passes from an indefinite incoherent homogeneity to a definite coherent heterogeneity.”

CONCEPT OF SOCIAL EVOLUTION

The concept of Social Evolution is quite popular in sociological discussion. The explanation of social evolution revolves around two questions:

- (i) How does society evolve?
- (ii) How did our civilisation come to be what is it today?

The common assumption is that society evolved because of man, who made society evolved. Accordingly, men who had not evolved too far, would have a crude culture while men who are more evolved would have an advanced society. Society is understood here in terms of social behaviour and behaviour is a function of biological structure. Men with superior and more evolved biological structure, thus, could give rise to a more complex society.

When we consider the factors that explain social evolution we are confronted with another question i.e., “What is that evolving in the social world?”. The answer is usually ‘society’. As far as the society is concerned, something other than the biological element in it is undergoing the change. To the anthropologists like R.H. Lowie and A.Kroeber and others that element is ‘Culture’ social evolution then becomes ‘Cultural evolution’ evolution of groups from times immemorial becomes a part of the evolution of culture. “What then are the factors that have caused the great evolution of our culture from crude and simple beginnings to the magnificence, it has now attained”? The answer lies in four factors: accumulation, invention, diffusion and adjustment.

SOCIAL EVOLUTION IN SOCIOLOGICAL STUDIES:

The concept of ‘Social Evolution’ basically involves the notion that all societies pass through certain definite stages in a passage from a simple to complex form. All those who made use of this concept essentially meant the same. Some have stressed the analogy between the growth of an organism and the growth of human society. The concept has also been extended to include the process of gradual change taking place in all societies.

Saint Simon, for example, agreed that there was an evolutionary sequence through which all mankind must pass. He distinguished three stages of mental activity; the conjectural, the miconjectural and the positive. August Comte synthesised the works of his predecessors and developed his own theory in which he asserted that all societies must pass through three stages: the theological, meta-physical and the positive or scientific. Comte saw society as a social organism possessing a harmony of structure and function. Herbert Spencer in his 'principles of sociology' developed many of Comte's ideas even though he did not acknowledge this fact. Spencer presupposed rather than tried to prove the evolutionary hypothesis. "He felt that there was in social life a change from simple to complex forms-from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous and that there was with society an integration of the 'whole' and a differentiation of parts".

There are other 19th century scholars who were concerned with different aspects of social evolution.

- (i) Sir Henry Maine in his Ancient law, 1861 argued that "societies developed from organisational forms where relationships were based on status to those based upon contract.
- (ii) L.H. Morgan in his "Ancient society"- 1878 "established an elaborate sequence of family forms from primordial promiscuity to Monogamy through which he thought societies must pass.
- (iii) E.B. Tylor in his famous work "Primitive Culture"- 1871 linked his observations covering a large number of societies to the evolutionary framework. In particular he tried to establish a sequential development of religious forms. This particular work had great impact on Sir James Frazer and Emile Durkheim.

"The evolutionary doctrine provided a broad general framework through which the whole progress of human society could be conceptualised". This doctrine was, however, rejected in the early 20th century. This vacuum could only gradually be filled with the development of the structural system of analysis. This later development is more clearly witnessed in the field of social anthropology. In the field of sociology, the structural functionalists have again renewed its usage by making a number of modifications so as to make it more scientific and less imaginary.

The principle of evolution is applicable to both biological and cultural spheres.

1.3 CULTURAL AND BIOLOGICAL EVOLUTION

Cultural evolution may be defined as a process by which different successive forms in socio-cultural institutions or culture of mankind as a whole are developed and accumulated to constitute the growth of culture over different periods of time, but in a continuity. Cultural evolutionists have used it as a methodological approach to show the history of mankind from past to present by establishing sequence through stages. The methodology of cultural evolution contains two vitally important assumptions. First, it postulates that genuine cultural parallels or cultural similarities, developed independently in all cultures in historical sequences. Second, it assumes that parallels or similarities developed independently due to psychic unity of mankind. Thus, cultural evolution as a methodology is avowedly scientific and generalising rather than historical and particularising. It is less concerned with unique and divergent or convergent patterns and features of culture; although it does not necessarily deny such divergence than with parallels or similarities or regularities that recur crossculturally. Further, it endeavours to determine recurrent patterns and processes and to formulate interrelationships between phenomena in terms of law. The 19th century cultural evolutionists are important to contemporary studies more because of their scientific objective and pre-occupation than because of their particular substantive historical reconstruction.

Thus, cultural evolution may be defined as a quest for cultural similarities or cultural parallels or cultural regularities.

BIOLOGICAL EVOLUTION

It is necessary here to clear the meaning of cultural evolution in relation to biological evolution. Because, there is tendency to consider the former as an extension of and analogous to the latter. It is not denying the fact that there is relationship between cultural and biological evolution, because the minimum development of Hominidae was a precondition of culture. But cultural development is extension of or analogy to biological development only in a chronological sense. The nature of evolutionary scheme and of developmental process differ profoundly in biology and culture.

In biological evolution, it is assumed that all forms are genetically related and their development is essentially divergent or convergent. Parallels such as swimming, flying, walking etc. are superficial and fairly uncommon. They are genetically considered to be instances of convergent evolution rather than true parallels.

In cultural evolution, on the other hand, it is assumed that cultural patterns in different parts of the world are genetically unrelated yet pass through parallel sequences. The divergent trends, which do not follow the postulated universal sequences, such as those caused by local environment or areas or sub areas, are attributed to only secondary importance. This was the basic assumption of not only 19th century classical evolutionists but modern or Neo-evolutionists like White and Childe also escaped from the awkward facts of cultural divergence and local variations to deal with culture as a whole, rather than particular cultures.

V.G. Childe, a Neo-evolutionist of Britain, has attempted to make a distinction between biological and cultural evolution by stressing the divergent nature of the former and operation of diffusion and frequency of convergence in the latter. It is interesting that such history as implied in cultural relativism or historical particularism is similar to biological evolution. In cultural relativism, variations or unique patterns of different areas or subareas are clearly conceived as to represent divergent development and presumably an ultimate genetic relationship. It is only complementary concept of diffusion, which tends to level differences, a phenomena unknown in biology, that prevents cultural relativism from having an exclusively genetic significance like that of biological evolution.

Analogies between cultural and biological evolution are also represented by two attributes of each (i) a tendency towards increasing complexity of forms and (ii) the development of superior forms i.e. improvement or progress. It is, of course, quite possible to define complexity and progress so as to make them characteristics of evolution. But they are not attributes exclusively of evolution. They may also be considered characteristics of culture change or development as conceived from any non-evolutionary point of view. The assumption that culture change normally involves increasing complexity is found virtually in all historical interpretations of cultural data, but complexity in biological and cultural evolution differs.

According to Kroeber, an American anthropologist, the process of cultural evolution is an additive and therefore, accumulative one, whereas the process of organic evolution is substitutive one. It is on the question not of complexity but divergent that relativists and evolutionists differ.

1.4 TYPOLOGY OF CULTURAL EVOLUTION

Julian Steward, an American anthropologists, who revived evolutionary theory of culture growth in 20th century, has attempted to provide us typology of cultural evolution, in which the data related to cultural evolution can be placed. These are :


- (i) Unilinear Cultural Evolution
- (ii) Universal Cultural Evolution
- (iii) Multilinear Cultural Evolution

(i) *Unilinear Cultural Evolution* : The basic assumptions of 19th century classical evolutionists such as unilinear sequences, parallel inventions and psychic unity of mankind deal with unilinear cultural evolution. In this evolutionary scheme it is postulated that culture or cultures of world pass through different, successive developmental stages in continuity. As a result of which simple forms change into complex ones, homogeneity moves towards heterogeneity and the state of uncertainty goes towards certainty.

(ii) *Universal Cultural Evolution* : It is rather arbitrary label to designate the modern revamping of unilinear evolution. It is concerned with the evolution of culture of mankind as a whole, rather than with particular cultures. Thus, universal evolution which is represented to-day by Leslie White of America and V. Gordon Childe of Britain, who are also known as neo-evolutionists, is the heritage of 19th century classical or unilinear evolutionists. It is so only in the scope of its generalisations but not in its treatment of particulars. White and Childe endeavour to keep evolutionary concept of cultural stages alive by relating those stages to the culture of mankind as a whole. In this scheme, distinctive cultural traditions and local

variations are excluded as irrelevant. The details about universal cultural evolution will be presented, while dealing with the contributions of Lesile White and V.G. Childe under sub-heading Neo-evolutionary school.

(iii) *Multilinear Cultural Evolution* : It is somewhat less ambitious approach than the others two *i.e.* unilinear and universal evolution. It is like unilinear evolutionary scheme, in dealing with development sequences, but it is distinctive in searching for independent discoveries or parallels of limited occurrence instead of universals. Methodological approach of multilinear evolution is based on the assumption that significant regularities or similarities due to parallel discoveries occur in cultural change, which is concerned with the determination of cultural laws. Its method is empirical rather than deductive. It is inevitably concerned also with historical reconstructions, but it does not expect that historical data can be classified in universal stages. The kinds of parallels or similarities with which multilinear evolution deals are distinguished by their limited occurrence and their specificity. For this reason outstanding methodological problem of multilinear evolution is an appropriate taxonomy of cultural phenomena



1.5 CLASSICAL EVOLUTIONARY THEORY

Basic Postulates of Classical Evolutionary Scheme

Although, classical evolutionists have been criticised by relativists, particularists, diffusionists and migrationists, who have discredited the fundamental postulates of evolutionists on the basis of empirical findings, but it is beyond doubt that they were first and foremost thinkers who opined that the concept of racial superiority is psychological and myth. For them, the primitives or tribal societies of mankind were ancestors of modern civilized societies of the universe. The former represented the earlier stage of humanity through which the civilized mankind as a whole had evolved out. Their such thinking reflects clearly that they had critical mind and analytical brain to understand the cultural history of mankind in the dynamic dimensions of time. Although their evolutionary schemes were to a great extent de-educative and speculative but they were certainly aware of facts and explanation of processes of change. They seriously aimed at showing that mankind was a unity not diversity. The lower developmental stages of mankind were directly related to latter ones. In absence of written records, it was a difficult task for them to show the evolution of mankind. But their critical mind devised a method to fill in the gap by the concepts of survivals. Survivals were uncommon customs, which had lost their significance in present state, but had valuable meaning in past. Thus, survivals were licators of conditions of culture of mankind in earlier periods.

They were of the opinion that historical explanations were sufficient to the understanding of cultural varieties. They did not confuse history with evolution, but they took help of historical explanations to show that human culture had undergone progressive and cumulative change in 19th century. Their this method of reconstruction was also known as historical method.

They compared the early stage of primitive people with civilized ones and assumed that formers were the reflection of early condition of the latters. They also compared survivals, both material and non-material, to establish sequence of development from simple to the complex, from homogeneity to heterogeneity and from uncertainty to certainty. This method of comparing cultures or cultural institutions of the world, became known as comparative method of cultural evolutionists

Evolutionists were very much puzzled, while dealing with the evolutionary schemes, on the question of similarities in culture traits, culture complex and culture patterns of the people of the world without known historical connection. Was it due to independent invention or because of diffusion? The theory of diffusion could not seem convincing to them and they postulated that similarities in traits, complex and patterns of cultures existing all over the world were not due to diffusion, but they revealed certainly that parallel inventions or discoveries were made in different parts of the world by human beings, who were genetically unrelated, yet passed through the same developmental sequences. Independent inventions or parallel discoveries of culture traits, culture complex and culture patterns are designated as cultural parallels. The ideologies of evolutionists related to the formation of cultural parallels are termed as cultural parallelism, which is synonymic to cultural similarism.

The evolutionists assumed that cultural parallels or cultural similarities came into existence due to Psychic unity of mankind. Psychic unity of mankind refers to similar mentality of human beings to react and think similarly with like environmental situation at a particular period of time. It was because of psychic unity of mankind that human beings residing at different places of the world passed through the similar stages of savagery, barbarism and civilization. The invention of agriculture took place simultaneous in South-east Asia, South-west Asia and America. The use of zero was invented at the same time in Hind, Babylonia and Maya cultures. The invention of paper and printing came in to being independently at the same time in East and West. Writing also came into being simultaneously in many countries of the world. Such examples of cultural similarities or cultural parallels bear testimony that human beings possess psychic unity. Differences in environments and situations create diversities in traits, complexes and patterns, which occupy secondary significance in evolution of culture.

Thus, classical evolutionists postulated that in the beginning all cultures possessed similar and simple culture traits, but they gradually developed into complex forms or patterns due to cultural developments.

SALIENT FEATURES OF UNILINEAR EVOLUTIONISM

1. Human culture as a whole or socio-cultural institutions, evolve in unilinear sequence, stage after stage.

2. The direction of cultural evolution is from simple to complex, from similarity to dissimilarity, and from indefinite to definite.
3. Different stages of evolution can be established by speculating historical explanations and using comparative method.
4. Similarities in culture traits, culture complex, culture patterns of the world are caused by psychic unity of mankind and parallel inventions.
5. Cultural diversities do not occupy significant place in unilinear evolutionary scheme.
6. In the higher stage of culture, some residues of primitive stages can be seen, which are termed as survivals, and which remind us about the earlier stages of the culture.

1.5 CLASSICAL EVOLUTIONARY SCHOOL

Classical evolutionists used evolutionary schemes as a methodology or approach to reconstruct the developmental stages of culture of mankind as a whole as well as to establish developmental sequences of cultural institutions like marriage, family, kinship etc. In this approach they applied comparative method to reconstruct cultural history of mankind as a whole or cultural institutions.

Considering the primitive people as reflecting the early condition of men and comparing their early culture with developed ones, Tylor and Morgan postulated that man kind as a whole has passed through the stages of savagery, barbarism and civilization. Tylor did not place specific cultures into different stages of cultural development of human beings, but Morgan subdivided the stages of savagery and barbarism each in to three groups, namely lower, middle and upper. He was of opinion that lower savagery began with development of language and gathering of fruits and nuts as subsistence. This stage ended with development of fishing subsistence and use of fire. No living example can be cited to this stratum.

In middle status of savagery, fishing subsistence and use of fire continued, but ended with invention of bow and arrow. During this period, mankind expanded to cover the greater part of earth's surface. He placed Australians and Polynesians at

the time of first contact with European.

In upper status of savagery, invention of bow and arrow continued, but ended with the invention of pottery. Examples of this stage are American Indians of the Western sub-arctic, Columbia River valley tribes and certain tribes of North and South America at the time of first contact with Europeans.

Lower status of barbarism witnessed continuation of pottery inventions, either by original or by adoption and ended with invention of animal domestication in eastern hemisphere, but invention of plant cultivation by irrigation and use of adobe brick and stone in house construction. He cited examples of American Indian tribes east of Missouri river, and tribes of Europe and Asia, who had pottery, but no domesticated animals.

Middle status of barbarism witnessed animal domestication in old world and use of plant cultivation, adobe brick and stone in New world and invention of iron ore smelting in both worlds. Examples are pueblo Indians of America, village dwelling Indians of Mexico, Central America and Tribes in eastern hemisphere.

In upper status of barbarism, smelting of iron continued and ended with the invention of phonetic alphabet and use of written literature. Examples are Grecian tribes of Homeric age, Italian tribes before foundation of Rome and Germanic tribes of Julius Caesar's time.

The stage of civilization began with phonetic alphabet and literary writing. Morgan's classification of stages of development of humankind in terms of ethnic period such as savagery, barbarism and civilization, are what anthropologists generally call hunting and food gathering societies, horticultural tribals, and pre or proto state societies.

Thus, Morgan compared the tools and levels of subsistence and attempted to trace development stages of mankind as a whole. Tylor and Morgan's offensive words like savagery and barbarism have been dropped by present day anthropologists, but all have accepted historical sequence from hunting and gathering to domestication of plants and animals and most single item, writing, as the beginning of civilization.

These evolutionists also tried to establish the historical sequence of marriage, family

and kinship. According to Tylor, Morgan, McLennan, J.J. Bachofen and Adolf Bastian, Sexual promiscuity was the early stage of marriage in historical sequence, from which present day monogamy evolved out, through group marriage and polyandry.

They all have postulated that societies in early stage was matriarchal and residence was matrilineal from which patriarchal family and patrilineal residence evolved out in historical period. Thus, matrilineality proceeded the patrilineality. In kinship organisation, descent was traced through female in early societies from which the present patrilineal descent developed in course of time.

Morgan was of the opinion that family system has passed through fifteen successive stages of development, the early stage of family was consanguinal family and monogamous family was the developed stage. In kinship terminology, classificatory system was the early stage, which proceeded the descriptive system.

Maine was exception, whose sequence of family organisation revealed that patriarchy was the early stage of family organisation which proceeded matriarchy, which was not acceptable to other evolutionists.

But his historical sequences of kinship organisation to territorial organization, from status to contract, from civil law to criminal was accepted by all.

It was Tylor, who took enthusiastic interest in establishing historical sequences of religion. He was of opinion that animism, i.e., belief in soul, was the early stage of religion, from which present stage of monotheism has developed through polytheism.

Unilinear evolutionary approaches were applied to show the historical sequences of economic organisation, technology and art, etc. In the field of economic organisation developmental stages are: hunting and gathering, domestication of plant and animal, industrial labour, etc. In the field of technology, three stages of successive development are: stone age, bronze age, and iron age. A.C. Haddon, in his book *Development of Art*, has established three successive stages of development, which are realistic, symbolic and geometric. According to Frazer, society has passed through three successive stages of development, i.e. magic, religion, and science.

CONTRIBUTIONS OF TYLOR ON CULTURAL EVOLUTION

Tylor published his first book entitled, *Anahuac* : also known as *Mexico-Mexican*,

Ancient and Modern, in 1861 from London. In his book, Tylor discusses the evolution or reconstruction of cultural history of Mexico. On the basis of observing and comparing the material remains of culture and antiquities of popular rites, customs, beliefs myths, legends, folklore etc., he came to the conclusion that culture of Mexico-mexican has developed from primitive to civilized stage. He used a number of different techniques for such reconstructions. One of those was assignment of conditions opposite to present one to early stage of development, another was his concept of 'survivals, which he used in a manner similar to Maine and McLennan's concept of *Survivals*. According to him, survivals are processes, customs and opinions that persist by force of habit, even when they lose their utility. Thus, survivals remain proof of earlier condition. He found such survivals in both material and non-material aspects of culture. He cited an example of saying 'God bless you' to someone who sneezed. This custom was existing even in civilized society indicating an earlier belief that sneezing was an attempt of the soul to leave the body. This danger was encountered by saying, "God bless you". Such belief is also existing among Indians, because sneezing is regarded as a bad omen. When anyone sneezes, it is a custom to say that May God grant a long life.

Tylor's second book entitled *Researches into the Early History of Mankind and Development of Civilization*, was published in 1865. This book deals with progressive theory of cultural development on the basis of similarity of human mind. When he thought about development of civilization, the basic question which perplexed him was whether the differences between civilized and savage life was to be explained by the progress of the former, or the degeneration of the latter. Following the same approach of collecting material and non-material aspects of cultural survivals and comparing them in time sequence, the conclusion of the book revealed that differences in primitive and civilized people were due to progress which took place in culture as a whole. He was of opinion that culture as a whole had progressed rather than degenerated, and in the reconstruction of cultural history of civilization, the progress of culture must be taken into consideration. On the basis of evaluating the progress of culture, his researches into early history of mankind and development indicated that the present civilization has evolved from savagery (early stage of human kind) through barbarism. Thus, there were three successive stages of cultural development through

which the present form of civilization has emerged.

Tylor's most recognised book, *Primitive Culture* Was published in 1871. This book was regarded as anthropological classic which marks the beginning of the scientific study of culture. Two major contributions to cultural anthropology emerged from this book. The 'doctrine of survivals' and 'theory of animism'.

In this book, it was Tylor, who gave a scientific definition of culture. According to him, "culture is that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom and any other capabilities and habit acquired by man as a member of society".

In this definition of culture, the term 'Acquired' is the key word, because it meant that culture was the product of social learning, rather than of biological heredity, and that the differences in cultural development were not the result of degeneration, but of progress in cultural knowledge. Tylor's insistence that culture was a 'complex whole' implied that it included all socially learned behaviour, no matter if it seemed trivial or not. Thus, every facet of social life was worthy of study, because it contributed to the understanding of mankind.

In his book, *Primitive Culture*, Tylor has discussed the origin of culture and religion in primitive culture. Tylor considered two methods of revolutionary reconstruction, which also suggested the method of survivals to him. One was reconstruction of material culture by the archaeologists and geologists on the basis of the discoveries of material relics (artifacts) in geological strata. The archaeologist working with geologists could establish from a few surviving artifacts such a fragments of weapons, implements, pottery, etc. a general picture of material culture of an ancient society and its approximate place in chronological series. On the basis of surviving material relics and correlating them with chronological sequence, Tylor observed that the evolution of material culture has passed through three successive stages of development, viz. stone, bronze and iron.

Although Tylor reconstructed possible sequence of many cultural institutions, but his most comprehensive treatment was in the field of *primitive religion*. In his book *Primitive Culture*, Tylor defined religion as belief in spiritual beings. He stated that religion was a cultural universal, because no known cultures were without such beliefs.

According to him, religion originated as belief in soul, which is also designated by the term 'animism' (*anima* means soul). Therefore, animism was the ancient form of religion. As souls were numerous, who were worshipped on different occasions in the form of ancestral worship, this created belief in polytheism, which following the processes of cultural evolution, reached at a stage of monotheism, the great belief of civilized people. Thus, the evolution of religion has passed through the development processes of animism, polytheism and monotheism.

Frazer is the representative of an epoch in anthropology, which ends with his death. He was the last survivor of British classical anthropology. He represented better than any of our contemporaries that trend in humanism which sought inspiration from the comparative study of man for the understanding of the Greek, Latin and Oriental cultures of antiquity. In all his directly theoretical contributions, he is an evolutionist interested in primitive, whether he refers to mankind at large, or to specific beliefs, customs and practices of contemporary savages. He worked by the comparative method, collecting and examined evidence from all parts of the world, at all levels of development and in all cultures. The comparative method, combined with evolutionary, implies certain general assumptions.

FRAZER'S EVOLUTIONARY PRINCIPLE

As referred to earlier, Frazer's convenient pegs were evolution, the principle of psychic unity of mankind, but he never clearly defined these ideas, nor did he develop full theoretical statements about them. His evolution was primarily one of the mental progresses of mankind. He described the meaning of *Golden Bough* as follows :

The cycle of the Golden Bough depicts, in its sinuous outline, in its play of alternative light and shadow, the long evolution by which the thoughts and efforts of man have passed through the successive stages of Magic, Religion and Science. It is in some measure, an epic of humanity, which starting from magic, attains to science in its ripe age.....

Thus, according to Frazer, the society or culture of mankind has passed through three successive development stages, namely, religion, and science.

FRAZER'S VIEWS ON TOTEM AND TABOO

As referred to earlier, Frazer wrote articles on totem and taboo, for *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, the 9th edition, which appeared in 1888. For Frazer, these articles were the beginning of a systematic application to anthropology and especially to a study of backward races of men, whom we call savages and barbarians. Frazer gave his reason for concentrating on savagery than on civilization as follows:

Civilization is extremely complex, savagery is comparatively simple. Savagery is undoubtedly the source from which all civilization has been ultimately derived by a slow process of evolution. It seemed to me, therefore, that if we are to understand the complex product, we must begin by studying the simple elements out of which it has been gradually compounded. In other words, we must try to understand savagery before we can hopefully to comprehend civilization.

In his article on totemism and taboo, Frazer has given a general idea about social origins, which became the guiding principle for much of his work, namely that from irrational beginning, system of great adaptative value for society are evolved. In taboo, Frazer remarks, we shall scarcely err in believing that even in advanced society the moral sentiments, in so far as they are merely sentiments are not based on an induction from experience, desire much of their force from an original system of taboo. Thus, on the taboo were grafted the golden fruits of law and morality.

According to Frazer, a totem is a class of material objects, which a savage regards superstitions with respect believing that there exists between him and every member of clan an intimate all together a special relation.

In his four volumes book entitled, *Totemism and Exogamy* (1910), Frazer gave a theory of soul for the origin of totem. He opined that totem originated as belief in soul. Savages believed that souls of human beings, after death, resided in plant, tree, animals, birds etc. The plant, tree, animal or bird, which was possessed by the soul of dead persons, the savages began to pay respect towards them. Eating and killing of those objects were strictly tabooed. In this way totemism came in to being. He cited example from Arunta tribe of Australia, in whose belief system, totems were regarded as responsible for causing pregnancy among women. Thus, totemism came into being from female side rather than male side. When in course of time, totems

had become hereditary, exogamy developed as a means for preventing in breeding.

Frazer's views on Magic, Religion and Science

In his book, *Golden Bough*, Frazer explained that early man knew nothing of science. In this way, they possessed completely wrong idea of natural causes. He lived primarily by two erroneous principles on which all his magic was based. These two erroneous principles of magic were, namely (i) law of similarity and (ii) the law of contact. The first law presumed that like produces like. The magic associated with this law or principle of similarity is designated as Homeopathic magic or imitative magic. In this, magicians were, thus, convinced that they could control nature by imitating it. Thus, if rain was needed, water was poured out, and to harm an enemy, a doll was fashioned in his image and needles run through its head and heart.

The second principle of magic, i.e., law of contact, presumed that once in contact was always in contact. The magic associated with this law was known as contagious magic. This law posited that connections remained en force even after separation. Thus, one could get hold of one's hair or nail, or clippings or clothes, he had worn, and burn or otherwise mutilate such items in the conviction that the same would happen to their former owner.

AMERICAN EVOLUTIONARY SCHOOL

Lewis Henry Morgan (1818-1881)

Morgan's paper entitled, "A Conjectural Solution to the Origin of the Classificatory System of Relationship" was published by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 1868. Thereafter, he emerged as a full-fledged evolutionist. In this paper, he traced the history of human family from primitive sexual promiscuity through fifteen stages of evolution to modern monogamy. In this reconstruction of history of marriage, he used a vast array of different types of kinship nomenclature. From this time onward, he began to work on the reconstruction of world history rather than that of American Indians alone. His thinking and researches in this direction produced monumental book *Ancient Society : Researches in Lines of Human Progress from Savagery through Barbarism to Civilization* in 1877.

In this book Morgan envisioned human history as consisting three major “

ethnical periods” - Savagery, Barbarism and Civilization. The first two periods were divided into sub-periods denoted Lower, Middle and Upper. These ethnical periods and their subdivisions were defined by the following sequence of technological innovations :

Ethnic Periods	: Technological Development.
Lower Savagery	: Invention of speech, subsistence on fruits and nuts.
Middle Savagery	: Fish subsistence and the use of fire.
Upper Savagery	: Bow and arrow.
Lower Barbarism	: Pottery
Middle Barbarism	: Domestication of animals in the old world, Cultivation of maize by irrigation, adobe and stone brick buildings in New World.
Upper Barbarism	: Iron-smelting and Iron tools.
Civilization	: Phonetic alphabet and writing.

He was of opinion that each of these periods had a distinct culture and exhibits a mode of life more or less special and peculiar to itself. This specialization of ethnical periods rendered it possible to treat a particular society according to its condition of relative advancement and to make it a subject of independent study and discussion.

Edward B. Tylor had also talked about the evolution of ethnical periods as savagery, barbarism and civilization but he never placed a particular groups of cultures and technological inventions into any categories as Morgan did. His assumption was that survivals of materials and non-material cultures were sufficient evidence to indicate that the mankind has reached into complex form of civilization from simple form of savagery through barbarism. Thus, unlike Tylor, Morgan assigned specific known cultures to the various stages of development. He was of opinion that lower savagery had passed out of existence. Australians and most polynesians were in middle savagery. Indian tribes east of Missouri river were in the stage of lower barbarism. Village Indians in Mexico, Central America and Peru were in middle barbarism, while Homeric Greeks, Germanic tribes of Caesar’s time, and ancient Italians were in the stage of upper barbarism.

Except for civilization, Morgan used criteria of subsistence and material culture for the recognition of his periods of human history. He also established sequences of family organisation, kinship terminology, descent pattern, socio-political organisation and rules of inheritance of property. At every point, he asked himself how far and why institutions changed from one form to next. His observations revealed that kinship based society preceded the state formation, concept of property was not developed in early stage and inheritance pattern in those days was also absent. Therefore, he came to the conclusion that descriptive kinship terminology and monogamy were relatively late in their emergence.

His correlations, sequence and conclusions were also criticised. His analysis was also of a functionalist nature, particularly when he talked about the aspects of socio-political organisations interrelated with one another and tied to technological developments and economic pursuits.

The major weakness of Morgan's system rests in the confusion between *synchronic* and *diachronic* reconstructions. Extrapolating from living culture, he felt that past society could be fully recovered not by archaeological evidence but by simple accepting the Idea that contemporary non-literate societies in their totality were accurate reflections of the past. Tylor and McLennan were careful in explanations of the comparative method. They reconstructed the sequences of specific institutions or of discrete cultural elements, but not of whole cultures.

Morgan's last book entitled *Houses and House Life of American Aborigines* was published in 1881. This book was an another land mark in the field of Anthropology. He was the first anthropologist to recognise that products of material culture do not occur in isolation from other social developments. He showed that the patterns of architecture interrelate with forms of family organisations and social life.

Adolf Bastian (1826-1905)

Adolf Bastian, was an another German ethnographer, who strongly championed the psychic unity principle in reconstructing culture history. Being empiricist, he criticised and rejected both Lamanck's and Darwin's theories of evolution on the ground that no one had seen species changing into another. He wrote two books in German language, which have not been translated into English. These are as follows

(i) *Der Mensch in der Geschichte*, O'Wigand, Leipzig, 1860

(ii) *Ethnische Elementargedanken in der Lahrevom Manschem*, Berlin, 1895.

These books revealed that he was interested in the study of history of culture in terms of social evolution. His emphasis was more on similarities of culture between different types of people rather than their differences. He was of opinion that similarities were caused due to psychic unity of man -kind. His opinion revealed that there was a restricted number of basic ideas common to all mankind, a theory presently examined by Le'vi-Strauss. Bastian called these basic ideas as Elementargedankengo, which means, elementary thought pattern. Since these ideas develop in various environments, they always find their specific expression as 'Volkergedanken' (folk idea). Those ideas with similar 'folk ideas' constituted 'Geographical provinces', a concept foreshadowing later American culture areas concept. Bastian gladly admitted that these provinces had not remained pure, because migration and diffusion had introduced different culture traits. In this way, he was better aware of complexity of cultural evolution than many other 19th century evolutionists.

CRITICISM OF CLASSICAL EVOLUTIONARY THEORY

There is no denying the fact that classical evolutionists tried their best to explore, analyse and understand cultural processes on the basis of their postulates and theories of evolution of cultures or culture as a whole. It is also true that they surveyed ample existing literatures, left by travellers, missionaries, ethnographers to reconstruct the history of cultural institutions and mankind as a whole. Where the written account was not available, they took help of cultural survivals, which played significant role in their analysis of reconstruction. Historical and comparative approach, used by them as method of viewing research, is still accepted as important tool for understanding the present cultural phenomena in relation to past. In this way, they have preserved a vast material on development of human culture and civilization of further inquiry and explorations for the coming generations. But inspite of all such valuable contributions made in the field of antropology in general and cultural and social anthropology in particular, their theories of cultural evolution have been subjected to many criticism. Major criticism levelled against them are as follows :

I. These evolutionists mostly tried to show independent evolution of culture stage

after stage or period after period in a sequence. Thus, their explanation was one sided.

This one sided analysis was their greatest weakness for which they were frequently criticised by other anthropologists in general and diffusionists in particular.

II. These evolutionists have accepted that origin of similar cultural traits was due to similar cause. This assumption of evolutionist is also a subject to criticism because human history is a witness that different cultures have originated in same geographical environment. If these scholars would have gone through more historical and archaeological evidences, they might have accepted their such mistake. It is true that each society has dissimilar geographical and other environmental conditions, which naturally influences the processes of cultural development. Then how it is possible that in ununiform environmental situations, the process of evolution was similar. Critiques believe that in different environmental condition, the processes of evolution also follow different ways and direction. For instance, the institution of polygeneous marriage originated due to plenty of women at a place, while on another place, it existed on account of social prestige and wealth.

III. The claim of these evolutionists, that mankind of world has passed through different stages or period of cultural development in a sequence, also does not stand true for all cultural or social groups. It can not be said saftely that the evolutionary sequences of economic development such as food gathering and hunting, domestication of plant and animal, introduction of agriculture, and setting of industry, were similar, for all societies. Later anthropological researches do not support this conclusion. For instance, practice of hunting and food fathering indicates the early stage of economic development, historically and archaeologically, but this stage of hunting and gathering is still existing among the societies belonging to other stages of economic development. Again we do not have sufficient evidence to refer to that in history of mankind there was a time, when men survived only on hunting. The survey of primitive world reveals that there are many tribes of America and Africa, which carry on agriculture but they have not passed through the stage of domestication of animal. It means that among them, the stage of agriculture

developed from hunting and gathering without following the evolutionary sequence of pastoralism. This indicates that the sequence of evolution can get broken by other existing situation. For example, in India the setting up of industries have made many tribals industrial labour, who led a life like hunter, gatherer and pastoral. In this way, they did not reach into a stage of agriculture, before reaching the stage of industrial labour.

In the same way, the sequence of technological developments— stone age, bronze age and iron age— do not appear true as for all societies of mankind. Though the evidences of technological developments in European countries throw sufficient light to believe that culture of mankind as a whole has passed through the successive periods of stone age, bronze age and iron age, but evidences gathered from African countries indicate that Africa witnessed the development of iron age after stone age. Uptil now, there is no proof available to refer to existence of copper age there. Such examples reveal clearly that evolutionary theory of cultural processes can not be limited in boundary of certain definite sequence.

- IV. The evolutionists are also criticised for adopting weak method of study. They all were arm-chair anthropologists, who never visited the field for actual observation of the phenomena, rather they were disinterested in fieldwork. They relied upon the data gathered by travellers and missionaries and never showed interest in testing the reliability of data before arriving at a conclusion. They had become so extremist in establishing their theory of cultural evolutionism that wherever they observed similarities in culture traits, they tried to place them in a sequence.
- V. Evolutionists were so biased with their preconceptions that they forgot the theory of diffusion or migration of culture traits. In other words, they overlooked that culture traits diffuse or migrate from one place to another. Culture is dynamic not static, which is an important characteristic of culture. Diffusionists have tried to show that culture growth is also caused by the process of diffusion. As culture is imitated, when groups having different cultures come in contact with each other, they imitate culture traits of each other. As a result of this, the diffusion of culture takes places at distant places.

VI. Golden-wiser, an American diffusionist, criticised evolutionists not only because they ignored the significance of diffusion in cultural development, but, at the same time, the classical evolutionists also neglected the importance of discovery or invention. According to him, culture is an invention or discovery of human beings through social needs. Historical evidences make it clear that evolution in culture does not take place in that sense in which the evolutionists have used. It is tradition of society which makes a culture living. Many generations join their hands and shoulder in its continuation. Each generation adds new knowledge etc. in the developmental process of culture. Whether this processes of cultural development would be termed as evolution? If it is, it cannot be denied that evolution means only change in form, but also in quality. Qualitative change is possible through creative processes, whose expression can be found in social invention or discovery. For qualitative change in cultural form, he does not believe in psychic unity, but it was possible by way of diffusion of invented traits.

In spite of these severe criticism, evolutionism is now no longer unfashionable. Though much modern theories differ from earlier ones, but the relevance of their over all approach is generally recognised.

POSITIVE CONTRIBUTIONS OF CLASSICAL EVOLUTIONISTS

Although on the basis of empirical researches of 20th century, classical evolutionary scheme has been criticised, but their following contributions cannot be forgotten :

1. Anthropology as a 'science of culture' and separate discipline of study was established by the greatest pioneer E.B. Tylor in 1884 at Oxford University, London.
2. They developed the concept of culture and advanced the principle that culture and race must not be confused in studying the lifeways of human society.
3. They distinguished those subdivisions of culture, which we call today, as aspects and showed their usefulness in studying culture.
4. They established the principle of continuity and orderly development of culture,

a principle, that must underly any realistic approach to the analysis of cultural dynamics.

5. By analysing and comparing the cultures of the universe, they have provided rich material to cultural anthropology for the study and further explorations.

1.6 NEO-EVOLUTIONARY SCHOOL

Classical or unilinear evolutionists had to face rough criticism by 20th century diffusionists and relativists, on the ground of empirical data. Diffusionists emphasised upon the need of cultural diffusion which brought about similarities in cultures of the world. They disfavoured the idea of 'psychic unity' and 'parallel inventions' on the argument that basically men were uninventive, but they had limitless capacity to adapt and imitate, which is possible either by diffusion or by migration. Historical particularists or cultural relativists emphasised upon divergent trends in culture of a area or sub-area. They were not ready to accept unilinear sequences of cultural evolution, in which cultural diversities were not denied, but they were of mere secondary importance.

In order to remove those shortcomings, Neo-evolutionary scheme was proposed by Neo-evolutionists. Among Neo-evolutionists, Leslie White and Julian Steward of America and V. Gordon Childe of Britain, occupy most significant place in reviving evolutionary theory. Neo-evolutionists believe that all weaknesses of classical evolutionary theory can be solved, if it is accepted that culture develops not in unilinear sequence but in the form of *Parabolic curve*. According to parabolic curve theory of cultural evolution, a social institution is born in specific form in the early stage. It, then, gradually develops in entirely different form in different direction. It again moves towards original form but in a new developed form. For instance, the institution of property was born in the form of communal ownership or communism. In Medieval time, the common ownership took the form of private ownership. Today, again the concept of common ownership through state has developed. Similarly, in the beginning there was lack of clothes and men used to remain naked. Invention of clothes made it possible to cover the entire body. But in present time, the adoption of fashion is compelling to remain half-naked. This sequence can also be observed in the field of sex-relation. In early stage, there was sexual promiscuity, in course of time monogamy

came into existence, and again in present time, arguments are made in favour of sex-freedom. These examples can be shown by graph as follow

Third Stage

- 1. Common ownership
- 2. Nudism
- 3. Sex-freedom

Second Stage

- 1. Individual ownership
- 2. Body covered with cloth
- 3. Monogamy

- 1. Common ownership
- 2. Shortage of cloth
- 3. Sexual promiscuity

First Stage

EVOLUTION IN PARABOLIC CURVE

This is particularly true for the western countries. But societies in east will also follow it.

1.7 WHAT IS DIFFUSION

Nineteenth century evolutionists were well aware that a full understanding of culture required explanations of both their similarities and differences. Although not all their interpretations were alike, it was held in general that differences existed because of unequal pace of march of progress, but degree of outside influence and adaptation to environment were not neglected. They were of views that similarities emerged because of mental uniformity caused mankind to react roughly in the same way to uniform environment, added, however, by the development of progress of mind. Cultures in the same stage of development were not related, because a greater or

lesser part of the cultural inventory was discovered freely. When uniform traits appeared in the area far apart and without historical contact, it was accepted that they had evolved separately. Thus, similar parallel inventions were the strongest proof of 'psychic unity'.

Though they recognised that diffusion was an undeniable fact, but none of the evolutionists even maintained that culture traits were more often invented than imitated. Diffusion does not necessarily deny evolution, but it certainly interferes in the neatness of evolutionary schemes.

During 20th century, several schools of thought appeared in Britain, America and Germany that claimed to be anti-evolutionist, but in fact they were more critical of 'psychic unity'. They emphasised upon the idea that man was basically uninventive and thus, important inventions were made only once at a particular place, from where they spread through rest of the world by diffusion or migration. The difference between these two ideas is not always appreciated, but in fact they represent two different processes of cultural change. Diffusion is taking over of traits by imitation, while migration implies that culture carrier broke away from their original settlements and moved to other parts of the world taking their cultural inventory with them, but adapting it to new environmental conditions.

Thus, cultural diffusion is the process by which culture traits, discovered or invented at one place or society, are spread directly or indirectly to other societies or places. Although, the exact origin of specific cultural traits is difficult to trace, but diffusion of a trait can fairly be traced. Historically, more is known about diffusion than origin of culture.

In history, certain societies or places have served as centres from where cultural traits have spread to other parts of the world. These centres of cultural diffusion were more progressive societies and had developed rapidly by invention and discovery. Egypt was, for many centuries a cultural centre from where culture traits in the field of arts and political organisation spread to north-west in Europe and to east as far India. Subsequently, Rome was a great cultural centre, from where Roman law spread in most countries of Europe. In Asia, Chinese middle kingdom was, from early times, a dominant cultural centre, from where culture traits spread throughout the Asiatic main

land. From India, Buddhist Religion diffused in other Asiatic countries. About 4th century B.C., Western Europe became the dominant cultural centre. At present, United States and other developed countries are exporting its culture to other countries. Indian decimal system crossed to Arabia and Europe.

It may not, however, be supposed that the centres of cultural diffusion have always been the places of cultural development. In some cases, they have been mere a trader in culture than originator of culture. It deals with cultural migration. Thus, early Greeks were more trader in culture than originator of culture. In ancient time, when territory of India was extended up to Afghan, Kabul was an important centre of trade, where merchants of different countries used to meet and exchange their goods as well as ideas. The following factors are influential in process of diffusion :

- (i) Relation and communication
- (ii) Need for and desire for new traits
- (iii) Competition with old traits and their opposition
- (iv) Respect and recognition of those who bring new traits.

SCHOOLS OF DIFFUSION

Diffusionists have not shown unanimity on the question as to which was the place from where culture traits reached in other parts of the world. As a result of difference in their opinions, on this point, the diffusionists are divided into three schools namely.

- (i) British School of Diffusion
- (ii) German School of Diffusion
- (iii) American School of Diffusion

This division of schools also indicates the nationality of diffusionists. The division of school of diffusion and their followers are as follows :-

(I) British School of Diffusion

- (i) G.E. Smith
- (ii) W.J. Perry
- (iii) W.H.R. Rivers

(II) German School of Diffusion

- (i) F. Ratzel
- (ii) F. Graebner
- (iii) F.W. Schmidt

(III) American School of Diffusion

- (i) Franz Boas
- (ii) Clark Wissler
- (iii) A.L. Kioeber

- (i) British School of Diffusion :** British school of diffusion is also known as Pan-Egyptian school. This school came into being too late in the history of anthropology, but was first to disappear.

Elliot Smith was the founder of this school and W.J. Perry was his true follower. They are designated as extreme diffusionists and Egyptogist, because for them, Egypt was the only centre of culture from where culture traits diffused or migrated to real parts of the world. They went on popularising blindly that Egypt was the only culture cradle. They used both explanations, diffusion as well as migration, in context of Egypt as centre of culture.

- (ii) German School of Diffusion :** According to German diffusionists development of culture takes place not only at a particular place like Egypt, but it occurs at several different places at several times. This means that different cultural traits and cultural complexes originated independently or freely, at several parts of the earth, from where they are imitated or migrated to other places.

They were of view that discoveries of all things were not possible at the same time and at the same place, rather they were discovered at several places by several generations i.e. not at a particular place by same generation. Inventions and discoveries were continuous process. They held opinion that cultural traits or complexes developed at different places and reached into places of other parts by migration thus, they accepted the theory of diffusion as well as evolution both for the cultural development and growth.

German diffusionists opinioned that if different layers of cultural traits were

examined and analysed scientifically migration of different traits from different places could be identified easily. They further opined that different circles or districts developed at different places in different phases. Thus, each culture trait and complex had a circle or a district from where they migrated to other places, but it was not necessary that all traits or complexes might migrate all over the world. Migration of traits could be explained with the help of historical data. Spread of culture traits from one circle to another or from one district to another, their school is also known as “kulture kreise school” or “culture circle” or “culture district” school and culture historic school when diffusion of culture traits examined on the basis of historical fact.

(iii) American School of Diffusion : The founder of American School of diffusion was Fraz Boas. Clark Wissler and A. L. Kroeber were his follower. American Diffusionists were of view that empirical researches were evidence to refer to that give and take of culture traits and culture complex had taken place through the medium of transport and communication. This process of give and take, of cultural traits and cultural complexes was more prevalent among the cultural groups residing in close contact to each other. As culture is learnt, therefore it becomes easy to imitate and adapt culture traits or complex among the groups residing in close proximity. Thus, diffusion of culture traits and culture complexes takes place, which is a continuous process. American diffusionists were of opinion that every culture makes its own adaptation, therefore, the question that one progressed more than other becomes futile. American diffusionists explained why the diffusion takes place in the two ways.

- (i) The process of imitation causes diffusion of culture traits and complexes from one place to other or from one cultural group to another and
- (ii) Sometimes it looks easy to borrow some traits from cultural groups instead of inventing separately.

American diffusionists devised a methodology which is known as Culture Area Approach. They did not analyse cultural diffusion prevalent all over the world at the same time. Instead, they divided world into different cultural areas on

the basis of geographical regions and concluded that cultural groups residing in close geographical areas represent more uniformity than those residing in distant geographical region. Thus according to them, the concept of culture area reveals geographical area of cultural similarities.

1.8 CONDITIONS RELATED TO CULTURAL DIFFUSION

Diffusionists have explained some conditions and characteristics of cultural diffusion which are as follows :

1. Any cultural group will adopt a culture trait of other cultural group, only when it would be meaningful and useful either economically or socially or both.
2. In course of diffusion, culture trait may not remain in original form, but changes in it can take place due to different environmental situations.
3. Process of diffusion of culture traits always follow from high culture to low culture or developed culture to underdeveloped culture.
4. Process of diffusion may create culture change in groups adopting culture of other groups. Sometimes, borrowed culture traits get assimilated easily, but sometimes, they are responsible for many changes.
5. There are some obstacles in cultural diffusion, such as lack of transport and communication facilities, ocean, river, mountain, desert etc.

1.9 CRITICISM

- As British diffusionists were anti-evolutionists but their views that inventiveness was rare and similarities in culture could be explained by imitation only. It is true that every cultural group borrows more than it invents. But this does not mean that inventions are made only once and at a particular place and because of this they are labelled as extreme diffusionists.
- They considered only Egypt as the centre of culture from where rest parts of the world borrowed the same culture.
- They emphasised only on diffusion and culture traits not on culture complex.
- They ignored non-material aspects of culture while explaining diffusion.

— Because of narrow scope of diffusion, they disappear force from the scene of British Authropology.

ASK YOURSELF

- Q.1 What is evolution? What are the basic postulates of Evolutionary Scheme?
- Q.2 What is diffusion and what are the conditions related to cultural diffusion?
- Q.3 Give Tylor's & Morgan's contribution to the evolutionary school of thought.

STRUCTURE

- 2.1 Objectives
- 2.2 Introduction – Social Progress and Evolution
- 2.3 Characteristics of Progress
- 2.4 Development of the Concept of Progress
- 2.5 Differentiation between Evolution and Progress

1.1 OBJECTIVES

The main objective of this lesson is to equip you with :

- Meaning and Definitions of progress.
- Characteristics and Development of the concept of progress.
- How progress is different from Evolution.

2.2 INTRODUCTION – SOCIAL PROGRESS AND EVOLUTION

The idea of progress is rooted in the tradition of social evolution. It, in fact, includes the attributes of rationality, technological advancement, control over forces of nature and resolution of conflict between social groups. Comte (1877) and Spencer (1961) equated the notion of evolution with the idea of social progress. Industrial revolution has contributed a lot to social progress.

Progress refers to a desirable change to a realization of the cherished values. When we speak of progress, we imply merely direction, but direction towards some final goal, some ideal predetermined destination. When social change occurs in the

desired way, it is called progress. Progress is a relative notion as it involves comparison of the present with the past state of affairs. However, evaluation of change is made on a certain common scale. Thus, only relative comparisons can give a fair idea of progress. The criteria of evaluation may be economic and technical achievements, cultural attributes, mental growth, etc. The easiest criteria are those of technical advancement. These include, for example, money economy and a technological system. However, there is a closer relationship between technological and cultural or social development. The total amount of energy production in a given society cannot be the sole basis of evaluation of progress. Such a view assumes that cultural progress is secondary to technological change. Change or progress in one area is, in fact, related to and dependent upon the other area. Change is a complex phenomenon.

The evolutionists, like Lewis Morgan and Herbert Spencer, consider every successive stage of human development as progress. Morgan (1984) considers the accumulation of inventions in the realm of technology as the determinant of social progress. Spencer (1961) stresses the growing complexity of organisation, a more elaborate division of labour, and an increase in the size of a society as the main criteria of progress. However, in social terms, progress cannot simply be treated as a phenomenon “from simple to complex”. Increasing complexity does not necessarily result in technical progress and higher efficiency. Complexity of caste, joint family and Hinduism have not been conducive to technological progress and social development. On the other hand, urbanisation and industrialisation have reduced the complexities of caste, family and religion by attacking their rigidities.

CRITERIA OF PROGRESS

A rigid division of labour is not necessarily a sign of progress as it may become a hindrance to progress. It reduces adaptability to different tasks and new technical devices because of narrow and extreme specialisation. In a competitive society, progress can be achieved by increased flexibility. The element of ideology is implicit in the notion of progress. We cannot accept the super organic nature of cultural forces. It is also not easy to accept supremacy of technological change because cultural change becomes subservient to it. Industrial progress may be noted in a specific society over a period of time. Because there are other accompanying adverse effects of such a

progress in the form of slums, exploitation, dehumanisation and exploitation of women and children. Industrial unrest has become a serious problem caused by faulty industrialisation.

One dimension of progress is that once positive gain is achieved, it continues to last. The centres of political power, technological know-how and cultural excellence become stable. This is a unilinear gradualist view, not supported by available historical evidence. Jan Romein (1974) mentions the 'skipping' phenomenon in human history as a general trend. There is evidence of shifting centres of human civilisation or political power. We know about the rise and fall of empires, civilisations, cities and centres of learning. Cyclical change is a widely accepted phenomenon. However, one must also reckon with the fact that a general worldwide trend towards progress has been noticed during the past seventy years and more.

Regression in a country, context or an aspect affects its counterparts elsewhere. Thus, Romein (ibid) puts forward two universally acceptable criteria of progress: (1) technological proficiency and (2) organisation expediency. Romein adds a third criterion also, that is evolution is as discontinuous process. Human evolution is, therefore, characterised by the skipping of phases and discontinuity. Romein talks of the 'dialectics of progress', that human history progresses in leaps and bounds. A society, which has achieved a high degree of perfection in a given direction, is not likely to have quick and rapid change again due to complacency and vested interests. Adjustment and stabilisation oppose fundamental change would occur where a sense of being underprivileged has become intense and the urge for emancipation has become very strong. In such situation, resistance to change is weak. Backwardness may act as an advantage in bringing about progress where a rapid advance in wages may act as a brake. This is what Romein calls the 'dialectics of progress'.

Romein's logic does not perhaps apply to the Indian situation. In general, India is considerably behind the countries of Europe, Japan, China and America in the scientific, technological and industrial fields. Within India, backward states, regions and districts have not shown much progress. The better off states and regions have achieved more than the weak ones. The same applies to groups, families and individuals. There is hardly any 'skipping' and 'discontinuity' as observed by Romein.

What we find today are substantial cumulative inequalities and concentration of wealth and power in a few hands.

Social - Progress is a social change in a desired or approved direction. In the earlier theories of biological evolution, the idea of Progress was closely associated with that of Evolution. The technological advance of the 19th century lead many philosophers and sociologists to conclude that the major trends of social-phenomenon made for social-progress. Later on, it has been proved that Social-Progress is different from social-evolution. Progress is development or evolution in a direction which satisfies rational criteria of value. In early modern times one of the most widely accepted notions of social-change was that of continuous progress. After evaluation the term "Progress" came in vogue, but soon it was realized to be an ethnocentric concept at best. Progress is always value-loaded term. The culminating (highest) Point of the Idea of Progress was reached towards the end of 20th century, No laws of progress had infact been scientifically established but the general idea of progress harmonized with notions of development that had become current during the period in science and philosophy.

DEFINITIONS

- (i) **Bury** defined progress as the belief that, "Civilization has moved, is moving and will move in a desirable direction" Although Bury has defined the term progress economically but such a definition does not serve the purpose well.
- (ii) Acc. to **Ginsberg**, "Progress is a development or evolution in a direction which satisfies rational criteria of value."
- (iii) Acc. to **Ogburn**, "Progress is a movement towards an objective, thought to be desirable by the general group for the visible future."
- (iv) **MacIver**, "By progress we imply not merely direction but direction towards some final goal, some destination determined ideally not simply by the objective consideration at work."

In simple words we can also says that progress indicates a change or an advance towards a desirable end."

So, it implies the progress is value-judgement. When ever the change is for the better for an upward trend, then there is progress. Progress always refers to the change that leads to human-happiness.

2.3 CHARACTERISTICS OF PROGRESS

- 1. Progress involves change :** There always occurs change in progress. There can be no progress without some or the other change.
- 2. Change is towards desired goal :** It is not true that all changes imply progress. A change can be called progress only when it fulfills or on the process of fulfilling the desired end. Progress should bring happiness.\
- 3. Progress is communal :** Progress from the sociological point of view is communal in nature. Here the progress or the welfare of the entire group or society in the desired direction is taken into consideration and not the happiness of an individual.
- 4. Progress is attached to the concept of value :** It is a value-loaded term. It is on the basis of our value system that we always decide whether a particular change implies progress or not. Our own values would tell us whether a change is taking us towards the goal fixed ideally or towards the desirable end or not.
- 5. Progress does not have a definite measuring rod :** The idea of progress is more subjective than objective. Because we don't have any objective means of measuring it. It even differs with people, further the same person's notion may undergo change with the lapse of time.
- 6. Progress has different interpretations :** Since the system of values differ from society to society and time to time with in the same society, the interpretation of progress also differ accordingly. Goals and ideals change from time to time and place to place and along with them the idea of progress also changes.

2.4. DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONCEPT OF PROGRESS

Historically speaking, as early as in the 17th century, Francis Bacon defended the

concept of change as continuous progress. In the 18th century, the French thinkers Turgot and Condorcet maintained that human society was gradually but constantly advancing towards desirability.

August Comte believed that the positive attitude to life itself was progressive. Herbert Spencer maintained that human society had been gradually progressing towards a better state. But he regarded it as an automatic process beyond the human control. He identified social progress with social evolution and said that the human society was inevitably moving towards ever greater heights of perfection. According to him, progress could not be affected by human engineering for it was determined by the cosmic forces.

The concept of progress was given greater importance during and after the Renaissance. After the American Revolution ushered in a new epoch of progress, the French Encyclopaedists began to preach the doctrine of progress and of human perfectability. American sociologist Lester F. Ward (1841-1915) was a strange believer and an advocate of social progress. His doctrine of Teleology or Telesis was not just philosophical, he related it to society-social Telesis.

The modern writers today speak of social progress though they do not have a single satisfactory explanation of the concept. They do not, of course, subscribe to the view that society gradually and inevitably moves to an ever higher state of perfection. They have almost abandoned the idea that society evolves in a linear fashion and in the direction of improvement.

‘Social progress’ is no doubt an abstract term. We may or may not agree that there is progress, but we cannot prove it. Progress is a reality which is immeasurable and undemonstrable. Anything that cannot be demonstrated and measured scientifically cannot be rejected socially. It is especially true in the case of social progress.

2.5. DIFFERENCE BETWEEN EVOLUTION AND PROGRESS

When one speaks of social-evolution, we refer to the emergence of certain institutions. The emergence of the institution may or may not be welcomed by the people. Evolution is merely change, the change may be for the better or the worse. But when one speaks of progress one implies not merely direction, but direction towards

some final goal, some destination: determined ideally. It is not logically necessary that evolutionary process should always move in the direction of progress. Hobhouse writes, “By evolution I mean any sort of growth, by social progress, the growth of social life in respect of those qualities to which human being can attach or can rationally attach values.

There are no limits to human progress. Have we progressed? To the question whether we are progressing or not or whether we are more cultured than our ancestors, no absolute answer can be given. ‘**Marx**’ advanced the thesis that progress was a law of society. Nothing could prevent the coming of communism where all men would share alike and all would be content. In those days progress was regarded as a ‘**cultural compulsion**’.

We have invented aeroplanes and other fast-moving mobiles, but does it bring more security of life? Our country is on the way to industrialization but does this bring health, happiness or peace of mind? Whether it really represents progress. In spite of the many technological achievements, big industries and imposing dams, the fact remains that in India the evils of unemployment, crime, violence and disease have not lessened. Thinkers like Mahatma–Gandhi and Aurobindo Ghosh have warned mankind against moral degeneration. But as stated above it is all a question of one’s standard of moral-value and outlook. If we believe that in India more people have now scope for development than before, then we may justly say that we have progressed. Nobody can deny that society have progressed in the case of technology. While considering social-progress it is well to note the time and place qualifications..

ASK YOURSELF

- Q.1 Define Progress and enlist the characteristics of progress.
- Q.2 Trace the development of the Concept of Progress.
- Q.3 Differentiate between Evolution and Progress.

STRUCTURE

- 3.1 Objective
- 3.2 Introduction
- 3.3 Concept of Development
- 3.4 Changing Conceptions of Development
- 3.5 Development as Redistribution with Growth
- 3.6 Development as Improvement in Life Chances
- 3.7 Development as Liberation from dependency and Exploitation.
- 3.8 The Missing Dimension
- 3.9 Concept of Transformation
- 3.10 Transformation of societies with the changing of their mode of production and their class structure
- 3.11 Transformation with respect to the structure and function of the family

3.1 OBJECTIVE

The main objective of this unit is to equip you with :

- Concept of Development
- Changing conception of Development
- Concept of Transformation

- Transformation of societies with respect to change of their mode of production.
- Transformation with respect to the structure and function of the family.

3.2 INTRODUCTION

Few terms are as much in vogue today as is development, yet few are as vaguely defined as this. Almost every writing on development poses the question “what constitutes development?” and leaves it at that, or at best makes a hazy attempt to grapple with it only to leave the reader as puzzled, if not more, as before. Much of the confusion seems to stem from the multiplicity of disciplinary perspectives, differing ideological premises, varying usages by international and national development agencies, and above all, the changing connotation of the term itself .

Like the idea of progress, the concept of development refers to a change in the desired direction. The notion of development is a recent phenomenon, where as the idea of progress dates back to the era of enlightenment and industrial revolution. Development is contextual and relative in nature, whereas progress is considered general and based on rationalistic considerations. Yogendra Singh (1974) refers to development as a strategy of planned social change in a direction which is considered desirable by the members of the society. He writes: “The notion of development may, therefore differ from society to society based on its socio-cultural background and political and geographical situation.” According to Singh, “development is a composite concept.” The development of a society includes progress in various fields, including trade, agriculture, industry, education, health, etc. It also includes the welfare of weaker sections, women and children, sick, unemployed, old people and minorities. Various policies and programmes aim at the development of rural and urban people, SCs and STs, women, agricultural labourers and industrial workers. Thus, development is a value-loaded concept, specific to the socio-cultural and economic needs of a given society, region and people.

L.T Hobhouse and his associates(1915) added the element of qualification to change. Four criteria of such a change(development) are increases in scale, efficiency, mutuality and freedom. These criteria are basically applicable to the notion of biological

evolution. The criterion of scale is thus basic to development, hence development is unilinear. The criterion of social differentiation has also been attributed to development. Development in this way refers to a fuller growth or evolution of a social phenomenon. Man's control over his environment in one such example of development. Besides these general connotations of the idea of development, there are two specific criteria: (1) evolution of society from the primitive or agricultural stage to industrial society; and (2) economic changes. These aspects imply a growth of knowledge and man's increased control over his environment. In this sense, social development is synonymous with social progress.

MYRDAL'S VIEWS ON DEVELOPMENT

Gunnar Myrdal, in his study *Asian Drama* (1968), observes that quest for rationality is the basis of development in economic and social fields. Myrdal (1968) means by development - what he calls the 'modernisation ideals'. He writes: "Development means improvement of the host of undesirable conditions in the social system that have perpetuated a state of underdevelopment." Development can be brought about through planning, which is a rationally coordinated system of policy measures.

India has a social system consisting of a great number of conditions that are causally interrelated, where a change in one will cause change in others. Such an interdependence of different parts of the system and conceiving of the system as a totality based on such relationships are the central points of Myrdal's perspective. The change in one condition which brings about a change in other conditions is known as 'circular causation'. Another implication of such an explanation of change is the idea of a 'vicious circle'. Vicious circles are found in the context of poverty, illiteracy, malnutrition, bad health, unemployment, etc. For example, if unemployment is not controlled, all other problems would remain. A proper equilibrium is needed to get out of the vicious circles in various social and economic fields.

Myrdal classifies the conditions of development into six broad categories: (1) output and income; (2) conditions of production; (3) levels of living; (4) attitudes towards life and work; (5) institutions; and (6) policies. The first three refer to economic factors. Categories four and five represent the non-economic ones. Category six is a mixture of the first three and the latter two. The interdependence

of these categories does not imply the precedence of anyone category over the others.

Myrdal is a strong advocate of the institutional approach to social change and development. His emphasis is on the understanding of the people's desire for development or of the articulate ones from amongst them. The desire for development includes changes in institutions, attitudes towards life and work (for example, the theory of 'karma'), levels of living, conditions of production, productivity and, income. In a way, all these conditions are social. An upward change in anyone of these conditions implies, according to Myrdal, an upward movement of other conditions, and hence of the whole system. However, a change may take place in other conditions independently, or it could affect the one which has already affected them. Thus, the independent value of change as well as the ability of change in one condition to effect change in other conditions are basic to the conception of causal interdependence in development.

Development has acquired currency in India as a very significant concept of change in a desired direction. Community Development Programmes were launched in 1952 for achieving an all-round development of the countryside. The concept of rural development has become popular at the governmental level because of various schemes, including the Integrated Rural Development Programme (IRDP). We hear a lot about the role of women in development. The development of women, weaker sections, economy, polity, and cultural institutions congenial to national integration has been receiving priority from the Government of India. There are policies and programmes for the development of industry and agriculture. Besides economic development, new political and social institutions responsive to economic progress have also been promoted. Development is, in fact, a composite phenomenon as it covers all aspects of human life.

3.3 CONCEPT OF DEVELOPMENT

It will be of some interest to trace the career of the concept of development to see how its meaning has changed over the years. In the works of early social scientists the term development was used to refer to the course of social evolution. Hobhouse, for instance, defined it in terms of the increase in the scale and efficiency of social organization. Implied in this perspective was the metaphor of

growth. Development was thus conceived of as organic, immanent, directional, cumulative and irreversible. Also it entailed the idea of structural differentiation and increasing complexity.

With the rise of the industrial system and the emergence of capitalism there cropped up new western development thinking. The central element of this new thinking was the idea of *economic growth*, measured in terms of growth of GNP. This shift in the meaning of development gained further impetus in the middle of the present century when so many countries of the third world attained freedom from colonial rule and confronted the problem of economic reconstruction. Thus the term development acquired a strong economic connotation, so strong as to become synonymous with economic growth. The works authored by Rostov and Hoselitz among others bear ample testimony to this shift in the meaning of development.

Closely on the heels of the western capitalist thought followed the rise of the Marxian perspective in development analysis, calling into question the simple GNP growth conception of development. The GNP conception came under fire primarily for its lack of concern for distribution. Accordingly, development got redefined as redistribution with growth.

A more serious challenge to the GNP conception came from those who underscored the lack of correspondence between economic growth and the satisfaction of basic human needs. This resulted in the re-interpretation of development as an endeavour to provide for the basic needs of people. The element of key importance in this perspective is the fulfillment of the *basic needs* of people, measured in terms of the provision of necessary services or an increase in the life chances of people.

Given the limitations of resources at the disposal of developing countries to fulfil the basic needs of their people, attention came to be focussed on the dependency of the less developed on the more developed countries. This led to a reconceptualization of development as liberation from dependency as well as exploitation, measured in terms of enhanced opportunities for the deprived masses to obtain their just share of resources.

In attempting a review of the above outlined conceptions of development the present paper seeks to draw attention to a missing dimension of development, i.e., the socio-cultural dimension. It seeks to bring in to sharp relief an overly materialistic or physical bias of the prevailing development thought and show how this thought is oblivious to the socio-cultural dimensions of development. An attempt is also made to reformulate the concept of development in terms of its sociocultural concerns along with that of the material and physical.

3.4 CHANGING CONCEPTIONS OF DEVELOPMENT

Since the earlier conception of development as social evolution is of no more than mere academic importance, its review may be well be spared. Let us instead examine the current conceptions of development.

DEVELOPMENT AS ECONOMIC GROWTH

Influenced by the so-called “Harrod-Domar” model, economists earlier tended to identify development with economic growth, as measured by the growth of gross national product (GNP) or of per capita income. It is not uncommon to find even today in the reports of international development agencies like World Bank a table showing the nations of the world arranged in order of GNP or per capita income.

Generally implied in this view of economic development is the idea of structural changes in the economy reflected in the sectorial shifts from agriculture to industry or from the primary sector to the secondary and tertiary-sector. The development of the labour force is also supposed to change correspondingly. Investment in skill formation, energy production and technological innovation forms the backbone of such a view of development.

Given the technological backwardness of underdeveloped countries and the lack of resources for investment, this view of development assigns a key role to imported capital and technology in the development of third world countries. Without ruling out the possibility of highly skewed income distribution in the initial phase of growth, it envisages every possibility of eventual trickle down effect.

This then is a highly condensed version of development as economic growth.

Having enjoyed mounting importance in the fifties and sixties, it has been facing rough weather since the seventies. It has been criticized for its crude methods of estimating GNP, the inadequacy of GNP growth as development, for overstressing industrialization, and for concealing dependency and the assumption of an automatic trickle down effect.

Because of the rough methods of estimating GNP, the simple identification of development with GNP growth disregards what Singer (1981) calls “quality of GNP.” “An increase in armament production is treated for GNP analysis in exactly the same way as improvement in the nutrition of young children. No distinction is made between humanly favourable and humanly irrelevant or unfavourable increments to GNP”.

Then there is the question of the distribution of GNP. The GNP of a country may grow, while the majority of the people may experience even greater hardship. This may well happen when the growth of GNP is accompanied by a more unequal income distribution which is what usually happens. An all-important question to ask therefore is whose income grows with the growth of GNP and whose does not?

Further, there is no necessary positive relationship between GNP growth and the improvement in the life chances of people. Many countries with a high per capita income give a poor account of themselves in respect to the life chances of their people while many with a low per capita income give evidence of better life chances. For instance, Abu Dhabi has an annual per capita income of 825,000, yet its infant mortality rate is higher than countries like Sri Lanka, Guyana and China that have per capita income of 8300, 8720, and 8300 respectively. This shows that an increase in wealth may not always mean improvement in the life chances of the masses. This point is well brought out in a seminar paper published by the Washington-based Overseas Development Council which argues that “the traditional measures of national economic progress—GNP—cannot very satisfactorily measure the extent to which the human needs of individuals are being met.... There is no automatic relationship between any particular level or rate of growth of GNP and improvement in such indicators as life expectancy, death rates, infant mortality and literacy”. No less problematic is the assumption of a sectoral

shift from agriculture to industry. It may well have been a characteristic feature of the development of early developers but not so of developing nations today. Indeed according to some, it is the agricultural miracle in the U.S.A. which made that country great. As for the developing nations, Israel is well-known for its breakthrough in agricultural development in spite of infertile land. More recently, even countries like Jamaica with all its difficulties of terrain have begun to point hope on agriculture for development.

The strategy of imported capital and technology for development has its own risks. First, foreign aid without strings is hard to come by. Secondly, dependence on foreign aid entails the possibility of political and cultural dependence too. Thirdly, the idea of economic dependence negates the idea of economic self-reliance which by any standard is the true measure of economic development. One has therefore to take this prescription with a pinch of salt.

Finally, the assumption of an automatic trickle-down effect is untenable in the light of the experience of developing countries. It just does not work that way unless so directed by deliberate policies and programmes. Given the structural inequalities and class contradictions in underdeveloped countries, the benefits of economic growth have generally remained concentrated in a few monopoly houses and have not trickled down to the vast majority of the people.

The message of this critique is not that economic growth is not essential for development, but that economic growth alone is not enough. There is a lot else to development including the distribution of GNP and the quality of life of a society to which we will get back later. For the present it remains to be noted that the concerns of economic development have broadened in recent years. By about the mid 1970's the focus of development shifted from the growth of GNP to the reduction of poverty. Accordingly, the concept of economic development got enlarged to refer to economic equity and self-reliance along with economic growth.

3.5 DEVELOPMENT AS REDISTRIBUTION WITH GROWTH

Realizing the limitations of economic growth as a measure of development, many a serious analyst has redefined the scope of economic development in terms of redistribution with growth or a trinity of economic growth, equity and self-

reliance. Indicators have been devised to measure each of the three development objectives. The principal indicators of economic growth, are the rates of increase of GNP and per capita GNP, together with separate estimates of the rates of growth of the two major goods-producing sectors : agriculture and industry. The equity objective is held to comprise of the equality of current income and employment opportunities with their indicators as follows : (a) the degree of equality in the overall distribution of income class; (b) the differential between average levels of living in urban and rural areas; (c) the dispersion of average levels of living among the different regions of a country; (d) the range of incomes accruing to people working within an economic enterprise, from the highest paid executive or manager to the lowest paid worker; and (e) the extent to which employment opportunities are available to the (potentially) working population, as well as the adequacy of provisions made for the unemployed and the under-employed. Finally, the indicators of economic self-reliance of a nation are : (a) the extent to which the control of productive enterprise is exercised by nationals; (b) the extent to which the country has remained free of foreign exchange problems and foreign debt; (c) the extent to which the country has been able to do without foreign aid; and (d) the extent to which the country has developed an independent technological base for economic activity.

This conception of development is different in some very important respects from the GNP growth conception of development. First, in that it envisages economic growth without external dependence. This is evident from the premium that it puts on self-reliance. Thus it rejects the dependent capitalist development paradigm which remains an integral part of the conventional economic growth paradigm. Secondly, and more importantly, it lends no credence to the assumption of an automatic trickle-down effect; instead it places an accent on planned redistribution leading to the diminution of economic disparities. Finally, it acknowledges the importance of agriculture for economic development without at the same time under-rating the contribution of the industrial sector. This is in line with the development experience of many developing nations.

This enlarged version of economic development is no doubt an improvement over the conventional conception—only that doesn't seem easy of realization. To

be sure, economic self-reliance is the true measure of development. But given the skewed distribution of world resources such that only one country, with barely 6 per cent of the total population of the world, controls more than 36 per cent of all the natural resources under the sun, one wonders whether economic self-reliance can ever be achieved by hundreds of underdeveloped countries without effective redistribution of world resources. Furthermore, given the structure of powerful vested interests within each developing country, one can never be too sure whether existing economic disparities can be eliminated at all without effective state regulation. The nature of state in most developing countries being what it is, i.e., the class state, nothing much can be expected of it by way of effective reduction in disparities. It therefore takes a totalitarian state to achieve some measure of economic equity. But this alternative has its own cost as freedom is the obvious causality. And many of us would not like to pay that cost.

Another problem with this conception is that of the strain between the twin objectives of growth and redistribution. In some ways distribution tends to impede growth. Take the case of land reforms, for instance. An issue which is being seriously debated in developing countries like India and Jamaica is that of the viable size of land for economic growth. It is feared that the redistribution of land among the landless labour and the small and marginal farmers without due regard for farm size may prove counter-productive for growth. The two development objectives are thus difficult to reconcile.

Finally, the proposed indicators of economic equity also leave something to be desired. These are concerned with income differentials and levels of living only and do not so much as touch on the redistribution of resources. Again, even so, while these seek to gauge the extent of regional and rural-urban disparities, the disparities between ethnic groups, status groups and sexes go unnoticed. But these can always be devised and hence do not detract from the value of the concept. The hard nuts to crack are the points pertaining to the skewed distribution of world resources and the structures of vested interests.

Because of some of these practical limitations of the possibility of redistribution, there emerged another conception of development with its focus

on basic human needs. To be precise, this may indeed be regarded as the first ever alternative to the GNP conception of development, for the emphasis on redistribution represents essentially an extension of, or at best a corrective to the conventional conception of development as economic growth. The beginnings of the basic needs conception of development may be traced to the UNO's development programme as well as the development approach of such other international agencies as ILO and the Overseas Development Council.

3.6 DEVELOPMENT AS IMPROVEMENT IN LIFE CHANCES

A look at the publications and programmes of international development agencies makes it clear that they view development as an endeavour to provide for the basic needs of people. Declaring that "the ultimate purpose of development is to provide increasing opportunities to all people for a better life" the United Nations maintain that "it is essential to expand and improve facilities education, health, nutrition, housing, social welfare, and to safeguard the environment". The UNICEF's development policy focusses on the provision of daily needs such as safe water, nutritious food, vaccination, sanitation, basic education and relief of women's drudgery. Similarly, the ILO called for production plans on the basis of the basic needs of the people, though without neglecting the needs of the modern sector.

All this goes to show how development has acquired a different connotation with the change in emphasis from economic growth to the provision of basic human needs. As an operative reality, it now refers to all those projects launched by any agency—international, national or voluntary—which peek to provide for the basic needs of people including those designed for select target groups like weaker sections, the poor and landless, small and marginal for All (WHO), Food for Work (India), Housing for Poor (Jamaica) are some of the examples. What are some of the operational indicators of this new conception of development? Broadly two types of indicators can be discerned from the existing literature : a scale of social services and the improvement in life chances. One of the ways to gauge the fulfilment of basic needs is to focus on the provision and utilization of services in such fields as health and nutrition, housing and education. In the field of health,

for instance, the operational indicators have to do with the provisions of medical care, i.e., the number of hospitals, primary health centres, and doctors per 100,000 population. Similarly, indicators of nutrition are : the extent of availability of safe drinking water, calories intake and protein consumption per capita per day. The indicators pertaining to housing are : the number of persons to a room, the number of dwelling units to the number of houses. The indicators in respect to education are : the number of educational institutions of various levels, primary and secondary enrolment at the third level, the student teacher ratio at various levels, university degree holders per 1,000,000 population, and the adult literacy rate. Obviously it is not an exhaustive but rather an illustrative account of the type of indicators comprising scale of services.

The indicators of life chances have to do with the effects of these services. Some indicators are life expectancy, death rates, infant mortality and literacy. Together, these constitute the “physical quality of life index” (PQLI), so says the Overseas Development Council. The mechanics of the index are simple. Life expectancy, death rates, infant mortality and literacy are each rated on a scale of 1 to 100. The most favourable country gets 100, the least, 1.

The results of this index call into question the merit of GNP. As many as eight developed countries supposedly “poorer” than the United States in GNP outrank it in PQLI. More pronounced anomalies appear within the Third World countries. For instance, countries with relatively high GNPs, like Abu Dhabi, Iran and Kuwait are outscored on the PQLI by countries with GNPs like Cuba and Sri Lanka. South Korea is cited as a success story in GNP growth but the life expectancy there is lower than in Sri Lanka although per capita income in South Korea is now more than five times that of Sri Lanka.

Given the widespread poverty and scarcity in the third world countries, it makes sense to conceptualize development as an endeavour towards meeting the basic needs of people. But the question is how to meet the basic needs of people in view of the paucity of resources at the disposal of underdeveloped countries as well as the limitation of funds with the international development agencies. Piecemeal development projects launched by UNICEF or World Bank may help

meet some of the needs of some people in select sites, but cannot cope with the needs of the masses in general. The success stories of development projects sponsored by voluntary agencies are few and far between.

Turning to operational indicators, measuring development in terms of a scale of services leaves much to be desired. The stress on the volume of services to the neglect of their distribution quality and western orientation renders it particularly problematic. A glance at any scheme of indicators devised in terms of services makes it at once clear that it is concerned with aggregates rather than entity. Who benefit from these services cannot be known from the aggregates unless one cares to probe into their break-up. Enrolment at various levels of education, for instance, tells us nothing about the class background of those enrolled. Hence, it remains an inadequate measure. The question of the quality of service is not so much as raised, let alone examined. What counts is the number of educational institutions. Not a wink of attention is paid to question of the quality of education. The same is true with medical care. It is the number of hospitals or primary health centres that seems to matter, not the quality of medical care, let alone the standard of cleanliness and hygiene in these institutions.

A more serious problem is posed by the given western orientation of these services. Nowhere else is this more glaring than in the field of health and medicine. The allopathic system rules the roost even where it is not appropriate. One story from Egypt recounts how the use of 10-cent packages of salts succeeded in treating diarrhoea and reducing infant mortality rate to half where injections or intravenous feeding taught at western medical school failed. Another story from South America further exposes the limitations of western medical procedures. Colombian pediatricians had been trained, western fashion, that the remedy for low birthweight babies was to place them in incubators. But how many Colombian villages have incubators. Dr. Edgar Rey devised an alternative. Low birth-weight babies are “packed” close to their mother’s breasts. Where, the baby’s temperature, the critical problem, is regulated by the mother’s own body. And instead of being bottle-fed, the “packed” baby can feed in small amounts as often as it likes. The results were dramatic. Earlier, all babies weighing less than 2.2 pounds died : now, three-quarters of them are saved. This clearly shows that expensive western-type

medical practices, which dominate the existing indicators of development, can be inappropriate and that there are other ways of improving health of people. Similar illustrations can be advanced to show the inadequacy of indicators pertaining to other domains

The operationalization of development in terms of the improvement in life chances has its own shortcomings. First, it begs the question : improvement in whose life chances. The life expectancy of the people of the higher socio-economic strata may go up, while the lower class people remain unaffected. The literacy rate among the better-off may go up while the poor continue to remain illiterate. Once again the same problem of distribution.

A more basic limitation of this construct is that it restricts development to improvement in the physical quality of life only. How about psychological the quality of life, the social quality of life, the cultural quality of life and so on? What is the justification for limiting development to only the physical quality of life? Is it that the physical quality of life is more important than the social and cultural? Or, is it that physical quality of life is amenable to measurement while social and cultural are not? In either case, the assumption remains questionable.

What use is an increase in life chances if the psychological quality of life is deplorable as is the case with many so-called developed countries which have much higher rates of mental illness and psychopathic perversities? What use in the increase in life chances if the social quality of life is eroded by alienation and social aberration? What use is an increase in life chance if the cultural quality of life is marked by the emergence of psychodelic cultures? What use is an increase in life chances if man begins to lose his quality of humanness and is often treated as a mere instrument of production?

It is not the intent of this critique to under rate the importance of basic needs or of improvement in life chances as a measure of development. The point rather is that it is a woefully inadequate view of development, crassly materialistic and grossly physical.

At any rate the basic needs approach seems to have run its course. It has now come to mean service delivery to the target groups in selected areas in various

countries: It has almost lost its original clan of poverty eradication and employment generation.

Without having any quarrel with the goal of development as fulfilment of basic human needs the scholars of Marxian persuasion reject this conception for following the strategy of the conventional capitalist paradigm of development. As an alternative, they propose to define development as the liberation from dependency and exploitation. Let us take a close look at it.

3.7 DEVELOPMENT AS LIBERATION FROM DEPENDENCY AND EXPLOITATION

Following a dialectical perspective, it has been argued by a number of scholars that the underdevelopment of the Third World is a result of the development of the First World. Scholars like, Paul Baran, Andre Gunder Frank and Samir Amin have variously elaborated the above thesis by tracing the dialectics of development and underdevelopment from the period of merchant capitalism through colonialism to neo-colonialism. Advancing the “centre-periphery” thesis, Andre Gunder Frank (1907), for instance, observes that the centre (colonial power) directly exploited the periphery (colony) in colonial times and developed at the expenses of the periphery. In the neo-colonial phase, he pins down unequal exchange as the root cause of underdevelopment in the periphery. In the international context, thus, development implies liberation from dependency on an unequal exchange. This calls for drastic changes in the relationship among nations, particularly between the development and developing. Hence the call for a New International Economic Order and the relevance of the recommendations of the Brandit Commission Report.

Extending the centre-periphery thesis to the national context, Frank maintains that the national structures are less unequal. Just as there are more developed (centre) and less developed (periphery) nations in the world there are dominant and dominated classes within each nation. Development in the national context therefore means the liberation of the masses from the dependence on dominant classes. Such a liberation implies the restructuring of class and power relations in any individual country.

More recently, Kim has articulated such a conception of development. He defines it as that type of structural transformation which involves the alteration of a society's resource allocation or distribution. For the purposes of operationalization he proposes the concept of structural flexibility as a measure of development. By structural flexibility he means "the degree to which the structure of society allows the deprived and alienated majority not only to demand their just (or equal, ideally if possible) share of resources but also to actually obtain such goals". Accordingly, as long as "the structure of society changes in the direction that enhances the opportunity for the deprived mass to obtain a greater share of resources, that structure is in the process of development".

Such a change in the structure of society presupposes a measure of conscientization and politicization of the people, particularly of the alienated and deprived masses. Clearly, this concept of development is premised upon the analysis of class conflict both in the domestic and international contexts. Self reliance rather than dependence on external aid and assistance is suggested as the proper path of development.

This concept is valuable insofar as it picks on the reality of dependency as the main problem of development, but it is vulnerable in that it stands on a slippery ground. Given the complexities of the world system and the fact that developed countries should not like to abdicate, or even share, the gains of development with the underdeveloped, it is a fall order to expect a drastic egalitarian restructuring of their relationships with the underdeveloped. No such radical readjustment seems to be in sight in spite of noisy dialogue between the north and south.

Equality and social justice are the king pins of this conception of development. If experience is any guide, it is not possible to be very optimistic where equality and social justice are concerned in most countries. One finds that even in states which came into existence on the promise of equality and social justice, the experience is that they become as concerned about the distribution of power and privileges, as their predecessors. Others have paid only lip service to these values but failed to liberate certain chronically disadvantaged groups within their societies.

Furthermore, there is the problem of the lack of freedom and that of alleged political repression in socialist societies which are implied in this conception as models of developed societies. Given the centralized political power, any dissent attracts wrath of the powers that be. That is the reason why M. N. Roy, who participated in the socialist revolution of as many as four countries, describes the political machinery in socialist states as ‘dictatorial’.

The notion of “structural flexibility” as a measure of development is rather vague. What it implies is the idea of bargaining through conflict on the part of the alienated and deprived majority. But this majority is not always a homogenous group. It comprises of so many heterogeneous groups, some of which are well organized, some less organized, and some unorganized. It may well be that structure of a society allows the well organized groups to demand and obtain their just share of resources, ignoring other groups. Will that be or not be a measure of “structural flexibility”? In short, it leaves the operational indicators of “structural flexibility” unspecified which in turn renders this measure imprecise.

Above all, this conception of development remains basically economic notwithstanding the use of such categories as equality and social justice. This is evident from the fact the dependency is defined in terms of an unequal exchange and that development is viewed as a structural change involving an alteration of resource allocation or distribution.

3.8 THE MISSING DIMENSION

From the above review of the conceptions of development it is possible to glean some of the dominant features of the current thinking on development. First, it seems to draw heavily upon the western experience of development and tend to project achievements of the west in economic growth and material advancement as ideals of development for the Third World countries. Accordingly, the economic or material dimension seems to constitute the dominant concern of the current development thought.

Secondly, in the context of developing countries, development thought, has taken on a pronounced concern for the basic needs of people and their life

chances. The stress once again on the physical dimension of human existence.

Thirdly, the present development thought seems to have become a prisoner of the two prevailing theoretical paradigms—functional and Marxian—or, ideological camps—capitalist and socialist. Their differences notwithstanding, what they shall in common is the centrality of economic and material concern of development. In both the paradigms the goal of development are more or less the same, i.e., economic growth and poverty eradication, however, their paths of development are different. If one accords primacy to growth or increase in life chance the other insists on redistribution or liberation from dependence. The defining element remain economic, material or physical anyway.

Yet another feature of the conceptual thought on development is that it is constrained by limitations of operationalization. Economic, material and physical dimensions are easy to operationalize while social and cultural are not. That is the reason why economic, material and physical indicators dominate the scene. At any rate, the tendency of relying heavily on quantifiable indicators has set severe limits on our development thought. By all accounts then, it is all too evident that the socio-cultural dimension of human existence remains largely missing dimension in much of the thought on development.

3.9 CONCEPT OF TRANSFORMATION

Transformation broadly needs change of structure. Transformation is usually associated with more or less a total change, more akin to structural change. But this does not necessarily means a complete or all together a different kind of change. As M.S.A. Rao says, “structural change are often disjointed and partial. Transformation thus mean replacing the whole or a partial structure with a more suitable one. M.S.A. Rao places transformative changes or movements which bring about transformation between reforms and revolution. According to him, “transformation movements aim at bringing about middle level structural changes in the traditional distribution of power and in the system of differential allocation of resources, rights and privileges by attacking the monopoly of the upper classes and castes in different areas of life.

This process can be well analysed when one sees the transition taking from Feudalism to Capitalism.

The structure of joint family is transformed into nuclear family.

Dialectic laws of Hegel is the process through which transformation of society takes place in idealistic view and the Karl Marx historical materialism shows the real transformation of the society.

Hegel believe that the transformation of human civilization has not been in a positive straight line, it has rather been a sort of zig-zag movements. The whole process of evolution has followed along definite principles through a dialectic process. He saw three definite stages through which the entire transformation of civilization has taken place viz being, non-being and becoming. These can be called thesis, anti-thesis and synthesis.

Dialectical Materialism of Marx as being influenced by Hegelion dialectic and fitted into his thought and makes it historical materialism. Hegel hold that all ideas in the world developed through the process of dialectic and tried to help the development of history through the process of their, antisynthesis and synthesis and ultimately reaching the highest form of transformation.

Marx borrowed the idealistic philosophy of Hegel and fitted it into his own economic thought to demonstrate the necessity of the class-struggle and the inevitably of progress through revolution.

In Marx, it was a self developing system of products forces that embodied itself in basic pattern of economic distribution and in the social classes consequent thereto.

3.10 TRANSFORMATION OF SOCIETIES WITH THE CHANGING OF THEIR MODE OF PRODUCTION AND THEIR CLASS STRUCTURE

Stage	Modes of Production	Class Structure
(i) Primitive Communism	Hunting, fishing, food gathering etc.	Classes not yet formed
(ii) Slave system	Animal husbandry, domestic agriculture and small industry	Masters and slaves
(iii) Feudal System	Large Agriculture serfs.	Landlords and
(iv) Capitalist system	Large industry	capitartists and workers.
(v) Socialist system	Large industry	All citizens become worker.

These five stages of transformation of societies through different modes of production and the different class structures were emerged. This transformation of societies shows that how the development of societies within different class structures are formed.

Transformation of society leads to the development. It promotes the highest order of production through the improvement of Means of Production and Relations of Production.

3.11 TRANSFORMATION WITH RESPECT TO THE STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION OF THE FAMILY

The tradition form of family is the joint family but the modern form of family is going towards nuclear form of family. Joint family is that which is “undivided family” and sometimes as ‘extended family’. It normally consists of members who at least belong to three generations. Husband and wife, their married and unmarried children and their married as well as unmarried grand children.

But now it is changed toward nuclear family is a universal phenomenon. It can be defined as “A small group Composed of husband and wife and immature children which constitutes a unit apart from the rest of the community.”

TRANSFORMATION OF RURAL TO URBAN LIFE

Robert Redfield gives the rural-urban continuum and it shows that the societies transformed from Rural to Urban.

In 1941, Robert Redfield published a book entitled “The folk culture of Yupatam. This book is based on. comparative study of four communities namely

(i) A City Society (ii) A Town Society (iii) A Present Society (iii) A Folk or Present Society.

He selected these four communities or societies in the Mexican province of yupaten where he had visited many times for his field work.

The four places in the Mexican province of Yupatam, representing habitation of four communities were (i) Marida (City Society) (ii) Diztal (a Town Society) (iii) Chankam (a village of Peasant Society) (iii) Tuski (a village of Folk Society or Simple Society)

He shows that the societies transformed from the stages of Tuski to Marida and this transformation of the societies are continuous and interrelated.

ASK YOURSELF :

- Q.1. Give the concept of development
- Q.2. Define Transformationswith respect to change in mode of production.
- Q.3. Give the missing demensions of development.

STRUCTURE

- 4.1 Objective
- 4.2 Introduction
- 4.3 Development as Economic Growth
- 4.4 Whose Economic Growth
- 4.5 Paradigmatic shift
- 4.6 Development as human welfare
- 4.7 Need to go beyond
- 4.8 Ask yourself.

4.1 OBJECTIVE

The main objective of this unit is to equip you with :

- The concepts of Human and Social Development.
- Development as Economic growth.
- Development as Poverty Eradication.
- Development as human welfare.

4.2 INTRODUCTION

Development is a dynamic concept. Its connotations have changed over the years. In the course of last four decades, since the declaration of the sixties as the First

Development Decade by the U.N.O., its connotations have changed as many times, or indeed even more.

But development is also a cumulative concept. Its meanings have enlarged and concerns have expanded with the passage of time. This is evident from its expanding frontiers from economic growth to human welfare. The long distance covered by the journey of the concept of development notwithstanding, it is the submission here that it has not yet reached its final destination. There is still a need to go beyond.

Conceptual advances in development have derived from two schools of thought, i.e, economic growth and human development. Accordingly there have emerged two major conceptions of development, i.e., development as economic growth and development as human welfare, and in that order.

4.3 DEVELOPMENT AS ECONOMIC GROWTH

The economic growth conception of development is as old as is the idea of development which itself originated in the wake of industrial revolution. It is not that mankind was not concerned with improving its lot before the advent of industrial revolution. It surely was. But this concern was represented by another term, i.e, progress. And progress denoted change in a desirable direction particularly in the direction of promoting human happiness.

The origins of development apart, it gained in salience in the latter half of the present century. The middle of this century represents a period of great historic significance in that it marks the end of the era of colonialism. There emerged a configuration of historical forces in the late forties that led to liberation of colonies one after another. The newly liberated nations shared one feature in common, and that is over exploitation of their economics by the erstwhile imperial powers. As a result, all of them were economic wrecks and therefore all of them confronted the challenge of economic reconstruction. It is in this context that the term development gained in currency to signify a sensibility of economic growth. Little wonder that there appeared and prevailed the economic growth conception of development in the sixties. In other words, development in its initial formulation meant economic growth as measured by increase in gross national product (GNP) or income per capita.

This pioneering definition of development, however, encountered its first challenge in terms of its critique as a possible case of 'sponsored' growth. It was pointed out that a country may experience a sort of sponsored economic growth, backed up by a foreign power or powers, without really achieving sound economic fundamentals. The recent Asian crash which led to collapse of the economies of several apparently fast developing countries has indeed confirmed that apprehension. Thus, economic growth by itself may be spurious. This critique led to a revised version of development as self-reliant or self-sustaining economic growth.

4.4 WHOSE ECONOMIC GROWTH

Its revised version notwithstanding, the economic growth conception of development came under further interrogation, particularly in socialist circles. A powerful critical question was posed by the left oriented thinkers: whose economic growth are we talking about? It may be the case that the industrial output of a few monopoly houses and agricultural output of a few big landlords give an upward push to the gross national product, while the living conditions of the masses show no signs of improvement. Increase in GNP is therefore a misnomer, as it conceals more than it reveals. In particular it conceals widening disparities and inequalities.

In response to this critique, the definition of development expanded to mean economic growth with distributive justice. Reduction in socioeconomic disparities and provision of social justice became avowed goals of development together with economic growth. Incorporated into the core of development at the level of theory, the question of distributive justice has by and large remained on the margins in actual development practice.

That apart, the modified version of development as self-reliant even define development by focussing on the quality of the bottom most 25 per cent of the population." To make his position quite clear, he adds: "Quality of life is not to be decided by the size of the consumption basket or range of choices offered to a person alone. It must also include the enabling environment for individuals to explore their own creative potentials. This second component of the quality of life is far more important than the first component". What follows from the above observations is a notion of development as poverty eradication.

4.5 PARADIGMATIC SHIFT

The question that has really brought about a paradigmatic shift in the conceptualisation of development is : what does development do to people ? How does it affect their lives? The concept of development as economic growth implies that economic growth automatically leads to improvement in the quality of life of the people. The development experience of various countries has called this assumption into question. More sensitive development thinkers like Mahbub ul Haq and Amartya Sen have delivered scathing critique of this fallacious assumption. In own characteristic, style Mahbub ul Haq observes: “There is no automatic link between income and human lives. Yet there has long been an apparent presumption in economic thought that such an automatic link exists” (1996:5). Illustrating his point, Haq adds: “There are far too many examples when the presumed link between GNP level and human welfare breaks down. Saudi Arabia has a per capita income 16 times that of Sri Lanka but a much lower literacy rate. The infant mortality rate in Brazil is four times higher than that of Jamaica even though Brazil enjoys twice the per capita income. Oman has three times the per capita income of Costa Rica but only one-third its literacy rate, seven years lower life expectancy, and absence of most political and economic freedoms”.

4.6 DEVELOPMENT AS HUMAN WELFARE

It all began with physical quality of life and has more recently stretched to civil quality life. The inadequacy of the physical quality of life based conception of development was discovered through cross-national comparisons which brought to fore the importance of civil quality of life. For example, comparison of China and India revealed that China outscores India on all indicators of physical quality of life while India leaves China way behind on civil quality of life i.e., provision of political rights and civil liberties. Accordingly, human development conception is now reformulated as improvement not only in physical quality of life but also in civil quality of life of the people.

By all measures, human welfare centered conception of development represents a commendable advance over economic growth conception of development. There are, however, some telling differences between the two. While

economic growth conception of development focusses on economy as a primary unit of development, the human development concept focusses on people, particularly quality of life of the people, as a primary unit of development. While the former lays stress exclusively on the expansion of only one choice, i.e, income, the latter represents enlargement of human choices including economic demographic and civil. Above all, while the former is concerned primarily with 'more', the latter is concerned primarily with 'better'. This is illustrated so well by the following observation of Mahbub ul Haq : "The touch stone of the success of development policies becomes the betterment of people's lives, not just the expansion of production processes" (1996:8)

4.7 NEED TO GO BEYOND

Clearly, the concept of development has transferred a long distance. But it still has a constrained vision. A closer look at the prevailing concept of development as human welfare reveals some of its inherent limitations. The first one is that it measures human development in terms of mainly three dimensions of quality of life, i.e., economic, demographic and civil. Purchasing power of the people takes care of the economic, life expectancy, infant and child survival rate and literacy of the demographic and human opportunities and freedoms of the civil. There is a lot more to human life than just life chances, human capabilities, opportunities and civil liberties. How about social bonds and values, moral norms and standards, human sentiments and emotions? The quality of life is not exhausted with physical and civil. There are several other dimensions of quality of life also such as psychological, social moral, cultural, etc. To the extent that the prevailing construct of human development is preoccupied mainly with the physical and the civil to the neglect of psychological, social moral and cultural, it suffers from a constrained vision.

It is not without a reason that development is defined the way it is defined. It is defined in terms of the primacy of economic, physical and civil quality of life because the so-called developed nations are high on these dimensions. They are characterised by economic prosperity and higher purchasing power of the people, improved physical quality of life in terms of life expectancy, infant and child survival rate and literacy rate, as well as provision of political rights and civil liberties. The other dimensions of quality

of life do not enter into the reckoning of parameters of development because they do not suit them,. Take, for example, social quality of life as reflected in family harmony and community bonds; psychological quality of life in terms of level of satisfaction and contentment, mental health, sound sleep and tolerable limits of stress tension, moral quality of life in terms of minimal incidence of crime, delinquency, violence and unwed motherhood. On all these dimensions, the so-called developed nations present a miserable quality of life. They abound in incidence of divorce, desertion, single parent families and unwed motherhood on the social front; stress, hypertension, insomnia, drug addiction and mental illness on the psychological front; crime, delinquency, violence, pornography and permissiveness on the moral front. For the same reason, these dimensions of quality of life do not count for anything in the prevailing construct of human development.

From the above it is clear that the concept of development has to be further broad based in order that it is able to take care of the psychological, social and cultural quality of life over above the economic physical and civil.

4.8 ASK YOURSELF

- Q.1. How did the concept of economic development shift into the concept of human development?
- Q.2. Describe in brief the views of Mahbub ul Haq and Amartya Sen's views on human development.
- Q.3. Enlist the limitations of human development approach.

STRUCTURE

- 5.1 Objective
- 5.2 Concept of Sustainable Development
- 5.3 Unsustainable Setting
- 5.4 Towards Sustainable Development in India
- 5.5 Environmental Degradation in India
- 5.6 Alternative Explanations
- 5.7 Emerging Perspectives
- 5.8 Towards an Indian Perspective
- 5.9 Towards Sustainability
- 5.10 Ask Yourself.

5.1 OBJECTIVE

The main objective of this lesson is to equip to with :

- The concept of sustainable Development.
- Unsustainable setting
- Alternative Explanations
- Emerging perspectives.

5.2 CONCEPT OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

Sustainable development refers to a mode of human development in which resource use aims to meet human needs while preserving the environment so that these needs can be met not only in the present, but also for generations to come. The term ‘sustainable development’ was used by the Brundtland Commission which coined what has become the most often-quoted definition of sustainable development: “development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.”

Sustainable development ties together concern for the carrying capacity of natural systems with the social challenges faced by humanity. As early as the 1970s, “sustainability” was employed to describe an economy “in equilibrium with basic ecological support systems.” Ecologists have pointed to *The Limits to Growth*, and presented the alternative of a “steady state economy” in order to address environmental concerns.

The concept of sustainable development has in the past most often been broken out into three constituent parts: environmental sustainability, economic sustainability and sociopolitical sustainability. More recently, it has been suggested that a more consistent analytical breakdown is to distinguish four domains of economic, ecological, political and cultural sustainability. This is consistent with the UCLG move to make ‘culture’ the fourth domain of sustainability.

DEFINITION

In 1987, the United Nations released the Brundtland Report, which included what is now one of the most widely recognised definitions:

“Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.”

According to the same report, the above definition contains within it two key concepts:

- ◆ the concept of ‘needs’, in particular the essential needs of the world’s poor, to which overriding priority should be given; and

- ◆ the idea of limitations imposed by the state of technology and social organization on the environment's ability to meet present and future needs.

The United Nations 2005 World Summit Outcome Document refers to the “interdependent and mutually reinforcing pillars” of sustainable development as economic development, social development, and environmental protection. Based on the triple bottom line, numerous sustainability standards and certification systems have been established in recent years, in particular in the food industry.

Sustainable development is thus different from conventional development. Conventional development was so obsessed with growth that it gleefully neglected ecology; indeed, it acted detrimental to nature. Sustainable development, on the other hand, refers to ecology friendly development, one that harnesses nature without destroying it, keeps up its greenery and conserve its resources.

Originally defined within the context of ecological harmony, more recently sustainable development has taken on some broader interpretations. Apart from its ecological concern, sustainability is now being defined also in terms of technical, managerial institutional, human, social and cultural dimensions. In the latest literature on the subject there has emerged the idea of “multiple sustainabilities”. The expanding frontiers of sustainability notwithstanding the original definition of sustainable development as the capacity to provide for the needs of the present without diminishing the options of the future generations still remains the authentic one. Initially concerned with conservation of resources, it has now encompassed within its orbit the concern for environmental protection also.

HISTORY OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED NATIONS

The concept of sustainable development emerged from the post-War environmental movement, which recognised the negative impacts of human growth and development on the environment and communities. Since publishing the first ever national strategy for sustainable development in 1994, the UK Government has played a lead role in promoting sustainable development at home and overseas. The report, *Our Common Future*, published by WCED, is taken as a starting point for most current discussions on the concept of sustainable development. This report, a comprehensive one produced through a global partnership, constituted a major political turning point for

the concept of sustainable development. But it is neither the starting point nor the possible end of the conceptual development process. As any conceptual process governed by general evolutionary theory, there are some significant conceptual precursors that have led to the WCED's definition of sustainable development, which in turn is followed by other conceptualization efforts.

1972 LIMITS TO GROWTH

Commissioned by the Club of Rome, *Limits to Growth* attempts to model the consequences of a growing human population in a world of finite resources, concluding that current patterns of growth cannot be sustained indefinitely. In 1972, the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment held in Stockholm brought the industrialized and developing nations together to delineate the 'rights' of the human family to a healthy and productive environment. A series of such meetings followed, e.g. on the rights of people to adequate food, to sound housing, to safe water, to access to means of family planning. The recognition to revitalize humanity's connection with Nature, led to the creation of global institutions within the UN system.

In 1980, the International Union for the Conservation of Natural Resources (IUCN) published the *World Conservation Strategy (WCS)* which provided a precursor to the concept of sustainable development. The Strategy asserted that conservation of nature cannot be achieved without development to alleviate poverty and misery of hundreds of million of people and stressed the interdependence of conservation and development in which development depends on caring for the Earth. Unless the fertility and productivity of the planet are safeguarded, the human future is at risk.

Ten years later, at the 48th plenary of the General Assembly in 1982, the WCS initiative culminated with the approval of the *World Charter for Nature*. The Charter stated that "mankind is a part of nature and life depends on the uninterrupted functioning of natural systems".

In 1983, the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) was created and, by 1984, it was constituted as an independent body by the United Nations General Assembly. WCED was asked to formulate 'A global agenda for change'. In 1987, in its report *Our Common Future*, the WCED advanced the

understanding of global interdependence and the relationship between economics and the environment previously introduced by the WCS. The report wove together social, economic, cultural and environmental issues and global solutions. It reaffirmed that “the environment does not exist as a sphere separate from human actions, ambitions, and needs, and therefore it should not be considered in isolation from human concerns. The environment is where we all live; and development is what we all do in attempting to improve our lot within that abode. The two are inseparable.”

1987 OUR COMMON FUTURE

The term sustainable development came to prominence through the United Nations Brundtland Commission. The commission’s 1987 report, *Our Common Future* defined sustainable development as “development which meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs”.

1992 RIO CONFERENCE

The concept received further attention at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, the first international attempt to develop strategies for a more sustainable pattern of development. In June 1992, the first UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) was held in Rio de Janeiro and adopted an agenda for environment and development in the 21st Century. *Agenda 21: A Programme of Action for Sustainable Development* contains the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, which recognizes each nation’s right to pursue social and economic progress and assigned to States the responsibility of adopting a model of sustainable development; and, the Statement of Forest Principles. Agreements were also reached on the Convention on Biological Diversity and the Framework Convention on Climate Change. UNCED for the first time mobilized the Major Groups and legitimized their participation in the sustainable development process. This participation has remained a constant until today. For the first time also, the lifestyle of the current civilization was addressed in Principle 8 of the Rio Declaration. The urgency of a deep change in consumption and production patterns was expressly and broadly acknowledged by State leaders. *Agenda 21* further reaffirmed that sustainable development was delimited by the integration of the economic, social and environmental pillars.

Representatives of 178 national governments, including more than 100 heads of state, and many organisations representing civil society attended the conference. The world had never previously witnessed a larger gathering of national leaders. At the summit, governments around the world committed to sustainable development. The UK government was the first to produce its national strategy in 1994. The spirit of the conference was captured by the expression “Harmony with Nature”, brought into the fore with the first principle of the Rio Declaration: “Human beings are at the centre of concerns for sustainable development. They are entitled to a healthy and productive life in harmony with nature”.

In 1993, UNCED instituted the Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD) to follow-up on the implementation of Agenda 21.

In June 1997, the General Assembly dedicated its 19th Special Session (UNGASS-19) to design a “Programme for the Further Implementation of Agenda 21 .”

1999 BETTER QUALITY OF LIFE

In 1999, the UK government outlined how it proposed to deliver sustainable development in A Better Quality of Life. This set out a vision of simultaneously delivering economic, social and environmental outcomes as measured by a series of headline indicators.

2002 JOHANNESBURG SUMMIT

In 2002, ten years after the Rio Declaration, a follow-up conference, the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) was convened in Johannesburg from 26 August to 4 September 2002 to renew the global commitment to sustainable development.

The conference agreed on the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation (JPOI) and further tasked the CSD to follow-up on the implementation of sustainable development. The summit delivered three outcomes: a political declaration, the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation and the establishment of numerous partnership initiatives. Key commitments covered sustainable consumption and production, water and sanitation, and energy. The outcomes complemented the Millennium Development

Goals, reinforce Doha and Monterrey agreements and set challenging global goals and targets on accessing water, sanitation and modern energy services; increasing energy efficiency and use of renewable energy; sustainable fisheries and forests; reducing biodiversity loss on land and in our oceans; chemicals management; and decoupling environmental degradation from economic growth that is, achieving sustainable patterns of consumption and production. The UK's international priorities on sustainable development have principally been framed by the Millennium Development Goals, the Doha Development Agenda of the World Trade Organisation, the Monterrey Consensus on Financing for Development and the Plan of Implementation of the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD).

2005 SECURING THE FUTURE

2005 saw the publication of *Securing the Future*, a revised UK Government strategy for sustainable development. At the same time, a strategic framework was agreed by the UK Government and the devolved administrations in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, providing a consistent approach and focus across the UK for the period up to 2020.

On 24th December 2009 the UN General Assembly adopted a Resolution agreeing to hold the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development (UNCSD) in 2012 - also referred to as 'Rio+20' or 'Rio 20'. The Conference seeks three objectives: securing renewed political commitment to sustainable development, assessing the progress and implementation gaps in meeting already agreed commitments, and addressing new and emerging challenges. The Member States have agreed on the following two themes for the Conference: green economy within the context of sustainable development and poverty eradication, and institutional framework for sustainable development.

Since UNCED, sustainable development has become part of the international lexicon. The concept has been incorporated in many UN declarations and its implementation, while complex has been at the forefront of world's institutions and organizations working in the economic, social and environmental sectors. However, they all recognize how difficult it has proven to grant the environmental pillar the same recognition enjoyed by the other two pillars despite the many calls by scientists and

civil society signalling the vulnerability and precariousness of the Earth since the 1960s.

5.3 UNSUSTAINABLE SETTING

On the face of it, the original formulation of sustainable development appears to be quite unexceptionable, nay, noble. On closer examination, however, it comes out that it is utopian, partisan and segmental.

It is utopian because it is projected in terms of an unrealizable hope, a hope that present generation will have a concern for the future generation. Such a hope is premised upon two questionable assumptions : (i) that the present generation is a homogeneous entity; and (ii) that the present generation has concern for it self, i.e; for all its sections. The first assumption is empirically untenable in view of the fact that the present generation is a heterogeneous lot. The interests of the present generation in the more developed nations are not the same as that of its counter part in the less developed nations. More to the point, the two have differential control over and access to natural resources. A disconcerting feature of the present scenario is the wide disparity in the control and consumption of natural resources between developed and developing nations, the former having much large control than the latter it is common knowledge that the developed countries of the North, which accounts for roughly 20 per cent of the world's population, control and consume about 80 per cent of the world's resources. Among the countries of the North, again, United States alone, which accounts for barely 6 per cent of the world's population controls and consumes 36 per cent resources of the world. Little wonder that there is a sharp divergence of interests between the North and the South in view of which it is apparently wrong to assume that the present generation is a homogeneous entity.

Not again are the concerns of the present generation common. Do the people of the developed nations have a genuine concern for the people of the developing nations? Hardly any. Indeed, they are unscrupulously consuming in an excessive manner the limited resources of the world with scant concern for the needs of the teeming millions in the developing countries many of whom are not able to get even two square meals a day. According to a widely reported estimate the per capita energy use in industrialised countries is two hundred times more than in developing countries.

Given this inequities world order, it is unrealistic to expect realization of sustainable development in terms of concern of the present generation for the future generation. At a time when one section of the present generation, that in the countries of the North, has such a scarce concern for its own brethren in the countries of the South, what makes one believe that the present generation will acquire concern for the future generation. The paradox of the Brundtland Report is that it seeks to build “Our Common Future” on the foundation of an uncommon present.

A second problem with this construct is that it is partisan, as it suits the developed countries more than the developing countries. It suits the developed countries because having attained higher levels of development they are interested in preserving their gains which they can do only in a green and clean environment. In view of this it is hardly surprising that their priority at present is environment. They never thought of it for the last over hundred years when they plundered the natural resources for their development. The doctrine of sustainability, however, does not suit the developing countries as it sets constraints on their development by bringing it under the control of international regulations. Apart from suiting the developed countries, Brundtland’s formulation of sustainable development in terms of generational context indeed serves their interests, as it diverts attention of the world from the glaring inter-regional disparities in the parentship and use of natural resources.

Further more it is segmental. This is so for two reasons. In the first instance, the concept of development is itself one dimensional as it focuses primarily on economic growth. Secondly, the construct of sustainability again is one-dimensional as it is concerned primarily in terms of ecological dimension. This segmental conceptualization of both development and sustainability renders the construct of sustainable development highly problematic and unviable. Neither development nor sustainability can be broken into pieces. Each of them is a holistic category and has to be treated as such.

Above all, there is the paradox of seeking sustainable development in an unsustainable world order. The present world order is unsustainable as it is marked by glaring inequalities of resource distribution. Comprised of a three-tier hierarchy of the capitalist the socialist and the third world countries earlier, the world order is

transformed now into a two-tier hierarchy of the economically advanced nations and the backward nations, following the collapse of the socialist block. In our times when the ideal of equality reigns supreme, such an uneven international economic order is unlikely to be sustainable. It is not worth sustaining anyway. How can the goal of sustainable development be realised in a world order which itself is unsustainable.

The argument advanced here need not be misconstrued to mean a plea for abandoning the goal of sustainable development. That is not the message. Far from it, we must take care of the dimension of ecological sustainability in all our development endeavour. The message, however, is that we have to be aware of the politics of sustainable development and guard against it.

5.4 TOWARDS SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN INDIA

The discourse on sustainable development in India has passed through three phases: suspicion, reconciliation and reorientation. The initial response was and still is that of suspicion and interrogation. The prevailing definition of sustainable development in terms of intergenerational equity in the use of natural resources is debunked for concealing the ground reality of interregional disparities. It is argued that the developed countries comprising roughly 20 per cent of the global population control about 80 per cent natural resources of the world, and it is they who have been the biggest energy consumers and the biggest pollutant emitters. Further, the very goal of sustainable development is challenged by pointing out that it shows a kind of development in which one-sixth of the earth's population enjoys a disproportionate five-sixths of its wealth. More pointedly, it asks: sustainable for whom? Additionally, it is contended that the overall stress on ecological sustainability is not without a purpose, as it diverts attention from the question of socio-cultural unsustainability of the prevailing capitalist mode of development. For all these reasons, sustainable development is viewed as a garnish, a clever design, a bogey, nay a conspiracy of the developed capitalist nations to strangle the development, or at least slow down its pace, so as to keep them in a state of perpetual dependency.

Having enjoyed immense popularity earlier, this response is not very popular now. There are several reasons for it. One, it no doubt provides a powerful critique but offers no alternative hence, it loses much of its appeal. Two, it has callous and inhuman

overtones, as it prompts developing nations to pursue the goal of growth irrespective of the ecological and environmental damage it causes to them or to anyone else. Three, it is downright perilous for the developing countries themselves which may have to face the prospects of frightening famines like that of Ethiopia, the furious floods like that of Bangladesh, the horrifying gas disasters like that of Union Carbide in India, on account of their neglect of environmental considerations. Four, it ignores the fact that several developing nations have succeeded in improving their profile by following the path of sustainable development, the East Asian 'tigers', including Japan, South Korea, Hongkong, Taiwan, Singapore and China being some of its glaring examples.

Expectedly, the mood of intransigence had to give way to the phase of reconciliation. Little wonder that India signed international agreement as also enacted regular frameworks and regenerative measures for environmental protection and ecological preservation. The government of India indeed drew up a plan which set its focus on two points : (i) population control and conservation of natural resources such as land, water, atmosphere, biodiversity and biomass; and (ii) integration and internalization of environmental considerations in the policies and programmes of development in various sectors, including agriculture, irrigation, animal husbandry, forestry, energy, industry mining and quarrying, tourism, transportation and human settlements.

The phase of reconciliation notwithstanding, our policies and programmes of sustainable development have failed to arrest the decline in the state of our environment, leading to a search for alternatives in sustainable development. The discourse has, thus entered into its third phase, a phase of reorientation. There have emerged certain alternatives in sustainable development in India.

5.5 ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION IN INDIA

Available surveys reveal the disconcerting fact that India's environment is deteriorating at an alarming rate. According to a Government of India report as much as 60 per cent of agricultural land is degraded to varying degrees (1992). Our forest cover is barely 75.01 million hectare, which is a mere 19.5 per cent of the total area against the required target of 33 per cent. Common property resources (CPR) area

has shrunk between 30 per cent and 50 per cent over the past four decades. Our environmental problems are compounded by the fact that with only 2.8 per cent of the world's land, India supports 16 per cent of the world's population (CSE, 1987). Likewise, hardly 3.5 per cent of our total area is under grasslands, while our domesticated animal population is close to 500 million.

Data relating to flora and fauna and animal life present an equally bleak picture. According to the Botanical and Zoological surveys of India, over 1500 plant and animal species are in the endangered category. Ironically, known as a megadiversity area from the point of view of richness of biological diversity, India today has two of the world's sixteen most threatened 'hot spot' locations.

On water resources front too, the scenario is quite depressing. The annual availability of water per capita has declined from 5.236 cubic metres in 1951 to 2,227 cubic metres in 1991. Paradoxically, only about 40 per cent of the total water utilizable for irrigation is really used, implying thereby that we are not yet able to fully utilize our irrigation potential, even as calculated water deficit in the various yields ranges from 21 per cent to 63 per cent. Another disturbing trend is the massive shift of irrigation from surface water to ground water. The proportion of cultivated area irrigated by ground water has risen from about one third in 1965-66 to over 50 per cent at present, resulting in a steady fall in the water table. It should therefore come as no surprise that given the current water use practices in future times, it is water which will prove to be the effective constraint for production purposes, not land.

As for consumption, about 80 per cent of the population still does not have access to safe drinking water. As many as 1,75,000 villages are still without potable water (YCP, 1993). Even among the urban population, only about one third of the people have access to safe drinking water (Sivaramkrishnan 1993, Vol I). One reason for it is that more than two thirds of all drinking water is obtained from surface sources, seventy per cent of which is polluted (YCP, 1993). Besides, much of the sewage water remains largely untreated before being discharged into waterway as only 21 of over 3000 towns in India have water sewage treatment plants. Not surprisingly, water and sanitation related illnesses account for about 60 per cent of all urban deaths.

The situation is equally grim in respect of air pollution both in the urban and rural

areas. In the four metropolitan centres, suspended particulate matter (SPM) is 360 mg/cm compared to the WHO safety standard of 150. Add to it the ever-increasing pollution load, due to the emissions and vehicular exhaust, which is growing at a worrisome rate. A major source of worry is the exponential increase in petrol and diesel fueled vehicles, the number of which on Indian roads is just about doubled from eleven million to twenty one million between 1986 and 1991. In the rural areas too indoor air pollution due to smoke and fumes from the burning of biomass (wood and dung) which provides 87 per cent of all cooking fuels, is widespread. Nevertheless the problem of pollution is more acute in urban areas than in rural. This is because over one third of India's urban population live in slums. Also, about three quarters of urban households are without adequate sanitation. Barely 15 per cent of them have private toilets and more than 60 per cent resort to open defecation thereby, sullyng the surrounding environments.

Coal combustion is another critical source of environmental degradation. With a coal reserve of 200 million tonnes, India is having current annual production of 250 million tonnes, seventy per cent of which and virtually the entire lignite is used for power generation (Sahu 1994). While there is no escape from using coal, it pollutes the atmosphere by gaseous emissions of sulphur dioxide, nitrogen oxide etc., causing acid rain which is known to damage soil vegetation and aquatic life of the region besides producing a tremendous amount of solid wastes, fly ash and bottom ash.

Fast increasing quantity and content of the garbage is another source of environmental pollution. Though of not quite the same volume as in the developed countries the scale on which garbage is produced in Indian cities ranges between 294 grams and 484 grams per capita per day. While, the scale on which it is disposed of falls between 203 grams and 364 grams per capita per day. Thus, on an average, about 28 per cent of the garbage remains unattended to. Furthermore the character of the garbage has also undergone transformation. Unlike before it now includes large quantities of plastics, metals, glasses, chemicals and medicinal and toxic waste, which not only pose health hazards but also cause soil degradation.

5.6 ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS

The above account of eroding soils, vanishing forests, depleting water resources, increasing liquid and solid wastes, and air pollution should leave us in no doubt about the deteriorating quality of our environment. Several explanatory formulations have appeared in this regard, two of which are particularly noteworthy, poverty population-pollution interface and faulty developmental policies.

Many analysts blame the environmental crisis on poverty-population linkages. They maintain that the teeming millions in India are responsible for environmental degradation. The poor masses allegedly degrade the environment by their uncivil and unscientific ways of using environmental resources to meet their needs for food, fuel and fodder. Even more importantly, they do so by multiplying their numbers, and bringing the already scarce environmental resources under further strain. As such, poverty abetted by ever growing population is the worst pollutant in India. The prescription that follows from this diagnosis is: population control and slowing the pace of growth.

Without denying the linkages between poverty-population and pollution, it is essential to point out that this formulation does not capture the entire complexity of the economy-ecology inter-connections. In the first place, it presents a jaundiced view in that it ignores the pernicious effects of prosperity on environmental deterioration. If one cares to audit the per capita profligate consumption of the natural resources and sinks in the north, prosperity emerges as the biggest cause of ecological decay not only in the developed but also in the developing countries. Secondly, it glosses over the role of the commercial sector which alone is responsible for the actual falling of trees for profit making in India and also probably in other countries. Thirdly, it involves the fallacious assumption that poor people tend to produce children in order to use them as workers. This is far from true. It is not because children can be used as workers that they are produced. It is because they are produced that they are used as workers. Fourthly, it is premised upon a truncated view of poverty which is mistaken as autonomous of equity. Indeed, poverty cannot be treated as an independent entity, separated from equity. Finally, its prescription of slowing the pace of development is misleading because environmental degradation in India is the result not of excessive

but insufficient economic growth.

Little wonder that there has come up an alternative explanatory formulation which seeks to account for environmental deterioration in India in terms of political economy. Recently articulated by Rao, this formulation attributes environmental degeneration not to growth per se but to inadequate growth. It is argued that the Indian state has followed largely a capitalist path of development, which is evident from the policy choices that have been taken in the spheres of irrigation, energy and forestry. Policy options in favour of large dams over small in the sphere of irrigation, kerosene and diesel over electrification of rural households in the sphere of energy, restrictions on collection of fuelwood and fodder for domestic consumption by tribals and rural poor over planting trees on a massive scale in the sphere of forestry, are some of the instances in point. These policy decisions have contributed heavily to environmental contamination. The same can be said about the public policy which tends to favour private transportation over public transport, even as the former is far more polluting than the latter. The tax incidence on bus transport is reportedly 24, 11 and 9 times more than that on private cars in Bombay, Madras and Delhi, respectively.

These policy choices are clearly indicative of an uneven pattern of development. Accordingly, our development has degenerated into a process of state sponsored subsidized flows of resources to industrial elites and influential landlords. They have received water, power, forest and mineral resources all at highly subsidized rates along with license to pollute the commons. As it is, there has emerged an 'iron triangle' comprising the organised industry, the bureaucracy and the politicians who have collaborated to liquidate the country's base of natural resources.

The future, too, does not seem to hold any promise. In fact, it is believed that the policy of structural adjustment programme (SAP) together with emphasis on privatization and globalization is likely to further aggravate the environmental problem, for there are critical areas of conflict between liberalized trade and environmental standards. Timber is one such area and influx of dirty industries another, to cite just a few.

Largely convincing, this explanation seems to over estimate the role of policy choices in environmental decay. A 'U' turn has no doubt taken place in India's

economic policy with the adoption of structural adjustment programme in 1992, but our environment was in state of continuous degradation in the decades of 70s and 80s which was a period of regulated economic growth professedly in favour of poor masses. Similarly the Indian state has taken definite policy choices in favour of environmental protection and reiterated its pronouncement of the same following the Earth Summit but the state of India's environment continues to suffer progressive decline. Therefore, even as policy choices are important they are not adequate to explain the environmental decline in India. There seems to be something more to it than mere policy choices.

While both the explanatory perspectives are valid, each in its own way, they contain only parts of the truth. The malaise is much deeper. The overriding importance of materialism seems to have perverted our sense of value priorities. It has so dazzled us as to deprive us of our sense of direction, our concern for others, even for self esteem and above all, for the environment.

5.7 EMERGING PERSPECTIVES

Deriving from the experience of the developed nations there have emerged two perspectives for sustainable development in India which may be called the 'efficiency' and the 'equity' perspectives. Inspired by the success story of 'tigers' the 'efficiency' perspective maintains that if a number of countries of East Asia can make a grade towards sustainable development by following an efficient path of liberal market economy why can't India do so. Following this reasoning, it locates the key of the East Asia 'miracles' in the use of liberal managerial philosophy with its stress on efficiency.

Applauded by none other than Mahbub ul Haq, the author of the Human Development Report for the last few years, the 'efficiency' perspective lays stress on the following imperatives: primacy to managerial approach over bureaucratized approach, promotional measures over regulatory mechanisms, natural resources based planning over finance based planning, and investment in human capital over physical capital.

According to this perspective, the first pre-requisite of sustainable development

is debureaucratization and adoption of managerial approach. One reason for the disappointing performance of our family planning programme is its bureaucratized character. Likewise, it is bureaucratic approach to our programmes of poverty alleviation which accounts in large part for their uninspiring performance. The stories of official collusion with structures of vested interests, leading to large-scale deforestation and blind violation of anti pollution acts, are all too well known. If the experience of East Asian countries is any guide, management approach holds promise for population reduction, economic growth as well as environmental regeneration. The same holds for primacy to promotional measures over regulatory mechanisms. The countries of South Asia, particularly India, excel at enacting legislation especially prohibitive legislation, only to observe it in breach. What is the use of having elaborate legislation if it cannot be applied. Positive incentives are anyway better than negative sanctions. Hence, the importance of promotional measures for sustainable development is noticed.

Defining sustainable development as efficient optimization of natural resources the 'efficiency' perspective further favours natural resource based planning over merely financial resource based planning. There is very little of natural resource accounting, much less environmental accounting in India, which is why it continues to stay poor and depletes its natural resources unmindful of the consequences.

Investment in human capital is regarded as another critical input for sustainable development under the 'efficiency' perspective. Investment in health and education, particularly women's health and education, are known for their potential for sustainable development. There has come up cumulative, nay conclusive, evidence of correlation between female education and fertility decline. Spread of education, especially female education together with environmental literacy is thus likely to have multiplier effect on population reduction, hygiene and sanitation and environmental preservation.

Like the 'efficiency' perspective, the 'equity' perspective also in part draws upon the experience of East Asian countries to build up its case. However, unlike the former, the latter locates the secret of the success of East Asian economies in a different set of conditions, with 'equity' as its key coordinate. In order to identify the preconditions for the development of South Asian countries, Mathew, for example, highlights the

following characteristics of the East Asian 'tigers': The economic successes in these countries were made possible because of land reforms, the relatively low gap between high and low income and asset groups, high levels of education and literacy, better health standards and high levels of domestic savings and capital accumulation". Clearly, the stress here is on equity as an imperative of sustainable development.

A sharper formulation of the 'equity' perspective has been advanced by Rao who has proposed an alternative economic strategy to SAP which he calls 'needs-oriented economic and ecological development' or NEED. Criticizing SAP for its negative environmental fallouts, Rao articulates a case of NEED which in his view "directs economic reforms, explicitly to the fulfilment of basic needs, employment expansion and to a measure of environment restoration and protection". In formulating his alternative strategy of NEED, Rao explicitly accords primacy to equity over growth, as can be seen from his following statement : "Whereas achieving a significant measure of social equity will be a *sine qua non* of NEED, economic growth may be its fallour, not its prime mover. Nevertheless, NEED envisases institutional and policy changes in favour of equity and environmental restoration, not just as marginal correctives of market inefficiencies but as critical inputs for growth itself". Rao works out his strategy of NEED in great detail by positing complementarity between fulfilment of basic needs, employment growth and ecological refurbishment.

Valuable in their own ways, both the perspectives have limitations of their own. The 'efficiency' perspective, for example, suffers from limitations of background, scale and priority: It has worked in the countries with no background of colonial subjugation, as is true of the East Asian 'tigers'. It has clicked in the countries of small size, diversity and population which also is a characteristic feature of the successful East Asian countries. It has succeeded in the countries which gave precedence to development over free democracy in the formative phase of their economics. Even as they have had democ-racy, more often than not it has been accompanied by authoritarian discipline. While China represents a case of preference to development over democracy; Japan, Singapore and others are illustrations of democracy with authoritarian discipline. India is quite different from the countries of East Asia in these respects, as it is marked by a colonial past, population explosion and democratic conRAINT on development. These differentials render the replication of the 'efficiency'

perspective highly problematic in countries like India.

The 'equity' perspective, on the other hand, is too ambitious to be workable. It calls for radical restructuring of class and power relations. It demands a different kind of political economy, a radical, socialist economy, which has somehow failed to gain ground in India and has recently fallen in dispute. We have tried land reforms, but failed to enforce them, particularly the land ceiling act. We have strived to remove poverty but ended up with widening the disparities between rich and poor. We aimed at creating a socialistic pattern of society but find ourselves traversing the capitalist path of development. Given the kind of soft state which is ever willing to submit to the designs of entrenched interests and/or to populist pressures, the 'equity' perspective has little chance to succeed.

5.8 TOWARDS AN INDIAN PERSPECTIVE

The trouble with both the perspectives is that they draw upon the lessons from the East Asian and / or the western countries for devising a strategy of sustainable development for India. Little do they care to look for a strategy within the Indian cultural heritage and in the light of the region-specific problems. My submission is that we should find solution to our problems primarily within our own heritage, even as we may incorporate into it some of the elements of the strategies employed elsewhere.

Some of the major problems of development in India are : poverty, unemployment, inequality, population growth, undernutrition and malnutrition, illiteracy, rural exodus and urban slums. Our developmental endeavour has added to this list a number of other problems, including environmental pollution, ecological degradation, marginalization of indigenous people, displacement of rural and tribal folk from their natural habitat, immunization of women and children, and disfiguration of local cultures. Clearly, more problems have been generated than solved by the mode of development that we have followed, which is indicative of there being something fundamentally wrong with it.

The flaw in the developmental model adopted by us lies in its wrong set of priorities. It has not paid sufficient consideration to the optimum utilization of the natural and human resources that our country is endowed with. Rich in land and other resources, India has all along been primarily an agrarian society. If only we could harness our natural and human resources in a systematic and rational manner through

proper manpower planning, we would not have faced the problems of exodus from rural to urban, overcongestion and slums, marginalization of the indigenous people and so on. We have no doubt made efforts to modernize and diversify agriculture but have not done enough to maximize its full possibilities. As a matter of fact India has a tremendous potential to become a leading supplier of agricultural and agro-based industrial products apart from feedings its own population. This strategy has a cultural content as well in that it is in complete accord with the socio-cultural gestalt of our country.

Living in harmony with nature has been an important feature of our cultural heritage. It is a pity that this healthy tradition has been ruptured by the faulty model of development that we have adopted. Rather than destroying our environment, including biodiversity, we should learn to live in harmony with nature, as postulated in our indigenous vision.

Another dimension of Indian culture which has crucial relevance to sustainable development is the primacy of socio-cultural values over materialistic interests. In the prevailing paradigm of development, this relationship has been reversed with material interests taking precedence over socio-cultural values. This distortion precisely is at the root of many of our developmental and ecological problems. Sustainable development cannot be achieved by means of policy choices alone, no matter how enlightened and well thoughtout these are. The restoration of certain basic human values such as civility, discipline, hard work, professional integrity and, above all, concern for others, is necessary for environmental restoration and ecological preservation. The current strategy of interest based development has to be revised in favour of a strategy of value-based development in order to pursue the goal of sustained development.

Yet another strength of Indian heritage which can be of immense value for sustainable development is its rich tradition of voluntary action. While the Indian state needs visionary and principled leaders who can give evidence of strong political will to take and enforce national decision in favour of common masses, even at the risk of antagonizing entrenched corporate elites, the importance of the role of voluntary action groups, now called non-governmental organizations

(NGOs) cannot be emphasized enough. The voluntary action groups can work for sustainable development in various ways, e.g., by serving as watchdogs, conscientizing and organizing people against unsustainable projects, generating environmental awareness and literacy and launching programmes of greening and environmental regeneration. Some of these functions they are already performing. In India alone, for example, over 900 voluntary groups are involved in various environmental movements and projects. Many of them are thus serving as harbingers of silent revolution. These activist initiatives deserve to be applauded and promoted.

Finally, there is such a thing as integral perspective which is a distinguishing mark of Indian heritage. It is time that we bring to bear this perspective on the notion of sustainable development. In the West, sustainable development has been conceptualized in a segmental manner. This is evident from the use of phrases such as sustainable development, economically sustainability, politically sustainable, socially sustainable and culturally sustainable. This compartmentalized way of defining sustainability is fallacious, as it implies autonomy of one sphere vis a vis the other, which is not the case in the living reality. Logically speaking, the idea of segmentally sustainable development is a contradiction in terms. For example, it sounds paradoxical to speak of sustainable development, if it is sustainable ecologically but not culturally. It is time to rethink the prevailing concept of sustainable development in the light of the holistic perspective.

SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AT RIO, 1992

The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) at Rio in 1992 (also known as the Earth Summit) was attended *by* 128 heads of states and in total *by* the representatives of some 178 governments. Debate at the conference drew very directly on the mainstream ideas about the environment and development that had evolved during the 1980s. The Rio Declaration and the much larger *Agenda 21* were the fruits of endless negotiation at a series of Preparatory Commission meetings and at Rio itself, between teams of diplomats determined to surrender as little as possible of their national interest. A key feature of these debates was the gap between countries in the industrialized North and the underdeveloped South, which became steadily more glaring in the run up to, and during, the conference. The issues

of climatic change and biodiversity that dominated the Rio Conference are vitally important to certain countries (especially those vulnerable to sea-level rise), but they are not the principal environmental problems faced by most countries of the South.

The Rio Declaration ended up as a bland list of 27 principles. It was long-winded, and in places self-contradictory: even after long debate, the US delegation released an ‘interpretative statement’ that effectively dissociated it from a number of the principles agreed. It dissented from principle 3 that there was a right to development, the Americans arguing that development was not a right but simply a shared goal, and from any interpretation of principle 7 that suggested that there was an international liability to make development sustainable (i.e., for rich countries to pay for it). Choices about development and environment were matters for individual countries to make their minds up about, and not an issue over which they should be subject to international opinion..

Agenda 21 was even more burdened by divergent opinions, becoming a bloated volume of more than 600 pages in 40 separate chapters. Its scope was enormous, covering issues from biodiversity and water quality: to the role of women, children and organized labour in delivering sustainable development. It reflected previous mainstream thinking about sustainable development in several ways. First, it made the need for economic growth a central theme, as in the Brundtland Report. In the sustainable development ‘mainstream, everything is predicated on economic growth, both globally and nationally. Second, *Agenda 21* emphasized the familiar straightforward issues of environmental management: all the familiar environmental issues from the *World Conservation Strategy* appear developed but unmistakable. Third, *Agenda 21* was technocentric. The first six key themes make this quite clear: growth will power and technology will direct the evolution of policy towards more efficient use of ‘ the environment and hence towards a more sustainable world economy. The ‘essential means’ to achieve sustainability also reflect this technocentrism, building on information, science and environmentally sound technology. Fourth, *Agenda 21* presumed a multilateral benefit to be derived from a sustainable development strategy, as did the Brundtland Report. It suggested that change would arise from the mutual interest of industrialized and non-industrialized countries, and from the concern of present generations about the future. It suggested that this shared interest would cause

international financial resources and technology to flow, directed and promoted by international agencies and structured and regulated by international legal instruments. Fifth, like its predecessors, *Agenda 21* called for sustainable development through participation. As in *Caring for the Earth*, women, children, young people,; indigenous people, trade unionists, businessmen, industrialists, farmers, local authorities and scientists are all summoned to play a role-a rainbow coalition to put flesh on the endless skeleton of the text of *Agenda 21*.

The various programmes of the UNO, specially the UNEP, have emphasized the need for sustainable development, also referred as ‘eco-development’.

BASIC ASPECTS OF SUSTAINABILITY

The question of sustainable development has emerged not only due to over exploitation of resources but also mismanagement of technology. The aspects which require monitoring of sustainability include climatic change, biodiversity, disposal of hazardous and toxic wastes, disposal of pollution-generating industries and food and ecological security.

Swaminathan (1991) has identified nine principles for desired success in promoting ecologically-sound agriculture. These are : (i) land, (ii) water, (iii) energy, (iv) nutrient supply, (v) genetic diversity, (vi) pest management, (vii) post-harvest system, (viii) systems approach, and (ix) location-specific research and development.

The deterioration in the ecological base in various countries in spatio-temporal terms due to irrational management of the resource and environmental systems having damaging repercussions are reflective of unsustainable policy frame and planning strategies followed so far. Their observable signs can be listed as :

- (i) extensive deforestation accounting for loss of flora, fauna and some rare species ;
- (ii) drying up of drinking water resources and fall in the under-ground water levels ;
- (iii) intensifying rate and frequency of flood and droughts ;

- (iv) land degradation due to desertification, wastelands, salinity and waterlogging ;
- (v) deterioration in quality of air and water ;
- (vi) pressure of population resulting in unemployment and mass migrations;
- (vii) unplanned urbanization and unprecedented growth of urban slums, etc.

The environmental problems are multidimensional and varied in nature in developed and developing countries. There are global problems, which have had their impact throughout the world. On the other hand, every country has its own development as well as environmental problems. Apart from this, regional and local problems need immediate attention. The problems created by technology transfer from developed countries to Third World countries have become a cause for concern, because in the absence of proper management it has become a cause of environmental degradation. Such alarms are embodied in the unsustainable activities, which may include:

- (i) intensive cultivation of land without taking adequate care of soil fertility;
- (ii) development of irrigation facilities without proper water management, which leads to waterlogging, alkaline or saline soil;
- (iii) improper use of pesticides, fungicides, herbicides, etc., cause soil damage and biological imbalance;
- (iv) excessive trapping of underground water accounts for steep fall in underground water level;
- (v) replacement of high yielding hybrid varieties lead to spread of diseases capable of wiping out the entire crop as it happened with Irish potato crop in 1985 and Bengal rice famines in 1942;
- (vi) excessive use of non-degradable material like plastic creates problems of waste management;
- (vii) discharge of industrial and municipal waste in water bodies leads to problems like unmanageable water pollution; and

(viii) automobiles and industries have become a major cause of air pollution.

In fact, development without proper management has become a cause of eco-destruction, for which sustainable development is the only solution.

5.9 TOWARDS SUSTAINABILITY

The aim of ecologically sustainable development is to maximize human well-being or quality of life without jeopardizing the life support system. The measures for sustainable development may be different in developed and developing countries according to their level of technological and economic development. But developing countries like India can focus attention on the following measures :

- ensure clean and hygienic living and working conditions for the people ;
- sponsor research on environmental issues pertaining to the region ;
- ensure safety against known and proven industrial hazards ;
- find economical methods for salvaging hazardous industrial wastes ;
- encourage afforestation ;
- find out substitutes for proven hazardous materials based on local resources and needs instead of blindly depending on advanced nations to find solutions ;
- ensuring environmental education as a part of school and college curriculum ;
- encourage use of non-conventional sources of energy, specially solar energy ;
- as far as possible production of environment-friendly products be encouraged ;
- use of organic fertilizers and other bio-techniques should be popularized ;
- environment management is a key for sustainable development, it should include monitoring and accountability ; and

— Need for socialization and also humanization of all environmental issues.

The prime need for sustainable development is the conservation of natural resources. For this, the development policy should follow the following norms :

- (i) Make all attempts not to impair the natural regenerative capacity of renewable resources and simultaneously avoid excessive pollution hampering the biospherical capacity of waste assimilation and life support system.
- (ii) All technological changes and planning strategy processes, as far as physically possible, must attempt switch from non-renewable to renewable resources uses.
- (iii) Formulate a phase out policy of the use of non-renewable resources in general.

Thus, for a worldwide sustainable growth, there is need for efficient and effective management of available resources. In this field, the production of 'environment-friendly products' (EFPs) is a positive step. With the industrialization and technological development, markets are flooded with products of daily consumption. They could however be a source of danger to health and damage to our environment. There is thus need to distinguish the more environmentally harmful consumer products from those which are less harmful, or have a more benign impact on the environment right from the stage of manufacture through packaging, distribution, use, disposal and reusability or recycling.

Throughout the world, now emphasis has been shifted to the production of EPF. In India, plans are afoot to market EFPs with combined efforts of Bureau of Indian Standards, Ministry of Environment and Forests and Central Pollution Control Board. Since 1990, a scheme of labelling 'ECOMARK' has also been started. In its first phase, the items included in this scheme are soaps, plastics, paper, cosmetics, colours, lubricating oil, pesticides, drugs and various edible items. The scheme was first notified in the gazette on 20 February 1991. The objectives of the scheme are :

(i) to provide an incentive for manufactures and to reduce adverse environmental impact of products, (ii) to reward genuine initiatives by companies to reduce adverse environmental impact of their products, (iii) to assist consumers to become responsible in their daily lives by providing them information to take account of environmental factors in their purchase decisions, (iv) to encourage citizens to purchase products which have less harmful environmental impact, and (v) to improve the quality of the environment and to encourage the sustainable management of resources.

5.10 Ask Yourself

- Q. 1 Explain the concept of sustainable development in detail.
 - Q. 2 Explain in brief the environmental degradation in India and the poverty population linkages.
 - Q. 3 What are the various emerging perspectives of sustainable development in India?
 - Q. 4 Enlist and explain the various dimensions in India which have crucial relevance to sustainable development
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STRUCTURE

- 6.1 Objectives
- 6.2 Meaning of Social Change
- 6.3 Characteristic of social change
- 6.4 Issues of social change.

6.1 OBJECTIVES

The main objective of the Lesson is to equip you with :

- Meaning of social change and its characteristics.
- Issues of social changes.

6.2 MEANING OF SOCIAL CHANGE.

Social change is a fact of life. While many people embrace it, equal numbers fear it. Social change as a concept is very broad one. It consists of a constellation of processes of change in human society in terms of place, time and context. Since it is so broad, it is bound to be somewhat imprecise, tentative and value-neutral.

Social change is an ever-present phenomenon in social life, but has become especially intense in the modern era. The origin of modern sociology can be traced to attempt to understand the dramatic changes shattering the traditional world and promoting new form of social order. Social change and social order are closely connected. We may not understand the former without latter. Social order is a condition of society characterised by harmonious social relations and lack of conflict

among individuals and or subgroups as viewed by Duberman and Hartjen in their book on Sociology.

CONCEPT OF SOCIAL CHANGE

Broadly speaking, there are two types of processes: (1) which sustain the social system; and (2) which bring about change *in* the system and change *of* the system. The first processes may be termed as conformity, status quo and continuity. The latter may be called as processes of cultural and structural change. Social change is universal. Its pattern and factors may vary from time to time and from place to place. Change can be seen in terms of the elements of time and history in relation to a given society or social phenomena. MacIver and Page (1967) write in this regard: “Society exists only in time-sequence. It is a being not a process, and changing equilibrium of present relationship.” Social change is distinct from cultural or civilisational change. In social change the emphasis is on social relationships.

A social structure is a nexus of relationships. It is sustained by those members who participate in social relationships. Social change means change in social structure. Change in social values, institutions, property relations, economic pursuits, personnel and role distribution may be cited as examples of social change in modern society. Social change is always relative in terms of time, space and economy. In fact, one can compare patterns of change on the basis of these three elements. Resistance to social change is also quite a common feature as change disturbs the ongoing social order and relations. Resistance is registered particularly by those who are adversely affected by processes of social change.

Examples of the first kind of process are socialization and social control. The line between such processes and the processes of change is not fixed. For example, in a society undergoing revolution, parents, in socializing their children, deliberately teach them values and patterns of behaviour that are oriented more to the future structure of society than to its present structure — at least, the parents are not teaching everything that their parents taught them. In this case, the parents are transmitting or maintaining culture but they are also helping to reshape the social system.

Moreover, although processes of change by definition change the social system,

they may also help to maintain it. In the face of new circumstances, a social system may need to adapt its structure to some extent in order to survive. Change in the structure of the system may enable it to maintain its integrity as a distinguishable, whereas if it maintains the same structure too long it may lose its integrity as a system altogether (Johnson : 1970).

Our task here is to explain what we mean by “social change”. How should we define **social change**? There is a sense in which every thing changes, all of the time. Every day is a new day; every moment is a new instant in time. The Greek philosopher Heraclitus pointed out that a person cannot step into the same river twice. On the second occasion, the river is different, since water has flowed along it and the person has changed in subtle ways too. While this observation is in a sense correct, we *do* of course normally want to say that it is the same river and the same person stepping into it on two occasions. There is sufficient continuity in the shape or form of the river and in the physique and personality of the person with wet feet to say that each remains ‘the same’ through the changes that occur.

Identifying the significant change involves showing how far there are alterations in the *underlying structure* of an object or situation over a period of time. In the case of human societies, to decide how far and in what ways a system is in a process of change, we have to show to what degree there is any modification of *basic institutions* during a specific period. In this context, Giddens (1994) states that social change refers to the alteration in basic structures of a social group or society.

THE MEANING OF SOCIAL CHANGE :

Since men are social creatures, social change means human change. To change society is to change man. In this context, Davis (1969 : 621) defines : “Individuals may strive for stability and security; societies may foster the illusion of permanence; the quest for certainty may continue unabated and the belief in eternity persist unshaken, yet the fact remains that societies, like all phenomena, unremittingly and inevitably change.”

This fact of change has long fascinated the keenest minds and still poses some of the great unsolved problems in social science. What, for instance, is the *direction* of social change? Is it toward some goal, toward some catastrophe, or toward mere extinction? What is the *form* of social change? Is it more rapid now than in the past

matter of borrowing or a matter of independent invention? What is the *cause* of social change? Is it some key factor that explains all change, a prime mover that sets everything in motion, or it many different factors operating together? ...And finally, what is necessary for the *control* of social change? Can we regulate and guide it in the direction of our hearts desire? These are the tantalizing questions — tantalizing not only because of their difficulty but because of their human significance. These questions have been discussed by Davis (1969) in his book, '*Human Society*'. Therefore, we would like to explain following things to understand the meaning of social change :

1. The Rate of change
2. The Direction of change
3. The forms of Social change
4. The source of Social change
5. The causes of social change

1. The Rate of Change :

Social change takes place in every society and in all periods of time, but its rate differs from society to society. In one society, the rate of change may be fast, while in another, it may be slow. But the “rate of change” has two different applications according to whether one thinks of whole societies or of parts. In the first application, the rate refers to the rapidity of change in different societies or in the same society at different times. In the second application, the rate refers to the rapidity of change in various parts of the same society, usually in the same period. Thus, it is a disputed question as to whether in Western civilization during last four centuries; economic and political institutions have changed more rapidly than familial and religious institutions. Moreover, there are two situations some favouring change, others opposing it. To the extent that they cancel each other, stability reigns. To the extent that forces favouring change prevail, a rate of change results. One must conceive of a balance of opposed forces,

2. The Direction of change :

In most discussions of social change, some direction is assumed. Often,

however, this assumption is not inherent in the facts but is contributed by the wishes of the observer. The direction is interpreted as tending towards some goal that the individual would like to see reached, and it is against this goal (not the actual end-result) that “speed” or “slowness” is measured. Frequently, it is possible to discern a consistent trend in changes that have taken place in the past — for example the trend of modern technology toward greater productivity. But such a trend may not continue forever. It may reverse itself, in which case there would still be change but in the opposite direction. Again the length of time under discussion must be kept in mind.

Attempting to take account of the direction of change is a necessary procedure both in organizing the facts and in arriving at causal principle. But a trend cannot be extrapolated unless there are logical and empirical grounds lying outside the given phenomenon for expecting a continuation of the trend. For instance, the fact that a given population has been growing rapidly does not mean that it will continue to grow at the same rate. An analysis of the various demographic and social factors affecting population growth may indicate that it will grow even more rapidly or considerably less so. When “factors” are mentioned, we are obviously in the realm of causal analysis, which is fundamental both for a consideration of rates and for a direction of change.

3. The forms of Social Change :

Closely linked with the question of direction is the problem of the *form* of social change. Broadly, two forms of social change: *cyclical* and *linear*. First, an extreme statement of the *cyclical* hypothesis would be that social phenomena of whatever sort (whether specific traits or whole civilization) recur again and again, exactly as they were before. Second, an equally extremely statement of the *linear* hypothesis would be that all aspects of society change continually in a certain direction, never faltering, never repeating themselves. Put so baldly, neither of these statements would prove acceptable to most people. Yet what sort of answer can be given? Is there any sort of compromise? Yes, if we continue ourselves to what is known rather than to the eternal, there is a possible compromise.

It is quite obvious that any trend will show minor fluctuations, for nothing changes at identically the same rate from one year to the next :

4. The Source of Social Change :

For a long time, a controversy raged in cultural anthropology as to which is the more important, invention or diffusion (see e.g. Kroeber : 1927; Lowie : 1937). Though not quite dead, it is a dying controversy—not because one side is winning but because the question is proving pointless. The emphasis on diffusion was in the main protest against the evolutionary point of view, which had implied that culture develops through a series of self generating stages. The diffusionists pointed out that independent invention occurs with extreme rarity. The fact that a particular society has a given cultural trait is not usually due to its having evolved to that stage, but to the fact that it borrowed the trait from another society. Indeed, by the simple process of borrowing, a primitive society may become civilized within a century or so and thus jump across a cultural chasm that took thousand of years to bridge by independent invention.

The diffusionists were correct in their criticism of the extreme evolutionary point of view. Yet, they too overstated their case. Some of them went so far as to claim that two similar traits in two different societies could not possibly be due to invention in both places. The civilizations of South and Central America, for example, could not have arisen by themselves, but must have obtained their civilized traits from Egypt by way of India, Java and Polynesia.

Obviously, the opposition between these two points of view is much like that between environmentalists and hereditarians, or linear and cyclical theorists.

In the same way “diffusion” turns out to be a complex abstraction, not a separate entity. No idea, no practice, no technique ever passed from one society to another without some modification being added to it. The borrowed culture trait must be somehow modified and adapted so as to fit into the existing cultural context. It follows that diffusion and invention are always inseparably mixed. To oppose them as if they were mutually exclusive is to raise a false issue.

5. The Causes of Social Change :

None of the questions so far discussed strikes the central one—the question of causation. It is now time to raise this question directly, to ask what brings social change and what retards it. Most popular among the causal theories are the determinisms.

There are two types of deterministic theories, one of which selects a *nonsocial*, the other a *social*, factor. The quickest way to disprove the first type is to show that concomitant variation between this factor and the social system does not occur. The second type is much harder to disprove.

A good example of the first kind of theory is geographical determinism, which holds that the geographical setting ultimately governs the form of society and hence explains social change. But the geographic environment, unaffected by man, changes very slowly and therefore cannot explain most social changes. Another example of deterministic theory on the strictly social level is economic determinism of “the materialistic interpretation of history”. Proponents of this view protect their weak logical flank by refusing to make clear just what they conceive the “economic factor” to be. Sometime they seem to include technology and again they seem to include political elements.

The feeling that the economic interpretation is hard-headed and realistic, whereas any other is idealistic and fanciful, turns out to be the opposite of the truth. It is necessary to ask when discussing the pursuit of self-interest, what the “self” is. It is not simply a biological entity that feeds and spawns through instinct, but a human being formed by the inculcation of beliefs, attitudes, knowledge and values.... The pursuit of self interest, therefore, may well involve the pursuit of ideals, if these have been incorporated as part of the self. The desire of Muslims in India to have a separate nation was not determined by their economic interest. On the contrary, since Pakistan was known in advance to be a poor area on which to found a nation, it was bound to prove economically very costly; yet the Muslims, by virtue of their religious motivation, were willing to bear the economic cost (Davis : 1969 : 633). This was a clear case in which religious sentiments determined economic behaviour rather than the opposite. The same relationship can be found in countless other cases.

EQUILIBRIUM AND SOCIAL CHANGE :

In their quest for simplicity most deterministic theories try to state a law of social change, as if the whole complex subject could be summed up in a single formula. All of them contain a grain of truth but they try to travel too far on one grain. The simplicity

they introduce is a false simplicity which does not explain but explains away this problem. Let us abandon, then, the quest for a single law of social change. The subject requires instead an entire system of generalizations such as the notion of social equilibrium makes possible.

Functionalists view change as process by which social equilibrium is being altered giving place to new equilibrium. This process occurs through differentiation and integration. Emile Durkheim believed that religion had the function of providing a common set of values that enhanced the social solidarity of those who believed in it.

6.3 CHARACTERISTICS OF SOCIAL CHANGE :

- 1. Universal Process :** Social change is a universal process. It is ubiquitous and continuous process. It is found in every society of the world. There is no society in the world which may remain stable for a long time. Somewhere the rate of change may be fast and somewhere it may be slow but change will be there.
- 2. Various forms of social change :** There are various forms of social change. Every society has processes of cooperation, adjustment, conflict and competition which reflect different forms of social change, e.g. it may be sometime unilinear, some time multilinear. Similarly, it may be problem solving or related to the welfare of the society. Other forms of social change are : cyclic or evolutionary or revolutionary, it may be some time for short period and some time for long run.
- 3. Irregular and relative :** The rate of social change is not equal in different units of society. Change is also relative. For example, the rate of social change is faster in urban society than in rural society. Similarly, western society has been more dynamic than Indian society. Its factor has different influence in different society. Therefore, one may do comparative study of social change.
- 4. Not Predictable :** Social change is not predictable. There are different factors which may be cause of social change. It is difficult to predict social relations, ideas attitudes, ideals and values etc.

6.4 ISSUES OF SOCIAL CHANGE :

Before to explaining conceptual things, we would like to discourse upon the major issues of social change. They are mainly :

1. Social Versus Cultural Change,
2. Change Versus Interaction,
3. Short Versus Long-Run Changes,
4. Whole Societies Versus Parts,
5. Description Versus Analysis.

1. Social versus Cultural Change :

By “social change” is meant only such alterations as occur in social organization — that is, the structure and functions of society. Social change thus forms only a part of what is essentially a broader category called “cultural change”. The latter embraces all changes occurring in any branch of culture, including art, science, technology, philosophy, etc. as well as changes in the forms and rules of organization. Cultural changes are thus much broader than social change. Sociologically, therefore, we are interested in cultural change only to the extent that it arises from or has an effect on social organization. We are not interested in it for itself apart from social change.

If sociology is the scientific study of social structure, it follows that when sociologists are concerned with change, their attention would turn to changes in social structure. Because *a social structure is an inter-related set of social relationships based on culture, social change encompasses transformations in both social relationships and culture*, then, is really socio-cultural change.

It is, of course, possible to consider cultural change without reference to social structure. This applies to both material and non-material change. Thus, focus could be on such technological changes as the airplane and automobile, or on alterations in language and norms. But sociologists take social structure as their province and by doing so; they tend to concentrate on changes involving the intersection of social relationships and culture.

Thus, it may simply view that *social change refers to alterations in social structures*. Of particular interest are those social changes that relatively important consequences and that tend to be comparatively long lasting.

2. Change versus Interaction :

Individuals in a society are constantly interacting, yet the structure governing such activity — the forms and rules of interaction — may remain relatively stable for long periods of time. The activity itself should not be confused with changes in the structure, which alone comprises social change. There is a close connection between social interaction and social change, for it is mainly through interaction that change comes about. Though, the distinction between interaction and change may seem elementary, but in practice it is not always clear.

3. Short versus Long-Run Changes :

It seems wise to emphasize fairly long periods — generations or centuries at least — in first approaching the topic of social change. This helps to eliminate the confusion between interaction and change, and saves us from too great preoccupation with the ephemeral present. What seems important today, what seems a vital change may be nothing more than a temporary oscillation having nothing to do with essential trends? This is what historians mean when they say that time alone can place the events of the day in their true perspective. In any case, in discussing social change, one should specify the length of time one has in mind.

4. Whole Societies versus Parts :

Any social system differs in different epochs. Some of its parts may remain virtually stable but as a whole it changes. This fact has led many authors to try to delineate types of societies and to interpret social change as the successive shifting from one type to another (Spenger : 1926).

5. Description versus Analysis :

The poorest way to understand social change is simply to recapitulate all past changes. The study of social change has often tended in the direction of sheer history, with no real light on causation; or, discouraged by the avalanche of facts, it has tended

in the direction of sheer generalization, with mere citation of examples instead of systematic proof or disproof. To strike a golden mean requires that the facts be marshaled, organized, and dealt with in terms of theoretical propositions susceptible of verification. Only in this way, by a method analysis, can these kaleidoscopic phenomena of history be reduced to scientific order.

Kingsley Davis (1967) has listed several questions with regard to the understanding of social change. What is the direction of social change? What is the rate of social change? What is the source of social change? What is the cause of social change? Is the cause of social change overwhelmingly deterministic in nature? Can social change be regulated to the desired direction.

All the classical theories of society have grappled with these questions related to social change. Peter L. Berger and Brigitte Berger (1976) state that “the experience of social change is at the very core of sociology as a discipline. Sociology developed as an intellectual response to catalytic social change”. The French Revolution, the Civil War in America, the Industrial Revolution in Britain, and the Indian Freedom Movement are examples of rapid transformations of society.

SOCIOLOGY AND THE STUDY OF SOCIAL CHANGE

Sociology as a discipline would focus on change in society, its social groupings, institutions and behaviour patterns. Two tendencies can be ascertained in situations of upheaval and transformation: (1) to contain the change within certain limits; and (2) to channelise change in a desired direction. The first has been labelled as a conservative perspective, whereas the second is called a progressive or radical view. Berger and Berger (ibid) observe that “in either case, social change presents itself as a problem in a double sense. Social change is an intellectual problem, in that it is a challenge to understanding; social change is also a political problem, in that it demands practical actions”. Thus, social change is both an ideology and praxis. There is a need to strike a balance between the two. Max Weber (1970) treats the two as distinct from each other, whereas Karl Marx (1970) believes in the unity of theory and practice.

Auguste Comte (1877), who is known as the father of sociology, predicted the

direction that change would take in future. The idea of progress is basic to his evolutionary perspective. He makes a reference to laws- of history. The three stages of evolution of society are theological, metaphysical and scientific. In Comte's view, sociology can be understood as a kind of religion of progress, with the sociologist playing the role of priest. Comte's emphasis is on scientific reason and progress. Herbert Spencer (1961) was another evolutionary-positivist thinker who applied the Darwinian view about the dynamics of evolution to society and changes therein. Hewrites: "As in the biological sphere, social change too is dominted by the conflicts and adaptations that result in natural selection. The purpose of evolution biological or social is the survival of the fittest". Karl Marx(1970) explains social change in terms of the class relationships. Both Spencer and Marx emphasise that conflict and struggle are the forces of history. However, Marx refers to the concept of 'false conciousness' - the conciousness of the people who are unaware of their real social position in society with a more specific emphasis. He visualises the emergence of a capitalist society, class struggle between the bourgeoise and the proletariat, and the overthrow of the capitalist system.

STRUCTURE

- 7.1 Introduction
- 7.2 Problem Areas
- 7.3 Evolutionary Theory
- 7.4 Technological
- 7.5 Economic Theory
- 7.6 Mal-Integration
- 7.7 Adaptation
- 7.8 Ideational
- 7.9 Cultural Interaction

7.1 INTRODUCTION

All social structures change. The speed of change may vary from glacial to the mercurial, but the existence of social change is a constant. Given this fact, at least two questions are relevant: What are the *theories* of social change? What are the *processes* by which social structures are modified?

7.2 PROBLEM AREAS

There are two broad problem areas in the theoretical study of social change. The first is concerned with the factors or mechanisms which produce change. The second is concerned with general characteristics of the course of social change. The rest of

the lesson is concerned with mechanism of changes and the following lesson with the course of change in context to the different theories.

Since the eighteenth century, social theorists who have sought the mechanisms of social change, have tried on the whole to explain all or most forms of change in terms of single factor. Their theories can be divided into two groups: those explaining change in terms of endogenous factors or processes, and those emphasizing exogenous factors. The former have dominated most sociological thinking.

There are broad four theories connected with social change. These are Evolutionary, cyclical, functional, and conflict theories. The study of theory presents an interesting insight into the sociology of knowledge.

7.3 EVOLUTIONARY THEORY

Evolutionary theory holds that societies change from simple beginning to complex form, leading to big industrial and information technology complexes in modern times. The evolutionary view of social change got its momentum from Charles Darwin's work, *'The Origin of Species'* by means of Natural Selection, published in 1859. The societies or groups that survived were those that were able to adapt to the conditions of life. For the evolution theorists, 'change' did not mean 'progress'.

Cyclical theory views society as having a life cycle just like a human being : birth, growth, maturity, and death. The pattern of change repeats itself. This kind of change may also be seen in the Hindu mythology. Oswald Spengler writes in *'Decline of the West'* (1918), that the fall of the civilization is a matter of 'destiny', and that each civilization is like a biological organism having a life cycle. Arnold Toynbee held the belief that societies advanced or declined according to 'responses' to 'challenges'. Pitrim Sorokin, author of *'Social and Cultural Dynamics'* (1937), argued that Western civilization have been always fluctuating between two cultural extremes, the 'sensate' in which we perceive in our mind by our senses, and the 'ideational'. Cyclical theory of change hardly has the test of time as they are viewed as too speculative and subjective.

Functional Theory : Functionalists view changes as process by which social equilibrium is being altered giving place to new equilibrium. This process occurs

through differentiation and integration. Emile Durkheim believed that religion had the function of providing a common set of values that enhanced the social solidarity of those who believed in it.

Conflict Theory : Conflict theory is influenced by Karl Marx. He stresses that conflict is vital to society and a main source of change. He views that social change is determined by economic factors and that material conditions of life determined social change; and that change from one stage to another is due to change in the economic factors, such as the method of production and distribution. Marx concludes that any alteration in material conditions of life brought change in all social institutions, like the state, religion and family.

In Marx's theory, economic change only occurs and produces other change through the mechanism of intensified conflict between social groups and between different parts of the social system. Recently social theorists have suggested that conflict, in its broadest sense, must be the cause of social change. The reasoning behind this is that if there is consensus in society, and if the various sectors are integrated, there is little pressure for change; therefore, change must be due to conflict between groups and/or between different parts of the social and cultural system.

Conflict may not be sufficient to bring about change in many circumstances; it may not be necessary in some, though it clearly is necessary in a great many. But intensified conflict is itself one of the *products* of many types of social change.

The attraction of conflict theory is partly that it provides a simple answer to the problems of sociology; but it should be emphasized, that social conflict is often as much as the product of social change as the cause. And it is commonly a great obstacle to certain types of social change.

Besides the above theories, Cohen (1968), analyzes the best-known explanations of social change in terms of a single or dominant factor are the technological theory, the economic theory, the mal-unlegration theory, the adaptation theory, the ideational theory and, finally, the cultural interaction theory. We shall review all of these before returning to the question; can there be a single theory of social change?

7.4 TECHNOLOGICAL

This theory, which is sometimes mistakenly associated with Marxism, has had something of a vogue recently. In one context, it is used to explain the growing similarity between socialist and non-socialist industrial societies. In another context, it is used to analyze and predict the process of social change in so-called developing societies. The theory can be considered in two forms: as stating the sufficient conditions, or as stating the necessary conditions of social change.

In the first form, the theory is obviously true in one respect and false in others. Any technological change *which is great enough* will produce some other social change as a consequence. For example, new techniques of manufacture are bound to affect social relations in the relevant industry; new techniques of warfare are bound to affect some aspect of military organization. It would be hard to find a technological change of any significance which did not produce *some* social change. This, however, does not mean that technological change alone can produce social change of all types.

Nor is technological change always a necessary condition for other social changes. It may be that certain technological conditions are necessary before other factors can produce certain change, but these need not precipitate social change. This is not to deny that technological change is sometimes responsible for widespread and fundamental changes in social structure.

7.5 ECONOMIC THEORY

Owing largely to the influence of Marx and Marxism, the economic theory of change occupies a major place in the discussion of social scientists and historians. This is not because the theory, at least in its Marxian version, is so widely accepted, but rather because it invites an endless series of refutations and defences. Of course, economic interpretations of history or social change need not be Marxist; but none of the other version of the doctrine are quite as interesting as Marxism.

The Marxist theory rests on the fundamental assumption that changes in the economic 'infrastructure' of society are the prime movers of social change. This 'infrastructure' consists of the 'forces' and 'relation' of production; the 'super-structure' consists of those features of the social system, such as the judicial, political, and

religious institutions, which serve to maintain the 'infra-structure' and which are moulded by it. Marx does not assert that the 'super-structural' elements are *completely* renewed with changes in the 'infra-structure', nor does he suggest that all societies at the same stage of economic development poses identical 'super-structural features'. His is not a theory of the *complete determinism* of all institutions by certain common general processes of economic change (Meyer: 1963: 11-46). It simply asserts that economic changes are fundamental and that they bring about other changes which are in accordance with economic interests.

It is interesting that Marx did avoid a technological determinism; for such a theory might have seemed in keeping with a materialist philosophy of history. But his avoidance was perhaps necessary. For technological changes being not as material substance but as *ideas in the mind of men*.

7.6 MAL-INTEGRATION

Closely allied to the conflict theory is one which explains change in terms of incompatibilities between different parts of social systems. There are a number of sources of inconsistency or incompatibility within social systems. The most obvious is the possible tension between personality and the demands made upon it by social institutions. It leaves men incapable of dealing conflicting demands, which leads to mal-integration.

The principle version of the 'mal-integration' theory explains change in terms of the conflicting pressures or demands of different sectors of a society or culture. The assumption underlying this is that if actions in one sphere inhibit those in another then, one or other must change.

There is a version of 'mal-integration' theory which explains social change in terms of the 'need' for compatibility between parts. But this is really a separate theory which attempts a functionalist account of social change. It can be called the 'adaptation theory'.

7.7 ADAPTATION

It is commonly stated that functionalism does not or cannot explain social change. Yet, functionalism must be a theory of change if it is also a theory of social

persistence. One form of the doctrine comes very close to using the biological analogy in explaining functional processes in terms of survival value, and proposes an explicit theory of social change in terms of adaptation. What the theory states, in effect, is that, social systems, as wholes, *adapt to external environments*.

There are four terms of reference which are helpful to understand this theory :
these are :-

1. system,
2. environment,
3. differentiation,
4. adaptation,

- 1. System :** Of course, the term ‘system’ is used here to refer to any interrelated set of social processes in which there is sufficient evidence of ‘feedback’ (or circular causation) to warrant the assumption of some degree of self maintenance. In this sense, a system could be a family or *the* family, a local community, an organization or type of organization, the economy of the common market, the Indian polity or economy, a tribal society, and so on.
- 2. Environment :** The term environment is not only used here in the sense of physical environment but in the sense of ‘ecological’ system which reflects interrelations between organisms and their environment. Therefore, we are interested in the inter-relationship between human beings and their environment to understand social change.

In fact, what some proponents of this theory have in mind is the process of adaptation of social systems to one another. Thus one can explain changes in the economy as adaptation to other economies or to the polity, or changes in the family structure in terms of adaptation other institutions, and so on.

- 3. Differentiation :** The argument, which stems from Spencer, seems to be that differentiated structures are more likely to survive in any given environment than simple ones; therefore, the development of differentiation is due to the proves of adaptation to the environment (parsons 1966 : 21-9).
- 4. Adaptation :** Adaptation is used above in different environment. As far more

satisfactory formulation of the adaptation theory is that of Wilbert Moore (1963), who prefers the term 'tension-management'. Moore suggests that theories of social change should aim to locate the points of greatest tension in social systems and identify them as sites of social change. This view rests on the assumption that one of the necessary processes of social systems is the reduction of tension, and that such processes occur through change. This tension management may be called a process of one system, or system part, to another; but Moore emphasizes the point that change is likely to produce tension as to create it.

7.8 IDEATIONAL

The ideational theory of change has periodically suffered considerable unpopularity amongst sociologists. This aversion is largely due to the influence of Marx, and partly to that of Durkheim's interpreters, particularly Radcliffe Brown.

All social phenomena are, in an important sense, *ideational*. A social relationship does not exist unless men have some expectations concerning the likely conduct of others. These mutual expectations, which are fundamental element in social relationships, are of course *ideas*. This does not imply that these *ideas* can be articulated as consistent systems by those who hold them.

In addition to those *ideas* which are *inherent* in social relationships, there are, in all types of society, *ideas* which men have about social institutions, structures and systems, as well as *about* the physical and 'supernatural' world.

These two ideational levels do not necessarily remain separate. On the one hand, ideas which are implicit in social relationship may become explicitly formulated into doctrines, which may then be exported from one society to another, when this happens then may also become causes of social change. On the other hand, explicit doctrines about society may be applied to particular social conditions, and ultimately, become ideas which social system. In the process, whereby ideas within social systems become explicit doctrines, and those about social systems become explicit expectations, considerable transformation usually occurs.

Of course, ideas within and about *society* are not the only ones which are alleged

to influence and cause social change; in fact some theories attribute all important processes of social change to technological ideas.

An ideational theory of social change could take one of three forms. First, it could assert that all social change is ideational. Second, it could assert that ideational changes are *necessary conditions* for certain types of social change. Third, it could assert that ideational changes are *important contributory factors* to many or most types of change.

In real social life, there is always some scope for ideational creativity; but whether this can, in turn, promote social change will depend on whether certain forces can break through the over-determined 'deadweight' of interdependent elements; where this independence is great the 'deadweight' effect is powerful indeed. Here the mutual reinforcement of external and internal constraints can only be loosened by some impact from outside of the social and cultural system. One such form of impact is interaction with members of other cultures.

7.9 CULTURAL INTERACTION

An indigenous theory which has been suggested to explain change in simple societies and some historical societies, is the cultural interaction theory (Hart : 1959). This states simply that when the members of two cultures interact there is a tendency for cultural change to occur or for an acceleration of cultural change to occur. The reason for this is not simply that each brings new items of culture to the other, but that the increase in the number of cultural items available to each leads to the possibility of new combinations of these items (Hart : *ibid*).

The cultural interaction theory also stimulates thought on the causes of social change in complex societies. For it suggests that there may be endogenous processes of stimulation in complex systems which are analogous to the exogenous stimuli which affect change in simple societies. The intention of this argument is that the different parts and sections of complex societies constitute, to some extent, separate sub-cultures which, when they interact, stimulate change. The more complex a social system becomes the greater the number of such parts it creates; therefore the more likely it is to provide sources for further change.

THE SEARCH FOR A THEORY OF SOCIAL CHANGE :

The idea that sociology can provide a single theory of social change is a myth. Social systems provide many sources of change. To attempt to reduce these to a single factor is to believe that social change is a very specific phenomenon which must have very specific causes. Most attempt to discover a single theory either seize on one factor—like technology—or else they result in rather empty, though high—sounding notions concerning ‘shifts in equilibria’, the effects of ‘negative-feed-back’, and so on.

The assertion that there is or should be a single theory of change is often linked with the false notion that there is a single theory of social persistence. If there is a single theory it has yet to be stated.

One can only say in defence of such ideas that it is possible to construct a model interrelated processes, some of which reinforce one another in their present state, others of which disrupt one another, and yet others of which reinforce certain tendencies to change. Such a model would take account of the many pressures, counter pressures, tensions and conflict in social systems, in an attempt to locate the main sources of change.

This brings up back to the question of the functional or systemic approach to sociological explanation and its application to the problems of social change. A number of arguments are marshaled against the functional approach in this connection. First, that it does not incorporate the idea of action, without which the explanation of social change is not possible, Second, that it involves some idea of equilibrium and can, in effect, and at best, only provide a model of a persisting system. Third, that it so emphasized the multi-causality of social phenomena— that is, the mutual interdependence of all factors in a system— that it cannot explain the occurrence of anything without referring to everything else.

STRUCTURE

- 8.1 Introduction
- 8.2 Linear Theory
 - 8.2.1 Apocalyptic theories
 - 8.2.2 Evolutionary theories
- 8.3 Unilinear evolutionary theory
- 8.4 Universal evolutionary theory
- 8.5 Cyclical Theory
- 8.6 Cyclical Evolutionary Theory
- 8.7 Ask Yourself

8.1 INTRODUCTION

The analysis and explanation of change occupy an important place in the sociological tradition. The founding fathers of the discipline, each in his own way, built this aspect into the subject matter of sociology. **Comte** divided the subject matter of the discipline into two major parts—Social Statics (the study of major institutions or institutional complexes) and Social Dynamics (the study of development and change). Both parts were considered equally important; in fact one could not be studied without the other. **Spencer**, who defined the scope of sociology and itemized its contents, emphasized the necessity of studying the interrelation between the different elements of a society with a view to examining how the parts influence the whole and how the whole influences the parts. This promotes an understanding of the transformations

taking pace in the parts as well as in the whole society. **Durkheim**, a central figure both in Sociology and Social Anthropology, demonstrated his interest in the theme of change in several works, particularly in his intellectually stimulating ‘The Division of Labour in Society’. In this book, he showed how, with growing division of labour, societies with “mechanical solidarity” (consisting of homologous units and having a segmental structure) are transformed into societies with “organic solidarity” (having differentiated units deriving their uniformity from a moral foundation of interdependence). **Weber’s** interest in change was implicit in his definition of sociology as “a science which attempts the interpretative understanding of social action in order thereby to arrive at a causal explanation of its course and effects.” His study of the effect of religious ideas on economic development is a classic among the analytical studies on a major aspect of change. A substantial part of **Marx’s** sociological writings was aimed at explaining the causes and the course of change. The tradition laid down by the founding fathers has been followed by successive generations of practitioners of the discipline.

8.2 LINEAR THEORY

This long tradition backed by massive scholarly effort notwithstanding, some sociologists bemoan the absence of an adequate theory of change. If we grant that there is a theory of social persistence, it is difficult to see why there should not be a corresponding theory of social change also. Thus, for example, if factors A, B & C explain the persistence of society, their absence should explain the phenomenon of change. This complaint may mean only that sociology lacks a master theory that is global in scope, all encompassing in nature, and able to explain change in all types of social institutions under all possible conditions. It is true that this approach is under partial eclipse today and that some of the earlier formulations of this variety are under critical review. Instead, sociology today deals concretely with particular types of societies operating under specific sets of conditions, without at the same time losing the comparative perspective. Thus, for example, it is found more profitable to deal concretely with “developing societies” rather than lump them with the more developed ones. Even among developing societies, significant typological distinctions are noted. In the general area of change, middle-range theoretical formulations are found operationally more useful than grand theories.

The Linear theory is discussed below under the heads :

8.2.1 Apocalyptic Theories

8.2.2 Evolutionary Theories

– Judaic and early Christian thinking viewed society as moving towards a final judgement that would result in a pure and just social order. Even contemporary theologians are influenced by the Christian version of the apocalypse. Several writers, in considering the social history of mankind in a broad sweep, have come forward with such consummational theories. For example, Condorcet (1743-1794) visualized our entire history as divided into nine major epochs. The last of these, beginning with the French Revolution, was to inaugurate the era in which we could become perfect. The new order was expected to create conditions for ensuring full scope for individual development and for promoting social justice. Comte regarded society as passing through three epochs :

- (a) the theological and military epoch, in which the supernatural provides the dominating themes of culture and military conquest is the principal social goal;
- (b) the metaphysical and juridicial epoch, constituting a period of transition between the first and the third major epochs ;
- (c) the scientific and industrial epoch, in which religious speculations is replaced by positivism and peaceful economic production, instead of the waging of wars, becomes the dominant objective of social organization.

From his writings, it is evident that Comte believed that all societies moved through certain fixed stages towards perfection. The classless society visualised by Marx represented the ultimate and near-perfect, if not the perfect, stage of social evolution.

– Evolutionary theories posited an evolution of society, but their emphasis was on progress rather than on perfectibility. Spencer, Darwin, Maine, and a host of other writers belonged to this school. They charted the course of human evolution (social) through well-marked “stages” registering increasing progress.

Sociological thinking during the nineteenth century was dominated by various conceptions of evolution which was thought of as an observable process that delineated man’s march of progress from the most primitive to the most civilized cultures.

Early Sociologists and Anthropologists were so preoccupied with the process of evolution that they laboured to show the lawful nature of societal growth through systematically defined stages, such as hunting-and-gathering, horticultural, agrarian and industrial, that human culture treaded. The theoretical structure erected by the early evolutionists inhered the notion of cumulative development in human culture and considered progress, defined as an intrinsic goal, inevitable and universal. Although nineteenth century evolutionism has now fallen into disuse, the models of man and society derived from it continue to exercise some influence on contemporary sociology.

Out of the four variants of evolutionary theory, namely, Unilinear, Cyclical, Multilinear and Universal theory, the unilinear is one of the earliest and most important :

8.3 UNILINEAR EVOLUTIONARY THEORY

Based on the assumption that human culture has undergone progressive and cumulative growth, unilinear evolutionary theory posits that man and society are progressing up definite steps of evolution leading to some final stage of perfection. This conception of evolution involves three essential characteristics. First, evolution is viewed as an irreversible processes of unidirectional growth and development. Second, every society will go through a limited number of fixed stages of development. Third, evolution necessarily involves progress and every succeeding stage is considered to be better and higher than the preceding one. Comte had no doubt that the development of human race was towards a single design—the ultimate state of excellence, an utopia if you will, which the human mind and mankind will eventually reach. Every society will pass through the three great epochs and culminate in the inauguration of a scientific-industrial society characterized by progress in all aspects of life—social, technological and spiritual.

Lewis Henry Morgan traced the unilinear development of societal progress ‘from Savagery through Barbarism to Civilization’. Savagery comprised of stages - transition from the infancy of the human race to the development of simple tools, and the discovery of fire. The stage of barbarism was characterized by the invention of pottery, domestication of animals, cultivated by irrigation and improved metal tools. The invention of a phonetic alphabet and the development of language characterized the ststus of civilization..

In a sense, Marx and Engels who also subscribed to the unilinear conception of societal progress. They identified three stages through which societies passed : Feudalism, capitalism and communism. Each stage of civilization, which contained the seeds of its own destruction, prepared the ground for the next stage. Just as capitalism was founded on the ruins of feudalism, communist society will be borne out of the revolution which will destroy capitalism. The transition from one stage to another was considered historically necessary and inevitable.

8.4 UNIVERSAL EVOLUTIONARY THEORY

This perspective traces the development of human communities from simple to more complex forms with all its attendant consequences particularly those of increasing differentiation of parts and the integration of structure. It is not concerned with fixed stages or a unilinear sequence of development; nor does it assume that every society go through the same stages. The universal evolutionary theory posits that human society as a whole has followed a discernible path of evolution with varying consequences and patterns in different cultures. Spencer has summarized the process of evolution as follows :

Like a low animal, the embryo of a high one has few distinguishable parts; but, while it is acquiring greater mass, its parts multiply and differentiate. It is thus with a society. At first the unlikeness among its groups of units are inconspicuous in number and degree; but, as population augments, divisions and subdivisions become more numerous and more decided. As we progress from small groups to larger, from simple groups to compound groups, from compound groups to doubly compound, one, the unlikenesses of parts increase the social aggregate, homogeneous when minute, habitually gains in heterogeneity along with each increment of growth, and to reach great size must acquire great complexity.

According to Spencer, the knowable universe consists of material aggregates which are in a condition of incessant change. There is a universal tendency for elements to move from a condition of unstable equilibrium to a condition of stable equilibrium. The homogeneous is a condition of unstable equilibrium and must become heterogenous; correspondingly, the simple must become compound and doubly compound and so on. Thus change involves transition from homogeneity to heterogeneity, and uniform to multiform.

Different typologies of society may also be cited as examples of the variants of universal evolutionary theory. Durkheim enumerated two types of societies based on two types of social bond—mechanistic solidarity and organic solidarity - and the transformation from the one to the other is interpreted in terms of greater functional specialization, structural differentiation and the ‘non-contractual basis of contract’ as the foundation for individualistic and secular association. For Tonnies, the process of evolution is from Gemeinschaft dominated by natural will, unity and sacred tradition, to Gesellschaft based on rational will, self-interest and contractual relationships. Redfield identified two types of societies – folk and urban – and the transition from the former to the latter involved growth in the size and complexity of social organization, greater functional specialization, improved technology, contractual relationships, increased interdependence and societal integration.

8.5 CYCLICAL THEORY

Sociological thinking during the nineteenth century was dominated by various conceptions of evolution which was thought of as an observable process that delineated man’s march of progress from the most primitive to the most civilized cultures. Early sociologists and anthropologists were so preoccupied with the process of evolution that they laboured to show the lawful nature of societal growth through systematically defined stages, such as hunting and gathering, horticultural agrarian, and industrial, that human culture treated. This promotes an understanding of the transformation taking place in the parts as well as in the whole society.

There are at least three variants of evolutionary theory, namely

- (i) Linear evolutionary theories
- (ii) Cyclical evolutionary theories
- (iii) Dialectical evolutionary theories

Theory, which we want to discuss is given below and, that is, **cyclical evolutionary theory**.

8.6 CYCLICAL EVOLUTIONARY THEORIES :-

“Cyclical theories of social change focus on the rise and fall of civilisations

attempting to discover and account for these patterns of growth and decay” - Ian Robertson.

Oswald Spengler:- According to this perspective, there is no straight line evolution but there are discernible stages or cycles which a society or a long-enduring culture may go through more than once or even repeatedly. The famous rise and fall theory of civilizations expounded by **Oswald Spengler** best illustrates the cyclical evolutionary perspective. According to him, all societies have periods of rise and fall, of growth and decline he identified eight great civilization with a similar development and a similar destiny. He wrote. Thus each society, like an organism, has birth, adolescence, youth, maturity, decline and decay. The rising phase of society is referred to as **culture** and its declining, phase as **civilization**. During the cultural phase the society has a soul which nurtures the folk spirit and all creativity occur during this phase. As society grows to enormous size, large cities develop like cancer on its body drawing off its vigour and vitality by routinizing interpersonal relationships and by over institutionalizing social networks. Referring to the city’s history, Spengler observed: ‘growing from primitive barter-centre to culture-city and at last to world-city, it scarifies first the blood and soul of its creators to the need to its majestic evolution, and then the lost flower of that growth to the spirit of civilization and so, doomed, moves on to final self-destruction.

Arnold Toynbee : Where **Spengler** saw eight high civilizations, **Arnold Tonybee**, the English historian and author of **A Study of History**, discovered twenty one cultures with a common pattern of growth and evolutionary history. The cumulative development of human culture is the result of the interplay between ‘challenges’ and ‘responses’. The process of disintegration starts when these minorities lose their dynamism and fail to respond creatively to new challenges. The antecedents of civilization determine their levels than those emerging from primitive societies. The main thrust of Tonybee’s work, however, is that while the course of its history as a whole is cyclical, every long-enduring culture climbs to great heights, each succeeding step a little bit better than the one preceding it. Hence, Toynbee’s cyclical perspective is sometimes called the ‘**circular staircase theory of history**’.

Max Weber : A combination of the cyclical and linear approaches is reflected in Max Weber : Social development follows a cyclical course, while cultural

development takes a linear path. In the course of social development, a point is reached when the old structure loses its legitimacy. At this point a charismatic leader takes over and starts building a new structure. In course of time, this structure also exhausts its legitimacy and creates the opportunity for a new charismatic leader to emerge. The path of cultural development, on the contrary, is linear in the sense that the movements is towards greater rationalization, inner consistency and coherence. Weber overemphasizes charismatic upheavals and appears to underplay the role of slow and gradual self-correctives that reform society. Society does appear to move from relatively simple to increasingly complex forms—from **Gemeinschaft** to **Gesellschaft** but Toennies did not foresee that some elements of the former persist in the emerging more complex form of society (Gesellschaft) or that they can re-emerge after an initial period of decline.

PITRIM SOROKIN :

Pitrim Sorokin is concerned with cultural changes on a wide scale. He has sought to explain the rise and fall of cultures in the framework of a single typology of “cultural mentalities”. He identifies several types of changes.

- (a) changes that are unique in time and space.
- (b) changes that have a recurring patterns.
- (c) unilinear changes
- (d) Oscillating changes
- (e) Spiralling changes and
- (f) Change with a “branching pattern”.

He yields a broad three-fold typology of cultures.

1. **Sensate culture** :- A sensate culture is one in which all expression- art-literature, religion, law, ethics, social relations, and philosophy-appeal to the sense and satisfy sensual needs and desire.
2. **Ideational culture** :- An ideational culture, on the contrary, is one in which


these expressions appeal to the soul, the mind or the spirit.

- 3. Idealistic culture :-** Representing a combination of elements from sensate and ideational cultures.

Robert Bierstedt has beautifully pointed out the main difference between sensate culture and ideational culture.

Sensate art, for example, is visual, sensational and photographic; ideational art is symbolic, religious and often abstract. Sensate sculpture emphasizes the nude human body in realistic fashion; ideational sculptures clothes the body in religious vestments. Sensate literature emphasizes the degeneracy of unimportant people, whereas ideational literature sings of the sublimity of souls and the sanctity of saints. Sensate philosophy involves the truth of the sense (empiricism), whereas ideational philosophy relies upon the 'truth of faith' (fideism). Sensate religion is of the lecture-hall variety and emphasizes social welfare; ideational religion is ritualistic and formal and gives its attention to heaven and to hell.

Sorokin identifies and emphasizes one important type of cycle : the alternation of the domination of the Sensate, Ideational and Idealistic types. The Sensate and the Ideational extremes are inherently temporary, one giving way to the other with a brief intervening period of the Idealistic. The cycle may be presented thus :



From the course of **western** history **Sorokin** has singled out a number of **cultures** to illustrate his **thesis**. While the **Medieval** culture was undoubtedly **ideational**, the **twentieth**-century American civilization is in the '**over-ripe**' Sensate Phase. The Golden Age of Athens under pericles was an **idealistic** system which is an integration

of both **ideational** and **sensate** cultures. Sorokin believed that the fluctuation between ideational and sensate cultures was inevitable.

DIALECTICAL THEORY

Marx while discussing social change talks about ‘historical materialism’. This is known as ‘dialectic interpretation of change’. Marx’s interpretation of social change is related to the changes in infrastructure and superstructure. Infrastructure is the economic base while superstructure consists of the political, legal and cultural institution. Social changes occur in the process of developing more sophisticated systems of production. Due to exploitative relationship between the classes, which develop in this process, the relations of production change. The intermediary processes are class polarization, changing of class in itself’ to class for itself’ and ultimately dramatic revolutionary change.

Changes that occur in the forces of production set up tensions in other institutions in the superstructure, the more acute these tensions become, the more there is a pressure towards an overall transformation of society. Struggles between classes result in either the disintegration of existing institutions or the transition to a new type of social order through a process of revolution.

Marx’s dialectical theory of social change is also called deterministic theory of social change. He stressed economy as the only factor affecting all other aspects of social life and bringing about social change.

8.7 ASK YOURSELF :

- Q1. Critically examine cyclical theory of Social Change.
- Q2. Describe linear theory of Change.

FACTORS OF SOCIAL CHANGE

Social change occurs in the structure and culture of a society through internal and external factors. The structure of society refers to infrastructural facilities, their distribution among people, and people's access to them. The culture of society consists of tradition, religion, and norms of living and behaving with each other. Since the structure and culture of a society are static, social change is an inevitable process.

It has been stated in the earlier chapter that the direction of social change can be upward or downward, linear, multilinear or cyclical. Social change can occur in the form of progression or regression. Thus, social change refers to shifts in the structure and culture of a given society. Generally, social change is value-neutral, but sometimes it occurs in the form of ideological expressions of a conservative or a radical nature. Change is also cumulative, particularly in the field of science and technology. Besides being cumulative and evolutionary, change is also a cyclical and curve-like phenomenon.

Since tradition and modernity co-exist, continuity and change are empirical facets of social life. Tradition and continuity co-exist because all societies need a certain amount of stability and social checks. Modernity and change are required to attain new levels of knowledge and technical know how to meet the changing demands and challenges. It is these conditions which call for social change. Social tensions and conflicts are also sources of social change. Social conflicts are caused by differential values and interests of the old and the young, the educated and the illiterate, the townsmen and the rural folk.

FACTORS OF SOCIAL CHANGE

There is no single cause of social conflict and change. The following factors have, however, been mentioned: (1) demographic, (2) technological, (3) economic, (4) cultural, (5) legal and administrative, and (6) political.

DEMOGRAPHY AND SOCIAL CHANGE

The following four areas fall within the domain of the study of demography : (i) To ascertain the total population within a prescribed geographical area. (ii) To ascertain as to whether the population in particular period or year has increased or declined as compared to base period or year. (iii) To analyse the probable reasons for the increase or decline of population. (iv) To indicate, in the context of the aforesaid data, the future trend of population.

SOCIAL DEMOGRAPHY

A change in population of any area depends on three factors or variables : (a) birth, (b) death, (c) migration. This may be put in the form of an equation :

$$P_2 = P_1 \pm (\text{net increase/decrease}) \pm \text{Net migration.}$$

(In this equation, P_1 = Population of the base year. P_2 = Population of the year of comparison. Net increase/decrease = Birth rate — Death rate. Net migration = Immigration — Emigration).

Birth rate is a function of fertility, i.e., the *actual* reproduction of women. Demographers distinguish fertility from fecundity. The latter means the biological capacity to conceive and bear children. Usually, it covers women of the age-group 14-50 years.

Kingsley Davis observed that “fertility, morality and migration are all to a great extent socially determined and socially determining”³⁶. We may, therefore, take note of the social factors which bear on fertility, mortality and migration. We may thereafter take up the impact of demographic changes on society.

SOCIAL FACTORS DETERMINING FERTILITY

Human fertility involves the physiological capacity of women and men to

reproduce, subject to individual choice and social control. Both individual choice and social control are, however, considerably affected by cultural factors, either negatively or positively. We may note briefly some of these factors.

- (i) A society in which a couple is not supposed to marry until the husband is able to support a wife and family is likely to experience a lower birth rate and vice versa.
- (ii) Birth rate depends on whether law of the land lays down the minimum age at which men and women are permitted to marry. Birth rate goes down if the prescribed minimum age is comparatively high.
- (iii) Birth rate depends on whether the community adopts family planning as a way of life. If the community upholds values conducive to family planning, the birth rate is likely to be low and vice versa.
- (iv) Birth rate depends on whether abortion or temporary termination of pregnancy is on is not legally permissible.
- (v) Fertility depends on whether society permits widow re-marriage Kingsley Davis has shown that this is one of the main cultural factors responsible for lesser fertility among Hindus than among Muslims in India.
- (vi) A number of recent investigations have confirmed the fertility-reducing effect of breast feeding. Prolonged breastfeeding reduces the chances of pregnancy by delaying the return of menstruation as well as the return of ovulation in women after childbirth. It is interesting to note that demographers estimate that, at least, upto 1974, the aggregate contraceptive protection provided by breastfeeding in developing countries has probably been greater than that achieved through family planning programmes. Hence a decline in the practice of breastfeeding can increase fertility, if it is not controlled by other means.
- (vii) Education affects fertility. This may be discussed from different points of view. Several studies of differential fertility at both individual and aggregate levels have shown that education, particularly female education, is more influential than any other factor in decreasing fertility. Among the major states in India, Kerala has currently the lowest birth rate and the highest literacy rate; Uttar

Pradesh, which has the highest birth rate, ranks lowest in literacy rate – with the exception of Bihar. The relationship between educational level and fertility may be discussed in terms of use of contraceptive. According to an all- India sample survey conducted in 1970 by Operations Research Group, only 13 per cent of reproductive age couples with illiterate wives ever used any contraceptive method and the corresponding percentages were 29, 43, and 72 among couples with primary-, secondary-, and college-educated wives respectively.

A part from acceptance of family planning, delayed age at marriage is another way by which education can be instrumental in fertility decline. Several surveys have confirmed that educated girls tend to be married at a later average age, some of them late enough to have fewer children. For example, the 1961-62 National Sample Survey data show that among couples living in urban areas, the average age of illiterate wives was 16 years while that of college graduates was 22 years.

- (viii) The theories linking economic development and fertility recognise that one main reason for high fertility in less developed countries is parents' expectations of support from their surviving children, especially sons, in their old age. The decline in such expectations is presumed to be one of the ways in which economic development reduces fertility.
- (ix) The fertility level of a society may be related to its mortality level. A decline in mortality eventually produces a decline in fertility. So far as decline in fertility is concerned, reduction of infant and child mortality seems to be more pertinent than other components of mortality. Many parents in developing countries depend heavily on children for old age security and as insurance against various kinds of potential risks. Since the degree of uncertainty regarding survival of children is high in many developing countries, "the most plausible response of parents is toward over-compensation for the loss of children. An actual reduction in infant and child mortality, accompanied by a perception of reduction in the degree of uncertainty, is expected to reduce fertility ..."

The social and cultural factors affecting fertility, which are listed above, are

only illustrative and not exhaustive. What is the implication of such a study? Fertility behaviour of couples in every society is undoubtedly a matter of individual choice. But individual choice is influenced considerably by values and social institutions. In recent years, state intervention in fertility regulation in the form of state-sponsored family planning programmes appears to be a very powerful agency whose influence will be felt in the years to come.

SOCIAL DETERMINANTS OF MORTALITY

Like fertility, mortality is also determined by social factors some of which are noted below :

- (i) A high income at aggregate and individual levels is expected to cause decline in mortality because it facilitates increased consumption of items favourable to health, such as food and nutrition, medical and public health services, education, housing and leisure.
- (ii) Provision of public health services is another important factor affecting mortality. “In developed countries the validation of the germ theory of disease in the late 19th century and its impact on public health practices and technology had a significant impact on subsequent mortality decline”. Demeny, the demographer, is of the view that the application of modern techniques of public health control in less developed countries, independent of income level and distribution, is the main reason for the uniform trend in post-war mortality decline. A comparative study of mortality in Kerala and West Bengal shows that greater accessibility of health services in the rural areas of Kerala is one of the main reasons for lower mortality in that state.
- (iii) Education has an important role in affecting mortality. The link between education and mortality may be stated thus. The education of mother is of crucial significance. “One possible mechanism is greater awareness among literate women about the need to use modern health facilities and, consequently, higher utilisation of the facilities by them than by illiterate women. Other mechanisms through which education affects mortality are perhaps by generating modern attitudes regarding health, disease, nutrition, personal hygiene and sanitation.”

As in the case of fertility, so also in the case of mortality the factors effecting it, as listed above, are only illustrative and, by no means, exhaustive.

SOCIAL DETERMINANTS OF MIGRATION

Migration is a function of two kinds of factors : (i) Push factor which pushes people out of the country, resulting in what is generally known as emigration. (ii) Pull factor which attracts people into the country, resulting in what is called immigration.

Some of the factors which exercise either of these two kinds of influences are summarized as follows : (i) The prospect of better jobs or working conditions outside the country may push people out of the country while similar prospect in the home country may attract people from outside. (ii) Climate may be a factor influencing decisions of people either to go out or to come in. (iii) Religious or political persecution/ freedom in a country may be a factor which influences the decisions of people either to go out of the country or to attract, people of another country to come in. (iv) Law may influence migration directly. The host country may have immigration laws which may either encourage immigration or may serve as a deterrent.

IMPACT OF DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGES ON SOCIETY

Impact of demographic changes on society may be examined from three points of view : (i) Size of population; (ii) age composition of population; (iii) economic development.

SIZE OF POPULATION

Demographic changes may lead to either increase or decrease in the size of population. Apart from its impact on the economic life of society, the size of population affects social attitudes and social relationships. The observations of MacIver and Page on this aspect are very revealing. "For example, countries with growing populations and relatively limited resources have, under appropriate conditions, an incentive to imperialism and to militarism, while these attitudes in turn encourage a further increase of population. Thus, in Italy, which is both populous and relatively poor in resources, Mussolini constantly proclaimed that empires cannot be won or defended except by 'fecund peoples'. On the other hand, increase of population threatens the standard of living and thus inspires a change of attitude. At a certain stage in the unprecedented

growth of population in the nineteenth century the practice of birth control took a new development. This practice in turn had many repercussions on family relationships and even on attitudes towards marriage.”

With a change in population, there is a change in the age-composition of the population. The proportion of elderly people may either go up or go down in relation to total population, or the proportion of young people may either go up or go down in relation to total population. Such changes have far-reaching social consequences.

In the first place, a very important economic consequence of differences in age structure is the effect of age structure on the *dependency ratio*. The dependency ratio is defined as “the ratio of persons in dependent ages to persons in economically productive age-groups” The lower dependency ratio makes it easier for persons in the economically productive ages to support those in the dependent age-group. The dependent ages refer to ages ‘under 15 years’ and ‘65 year and over’. The remaining age groups are economically productive.

The second important economic consequence of differences in age structure is in respect of the average age of the labour. In the rapidly sloping age distribution caused by high fertility, the average age of persons within the broad age group 15 to 64 years will be relatively low. In the gently sloping age structure caused by low fertility, the average age will be relatively high. The average age of the labour force may produce several social consequences. A younger labour force has this advantage that they are likely to be more flexible and more receptive to new ideas and they are thus likely to learn new skills more readily. An older labour force, on the other hand, is likely to be more responsible and experienced and, at the same time, less receptive to new ideas and less adaptable to new innovations.

The third economic consequences of differences in age structure are in terms of pattern of consumption. Societies having large proportions of children are required to spend relatively larger amounts of money on food and education. On the other hand, societies with larger proportions of elderly people have to spend relatively more on medical care. There will be many other changes in patterns of

consumption consequent upon changes in age composition of a population.

Fourthly, variation in age structure will have demographic consequences. Thus, a young population will tend to have a much lower crude death-rate (the number of deaths per thousand population per annum) than an old population. This is obviously due to the fact that mortality rate is comparatively higher among aged people.

POPULATION GROWTH AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

We may approach this theme from two points of view :

First, theoretically speaking, population growth may have two contradictory effects on costs of production. There is one possibility that growth of population may expand the market for goods and thus may prepare the ground for increasing the scale of production. If this happens, the economies of scale would accrue. Thus, an increase in population may lead to a lowering of production costs. There is also a second possibility. The growth of population may strain the existing resources so much that “the law of diminishing marginal returns” may begin to operate resulting in lower rate of productivity for every additional application of in-put. If what is visualised as the first possibility actually happens, living standards are bound to improve. If, on the other hand, the second possibility becomes a reality, living conditions are bound to decline.

Secondly, changes in the rate of growth of population produce differences in the dependency ratio. This will affect the average living conditions of most of the families. In their book, *Population Growth and Economic Development in Low-Income Countries*, Ansley Coale and Edgar M. Hoover prepared projections in order to indicate how changes in fertility and mortality might affect the ratio of non-earning dependents to earners in India. According to their projection, which was based on the assumption of declining mortality and unchanged fertility, the ratio of dependents to wage-earners would rise during the period from 1956 to 1986. On the other hand, according to the projection based on the assumption of the same declining mortality but also a 50 per cent decline in fertility by 1981, the ratio of dependents to wage-earners would have declined by 1986. It is clear from these projections that the level of living in the average Indian family would be greatly improved by a reduction in fertility. On the other hand, continued decline in mortality might threaten existing levels of living merely by increasing the number of persons dependent on each wage-earner.

THEORY OF THE DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION

The theory of the demographic transition was popularized just after the end of World War II. This theory has been advanced as a comprehensive explanation of the effect of economic development both on mortality and fertility decline. The theory is as follows :

It is held that there are four stages of demographic transition. In the initial stage prior to economic development both birth and death rates are high. Because the birth rate is only approximately equal to the death rate, the natural increase in population is just about nil. During the second stage when there is simultaneous occurrence of economic development, industrialisation and urbanisation, birth rate is high and death rate declines. The rise in birth rate may be attributed to the comparative affluence of the people and their lack of motivation in the initial stages of economic development for practising family planning. The fall in mortality may be explained by the fact that economic development leads to a rise in the standard of living, including a higher level of nutrition, better sanitary facilities, and improved medical care. The second stage is, therefore, marked by an explosive population growth. This stage is characterised as pre-transitional stage. During the third stage (called transitional stage), birth rate begins to decline with the result that the rate of population growth is positive but of lesser magnitude than in the second stage. In terms of population growth, there is approximately a levelling off at this stage. The fourth stage (called post-transitional stage) is characterised by small or negative growth of population, since a low birth-rate approximates in magnitude a low death rate.

Economic activities occupy a major importance in the culture of every social group. Apart from the time spent in eating and sleeping most of the people devote the greater part of their lives to earn a living. As a consequence, the patterns of their daily activity are greatly influenced by their technology, i.e. by the kinds of goods which they are able to produce, by the ways in which they use them, and by the methods which they employ to produce them. In primitive societies, production was carried on with the aid of simple hand tools, and men spent most of their waking hours hunting, fishing, or tilling the soil. In modern industrial societies, on the other hand, technology is very much a part of our lives. We travel long distances by automobile, bus or train to reach our places of work, and spend a considerable portion of each day in offices, factories or laboratories. In our day to day living, we take the help of various technological aids. It will not be wrong to say that technology provides the basis of the material aspects of modern culture.

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN VALUES AND TECHNOLOGY

The term 'technology' should be understood in sociology in a much wider sense than the meaning usually attributed to it. The term does not simply mean machines and scientific instruments. It also implies an appropriate attitude, habits of thought and action. The reason is obvious. In the absence of the latter, mere installation of machine does not yield the desirable result. Machine does not work on its own. It has to be worked by man. The effectiveness of the machine, therefore, depends on the way it is worked. If we make a comparative study of the working of the same type of machinery in different societies, we shall find to our surprise that in one society eighty to ninety percent of the productive capacity of the machinery might have been obtained while in another society the percentage might be forty or fifty or even less. The

differences in the utilisation of the productive capacity of the machinery have to be attributed to the differences in the personnel behind the machine. In one case the men who work on the machine may have the right attitude and the right motivation whereas in another case they may not have similar attitude and motivation. The observations of G. M. Foster are very pertinent : “Technological development is, indeed, a complex process. It does not simply mean the over acceptance of material and technical improvements. It implies a cultural, social and psychological process as well. Some writers, therefore, prefer to use the term socio-technological development”.

Max Weber in his classic book, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, discussed at length the relation between the dominant values and the entrepreneurial role of those who share those values. The same analysis applies to the use of machinery as well. The observations of Kingsley Davis are very illuminating. “One common feature of the fixed society is what might be called diffuse other-worldliness—the tendency to fix attention on transcendental world and to view the material world primarily as symbolic of transcendental realities. Since technology and science deal with the intrinsic relations between phenomena, the insistence upon a supernatural interpretation in every detail is a serious obstacle”. Professor D. P. Mukherjee brings out this point very forcefully thus : “The ideal pattern of Hindu values was woven round ‘wantlessness’. How could technology and machines geared to the production of goods for the satisfaction of wants, which created more wants, joint wants, derived wants, the infinite hyperbola of wants, be consonant with the pattern of Hindu norms? How could such norms square, for that matter, with economics, grounded as it was on wants and their satisfaction? If absolute separation of the soul from the body be the utter sum of existence, then Gandhiji, and with him every Hindu,... would raise the eternal query : Why this craze for machinery? Why machine civilisation at all?”

The same theme may be discussed from another perspective. The full utilisation of machine demands a flexible attitude and receptivity to new ideas and new methods. “Some cultures value positively novelty and change for their own sake. The fact that something is new and different is sufficient reason to examine it and perhaps to try it”. There are some cultures, on the other hand, which are not favourably disposed towards novelty and change discourage all attempts toward introducing novelty and

change. Technology does not yield the best results in the hands of those who are not open to the pragmatic test, more hedonistically rational and experimental.

The foregoing discussion establishes beyond doubt the close relationship between values and technology. When we discuss the type of changes which technology brings about, we should bear in mind that technology is both a promise and a demand. When the demands of technology are fully met, only then can we expect the promise of technology to be fulfilled in large measure.

HOW TECHNOLOGY CAUSES SOCIAL CHANGE?

Ogburn has made an extensive study of the patterns of change in material culture. He refers to two patterns. First, mechanical inventions tend to accumulate, and, as a result, the material culture becomes enlarged. Ogburn illustrates this process as follows : “The use of bone is added to the use of stone. The use of bronze is added to the use of copper and the use of iron is added to the use of bronze. So that the stream of material culture grows bigger”. Ogburn, however, notes that all material culture does not accumulate. As the use of some objects declines, the knowledge of making them is gradually lost. “For instance, we no longer chip flints to make stone implements for the chase”. Hence, the process of accumulation of material culture can be described as selective accumulation. Second, mechanical inventions become increasingly diversified and elaborated over the years. Such diversification and elaboration become possible because “a basic invention makes possible many various applications of its principle”. For example, the development of the internal combustion engine has made possible many mechanisms driven by such power plants.

Ogburn has studied the *process* of social change that takes place under the impact of technology from three angles : (i) *Dispersion or* the multiple effects of a major material invention. (ii) *Convergence* or the coming together of several influences of different inventions. (iii) *Spiral* or the circular cumulative accelerating process.

- (i) *Dispersion* : Any mechanical invention may have both *direct* and *derivative* social effects. Ogburn noted one hundred and fifty social effects of the radio : effects ranging all the way from entertainment, education, diffusion of culture to morning exercises. No invention is limited to a single social effect; its influence extends over a very wide range covering almost all aspects of society.

Besides these direct effects, a mechanical invention has some *derivative* effects as well. “When an invention has an influence on some institution or custom, the influence does not stop there but continues on and on, each influence succeeding the preceding one like links in a chain”. For instance, generation of hydel power has led in many cases directly to the spread of electric power in rural areas. Availability of power, in its turn, is followed by gradual growth of cottage and small scale industries in the countryside. This might eventually lead to a change in the modes of life, attitudes, and beliefs of the people of these areas. In this way, various social changes may be linked to the spread of electricity in the countryside.

(ii) *Convergence* : It should, however, be noted that the spread of electric power is not the sole determining cause of the growth of industrial units in rural areas. The industrial policy of the Government of India relating to the establishment and growth of ‘big’ industries also contributes to the emergence of rural industries as ancillary units of big industries. Thus, “the primary result of an invention is itself only one of many factors producing the secondary derivative influence and so on”. This brings us to the concept of *convergence* or the combination of several influences of different inventions. For example, the facilities of telephone, quick transport and of expensive accommodation have led people to lie far away from their place of work in the heart of the city. This leads to the size of a city or town getting bigger and bigger and to the development of suburban areas. It is, therefore, clear that group of inventions may converge together and may jointly have a derivative effect in the same way as a single invention has a derivative effect.

(iii) *Spiral* : So long we have been discussing only the derivative effects, that is, one social change leading to a number of social changes. But sometimes one social change leads to another which, in turn, reinforces the former change. Ogburn characterises this as ‘spiral’. Gunnar Myrdal calls this process “a circular cumulative accelerating process” because the effects of a change accumulate and the social changes are accelerated. The following example may be cited to illustrate this process. The industrial development of India is hampered by lack of capital. The government tries to meet this problem by

stimulating and mobilising peoples' savings and, at the same time, by drawing upon foreign aid. The industrial development, which is an offshoot of added capital investment, leads to additional employment, greater-income and, finally, to greater accumulation of savings and capital. Thus, the derivative effect of additional capital investment is turned back to stimulate the growth of capital. It is interesting to consider in this connection the view of Myrdal "that the social systems of developed countries are spiralling more rapidly than those of unaided underdeveloped countries and that hence the gap is widening between the developed and the underdeveloped countries."

SOCIAL EFFECTS OF TECHNOLOGY

That technology plays an increasingly dominant role in shaping our present day way of life is beyond question. Our modes of life and of thought and all our social institutions are influenced profoundly by mechanisation. Modern civilisation could not have developed in the absence of its technological base. Though technological and scientific advance has conferred great benefits on man, it has also created for him many problems. For example, when the industrial revolution first took place in England, it greatly accelerated the tempo of production, but, at the same time, it forced men and women particularly men, to stay away from home for long hours and thereby created problems not known before. Similarly, the development of nuclear power has given man the power to abolish all forms of human poverty and, simultaneously, also the power to destroy all forms of human life. In fact, technological changes are followed by far-reaching social changes. We may discuss these effects from different angles.

The increasing use and constant improvement of machines have raised tremendously the productivity of labour, that is, output per man-hour. It is true both of industrial worker and of farm labour. Greater quantities of goods are thus available. Most technological inventions have either of two purposes : either they are intended to create entirely new products for the direct satisfaction of human desires and needs or else their purpose is to produce familiar products more efficiently. Thus, technology raises our standards of living by providing for our enjoyment both new kinds of goods and greater quantities of goods. Technological advance has improved conditions of life for the average man in at least two other ways also. First, it has given him more

leisure. Second, it has greatly improved the quality of many of the goods which he buys.

Modern technology has brought into existence quite a number of jobs that require specialized skill and knowledge. Thus, “there are engineers who plan and design machines and factories, skilled construction workers, plumbers, electricians, and a great variety of machinists and mechanics who are engaged in making, operating and repairing machines”. There are also persons who are specially trained in the organisation and administration of industrial enterprises, in advertising and selling, in keeping accounts and records, etc. In other words, technology has brought into being new occupational classes and an open-class structure replacing the closed social system of old.

Modern technology has in many ways accelerated the tempo of human life. As illustrations, we may consider the following factors which contribute to the acceleration of the general tempo of living :

“The absence of adequate artificial light forced many projects to be confined to daylight hours; now they are carried on into the night.

The slowness of transportation gave much more leisure in travelling, though there was less comfort.

The slow rate of communication forced transactions to be spread over a longer period of time.

The dearth of professional entertainment—stage, screen, radio, and others—left time for meditation and thought.

The dispersal of a smaller population over rural districts provided fewer social contacts than are necessitated by today’s urban crowding”.

By destroying the domestic system of production, modern industrialism has radically changed the family organisation. Technology has placed man’s work, except in agriculture, wholly away from the homestead and has removed nearly all woman’s economic duties, except cooking, house-cleaning, sewing and laundering. It has, therefore, been possible for women to come away from home to the factory and the

office and have their independent earnings. The women have thus a new social life in this new environment.

Technology has affected man's ideas, attitudes, beliefs, and philosophies. Scientific discoveries and inventions have changed the attitude of men and women towards many rituals, creeds, and religious practices. Space explorations may change these ideas more radically in the near future. It is held that modern men and women are less serious, more inclined towards superficial excitements, and that wealth is esteemed more than cultural or intellectual attainments. The qualities that assure quick material success in life are prized highly. Men have grown pragmatic in their philosophies. They refuse to accept anything on trust. Every idea, concept or belief is tested by reason and experience before it is found acceptable. In other words, functional utility, rather than abstract value, dominates man's thinking in the modern world.

The government has also been affected by technology. By changing the family and the social organisation, technology has forced upon the government new functions and responsibilities in the form of social security measures and welfare activities. Another by-product of modern technology and industrialism has been a great expansion of government controls over business. Machine technology has brought into being large industrial enterprises which carry on production on a large scale. These mammoth enterprises have a great deal of economic power. If they are left to themselves, they are likely to engage in unfair competitive practices or to combine with one another in order to create unhealthy monopolies. The government has, therefore, to take action in order to protect the public against these abuses and dangers.

Besides, there are various other changes that follow from technological changes. Some of these changes can be identified. Improvements in transportation have led to the disintegration of the neighbourhood and to the growth of towns and cities. There is, moreover, the undermining of local folkways and the increasing dominance of urban ways over those of the country. Technology has also indirectly facilitated the growth of democratic ideas by transforming the position of labour from one of status to one of contract, and by bringing into existence the challenge of organised industrial groups, particularly the organisations of labour, to the older forms of authority.

THE CONCEPT OF CULTURAL LAG

The concept of cultural lag was first introduced by W. F. Ogburn in his book *Social Change* which was published in 1922. Since that date 'cultural lag' has been discussed from different angles by sociologists. Thus, MacIver has spoken of technological lag, technological restraint, culture clash and cultural ambivalence.

According to this theory, the culture of any society consists of a pattern of interrelated elements. We can easily see that all aspects of culture will not change at the same rate at the same time. Hence, a change in any one part of the cultural pattern may create strains and disturbances in the other closely related parts. Adjustments between these parts will have to be made eventually to restore harmony. But there will naturally be a time lag before harmony is restored. This is known as cultural lag.

In modern societies, it is technological change that sets the pace. According to Ogburn, "technological progress produces rapid changes in the material aspects of our culture, but the non-material aspects fail to adjust or they do so only after an excessive time lag. As a result, many troublesome social problems are created". For example, automobile was introduced long before we could sufficiently broaden our streets, which were suitable for horse-drawn carriages, and enforce strictly traffic rules in order to avoid motor accidents. There is, thus, a gap between the material aspects of a culture, represented by the automobile, and the non-material aspects, represented by broader streets and appropriate traffic rules. Similarly, when we make a statement that man's wisdom is lagging behind his power to make weapons of mass destruction, we actually refer to a kind of cultural lag. In this atomic change, such a lag is steadily increasing. "In atomic cultural lag, the leading variable is the maximum area within which, at any given date, people could be killed from a given base. The lagging variable is the ability to prevent this accelerating power from damaging or destroying the kind of civilisation which is valued within the accepted frame of values".

The above illustrations indicate that cultural lag appears when technological innovations move faster than social innovations. But many instances may be cited in which the leading factor of social change, which leads to cultural lag, has been political or social-psychological. Thus, a country may adopt parliamentary form of democracy as an instrument of political action. But, in the initial stages, this form of government

may not be very effective because of the failure of the people to develop habits of thought, attitudes, and temperaments that are so necessary for making the best use of this machinery. The initial failure of democracy in some of the newly independent countries of Asia and Africa is partly due to this reason.

We may also think of some striking forms of cultural lag which emerge from the development of non-technological innovations. For instance, the progressive income tax, that is, income tax assessed at progressive rate, may be regarded as a definite social innovation that is non-technological in character. Since the amounts of money involved are often quite large in the case of some persons, the inducement to find some dishonest method of escaping from part or all of the payment becomes great. The higher the rates of taxation, the greater is the inducement of evasion of taxes. The cultural lag in this case is the time interval between the innovation of progressive income taxation and the development (which is not yet completely achieved) of adequate social controls to prevent tax evasion and to maintain honest tax payments.

LIMITATIONS OF THE CONCEPT

Some sociologists hold that the concept of cultural lag may be accepted with important qualifications.

To begin with, we must not assume that changes in the material aspects of culture always precede changes in the non-material aspects. There is a constant interaction between the two. In the long run, technological progress itself is largely dependent on certain non-material factors, such as social attitudes. For instances, most, if not all, of the material products of culture originate in the minds of men, and their application and use are dependent upon a favourable social and cultural atmosphere. Thus a desire to improve the standard of living has to be kindled first in a community before it can accept technology and industrialised way of life. The rapid material progress, which is characteristic of present-day society, is itself the result of earlier changes in our thinking and other non-material aspects of culture.

A second qualification of the theory arises out of the difficulty of determining just what kind of adjustment to changes is desirable. For example, the technological advances in transportation and communication have annihilated distances between countries, so that what happens in one part of the world immediately affects other

parts. It may, therefore, be argued that, as a logical corollary of this technological development, small nations should be abolished and marketing area enlarged in order to derive the economic gains of international division of labour. But doubts may be raised as to whether the creation of these large political units would be socially desirable. According to E. F. Hunt, by destroying the homogeneity of small nations, we would sacrifice non-materials social values which are no less important to the welfare of the people than are higher standards of living.

Another objection raised against the cultural lag concept is that it inherently involves valuation. A question naturally arises : Can the value judgement implied in the term *lag* be reduced to objective and verifiable facts? In other words, we must have a standard of measurement by which to identify the pacemaker and the laggard. Where no such standard is available, we can not speak of *lag*. “Wherever one part or aspect of a productive system fails to measure up in efficiency to another part or aspect, the term lag is relevant. But wherever the question at issue is not one of comparative efficiency, the use of this term becomes dubious and may convey erroneous implications”.

Some critics of the cultural lag theory have expressed doubts as to whether the concept has any usefulness in helping us to understand social change. They argue that social change is always disturbing because it disrupts the patterns of life to which we have become accustomed, and also because such a change affects different people differently. Though it may benefit some groups, it is almost sure to injure others. According to Professor F. H. Knight, “what the culture lag theory really amounts to is the assertion that some social changes of which the theorist approves have taken place, while others of which he thinks he would approve have not, or “wrong” changes have occurred instead; the word ‘lag’ has not proper application”.

Cultural lag theory is also criticised on the ground that the ‘reasons’ for the lag are not given the importance which they deserve. In two cases of cultural lag, the reasons for the lag may be not only different but these differences may be socially significant. For example, we may acquire the necessary skill and expertise to make the best use of the resources of the forest, but there may be a time lag before we acquire the necessary know-how of preserving forest resources. In another case, there

may be a time lag in broadening the streets necessitated by the introduction of automobile because of the opposition of some vested interests. The 'reasons' for the lag in the two cases are different and should be brought out, because the two reasons are qualitatively distinct and sociologically significant. Such distinctions are not, however, brought out in the theory of cultural lag, as enunciated by Ogburn.

MacIver is, therefore, of the view that more refined analysis is necessary. "The complexity of modern social organisation gives peculiar significance to the various ways in which the inter-dependent parts of the inclusive system fail to function harmoniously together...". Hence, MacIver gives distinctive names "to the very different phenomena with which we have to deal within this broad area of lack of coordination amongst the various parts of the social system.

TECHNOLOGICAL LAG

What is generally known as 'industrial bottleneck' illustrates the concept of technological lag. This lag appears when any one aspect of an inclusive system of technology fails to keep in step with other aspects, resulting in impairment of productivity of the whole system. There may be many kinds of technological lag. This may occur when the management of a company fails to maintain over-all efficiency when it expands its scale of operations, particularly when it becomes a part of a combine or trust. The example we gave in the preceding paragraph of a lag between our knowledge of exploitation of forest resources and that of preservation of forest resources illustrates the concept of technological gap.

TECHNOLOGICAL RESTRAINT

There is no guarantee that discovery of efficient technological device will be easily adopted. Its adoption or application may be opposed by various interest groups. This state of affairs is characterised by MacIver as technological restraint. Some examples may be cited.

One reason for opposition may be that its adoption would affect adversely the vested interests involved in the pursuit of the existing method or procedure. In all countries, innovations in administrative procedure receive stiff opposition from the entrenched civil service. Such opposition may stem from the apprehension that honour,

power or pecuniary benefit may be affected adversely by the adoption of new procedure or a new technological device. Computer, for example, is undoubtedly of immense help in any kind of work situation. But the introduction of computer has not been easy in any work place, be it a government department or a semi-government or private enterprise. Trade unions oppose its introduction on the ground that it would restrict employment opportunities. Sometimes opposition may stem from cultural consideration. For example, when tube well was introduced in India about seven or eight decades ago, many conservative Hindu families did not use or drink water from tube wells on the ground that water came in contact with leather (in the form of washer) and thereby became 'impure'. Many innovations and discoveries have been opposed in the past on religious grounds, on the ground that those discoveries contradicted the statements in the scriptures. The case of Galileo is well known. Even Darwinian theory of evolution received opposition from the Established Church on the same ground. MacIver observes that in its resistance to technological advance culture fights a losing battle. It has become increasingly clear that culture cannot successfully oppose the advance of civilisation, but that instead its task is to accept and to direct that advance, controlling it to serve cultural ends. Only thus can the maladjustments of cultures and civilisation, which must constantly arise in the course of technological advance, be progressively reconciled.

CULTURE CLASH

MacIver defines culture clash thus : "We do not include under culture clash the conflicts of creeds and ideologies so frequent in every modern society. We refer only to conflicts between two entire culture patterns, each of which embraces a whole way of life. Such clashes arise pre-eminently from the coming together within a single community of groups that have been bred in separation before they become thus conjoined. Usually one of the cultures concerned is an imported culture while the other is indigenous or at least has long been established in its present home. The two are brought rather abruptly into contact, and under these conditions one of them appears to be a threat to the very existence of the other, especially if the former is associated with a dominant group". When Islam came to India about one thousand years ago with an entirely different cultural pattern, the indigenous population embracing Hindu way of life could not absorb it, as it had done in respect of earlier immigrant groups

such as Sakas, Huns, etc. The natural outcome was culture clash which has, unfortunately, gone on for the past several centuries. It appears that such culture clash would have considerably abated in the course of sharing joys and sufferings of common living for centuries, had there been no intervention of economic and political forces. Vested interests of both economic and political nature have grown around this division between the two communities and tend to fan the fire of separatism under the facade of culture clash.

CULTURAL AMBIVALENCE

The phenomenon of cultural ambivalence is a socio-psychological phenomenon which arises in the cases of individuals who are subjected to contradictory pulls, each representing a particular normative pattern. In a society there is usually a 'trend to consistency' (in Sumner's words) in respect of the prevailing mores, and an individual does not generally find any difficulty in accommodating to the mores of society, thanks to the processes of indoctrination and habituation to which he has been exposed since his early childhood. "But when the individual is subjected, especially in the formative stage of life, to the counter demands of clashing culture patterns, he may fail to achieve an adequate *personal* accommodation. He undergoes a process of cultural denudation or, seeking vainly to reconcile in his behaviour the opposing demand, he becomes more or less schizophrenic. We have then the phenomenon of cultural ambivalence". While discussing the causes of maladjusted behaviour among young people today, a UNESCO Report contains the following analysis which emphasises that conflicting cultural values leave a young person in an ambivalent state of mind with regard to the role he must play in society: "This generation has grown up in an ever more swiftly changing world. Social relationships are conditioned and characterised by the large-scale organisation of industrial economy, by technical development, automation and bureaucracy, by the strict laws of supply and demand, and by the functioning of depersonalised mass units. In contrast to non-industrialised society, where moral principles and customs are sometimes pre-determined and understood to which everyone is expected to conform, the great social changes introduced by industrialised society bring in their train the breaking up of these norms. In this urban civilisation

with its new freedom for the individual, each person must find and create his own way of life. Freedom from old feudal and class distinctions has presented man today with the problem of freedom to establish a new standard of morals and values. The relationship of young people to God and the Church is typical of this process today”.

Owing largely to the influence of Marx and Marxism, the economic factor of change occupies a major place in the discussion of social scientists and historians. This is not because the theory, at least in its Marxian version, is so widely accepted, but rather because it invites an endless series of refutations and defences. No doubt this is due in part to the enormous significance of Marxism as an ideological weapon in the struggle within and between societies. But it is also due to the attractiveness of the doctrine; for no matter how many criticisms are marshalled against it, it still invites more; and this is because it *is* so plausible, and seems to penetrate to the depths of social reality. Of course, economic interpretations of history or social change need not be Marxist; but none of the other versions of the doctrine are quite as interesting as Marxism.

The Marxist theory rests on the fundamental assumption that changes in the economic ‘infra-structure’ of society are the prime movers of social change. This ‘infra-structure’ consists of the ‘forces’ and ‘relations’ of production; the ‘super-structure’ consists of those features of the social system, such as the judicial, political and religious institutions, which serve to maintain the ‘infra-structure’ and which are moulded by it. Marx does not assert that the ‘super-structural’ elements are *completely* renewed with changes in the ‘infra-structure’; nor does he suggest that all societies at the same stage of economic development possess identical ‘super-structural features’. His is *not* a theory of the *complete determination* of all institutions by certain common, general processes of economic change. It simply asserts that economic changes are fundamental and that they bring about other changes which are in accordance with economic interests.

Marx’s theory is not a form of technological determinism. He himself states that

any social system can contain considerable, though not unlimited, developments in the 'forces of production' without breaking down. The limit is only reached when technological developments produce or exacerbate class conflict and other 'contradictions' to such an extent that the system must give way to a new one. By a change in the system Marx means a change in the relations of production, and in those other institutions which correspond to a particular form of these relations. What generates change are the 'contradictions' of the social system which stem from the social relations of production.

Although Marx's theory is considered a general theory of the mechanisms of social change, Marx scarcely applied it in form to any other system but capitalism. I do not propose to review here the many concrete criticisms of the Marxian theory: that capitalism has not been replaced by socialism in advanced capitalist societies; that the classes in capitalist society have not become increasingly polarized; that reforms and growing wealth have made revolution less likely in advanced industrial societies; and so on. All of these criticisms have been made often enough and sometimes accepted by Marxists.

The theory has also been criticised heavily for ignoring or underestimating the causal significance of ideas and political processes as such. These criticisms also are constantly rebutted by Marxists in the following way. First, they argue, Marxism does not deny an interaction between 'infra-structural' and 'super-structural' processes : for example, it does not deny that the oppressed classes may be attracted to religious beliefs which express some protest against the social system, and that these beliefs may later lend themselves to the formation of a political ideology of revolutionary activity; and it does not deny that the oppressed classes may make certain political gains through the democratic process which will, in turn, facilitate a radical transformation of the social system. Secondly, Marxism claims mainly to explain the 'significant' changes from one type of social system to another : from slavery to feudalism, from feudalism to capitalism, and from capitalism to socialism. In doing this it may show that, at any moment in time, there is an interaction between economic and other social factors, just as there is an interaction between technological and economic factors. However, in the final instance, the economic sub-structure must change before there can be a qualitative change in the social system as such.

It is this second argument which makes it difficult to treat Marxism as a testable theory of social change. For, if one adduces evidence to show that political and ideological changes are either necessary to produce certain economic changes, or that many social changes occur which are not preceded by significant economic changes, it can always be argued that this does not refute the Marxian theory, on the grounds that these changes are not 'fundamental' changes in the social structure. For example, if it is shown that political stability and ideological commitment to modernization are necessary preconditions for economic development, it could be argued by Marxists that the 'real' changes in the social structure only occur *after* economic development. If it is argued that political rivalry between nation states is as much a factor in promoting industrialization as economic factors, the reply could be that this is a stage in the liberation movement of the colonial peoples, which is itself a stage in the development and replacement of capitalism. The main trouble with Marxist theory is that it presupposes certain true and objective criteria whereby the qualitative change from one type of social system to another can be assessed. It is always possible to show that a social system is still *fundamentally* unchanged; just as it is always possible to show that it is *fundamentally* changed. The whole debate becomes purely ideological and once Marxian theory concedes some interaction between economic and other factors, it is difficult to sustain the view that economic change is the prime mover of social change. But the main defect of the theory is that it does not really account for many types of change at all. For example, much social change in non-industrial societies is due more to political and military pressures than to economic ones. Naturally, it is important to show that these other processes would not occur in all economic circumstances. But that is hardly the same thing as explaining these changes in terms of the internal processes of the economy itself. One of the interesting things about relatively stagnant economies is that they scarcely develop endogenous processes of change without certain radical changes in the structure of social relations and in those ideas which both permit the use of technological innovations and encourage their invention.

One of the great merits of the Marxian theory of change, as opposed to the technological theory, is that it is truly sociological. It seeks to explain social change in terms of the inner processes of social systems as such. And, moreover, it does not

treat these processes as reifications. It attempts to use a series of models of action and interaction at the economic level, to show a continuous logic in the development of capitalism or some other system. But the trouble is that social systems do not operate in such simple ways. Each area of social life develops some *degree* of autonomy even in the simplest societies, so that each can constitute a possible source of change. Furthermore, human creativity is such that its inventions and innovations do not simply occur in response to economic demands. They too have some autonomy of their own; though, it is true, as Marx has pointed out—and for this alone modern social theory is greatly in his debt—that inventions require a favourable social environment, and a stimulus, which may well come from the economy. And when they occur, they may have consequences which are quite unintended by their inventors or by those who apply them.

It is interesting that Marx did avoid a technological determinism; for such a theory might have seemed in keeping with a materialist philosophy of history. But his avoidance was perhaps necessary. For technological changes begin not as material substance but as *ideas in the minds of men*.

MARXIAN EXPLANATION OF SOCIAL CHANGE

According to Marx, social change occurs as a sequel to class struggle. The seeds of class struggle which generate change are found in the economic infra-structure of society. At the dawn of human history, when man used to live, in the words of Marx, in a state of primitive communism, those contradictions or conflicts of interest among classes did not exist. Both the forces of production and the products of labour were communally owned. As such, class distinctions did not exist. With the emergence of the private ownership of the forces of production, however, the fundamental contradictions or class distinctions were created. In other words, the forces of production give rise to particular relations of production. Through its ownership of the forces of production, a minority is able to control, command and enjoy the fruits of the labour of the majority. This dominant group also determines the superstructure in keeping with the interest of the group. Law, literature, philosophy, etc. are all created accordingly. In other words, the impact or influence of the dominant group is discernible in all areas of social life.

The forces of production do not, however, remain unchanged. Whenever the forces of production undergo a change, there is a corresponding change in the relations of production also. A new class emerges as dominant and seeks to control, command and enjoy the fruits of the labour of the majority. A conflict naturally ensues between the emerging dominant group on the one hand and the group which had hitherto enjoyed all the privileges. The emerging dominant group endeavours to determine the superstructure in terms its own interest. The society, as a whole, thus undergoes a change.

Marx seeks to explain all social changes in terms of the contradictions which are found in the economic infrastructure of society. "The history of all hitherto existing societies", says Marx, "is the history of class struggle". In his view, class struggle will continue till class distinctions are completely obliterated and a classless society comes into being.

Marxian theory of social change has been criticised from various points of view.

To begin with, it has been argued that the forces of production do not uniquely determine the relations of production. Thus, the same mode of production may be applied in situations that differ radically from one another in terms of social and economic system. The technological bases of the American and the Soviet economy are of as different as are the relations of production obtaining in these countries. Moreover, the influence of science and technology is very widespread and far-reaching, in so far as thinking, behaviour-pattern and value-system are concerned. In this context, it is not unrealistic assume that the people of two different societies may share similar making, behaviour-pattern and value-systems despite the fact that the economic systems in these countries are different. Another important factor should not also be overlooked. The terms "socialism" and "communism" do not convey today the same meaning as they did few decades ago. Both the systems are undergoing transformation of response to the demands of technology. The new economic experiment that is being tried in the Republic of China, Soviet Russia and socialist countries of Eastern Europe, dramatically illustrates this point. Marx recorded his observations at the dawn of industrial revolution. It was not, therefore, possible for him to anticipate the far-reaching and all-embracing developments in the sphere of

science and technology.

Secondly, the Marxist thesis that those who are economically dominant become, by virtue of their economic power, dominant in society is not fully supported by historical facts. Thus, the organised religion, such as the Church in Europe, the Brahmin priesthood in India, etc., established its domination in almost all societies in the past through non-economic influence. It is true that economic power helps one to gain other forms of power. But it is equally true that other forms of power help one to gain economic power. The conclusion of the Marxist doctrine that economic power is primary and that other forms of power are consequential cannot, therefore, be accepted.

Thirdly, the Marxist thesis that politics and culture of a particular epoch are explained by the fact that they subserve the interest of the economically dominant class in that epoch is also open to several objections. All human actions cannot always be explained, in terms of economic motivations. Religious pursuits, for example, cannot be explained in economic terms. The prayerful attitude of a true devotee has nothing to do with considerations of economic gain or loss. The motives which impel a poet to write a poem are, in most cases are non-economic. Again, the pursuits of eminent scientists are inspired by non-economic motives. It is also wrong to assume that those who exercise political power are always influenced by economic motives. If we try to analyse closely the motives of some of the well-known figures of history, we shall find that sometimes purely non-economic motives, such as the desire for distinction or personal glory or a desire for doing good to people, deeply influenced their thoughts and actions. King Ashoka, for example, decided to give up warfare as a means of winning other kingdoms from motives that were decidedly non-economic. Hitler was probably more influenced by the lure of personal glory than by the balanced calculations of probable material gain. A consideration of the motives that inspire art, culture, music, painting and sometimes even politics of a country will show that human nature is too complex to be explained simply in terms of economic motives. It is, of course, true that sometimes art of culture are made to subserve the interest of the economically dominant class in society. But such cultural product cannot permeate the whole of society because they lack the qualities, such as spontaneity of expression, strength and vitality, which characterise genuine works of art.

Fourthly, all the aspects of social dynamics, barring economic forces, are ignored in Marxian analysis. For example, can disputes between two religions or racial groups be explained simply in economic terms? Economic reasons may or may not generate such conflicts. Even when economic reasons are responsible, there may be many other non-economic reasons which are no less responsible for fanning the fire of dispute. If we view the genesis of such disputes from this angle, it is apparent that emphasis on economic reasons, to the exclusion of all others, makes the study biased and partial.

Fifthly, the assumption of Marxism that the establishment of classless society would bring to an end the exploitation of man by man is too simple to be accepted. As Maclver and Page have pointed out : “the power of man over man has deeper roots than economic advantage and that it can be at least as formidable and as tyrannical under a socialist economy as under any other kind of regime”.

In conclusion, we may say that it is undeniable that the economic factors exert a very important influence on politics and social philosophy of a given society. But to regard the economic system as the sole determinant of legal codes, political and cultural systems, is evidently wrong. There are other aspects of human life, besides economic, which are equally significant.

It should, however, be borne in mind—that Marx was not a determinist. According to him, class struggle will not ensure automatically when the objective situation seems to be favourable for the same. Till the people become class-conscious and consciously work for the struggle, no revolution will take place, even if the objective situation may be ripe for the same. It may be said that Marx anticipated what Talcott Parsons developed much later as the voluntaristic theory of social action. The observations of Hoselitz, the noted economist, will be in order : “...he (Marx) was perhaps the first scholar to anticipate what Talcott Parsons calls the voluntaristic theory of social action. Marx’s conception that revolution, although in an ultimate sense inevitable, occurs only when people are motivated to carry it out (when they have become ‘class conscious’) implies that deterministic social forces exists, but that they become operative only through affecting voluntary action—an important insight made explicit and elaborated by Max Weber.”

THE WEBERIAN ANALYSIS : PROTESTANT ETHIC AND CAPITALISM

Max Weber did not agree with Marx that economic forces alone brought about social change : “Weber saw that there is a direct relation between the practical ethics of a community and the character of its economic system, but he refused to accept the position that the latter determines the former”. He developed his views in this regard with reference to his thesis on the origin and growth of capitalism in Western Europe in the eighteenth century.

Max Weber aimed at bringing out clearly the distinctive features of modern Western Capitalism, because he looked upon it as a unique historical event. He recognised that Capitalism had appeared at various times in the history of the world and in various places. But he asked himself this question : What made the modern Western Capitalism unique ?

As seen by Weber, this kind of capitalism represented a complexity of institutions and institutionalised forms of behaviour. It was founded on the establishment of the Joint Stock Company, stock exchange machinery and introduction of a certain kind of currency and means for making currency exchanges. Certain political developments were also associated with the evolution of modern capitalism. But, above all, he recognised the necessity for what he called the Spirit (*Geist*) of Capitalism. According to him, what distinguishes modern Western Capitalism is not acquisitiveness nor a strong desire to engage in economic adventures. These are undoubtedly present. But these are ubiquitous and may be found in many kinds of economic activity which obtained in other ages and other places. “What Weber laid his finger on was the set of ethical desiderata associated with the modern form of capitalism, it was a moral outlook, a set of attitudes to life”. This is what he called the Spirit of Capitalism. He emphasised the indispensability of this spirit for modern Western Capitalism. “In the last resort, the factor which produced capitalism is the rational permanent enterprises, rational accounting, rational technology, and rational law, but again not these alone. Necessary complementary factors were rational spirit, the rationalisation of the conduct of life in general, and a rationalistic economic ethic”.

His views are expressed in the celebrated book on *The Protestant Ethic and*

the Spirit of Capitalism. In this book he endeavoured to identify some, if not all, of the origins of capitalism. By the term *Spirit of Capitalism*, Weber meant a set of attitudes, a belief “in maximizing wealth without much consideration of the means as long as the means are efficacious.”

How did this capitalist spirit originate? Weber argued that it was not difficult to see how a well-developed economic and social system could generate such attitudes and thereby enabled them to persist. But how could they develop initially out of a situation in which the values of people and their habits were so vastly different? He was of opinion that there must have been some particular factor favourable to the emergence of the Spirit of Capitalism. He discovered it in the rise of the Protestant movement. “Protestantism propagated the traditional Christian virtues of selflessness, humility, and charity.”

There were certain elements in the Protestant ethic which were consistent with the Capitalist Spirit.

The Protestant ethic in which Max Weber was interested was essentially Calvinist. He summarised the Calvinist conception in five points : (i) There exists an absolute, transcendent God who created the world and rules it. But he is incomprehensible, inaccessible to the finite minds of men. (ii) This all-powerful and mysterious God has predestined each of us to salvation or damnation, so that we cannot by our works alter a divine decree which was made before we were born. (iii) God created the world for his own glory. (iv) Irrespective of whether he is to be saved or damned, man is obliged to work for the glory of God and to create the kingdom of God on earth. (v) Earthly things, human nature, and flesh belong to the order to sin and death, and salvation can come to man only through divine grace.

According to Max Weber, all these elements exist separately in other religious conceptions. But their combination in Calvinism is original and unique and entails important consequences.

First, a vision of this order excludes all mysticism, since the communication between the finite mind of the creature on the one hand and infinite mind of God on the other is, by definition impossible.

By the same token, such a conception is anti-ritualist. The natural order, conceived by such a philosophy, can only be explored by science and not by rituals. Such a religious philosophy is thus contrary to all forms of idolatry and ritualism and is indirectly favourable to the development of scientific research.

Second, what can the Calvinist do in a world which is so interpreted? Apparently, he must do God's work. In different periods Calvinists have given different interpretations of what it means to work for the glory of god. (a) On the basis of the Calvinist vision, one can try, like Calvin himself, to build a republic true to the law of God, a kind of Kingdom of God. (b) Another interpretation is also conceivable. The Calvinist cannot know whether we will be saved or damned. This may eventually prove to be intolerable. He will, therefore, be prompted to seek psychological satisfaction by achieving worldly success, including economic success, as a sign of his salvation. The individual is thus driven towards work in order to overcome the anxiety which inevitably results from his uncertainty about his eternal destiny. Work comes to be interpreted as obedience to a commandment of God.

Third, the Protestant ethic calls upon the believer to consider flesh as guilty and to pursue asceticism as an ideal in life. This means that a believer is to work hard and use all rational means in order to maximise his profit for his comfort and for seeking the pleasures of life. This type of attitude and the conduct which follows from this attitude are necessary to the development of capitalism. Capitalism implies that work is to be rationally organised with a view to maximising productivity and profit and that the greater part of this profit is to be saved to permit capital accumulation for further economic advance. Thus, a spiritual affinity between the Protestant ethic and capitalist attitude can be clearly established.

Weber's arguments have been expressed in a very brief compass. Some warning is, however, necessary, so that his view-point is not misunderstood. As Talcott Parsons points out : "It is not Weber's thesis that Protestantism influenced capitalism through religious *approval* of acquisitive activities, expressed by preachers or otherwise, but because the religious interests of the believing individual directed his action in that direction." To this may be added another warning. Weber did not argue that Protestantism caused capitalism. In fact, he explicitly denied anything so crude. He

also did not present an idealistic interpretation of history of counter Marx's materialistic one. Weber's last words in his essay on the subject are : "It is, of course, not my aim to substitute for a one-sided materialistic an equally one-sided spiritualistic causal interpretation of culture and of history."

What Max Weber had in mind was to analyse the extent and nature of the impact of religion upon other aspects of human social structure, particularly upon the economy. His analysis clearly brings out that some religious beliefs, or at least some aspects of them, are seen to facilitate economic activity and that there are also religious beliefs which place obstacles in the way of economic development. In this connection, reference may be made to the difficulties in under-developed countries where traditional beliefs, often indirectly, but sometimes directly, prevent technological innovations from taking root, and thus hinder a new and more economically viable system to be established. In Weber's thought, there are two aspects of third problem. First, he was concerned with beliefs of an ethical and religious kind which had a bearing upon economic values. Second, he was interested in the way in which beliefs conditioned the growth of social groups and the ways in which these groups facilitated or hindered economic development. This kind of inquiry led him to embark on his studies in the sociology of religion.

The physical environment changes but slowly except as affected by the ceaseless activity of man. The biological processes determine the numbers, the composition, the selection, and the hereditary quality of the successive generations. These processes may themselves be set in motion by social attitudes and interests, as the latter control sex relations, marriage, racial intermixture, the size of the family, and so forth. Social behavior of various kinds induces biological changes. The population is biologically different, more numerous or less numerous, more healthy or less healthy, more fertile or less fertile, in response to socially determined conditions. Some social arrangements, such as taboos on intermarriage, restrictions on the marriage of the more fit, customs respecting the age at marriage, persecution of minorities, war, tend to lower the biological quality of the population. Others tend to raise it. The biological changes thus induced have their own causality, and in turn bring about new changes on the social level.

Changing size of the population. The population of every community is always changing both in numbers and in composition. During the nineteenth century the population of most countries of Western Europe increased with unusual rapidity. Between the period 1871-1875 and the year 1933 the birth rates of the countries of Western Europe fell from a range between 25 and 38 (per thousand of the population per annum) to a range between 20 and 14. During the same time the death rates of these countries fell from a range between 18 and 28 to a range between 10 and 16. This double phenomenon is unprecedented in the history of man. Population changes have occurred all through human history, by reason of migration, invasion, war, pestilence, changing food supply, and changing mores. There was depopulation and overpopulation in times past. But where population increased it was not, so far as we know, associated with a decrease in the birth

rate. Nor was there ever an increase so great, so rapid, so continuous, and over so great an area. We have no reliable figures for earlier times, but certainly we have no reason to believe that any previous changes were so impressive. There could have been no such doubling of the population of the whole world as happened in the century prior to World War I. There was no such quadrupling of population as took place in England in the nineteenth century, Assuredly there was nothing comparable to the growth of population in the United States since the founding of the Republic—though here immigration rather than natural increase was the major factor.

(1) *Evidences of the transformation* : The swift and steady decline of both the birth rate and the death rate in the past seventy years or so witnesses to a great social transformation. The change was particularly marked in the birth rate, though an earlier change in the death rate probably prepared the way for it. First apparent in France, it began rather abruptly in England in 1878 and in the eighties was markedly revealed in the statistics of Sweden, Denmark, Holland, and Australia. Thence it spread to the countries of Central Europe, and to America, at length including within its range, though in various degrees, every country of Western civilization. This extraordinary development was accompanied by a no less remarkable continuation of the decline of the death rate, more especially of the infant death rate. This double phenomenon is perhaps the most signal instance the world has known of the sudden emergence of new forms of social selection, or as some prefer to put it, of new interferences with natural selection.

There is, of course, a limit to the decline of both rates, and there are some evidences that the limit is in sight in certain countries. The rate of the decline of the birth rate diminishes markedly when a certain level is reached. For example, in the eighties of the last century Germany had a high birth rate (in 1876 it was nearly 41), while France, which led the movement, had what seemed an ominously low one. By 1927 the rates of the two countries were practically equal (19.5 for Germany as against 18.8 for France), but the convergence was due overwhelmingly to the fall of the German rate while the French rate moved very slowly lower. In Germany there was a minor reversion of the trend, the rate moving from 17 in 1931 to over 19 in 1938,

but this modest rise, due to special conditions aided by strong Nazi propaganda, did not signify any return to the old balance of births and deaths.

As for the death rate, the changing composition of the population under a falling birth rate must, for reasons presently to be considered, eventually end its decline, even if the application of medical science and the healthfulness of living conditions continue to advance. The changing composition of the population tends, on the other hand, to lower the birth rate still further, even though the actual fertility, as measured by the number of children born to women of childbearing age, remains constant.

In no country have the changes in size of the population been more significant than in the United States. The increase has, in fact, been quite unprecedented in human history. "From about 2,500,000 in 1776, the population has increased to 122,775,046 in 1930, almost fifty fold in little more than a century and a half." This growth has, of course, been due to a combination of natural increase and immigration. The conditions bringing it about are no longer operative. Net immigration to the United States fell to zero or below during the depression years and it is not likely to become an important population factor in the near future at least, owing to the severe restrictive measures that are in force. At the time of the 1940 census the total population was still increasing, though at a diminished rate. The birth rate for the United States has followed the same course as that of the countries of Western Europe and by 1934 had fallen to 17.1 for the registration area.

2. *Population problems ahead* : The facts just mentioned have led to a considerable amount of speculation, frequently of a gloomy character, regarding the future. It is rightly pointed out that a continuation of the present rates, not merely of the present trends, would mean for many countries a falling population. The United States and the countries of Western Europe are already producing fewer children than will suffice, if the birth rate does not change its course, to maintain their numbers. A falling population, it is claimed, will place the more advanced countries in a position of economic and political interiority compared with the more prolific countries. Beyond that threat there is the ominous prospect of "race suicide."

The danger must be recognized, and the responsibility. At the same time it is

important to see the problem in proper perspective. The future cannot be mechanically prognosticated by statistical projections of present trends. This method would have led to false conclusions if applied at any earlier stage of the decline. We should also remember that, throughout the whole period of this decline, the actual increase of the populations of Europe and America has been enormous, and if we take instead the longer period since the decline of the death rate began, the increase has been unprecedented in human history. Since many of the consequences of this growth do not appear until after the lapse of a generation, it is not surprising, particularly in times of large-scale unemployment, that many observers are still impressed with the opposite fear, that of overpopulation. It is surely unreasonable to expect this absolute increase to continue forever. The adjustment of population of changing conditions is itself a changing adjustment and is perhaps more subtle than we generally realize. Only if the total population were seriously dwindling would the fears generated by the present stage of the process seem justified; and if that condition were to appear who can say that it would not in turn set in motion corrective forces? The history of population theories since the eighteenth century shows the precariousness of short-run interpretations and the difficulty—but also the necessity—of the long-run view. Where severe population declines have occurred in past civilizations they have been associated with war and invasion, with pestilence, or with the denudation of the soil. The primal urge of race perpetuation is not necessarily undermined because it accommodates itself to new conditions. The fear of race suicide may some times be another form of the ancient majestic terror that “men have become as goods, knowing good and evil.”

The changing balance of births and deaths. To gain an adequate understanding of the changes we have been discussing it is essential to remember that the fall of the death rate was not only a sequel but also a precondition of the fall of the birth rate. If the death rate had not fallen, the present birth rate would indeed spell race suicide. On the other hand, under present conditions in Western society, the old birth rate, say between 32 and 45, would involve a multiplication of population such as, over any long period, could scarcely be imagined.

1. *The positive aspect:* The falling death rate has been a consequence of the advance of science, as scientific knowledge has been applied on the one hand

to hygiene, sanitation, and therapeutic and preventive medicine, and on the other hand to the increase of productivity and thus to the raising of the standard of living. Earlier man had little genuine control over disease or over the pestilences that from time to time wiped out large numbers, nor could he “be fruitful and multiply” without pressing disastrously on the means of subsistence. For the vast majority of human beings there was no escape from oppressive poverty, with its concomitants of malnutrition, privation and exposure to disease.

What, then has happened in the main is a very remarkable transition from an old balance of births and deaths where both rates were very high, with all the miseries attending this state of affairs, to a balance in which both rates are very considerably lower. This change has proceeded wherever modern civilization has prevailed for any length of time. It has the danger that it puts the balance of population directly under man’s control, demanding of social man a new kind of responsibility. But if this responsibility is accepted, the new balance thus attained has very great advantages. It means a higher standard of living, the emancipation of women from endless drudgery, better care for the young, and a greater regard generally for human life and human personality.

2. *National Variations* : Like all great social changes, this transition also has its disturbing features. Since it follows the advance of civilization it spreads gradually from one area to another. It began in the Western countries in which modern civilization first developed. As we have seen, this civilization, with its basic technology, is gradually pervading the globe. The countries that have been later in feeling its impact, those in the earlier stages of the industrial revolution, retain at first their higher birth rate while they are benefiting by a lower death rate. Thus their numbers increase at the same time that their resources increase. This differential gives concern, in a world of power competition, to countries that are reaching a stationary population and fear a falling population. In a previous period the same concern was expressed by England and France regarding Germany, but Germany somewhat abruptly took the same road they did. So, more recently, has Japan been going. Russia, on the other hand, is still in the earliest phase. After the Soviet Revolution, Western technology was hastily imported on a grand scale, with special attention to

heavy industry. Before that time Russia was a country with an extremely high birth rate but, owing to heavy mortality, with a relatively low natural increase. Its population was, and still is, overwhelmingly rural. Productivity has been increased, though it is still low by Western standards. In this phase the birth rate remains very high, but now the annual increase is considerable. There can, however, be little doubt that, as the country becomes more urbanized with the advance of technology, the birth rate will drop and Russia, no matter what the policies of its rulers, will gradually move toward the new balance of births and deaths.

Changes in composition of the population. With changes in size go changes in composition. While the birth rate is falling, the proportion of younger people in the population decreases. In the United States the median age of the population rose from 16.7 years in 1820 to 26.4 in 1930. In the period between 1920 and 1930 the numbers in the age-group 45-64 increased by more than a third. Obviously the change in age distribution reacts in turn on the birth rate, since the percentage of the population above childbearing age increases. Less obvious but probably quite significant, are the social changes responsive to a situation in which the proportion of youths declines and that of elders advances. But the change of age distribution is only one of the many aspects of the changing pattern of population. We have already seen that the proportion of urban to rural dwellers has been steadily increasing. Along with this have gone other processes of recruitment and of redistribution.

1. *Regional variations* : Birth rates and death rates vary significantly for different areas, different nationality groups, different religious affiliations different occupations, and generally, different modes of living. We shall leave for a later section a discussion of the differential rates for occupations and social classes and look here only on the variations that are exhibited by different parts of the country. The student should, of course, understand that geography itself is no explanation of these differences, but rather the ways of living that are associated with geographical distribution.

A report based on the 1920 census revealed remarkable variations of fertility

throughout the United States. Utah had the highest birth rate, twice as high as the lowest rate, which belonged to California. North Carolina had “over two and two fifths times as many children per 1000 women as California.” The agricultural areas everywhere had higher rates than the urban areas. The 1930 census showed similar differences, the lowest fertility being recorded on the Pacific coast, in Florida, and in certain Northeastern states, while the highest fertility was registered in the Southern and Southwestern and Mountain states. Consequently some states of the union were more than maintaining their numbers in the balance of births and deaths, while others had fallen (distinctly below the replacement level. These differences are brought out on Chart XXI.

2. *Other variations* : The birth rate is responsive to certain other conditions. We shall see in a later section how it varies with occupation and with social class. Again, it is higher for the foreign born than for the native born, while at the same time it is lowest for the native born of foreign or mixed parentage. However, in view of the restrictions placed on immigration since 1921, the significance of these disparities is greatly diminishing. We find also that the groups that are in large measure insulated from the cultural impacts of the American environment, such as the Latin Americans, the French Canadians, and the American Indians, usually bring up larger families than do the rest of the population. We note by way of contrast that the birth rate of Negroes, who have no cultural affiliations outside the United States, now corresponds closely to that of Whites.

Interaction of population change and social change. The changes we have illustrated with respect to the size and the composition of the population are intimately related to social changes. It is obvious that economic conditions and population rates are interdependent, and this aspect of the situation we have already dealt within Chapter V. But it is also clear that the changes in the death rate, the birth rate, and the marriage rate are both responsive to and determinant of changes in social attitudes and in social relationships. For example, countries with growing populations and relatively limited resources have, under appropriate conditions, an incentive to imperialism and to militarism, while these attitudes in turn encourage a further increase of population. Thus in Italy, which is both populous and relatively poor in resources,

Mussolini constantly proclaimed that empires cannot be won or defended except by “fecund peoples.” On the other hand, increase of population threatens the standard of living and thus inspires a change of attitude. At a certain stage in the unprecedented growth of population in the nineteenth century the practice of birth control took a new development. This practice in turn had many repercussions on family relationships and even on attitudes toward marriage. In the Comstock anti-birth-control law of 1873, contraceptives were designated “immoral”. There is strong evidence that a majority of the population no longer holds this view. With the consequent decrease of the size.

Social change and biological change. The evidence we have offered strongly suggests that with respect to fertility modern humanity is very sensitive to social influences, as distinct from racial or biological conditions; that whatever biological changes are involved are specifically set in motion by changes within the mores. It is much easier to assume that the conditions of occupation control the variations they reveal than that men select themselves for occupations which discourage fertility, say the occupation of spinner or of bank official, by virtue of a weaker instinct for large families. A like conclusion forces itself upon us when we consider the unprecedented decline in crude fertility which has been in progress throughout the civilized world in recent times, or again when we reflect on both the divergences and the similarities of population rates for different peoples.

[1] *Interpretation of declining fertility* : It is sometimes held that the decline of the birth rate is primarily a biological fact, due, that is, to increasing sterility or infecundity. In support of this conclusion there is some evidence that childless marriages are increasing, at least among the higher social classes. The proportion of childless marriages among the graduates of Harvard and Yale increased somewhat between the period 1861—1870 and the period 1881—1890. Evidences of this kind are susceptible of other interpretations, though it is quite possible that they point to a biological factor. But the differential fertility rates we have been discussing indicate very clearly that the social factor is the predominant one. Only on this hypothesis does it seem possible to explain the various correlations between fertility ratios and socioeconomic conditions, the graded decline of the birth rate from the higher to the lower economic levels, the spread of the decline from the classes and

the countries first affected to other classes and to other countries, the concomitance of declining birth rate and declining death rate, and such other statistically established facts as that the disparity in fertility between classes is greatest for early marriages and becomes rapidly smaller for marriages contracted at later age-periods.

The whole situation is far more easily intelligible if we assume that the decline in fertility is due to deliberate control responsive to changing mores and changing conditions. Take, for example, the abruptness with which in some countries the birth rate began to fall. In England the beginning of the continuous decline of the birth rate dates from 1878. It so happened that the previous year witnessed the famous trial of Charles Bradhaugh and Mrs. Annie Besant for their offense in publishing a new edition of an "obscene" book on birth control. Before the trial this book was selling at the rate of 700 copies a year. Because of the great publicity given to the case, 125,000 copies were sold in the three months between the arrest and the trial. In New South Wales a similar trial took place ten years later than the English one, and in the following year the birth rate of that colony dropped sharply. We are not, of course, suggesting that had these trials not taken place the subsequent continuous decline of the birth rate would not have occurred. But it seems a reasonable assumption that these episodes, with their sudden impact on the public mind, helped to precipitate attitudes which more deep-moving forces were fostering.

2. *The spread of social influences* : In order to interpret these movements it is particularly important to observe the manner in which they spread. Otherwise we may draw false conclusions as to their future course. They have arisen out of the conditions characteristic of modern civilization. First affecting the groups most responsive to these conditions, they have permeated gradually to all other classes. The groups that are semi-isolated from these influences, living by themselves as quasi communities, such as the English agricultural workers and the miners, are those most exempt from the process. And again it is those relatively self-contained communities, with mores strongly opposed to cultural change, such as the French Catholics of Quebec, which retain the old equilibrium of a high birth rate and a high death rate. The power of prestige and the contagion of suggestion, as well as the slower impact of the same

cultural influences, all work in the same direction. Nor are there economic obstacles to the spread of these influences such as limit the range of other practices of the well to do. In fact, in an age of compulsory schooling, child-labor laws, and old-age insurance, the former economic obstacles are transformed into economic inducements. The situation out of which this permeation of influences grows is well suggested in the following summary of conditions in a moderate-sized American city.

The behavior of the community in this matter of the voluntary limitation of parenthood—in this period [1890–1924] of rapidly changing standards of living, irregular employment, the increasing isolation and mobility of the individual family, growing emphasis upon child training and upon education and other long-term family plans such as insurance and enforced home ownership on a time payment basis—presents the appearance of a pyramid. At the top, among most of the business group, the use of relatively efficacious contraceptive methods appears practically universal, while sloping down from the peak is a mixed array of knowledge and ignorance until the base of ignorance is reached. Here fear and worry over pregnancy frequently walk hand in hand with discouragement as to the future of the husband's job and the dreaded lay-off.

The dark problem of social selection : Reviewing the manifold evidences of the activity of social selection, we are impressed by one great difficulty which all investigations along these lines encounter. We find social selection everywhere at work, but we never *see* its results as such. The causes are clear, the results are hidden. How, for example, does the present generation, because of the disproportionate recruiting of its members from the various economic and social classes of the past generation, differ from the latter? Can we *know* that the particular characteristics which its members display are differences in any degree due to social selection? They have been brought up in a changing social environment, and we can observe their responsiveness to these changes. The selective influences belong within that environment, and we can perceive how these influences affect their conduct, their social relationships. We can perceive how the lower birth rate and lower death rate are factors changing the family, not through selection, however, but through the new situations they create for their *present* members. The results of accommodation to environment we can trace; the

results of selection remain a hazardous inference. It is true that many writers speak confidently of the results of selection, writers like Ammon, Lapouge, Karl Pearson, Mc Dougall, and a host of others, but their confidence depends on their various assumptions and not on the demonstrated establishment of a causal nexus. The most disconcerting fact, which they do not face, is that the whole social environment is changing at the same time that selection is taking place. It might be held—though even this assumption is, as we have already seen, somewhat dubious—that physical or biometric traits are withdrawn from the influence of the social environment, and that a study of their changes reveals the specific work of selection. But the conclusions thereby attained, such as Lapouge’s “law” that the selective influence of urban life tends to eliminate the short-headed types in favor of long-headed, are conflicting or contradicted by other evidences. We seem forced to the position that selection is always at work, but what precisely it accomplishes remains unknown. It is certainly far easier to explain the genesis of selective force, such as the differential birth rate, than to interpret the resulting selection.

Culture as dynamic. Our rejection of the deterministic principle prepares us to look on culture as a dynamic of social change. Everyone acknowledges that there is an intimate connection between our beliefs and our institutions, our valuations and our social relationships. Certainly all cultural change involves social change, for, as we have seen, the social and the cultural are closely interwoven.

1. *The directional role of culture* : What is less fully realized is that the cultural factor in turn not only is responsive to technological change but also acts back on it so as to influence its direction and its character. The apparatus of civilization is in a degree indifferent to the use we make of it. The powers we harness for productive purposes stand ready to produce whatever we will. The industrial plant can turn out necessities or luxuries, the comforts of life or the ammunitions of war. This increasing indifference of the agencies of production expresses the degree in which our culture is itself a determinant factor. The civilizational means may be represented by a ship which can set sail to various ports. The port we sail to remains a cultural choice. Without the ship we could not sail at all; according to the character of the ship we sail fast or slow, take longer or shorter voyages; our lives are also accommodated to the conditions on ship-board and our experiences vary accordingly. But the direction in which we travel is not predestinated by the design of the ship. The more efficient it is, the more ports lie within the range of our choosing.
2. *Historical illustrations* : The history of culture offers many confirmatory evidences. We find, for example, cultural types, such as a religious doctrine, which persists with variations throughout many centuries. Even if the variations

could be construed as responses to different technological or environmental situations, the type itself, enduring through great diversities of historical circumstance, could not be interpreted in this way. We find, let us say, certain modes of valuation, certain attitudes toward social problems, which develop under one set of circumstances, spread over wide areas, and continue to dominate the thoughts of men under vastly different economic and political conditions. An example of this phenomenon is the view of the role of sex in human life which was formulated by the Church Fathers in the early Middle Ages. Again, the way in which cultural movements spread, the way in which they are associated with the names of great prophets, leaders, and creative minds, and such distinctive features of the cultural process in general as that a cultural style of a long-past age may be revived in the present or that the most primitive and the most advanced cultural elements may live side by side, can hardly be reconciled with any purely responsive or determinist theory.

Curiously enough, the determinist school has provided the supreme illustration of the influence of cultural attitudes on society. It is not possible to explain the Soviet Revolution along the lines of Marx's "materialistic interpretation of history". That revolution was not inspired by the necessity to adjust the culture of Russia to the existing economic situation or to that of the other capitalistic countries. It was the social philosophy of Marxism, wrought into a dynamic evangelism and finding its opportunity in the suffering and disillusionment of a catastrophic war, which gained control of the economic and political order, and by persistent cultural propaganda, aided by the terrorism of the Revolution, transformed it over a vast feudalized territory.

In the quieter processes of industrial evolution the activity and creativeness of cultural forces may also be discerned. We are apt to think of the new industrial civilization as dethorning the old culture, and again there are many evidences which point in that direction. We are apt to fear for the culture of countries which, like Japan or China or Mexico, are threatened by the invasion of machine production. Some among us fervently hope that countries wherein the threat is not yet fulfilled will resist the process to save their souls. But the alternatives are not so simply stated. Every new factor, whether it be a creed or a machine, disturbs an old adjustment. The disturbance created by mechanism was so great that it seemed the enemy of culture,

as indeed all revolutions seem. The wealth-bringing machine brought also ugliness, shoddiness, haste, standardization. It brought the meanness of factory towns and mining villages; it brought new hazards, new diseases, industrial fatigue. That was not the fault of the machine and the power plant. It was due to the ruthlessness and greed of those who controlled these great inventions. But human values reasserted themselves against economic exploitation. Culture began at first very slowly, to redirect the new civilization. It ceased to tolerate the black wretchedness of toil detached from all the purposes of living which was the early lot of the industrial worker.

At length our culture began to bring the machine also into the world of the imagination and endowed it not only with power but also, often, with beauty. It made the new means of living at length more tractable to the uses of personality, and new arts blossomed on the ruins of the old. The new means became at length means to culture also, nor should we forget, because of the disturbance and the struggle for mastery, that a high culture needs the equipment of civilization.

Max Weber's contribution of the study of culture as determinant. We are justified therefore, in regarding culture as, no less than civilization, a basic condition of social change. It operates not only directly as a source of social change but also indirectly, by its impact on the utilitarian order.

1. *Capitalism and Protestantism* : This subject, however, has received comparatively little attention from sociologists. One of the few important contributions to it is that made by Max Weber in his *Sociology of Religion*. The best-known part of this work is the study of the relation between certain forms of Protestantism and early capitalism. Weber saw that there is a direct relation between the practical ethics of a community and the character of its economic system, but he refused to accept the position that the latter determines the former. Each influences the other, and at times the cultural element prepares the way for economic change. Weber was a profound student of scientific method and appreciated the complexity of the problem. He saw that there is a relation between practical ethics and religious beliefs, but also that many factors other than the religious one are involved in the creation of the effective forms of conduct. Nevertheless, every period and

every group tend to have a typical scheme of beliefs and values, a typical world outlook that find expression in social behavior and in social institutions. The historical correspondence of religious and economic phenomena was studied by him along these lines. He concluded from certain evidences of the historical priority of particular religious forms that they stimulated the economic systems to which their practical ethics were congenial, and in particular that the worldly, ascetic Protestant sects prepared the way for capitalism.

2. *Concomitance of cultural and social change* : The difficulty, then, does not lie in Weber's approach but in the complex nature of social causation. We saw that every social phenomenon is an event belonging to an historical moment. More precisely, it does not endure an instant longer than it is maintained by the contemporary attitudes and activities of social beings. It is a life-expression which must change with the life which it expresses. Not only social relationships themselves but also the mode or formulas in accordance with which they occur, their institutional framework, are subject to this law. Institutions cannot live on like shells within which life is extinct, though, of course, they can endure to the determinent of the life that still upholds them. Social systems are thus directly or indirectly the creations of cultural values, directly in the organization of culture itself and indirectly in the organization of utility. Every change in valuations on the part of social groups registers itself in institutional change. In this respect Max Weber's position is wholly justified. But unfortunately the correspondence, though complete, is also complex. The unity of the social structure corresponds to a diversity of social attitudes and interests. These attitudes and interests are not only variant, and variantly influential; they are also in part conflicting as well as in part co-operant—and the social structure is the resultant of them all. To discern how they combine to sustain the structure requires, therefore, a keen and difficult analysis of each changing situation. We may agree with Hobhouse that there is "a broad correlation between the system of institutions and the mentality behind them." But as the system is the same for many divergent minds, the mentality to which it corresponds is, as it were, a composite mentality of various levels.

Yet for the reasons given there must always be a definite relation between changing

social forms and changing attitudes, beliefs, and cultural activities. As we have shown, technological change as such does not prescribe the specific direction of cultural change, but instead opens up various alternatives. For example, the economy of effort which is the counterpart of higher technological efficiency means that less toil is needed for the satisfaction of primary organic needs. The organic needs of food, shelter, warmth are relatively satiable. A surplus of energy and of wealth is thus made available unless the advantage of the higher economy is consumed by a proportionate increase of population, for the satisfaction of various cultural demands. These latter fall into two classes, between which every society strikes some kind of balance. On the one hand there are the expressions of our like competitive interests, seeking forms of possession, luxury, power, distinction, all relative goods because they are valued by comparison. On the other hand there are the expressions of our common interests, absolute goods in the sense that all can share in them without diminution or apportionment, the inclusive cultural or spiritual satisfactions. The *degree in which* one or the other of these alternatives is followed is *culturally* determined.

Specific manifestations of cultural change. Cultural processes can be represented graphically they tend to exhibit a rhythmic undulating motion instead of the continuous trend in a single direction characteristic of technological processes. Numerous attempts have in fact been made to show that not only cultural but also economic and political processes are cyclical in character, following a repetitive pattern and possessing a definite periodicity in the succession of their stages. Some writers are even led to postulate for various human phenomena, from fashions to civilizations, a regular order of rise, development, and fall, or else a perfect symmetry of rhythmic recurrence.

1. *Cyclical theories* : This hypothesis, for example, is presented on the sc....?? of world history in the erudite if pretentious volumes of Oswald Spengler *The Decline of the West*, in which he attempted to show that all cultures through a regular succession of stages corresponding to spring, summer, autumn and winter. More recently, in his elaborate review of the great civilizations the world, Arnold J. Toynbee has sought to trace their rise and decline through a determinate pattern of changes, from their first “response to challenge” their “time of troubles” and final downfall. In a more matter-of-fact way to principle

was used by F. S. Chapin for the interpretation of the synchronous changes of the diverse aspects of human life. And A. L. Kroeber found that the changes in women's clothes from the Civil War to the end of World War had a wavelike motion and an elaborate periodicity. There is always a danger in these demonstrations—and it is flagrantly illustrated in Spengler work – that we shall fit the facts to the preconceived symmetry. We are ?????? to look for the order or balance of simple patterns. The early astronomy found it in the movements of the heavenly bodies. Historians found it in the cycle of history; economists, in the economic cycle. But as knowledge increase as the intricacy of the changeful world was revealed, these notions had to be discarded. Everywhere nature and history give us intimations of rhythm, seldom do they follow the pattern of our impatient imaginations.

2. *The sense in which rhythm is an ever-present aspect of change* : Yet rhythm in some sense is implicit in cultural processes. Culture is life expressing its in valuations and in styles. It is always selective between the potentialities expression. Styles are always changeful and valuations always partial. The style can please forever, and no valuations can satisfy the capacities of experience. In those areas where culture is most free from authoritarian control as in the fine arts, we have a constant succession of styles, a frequent return with variations to former mores, a supersession of the old by the new and then of the new by the old, presenting something of the pattern of an undulated rhythm. Even in the more authoritarian and institutionalized areas of culture even in the fundamental mores, there are aspects of undulation. There oscillations between conservatism and radicalism, between more ascetic and more libertarianism, between a stronger orthodoxy and a larger tolerance between self-containedness and expansion. Such oscillations occur in the company of the individual life as well as in the life history of peoples. But in the la with the ever-renewed energies and creative impulses of overlapping generations, they repeat themselves without term. It is this fact that gives plausible to the Hegelian doctrine of social evolution, according to which one historical stage gives place to another that is a revulsion from it, asserting what the former denied. Culture is always in flux, not merely because civilization changes, but

because changefulness inheres in it.

3. *Indices of cultural change* : In order to appreciate how cultural change stimulates social change, it is very desirable that we should develop methods of tracing or measuring cultural trends. This is a harder task than the measurement of technological change, since the latter reveals itself in concrete and comparable embodiments. But many aspects of culture are elusive and intangible. It is relatively easy to trace changes in the arts and in externalized styles, such as those of architecture, decoration, and dress. It is not difficult to trace changes in the range of opinions that register themselves through such devices as voting. It is less easy to study the changes in the ideas that cluster round the everyday life, the popular philosophies, the notions of authority, the doubts and the certitudes, the fears and the hopes of men. Even those larger principles, such as nationalism or socialism, which reveal the character of an age, are seldom intensively studied as *processes of opinion* that emerge and rise to power. We know far more about the rise and fall of institutional systems than about the changing valuations that explain their rise and fall.

In an earlier chapter we discussed the attempts of psychologists and sociologists to “measure” attitudes. To measure *changes* of group attitudes, we should here point out, is a very different thing and not open to the same objections. It is true that we have to depend on a variety of indices, none of them fully revelatory of the subjective change, and all of them therefore requiring careful interpretation. But changes of attitude are indicated in many ways, through their effect on habits, customs, fashions, and modes of living as well as through their expression in art, entertainment, and literature. An example of the way in which popular magazine literature can be used to reveal changes of attitudes is offered in a work to which we have several times referred, *Recent Social Trends*. Among other signs of the somewhat rapid shifts in attitude characteristic of modern society it is there pointed out that the “discussion of sex moral in *Reader’s Guide* periodicals was three times as frequent in 1930-1931 as in 1919-1921 In the *New York Times Index*, entries under ‘moral’, ‘moral conditions,’ etc., rose from 0 in 1914, 1915, and 1918, to 92 in 1926 and then sank to 6 in 1931.” Another significant indication is that “while popular scientific periodicals increased their proportion of the total circulation about four times, the circulation of

Protestant religious periodicals decreased to about one-sixth of what it was in 1990.” This last illustration provides an example of the need for the interpretation of indices. In the same work it is pointed out that “the total number of church members in the United States has been growing at virtually the same rate as the population.” The one index suggests a stability, the other a weakening, of religious attitudes. We leave it to the student to explain the disparity and to consider in what respects one or the other of the two indices is a better reflection of the changing situation.

STRUCTURE

- 14.1 Objectives
- 14.2 Modernization
- 14.3 The Concept
- 14.4 Characteristics
- 14.5 Measures
- 14.6 Pre-requisites
- 14.7 Impact of West

14.1 OBJECTIVES

After going through this chapter you will be able to have knowledge of

- concept of modernization.
- measures of pre-requisites
- impact of modernization.

14.2 MODERNIZATION

Modernization has many dimensions. It may be perceived at society level, group level, or individual level. It may also be perceived as economic modernization, political modernization, social modernization, technological modernization, military modernization, police modernization, educational modernization, administrative modernization, and so forth. The concept has thus been employed in a diffused manner.

Economists perceive modernization in terms of man's application of technologies to the control of nature's resources. In order to bring about a marked increase in the output per individual in the society. Sociologists examine it in terms of differentiation in the quality of life that characterizes the modern societies. They explore new structures created to perform new functions, or new functions assigned to old structures. They also study the dysfunctional consequences of the modernization process like mental illness, violence, social unrest, regionalism and parochialism, and caste and class conflicts, etc. Political scientists focus on the problems of nation and government building as modernization occurs. They also remain concerned with the ways in which political elite respond to the efforts of new participants in politics to share power and to make demands upon those who monopolize power (Myron Weiner, 1966: 3).

According to Eisenstadt (1969: 1), modernization is the most over-whelming feature of the contemporary scene, in the sense that most nations are nowadays caught in its web. The characteristics and the processes of modernization in different countries are in some respect common and in some respect different. Historically, modernization (as the process of change in social, economic and political systems) has developed from a great variety of different traditional societies in different regions of the world. In western Europe, societies developed from feudal states, in eastern Europe from more autocratic states, in the United States, Canada and Australia through the processes of colonization and immigration, in Latin America from oligarchic conquest-colonial societies, in Japan from a centralised feudal state, in China from the breakdown of the most continuous imperial system, in most Asian and African societies from within colonial frameworks in some societies (specially in Asia) from more centralized monarchical societies, and in some from tribal structures and traditions. Eisenstadt submits that the different starting points of the process of modernization of these societies have greatly influenced the specific contours of their development and the problems encountered in the course of it.

The ambiguity and diffuseness of the concept of modernization has resulted in identifying modernization with different forms/ types of social change, like westernization, industrialization, progress, development, and so forth. Besides this, emphasis has come to be laid on particular aspects as the essential cores of modernization. It is, therefore,

essential that the term 'modernization' may be defined precisely and objectively.

14.3 THE CONCEPT

Modernization is not a philosophy or a movement with a clearly articulated value-system. It is a process of change (Gore, 1982: 7). Earlier, the term 'modernization' was used to refer only to "change in economy and its related effect on social values and social practices". It was described as a process that changed the society from primarily agricultural to primarily industrial economy. As a consequence of this change in economy, the society simultaneously underwent changes in values, beliefs and norms (Gore, Ibid: 7). Today, the term 'modernization' is given a broader meaning. It is described as "social change involving the elements of science and technology." It involves 'change based on rationality. According to Alatas (1972: 22), modernization is a process by which modern scientific knowledge is introduced in the society with the ultimate purpose of achieving a better and more satisfactory life in the broadest sense of the term, as accepted by the society concerned. In this definition, the phrase 'modern scientific knowledge' involves: (i) the recourse to experimentation to assess the validity of suggested explanations, (ii) the assumption of laws explainable in terms of a rational and experimental approach as distinct from religious dogma and philosophical explanation, (iii) the employment of definite methods in ascertaining the validity of facts, (iv) the use of concepts and signs, and (v) the search for truth for its own sake.

According to Eisenstadt (1969: 2), modernization refers to both (a) structural aspects of social organisation, and (b) socio-demographic aspects of societies. Karl Deutsch (American Political Science Review, September 1961: 494-95) has coined the term 'social mobilization' to denote most of the socio-demographic aspects of modernization. He has defined social mobilization as "the process in which major clusters of old social, economic and psychological commitments are eroded and broken and people become available for new patterns of socialization and behaviour".

Rustow and Ward (1964) have maintained that the basic process in modernization is the application of modern science to human affairs. According to Pye (1969: 329) modernization is the development of an inquiring and inventive attitude of mind, individual and social, that lies behind the use of techniques and machines and inspires

new forms of social relations. Scholars like Toynbee (1962: 24) feel that there is no difference between modernization and westernization. He writes that the agreeable word 'modern' is a substitute for the less agreeable word 'western'. The motive for using the word 'modern' instead of 'western' for the introduction of science and democracy is merely to save face, because it goes against the grain to admit that one's own ancestral way of life is not adequate to the situation in which one now finds oneself. But such views have been described as totally biased and unjustified.

Modernization is also not to be confused with industrialization. Industrialization refers to changes in methods of production, and economic and social organization resulting from the introduction of power driven machinery and the consequent rise of the factory system. According to Theodorson (1969: 201), it (industrialization) is characterized by: (i) the replacement of hand production centered in a craftsman's home or small shop by machine production centered in factories, (ii) by the production of standardized goods with interchangeable parts, (iii) by the rise of a class of factory workers who work for wages and do not own the means of production or the goods they produce, (iv) by a great increase in the proportion of the population engaged in non agricultural occupations, and (v) by the growth of numerous large cities. Industrialization provides a vast quantity of material goods never before available to the majority of the population. Modernization, on the other hand, is a long process with the end result being a scientific attitude of mind.

An analysis of the modernization process has been divided into three aspects by James O' Connell (1965: 554): (i) inventive outlook, that is, the scientific spirit for a continuing systematic and inventive search for knowledge pertaining to the cause and effect of the phenomenon, (ii) invention of new tools and techniques, that is search for varied inquiry methods that facilitate research and finding out new machines that make a different pattern of life necessary, and (iii) flexibility of social structures and continuing identity, that is, a willingness to accept continuous change on the plane of both individual and social structures together with a capacity to preserve individual and social identity. For example, in the polygynous traditional society, the marital customs were centered around the older men, but with the introduction of the wage system and labour mobility, the economic achievement of the younger men enabled em to compete for wives.

The changes that occur with the transition from a traditional to a modern society, according to James O' Connell (1965: 549) are:

- ◆ Economic growth Increases and it becomes self-sustaining.
- ◆ Occupations become more skilled and specialized.
- ◆ Number of people engaged in primary occupations reduces while that of people engaged in secondary and tertiary occupations increases.
- ◆ Age-old agricultural implements and methods give way to use of tractors, fertilizers, etc.
- ◆ Barter system is replaced by the money system.
- ◆ An Interdependence comes into being between communities that previously were separated from and independent of one another. The process of urbanization increases.
- ◆ Ascriptive status gives way to achieved status.
- ◆ Equality gradually replaces hierarchy.
- ◆ With better medical care and improved health, the longevity of life or survival rate increases.
- ◆ Geographical distances are shortened with the use of new methods of transport and communication.
- ◆ Hereditary leadership gives way to elected leadership.

In this connection, it is necessary to understand the terms tradition, traditionalism, and traditional society. 'Tradition' refers to the beliefs and practices handed down from the past. 'Traditionalism' is the psychic attitude that glorifies past beliefs and practices as immutable (which cannot be changed). It is antithetical to change and development. Traditionalists see tradition as static. They urge that the traditional values and practices have to be adopted and preserved because they were found useful in the past. They are thus hostile to innovations that violate previous practices.

According to Edward Shils ("Tradition and Liberty" in *Ethics*, 1965: 160-161),

tradition or traditionalistically-oriented action is a "self-conscious deliberate affirmation of traditional norms, in full awareness of their traditional nature." The traditional norms derive their merit from a sacred origin. If traditional norms are believed related to a sacred object in the past, these norms will be more opposed to alteration than if the norms were not grounded on some sacred object.

The traditionally transmitted norms are accepted because (i) their non-observance involves sanctions, (2) they fill the need to have rules in a given situation and thus perform a stabilizing function in society, (3) they have a sacred orientation, (4) they have been transmitted from the past, and (5) because of fear and ignorance also, people revere the past and resist change.

A 'traditional society', according to R.N, Bellah (Values and Social Change in Modern Japan, 1961: 15) is characterized by the dominance of oral traditions, organization based on kinship, ascriptive status, and hierarchical social order. Contrary to this, a 'modern society' can be said to be characterized by machine technology, national and secular attitudes, and highly differentiated structures. In simple terms, it may be said that while the traditional society is custom-bound, hierarchical, ascriptive, and unproductive, a modern society is egalitarian, achievement-oriented and based on production-oriented economy.

A traditional society is an immobile society. In a society of high mobility, which is termed as 'open society', a person can change his position freely, utilizing his abilities, potentialities, and opportunities which come his way. On the other hand, in an immobile or 'closed society', an individual remains from birth to death in the same relative position. By 'modernization', we mean creation of an open society, or the extent of creation of new institutions and accepting change which takes place in institutions, ideas, and social structures of society. Shils has maintained that the traditional society is not by any means entirely traditional and modern society is by no means free of tradition.

14.4 THE CHARACTERISTICS

Karl Deutsch (Ibid: 494-95) referring to one aspect of modernization (that is, socio-demographic aspect, or what he calls 'social mobilization) has indicated some of its indices as: exposure to modern life through machinery, response to mass media,

urbanization, change from agricultural occupations literacy and growth of per capita income.

According to Eisenstadt (1969: 3), some of the indices pertaining to the structural aspects of social organization (or modernization) are: specialized roles are 'free-floating' (that is, admission to them is not determined by ascribed properties of the individual), and wealth and power are, not ascriptively allocated (as in traditional societies). This is associated with institutions like markets (in economic life) and voting and party activities in politics.

Moore (1961: 57-82) has suggested that a modern society has specific economic, political and cultural characteristic. In the economic sphere' a modern society is characterized by: (a) the development of a very high level of technology, fostered by the systematic application of knowledge, the pursuit of which became the province of the secondary (industrial, commercial) and tertiary (service) occupations, as against the primary (agricultural) ones; (b) growing specialization of economic roles; and (C) the growth of the scope and complexity of the major markets, the markets for goods, labour, and money.

In the political sphere, a modern society is in some sense democratic or atleast Populistic. It is characterized by: (a) the decline of traditional legitimation of the rulers with reference to powers outside their own society, (b) the establishment of some sort of ideological accountability of the rulers to the ruled who are alleged to be the holders of the potential power; (c) growing extension of the territorial scope of the power of the central, legal, administrative and political agencies of the society , (d) continual spread of potential power to wider groups in the society-ultimately to all adult citizens and to moral orders; and (c) total disappearance on weakening of ascriptive political commitment to any given ruler or group.

In the cultural sphere, a modern society is characterised by: (a) growing differentiation of the major cultural and value systems, that is, religion, philosophy and science;(b) the spread of literacy and secular education;(c) a more complex institutional system for the advancement of specialized roles based on intellectual disciplines;(d) expansion of the media of communication; and (e) development of a new cultural outlook, characterised by an emphasis on progress and improvement,

on happiness and expression of abilities, on individuality as a moral value and stress on dignity of the individual and on efficiency.

Broadly speaking, modernization has following important characteristics:

- ◆ a temper of science
- ◆ reason and rationalism
- ◆ secularism
- ◆ high aspirations and achievement orientation
- ◆ overall transformation of attitudes, norms and values
- ◆ creation of new functional institutions
- ◆ investment in human resources
- ◆ a growth-oriented economy
- ◆ a national interest rather than kin, caste, religion, region or language oriented results
- ◆ an open society
- ◆ a mobile personality

14.5 MEASURES OF MODERNIZATION

Talking of the measures of modernization, Rustow and Ward(1964:4) have included in it such specific aspects of change as: (i) industrialization of economy and adopting a scientific technology in industry, agriculture, dairy farming, etc. to make them highly productive; (ii) secularization of ideas; (iii) a marked increase in geographical and social mobility; (iv) a spread of technical and technical education; (v) a transition from ascribed to achieved status; (vi) an increase in material standards of living; (vii) high ratio of inanimate energy used in the economy; (viii) high proportion of working force employed in the secondary and tertiary rather than primary production (that is, manufacturing and services as opposed to agriculture and fishing); (ix) high degree of urbanisation; (x) high level of literacy; (xi) high national product per capita; (xii) free circulation of mass media; and (xiii) high expectancy of life at birth.

14.6 PRE-REQUISITES OF MODERNIZATION

Before the transition from traditionalism to modernization is made, certain prerequisites of social change and modernization must be present in the society. These are: (i) an awareness of purpose and an eye on future; (ii) an awareness of existence, beyond one's own world, of many other societies; (iii) a sense of urgency; (iv) availability of variety of opportunities and roles; (v) an emotional preparedness for self-imposed tasks and sacrifices; and (vi) emergence of devoted, dynamic and committed leadership (Narmadeshwar Prasad, 1970: 19).

Modernization is critical because it requires not only a relatively stable new structure but one capable of adopting to continuously changing conditions and problems. Its success depends on the society's capacity for internal transformation.

Eisenstadt (1965: 659) has maintained that modernization requires three structural characteristics of a society: (i) (a high level of) structural differentiation, (ii) (a high level of) social mobilization, and (iii) a relatively centralized and autonomous institutional framework.

All societies do not accept the process of modernization uniformly. Following Herbert Blumer (1964: 129), five different ways may be pointed out in which a traditional society can respond to the process of modernization. These are:

(1) Rejective Response

A traditional society may reject modernization. This may occur at different points in different ways. Powerful groups, landed aristocracy, a government oligarchy, a union of workers, and religious fanatics may discourage modernization to protect their vested interests. Social prejudices, special interests and firm attachment to given forms of traditional life, beliefs and customs may lead certain sets of people to reject the process of modernization and maintain the traditional order.

(2) Disjunctive Response

This response of conjunction between the old and the new or the co-existence of traditionalism and modernity occurs when the modernization process operates as a detached development, without affecting much the traditional life. In this way, there

is no conflict between modernization and the traditional order, because the older system is not threatened. Features of modernization exist alongside with the traditional life.

(3) Assimilative Response

This response consists of an absorption of the modernization process by the traditional order without disruption of its own organization and pattern of life. The example is the acceptance of the computer ideology by the employees in the banking system, or use of fertilizers and tractors by the peasants in the villages. In both cases, the modernization process comes to be woven into the traditional order without endangering or affecting the basic characteristics of the traditional order.

(4) Supportive Response

This response takes the form of accepting the new and modern things because they strengthen or reinforce the traditional order. For example, accepting the modernization process in the police or military systems because it increases the efficiency of the police or the power of the military. Different traditional groups and institutions use the opportunity presented by modernization to pursue more effectively traditional interests and to maintain traditional positions more firmly. Modernization may provide resources and facilities to further traditional interest.

(5) Disruptive Response

In this response, the traditional order is undermined at many points by the adjustments which are made to the situation introduced by modernization.

Usually, all five of these responses take place at different points of the traditional order and in different combinations. The responses are governed by preferences, interests, and values.

According to Myron Weiner (1966: 8), the main instruments which make modernization possible are:

(1) Education

It inculcates a sense of national loyalty and creates skills and attitudes essential

for technological innovation. Edward Shils has also emphasized on the role of education in the process of modernization. Arnold Anderson, however, maintains that formal education is not adequate for teaching skills. Sometimes, university education may be a waste, for it increases the number of students with degrees without an increase in the number of people with modern skills and attitudes.

(2) Communication

The development of mass communications (including telephone, TV, radio, movies, etc.) is an important means of spreading modern ideas at a faster rate. The only danger is that if these are controlled by the government, they will spread only one type of ideological thought. In democracies, however, the press is often independent to express its views.

(3) Ideology Based on Nationalism

The nationalistic ideologies serve as unifying influence in bridging social cleavages within plural societies. They also help the political elite in changing the behaviour of masses of people. Binder, however, has pointed out that the elite may have modern ideology but it is not necessary that it may facilitate development also.

(4) Charismatic Leadership

A charismatic leader is in a better position to persuade people to adopt modern beliefs, practices and behaviour patterns because of the respect and loyalty he commands. The danger is that the charismatic leader might use the modern values and attitudes as an instrument for personal glorification rather than national development.

(5) Coercive Governmental Authority

If the government authority is weak, it may not succeed in implementing the policies aimed at the modernization process, but if the government is strong, it may even adopt coercive measures to compel people to accept attitudes and behaviour patterns which aim at development. Myron Weiner is, however, of the opinion that nationalism, under the aegis of an authoritarian regime, may lead a country into suicidal expansion abroad rather than development at home. In this connection, it may not be wrong to cite the example of the policies of the Bush regime (in America) political elite pertaining to

countries like Iraq etc. After Russia lost its supremacy, America's governmental authority has started coercing the nations in the name of the process of modernizing the underdeveloped and the developing countries.

Myron Weiner (1966: 9-10) has also talked of opportunities and incentives along with value and attitude changes for the modernization of a society. Many economists have supported this viewpoint. They point to the existence of institutional impediments to productive activities that retard the rate of investment. A few examples of such institutional impediments are land tenure systems that deny peasants the gain from increasing productivity, taxes that slow the flow of goods from one part of the country to another, and an elaborate bureaucratic regulations.

14.7 IMPACT OF THE WEST AND MODERNIZATION IN INDIA

The impact of the West on India, following Alatas (1972: 121), can be discussed in five phases. The first phase is that of hostile contact with the conquest of Alexander, etc., followed by contact of peaceful interchange as the result of trade and commerce of successive centuries. The second phase began by the end of the fifteenth century when Vasco da Gama arrived with his ships at Calicut in 1498 A.D. Within a few years, the Portuguese occupied Goa. But the effect of these westerners was relatively restricted. The third phase began when East India Company established its rule in the beginning of the eighteenth century and later on the British rule was established in the country by the middle of the eighteenth century. This was the first step in the expansion of western culture in India. The fourth phase commenced with the beginning of the nineteenth century following the industrial revolution. With the economic exploitation of India by the British as source of raw materials, began the spread and dominance of western culture in social and cultural fields too. The fifth and the last phase began after the political independence of the country in 1947.

What has been the impact of the western culture on our society in terms of effect on our culture and our social systems? The impact may be briefly described as follows:

- (1) Western institutions like banking system, public administration, military organization, modern medicine, law, etc., were introduced in our country.
- (2) Western education broadened the outlook of the people who started talking of

their rights and freedom. The introduction of the new values, the rational and secular spirit, and the ideologies of individualism, equality and justice assumed great importance.

- (3) Acceptance of scientific innovations raised the aspirations of raising the standard of living and providing material welfare for the people.
- (4) Many reform movements came into being. Several traditional beliefs and practices dysfunctional to society were discarded and many new behaviour patterns were imbibed.
- (5) Our technology, agriculture, entrepreneurship and industry were modernized leading to the economic well-being of our country.
- (6) The hierarchy of political values has been restructured. Accepting the democratic form of government, all native states who had been under a monarchic form of government have been merged into the Indian State and the authority and domination of feudals and zamindars has been demolished.
- (7) There have been structural changes in social institutions like marriage, family and caste, creating new forms of relations in social life, religion, etc.
- (8) The introduction of the modern means of communication, such as railway and bus travel, postal service, air and sea travel, press, and radio and television have affected man's life in varied respects.
- (9) There is rise in the feeling of nationalism.
- (10) The emergence of the middle class has changed the dominant values of the society.

The impact of western culture has also been described by Alatas in terms of four types of changes in our culture and social system: eliminative changes, additive changes, supportive changes and synthetic changes. The eliminative changes are those which cause the disappearance of culture traits, behaviour patterns, values, beliefs, institutions, etc. As an illustration, we can cite the example of total change in weapons used in fighting wars, abolition of sati, and so forth. The additive changes refer to the adoption of new culture traits, institutions, behaviour patterns and belief systems covering diverse aspects of life.

These additions were not present earlier in the culture of people. Introducing divorce in the Hindu society, giving share to daughters in father's property, introducing election system in panchayats, etc. are a few examples of this type of change. The supportive changes are those which strengthen the values, beliefs or behaviour patterns present in society before contact with the West. A simple example of this change is the use of 'Hundi' system in loan transactions. The synthetic changes result in the creation of new forms from existing elements plus adopted ones. The most simple instance is the creation of residentially nuclear but functionally joint family which continues to fulfil social obligations to parents and siblings. Continuing dowry system but putting restrictions on amount to be given or taken, and associating children along with parents in mate selection are two other examples of synthetic change.

This categorization of changes due to western impact is only for the analytical purposes. In practice, it is not possible to isolate them from each other. Within one type of change, we may find elements of other types of changes too. For example, the introduction of the textile industry contains the supportive element in the sense that it facilitates the production of cloth. But at the same time, since it pushed back the traditional handloom and weaving industry, it may be said to have the element of eliminative change. Opening of the wall-less prisons in the prison system is another example of change having elements of three different types. So are the changes in the education system, banking system, family system, marriage system, and so forth.

The main question now is: Where has India reached after contact with the West? Has India progressed? Has it contributed to the welfare of the people? Is it possible to answer this question objectively? Can subjectivism and philosophical partiality be avoided in such analysis? Some intellectuals feel that India faced number of problems at the end of the Second World War, like the problems of economic backwardness and a large number of people living below the poverty line, unemployment, predominance of religion in all walks of life, rural indebtedness, caste conflicts, communal disharmony, shortage of capital, lack of trained personnel with technical skills, imperfect means for mobilizing human and material resources, and so forth. The western impact has provided alternative solutions to handle these problems. But other scholars hold that western impact has not helped India much in facing the problems. If some problems have been solved, many new have been created. And India is not trying to meet them through western models. It is using its indig-

enous elements in its approach. It was only after the independence of the country that there was a rise in industrial development, dissemination of education, rural development, control over population, and so forth. It was thus independence from western rule rather than contact with the West that made modernization possible.

The fact is that in certain areas of life, we may be justified in acclaiming the positive impact of the West. Modern medical science, modern technology, modern methods of combating natural catastrophes, modern methods of providing security from external dangers to the country, etc. will go down in Indian history as the incontestable contributions of the West. But India is using at the same time its traditional institutions, beliefs and practices for the uplift of the masses. Thus, even after the impact of the West, and after the modernization of various systems, India will remain India. Indian culture will subsist and survive in decades to come.

PROCESS OF MODERNIZATION IN INDIA

The analysis in the preceding pages indicates that tradition and modernity constitute a continuum with tradition at one end and modernization at the other. Any society can be placed at any point on the continuum line. Most societies are in some form of transition.

Indian society at the time of independence had deep-rooted traditions but it also wanted to become modern. There were people as well as leaders who wanted a traditional way of life; there were others who wanted to see India emerge as a modern state having no truck with the past. There were yet others who were for some kind of compromise or synthesis between tradition and modernity. They said that a traditional system can accept and absorb modernization up to a certain point. In the same way, a modernized system can tolerate traditional views up to a certain degree. They, thus, wanted co-existence. But the propounders of the first two schools maintained that the co-existence cannot last long. A Point is soon reached when the traditional ethos become irreconcilable. What process of change did we ultimately adopt?

We decided to modernize our society at various levels. What aspects of life were sought to be modernized and in what manner? At the social level, we wanted social relations to be based on concepts like equality and human dignity, and social values which would ensure social mobility, removal of caste disabilities, amelioration of the condition of

women, and so forth. At the economic level, we wanted technological growth and distributive justice. At the cultural level, we wanted secularism, rationalism, and liberalism. At the political level, we desired representative government, democratic institutions, achievement-oriented power structure, and a greater voice and participation for Indians in the governance of the country. The means or agents selected for modernizing the society (based on rationality and scientific knowledge) were: planning, education (which may dispel the darkness of ignorance), legislation, assistance from foreign countries, adopting policy of liberalization, and the like.

As regards the processes of modernization, broadly speaking, it may be said that from the qualitative point of view, modernization in India is undergoing the following processes:

At the economic structural level, there is a persistent and growing tendency to adopt the rational, mechanized industrial economy in place of older communal-familistic tool economy. This is even responsible for the breakdown of traditional systems like jajmani system.

At the political structural level, the change in the power structure is being introduced through the abolition of semi-feudal group-oriented power structure of the past and by replacing it by a rational parliamentary democratic structure of power which is essentially individual oriented.

At the cultural level, the change in the realm of values is from sacred value system to secular value system.

At the social structural level, there is a decline in the traditional principle of ascribed status and role to achieved status and role.

Yogendra Singh (1973: x) is of the opinion that a unique feature of modernization in India is that it is being carried forward through adaptive changes in the traditional structures rather than structural dissociation or breakdown. .

While it is true that most features of the traditional society cannot fit in with the modern society, modernity cannot be imposed upon the population. Modernization democratic structure of power which is essentially individual oriented.

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secular value system.

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Yogendra Singh (1973: x) is of the opinion that a unique feature of modernization in India is that it is being carried forward through adaptive changes in the traditional structures rather than structural dissociation or breakdown. .

While it is true that most features of the traditional society cannot fit in with the modern society, modernity cannot be imposed upon the population. Modernization has to be professionally directed. The good features of traditional institutions can be retained by suitable adjustments in the process of development. A society is tension-free only when it is a closed and an immobile society. A developing society functions on the basis of built-in resistances and tensions. Tensions exist because of an inherent clash between tradition and modernity. Quite often, tensions are the legacies of the past, accentuated by economic development. Often in the process of development, some of the tensions are resolved. There is a dichotomous relationship between the forces of stability and conservation and the forces of change and modernization. A developing society faces these problems rather acutely. Challenges to change and modernization like regionalism, parochialism, illiteracy, migration, inflation, lack of capital, adjustment with neighboring nations for reducing expenses on defence, political corruption, bureaucratic inefficiency and non-commitment, etc. have therefore to be faced patiently and methodically through rational adoptive processes. The break up of a traditional society implies greater individual freedom, horizontalization of authority, more association of masses with decision-making, etc. The process of modernization involves clearing away social structure 'resistances'. Simultaneously, planning development at all levels--economic, social, political and cultural--alone will provide incentive to people to accept and share attitudes and norms of modernity and compel key social groups--the intelligentsia, political elite, bureaucrats and technicians--to accept the challenges of planned change.

PROBLEMS OF MODERNIZATION

Following are some of the problems of modernization:

1. The first paradox of modernization is that a modern society must change in all

ways at once but such a regular, coordinated pattern of growth cannot be conceivably planned. A certain amount of social unrest is therefore inevitably created. For example, mass educational system demands that trained individuals must be absorbed in occupational roles commensurate with their training and knowledge. But it is not always possible to provide jobs to all the educated people. This leads to unrest among the educated unemployed.

2. The second problem is that structural change is uneven during periods of modernization. For instance, industries may be modernized but family system, religious system, etc. remain conservative. These discontinuities and patterns of change affect the established social and other structures and produce lags and bottlenecks. Another example of this in India is that decreasing the age of voting from twenty one to eighteen years might have been a step of entering into the modern era but it has created a crisis since a mass electorate rests on the assumption of a mature and literate electorate with a sense of citizenship and an ability to participate in the policy.
3. The third problem is that modernization of social and economic institutions creates conflicts with the traditional ways of life. For example, the trained doctors pose a threat to traditional medicine men. Similarly, the items produced by machinery deprive the domestic workers of their means of livelihood. At the same time, many people in the society with traditional and conservative values and attitudes become hostile to people who accept modern way of life. Thus, the conflict between the traditional and modern ways becomes a source of unrest.
4. The fourth problem is that most often roles adopted by the people are modern but values continue to be traditional. For example, even after taking training in medicine and surgery, a doctor tells his patient, "I treat, He cures". This indicates that he has no confidence in himself to diagnose the disease properly. But instead of blaming himself, he blames the way he is socialized to develop values in life.
5. The fifth problem is that there is lack of co-operation among agencies which modernize, and among institutions and systems which are modernized. This many-atime leads to cultural lag as well as institutional conflicts.

6. The last problem is that modernization raises the aspirations of people but social systems fail to provide opportunities to them to achieve their aspirations. This creates frustrations, deprivations and social unrest.

CENTRE PERIPHERY

STRUCTURE

- 15.1 Objectives
- 15.2 Introduction
- 15.3 Bourdieu's principle
- 15.4 Compensation principle
- 15.5 The dual Social World
- 15.6 Communication of the centre and the periphery
- 15.7 Mutual centre-periphery perception

15.1 OBJECTIVES

After going through this chapter you will be able to have knowledge of

- the concept of centre and periphery
- relation between the concepts

15.2 Introduction

The theoretical model discussed here makes reference to quite an abstract perception of the 'centre' and the 'periphery', which may correspond to various levels of spatial organisation, from the global level of intercontinental relations to the local level of an internal structure of a given country's regions or other smaller territorial units. Totally abstract references of the reflections below to the 'centre' and the 'periphery' defined in a symbolic space or –using the language of Pierre Bourdieu

(Bourdieu, Wacquant 2001)—in conventional ‘fields’ of social interaction, seem also to be possible. Thus, one may discuss a literary, musical or religious field where central and peripheral areas are distinguished.

Traditional ‘centre-periphery’ models usually focused on one of the selected dimensions of spatial relationships: economic, political or cultural. Classical economic theories include for example ‘the world system’ theory by Emanuel Wallerstein (e.g. Wallerstein 1974), which divided the world into four basic categories: core, semi-peripheries, peripheries and external areas not included in the world system. In his theory, Wallerstein emphasised the economic dominance of the core over the peripheries as well as the weakness, non-stability and dependence of the latter on the core centres. Theoreticians of the ‘relative development’ school, following in his footsteps, present a similar approach, describing in particular the dependence of Latin America on the developed countries of the West. At the same time, one should point out to a number of theories analysing economic centre-periphery relations in a more positive light, also drawing attention to an advantageous influence of the core on the periphery. For example, the ‘polarised growth theory’ by François Perroux, which the author himself defined in an abstract and non-geographical meaning, shows a positive role of the centres. Perroux highlighted their stimulating role for the development of the entire economic system. A similar approach is presented by the authors of many subsequent versions of the theory of economic activity concentration. The concepts of the so-called clusters may in particular be considered as their most recent form, which may be perceived as a specific form of the core centres creating the poles of positive development impulses.

Another area of the studies on the centre-periphery relations which is important from a theoretical point of view includes research concerning the emergence of modern nation-states and development of their political systems. Stein Rokkan is a classic researcher in this field, known for many theoretical papers on centre-periphery cleavages perceived in terms of political and cultural dimensions (e.g. Lipset, Rokkan 1967). The centre, in this approach, is understood as the centre of political dominance which uses the state machinery to subordinate the entire territory of the country to itself. Provinces resisting these activities are the peripheries proper. In his studies, Rokkan also emphasises the important cultural dimension of the centre-periphery tensions. A modern

(i.e. of the Enlightenment type) nation-state makes an attempt to subordinate the sphere of culture and religion to itself. In particular, it standardises the national language, subordinates the Church to the state and has ambitions to control the media. These aspirations are resisted by peripheral regions disagreeing to give up their cultural and religious distinctiveness. Significantly enough, the culture and religion spheres are largely of an instrumental character for the modern state; however, they are usually the key social resources for peripheral regions (cf. Rokkan 1970).

Together with the 'postmodern' growing interest in the role of culture in social sciences, in recent years we could observe the development of theories analysing only the cultural dimension of the centre-periphery relations. One of their well-known fields includes 'postcolonial' studies initiated by the famous work of Edward Said (1978), which point to the existing cultural domination of the metropolis over its former colonies, even after formal political relationships have ceased (e.g. Chakrabarty 2000). Another field of research concerning cultural relationships includes studies on the rebirth of regionalisms in post-modern nation-states. They highlight the significant role played by the cultural identity of periphery inhabitants and their occasional strong perception of the centre's cultural dominance (e.g. Keating 1988). The intention of the model presented here is to demonstrate the combination of the very relationship between the centre-periphery relations and theoretical concepts drawn from other areas of social sciences, in particular sociology and linguistics (discourse analysis).

15.3 The centre and the periphery and Pierre Bourdieu's theory of capitals

Pierre Bourdieu's theory, and in particular his concept of the three basic forms of capital, may seem to be the meeting point of various research fields concerning the centre-periphery relations discussed in the paper. We should bear in mind that apart from the classical economic capital, he also distinguished social capital and cultural capital (Bourdieu 1986). He defined the social capital as: *the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable net work of more or less institutionalised relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition or in other words, to membership in a group which provides each of its members with the backing of the collectively-owned capital, a credential which entitles them to credit, in the various senses of the word*. According to

Bourdieu, cultural capital comprises three main subtypes: 'institutionalised' cultural capital in the form of formal education; 'embodied' cultural capital in the form of internalised cultural norms, including aesthetic competencies, manners, knowledge of high culture forms, etc, and 'objectified' cultural capital in the form of objects having cultural value. The three types of capital distinguished by Bourdieu are also the dimensions in which social status and hierarchy can be described. They seem to correspond to the above mentioned three dimensions of the description of spatial hierarchies between central and peripheral areas.

Ivan Szelényi was the precursor of applying the concept of the three forms of capital to describe the divergences between individual societies and their evolution. Especially in his well-known book entitled *Making Capitalism Without Capitalists*, published with his associates (Eyal, Szelényi, Townsley 1998), Szelényi drew attention to the fact that individual societies may be described from the perspective of hierarchies of various types of capital. Along with the evolution of societies, the relative importance of these capitals as determinants of social status within the society will also tend to evolve. The principles of mutual conversion of capitals, which may be compared to changes in foreign exchange rates, will also be developed. Consequently, in certain periods and in certain social systems, the possession of specific forms of capital (e.g. economic, cultural or social) may result in special advantages, while in other societies and other periods, the same forms of capital will have a marginal value, and persons treating them as the main resource will not be able to acquire any significant social position.

In his initial work, Bourdieu primarily focused on a static description of relations between various types of capital (and their fields) in the contemporary French society. Szelényi with his associates demonstrated that the structure of capital hierarchy was unique for each society and subject to constant changes. For example, communist countries in particular could be described as fields with a dominant role of political capital which in Bourdieu's theory is defined as a subform of social capital.² However, liberalisation of the communist systems, followed by their collapse, may be described as replacing of the role of political capital by economic capital. The role of the latter became particularly important after liberal economic reforms had been implemented in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Whether economic capital

became the dominant capital in the societies of the region is still a controversial issue. As it seems, it definitely remains subordinated to the political capital in Russia. Eyal, Szélny and Townsley (1998) emphasise a particularly privileged role of cultural capital in the countries of Central Europe, especially in Poland and Hungary. They believe that, for example, the conversion of political capital into economic capital (commonly known as 'seizing the property rights to formerly state-owned assets by the nomenclature') never occurred there in a pure form. Cultural capital was the catalyst of the process and only owners of this capital managed to effectively exchange their privileged social positions defined by the ownership of political capital in the communist era for significant economic resources after 1989. Thus, although in Poland, with its relative weakness of the state, one can discuss the current low position of political capital,³ it is difficult to claim it has any overwhelming dominance, as cultural capital still seems to remain its strong competitor. Its influence manifests itself, among others, in a significant role of intellectual elites in the social and political life and a strong tradition of the intelligentsia, as compared with other countries in the region (Zarycki 2003).

An unambiguous determination of mutual relations of the respective capital types in a given community (i.e. in a social group, country or region) is never possible since the hierarchy of respective capitals and their subforms, including the principles of distinguishing and separating their fields, continues to be the subject of disputes which are symbolic fights about the methods of defining social status. Mutual relations of the capital types and their relative value will always be in a way a subjective evaluation influencing the way of defining our social status.

In the most developed Western societies in particular (that is, in the core areas of the world system), the relations between economic and political capitals are rather ambiguous. As Bourdieu frequently wrote, the role of their cultural capital is commonly regarded as subordinated. However, the relation between the sphere of politics and the sphere of money is still disputed. Although he defined the social hierarchies in the French society primarily in terms of economic capital, and less of cultural capital, Bourdieu also claimed that the field of power was a dominant field in all societies since it could verify the principles of operation of all other fields (e.g. through the nationalisation mechanism, it can take away the resources of economic capital or at least change the rules according to which the economic field operates). However, there

are also opinions that the above mentioned statement by Bourdieu is no longer valid in the globalisation era since the phenomenon of globalisation may in particular be regarded as a revolutionary process whereby the importance of economic capital is increasing and the importance of political capital is decreasing, a symptom of which includes the dwindling strength of modern states versus multinational corporations. Some authors such as for example Agnew (2005) suggest that a spectacular takeover of the explicitly dominating position of economic capital versus political capital could recently be observed especially in the United States. In other words, he argues, the United States is the first state in modern history whose institutions are subordinated to the interests of big capital. This is also what, in his opinion, constitutes the specific nature of the new type of hegemony. Unlike all earlier huge global powers, the United States use the state institutions as tools of their dominance in a very restricted way. The US do not conquer new colonies, but in the majority of cases, make other countries dependent by means of economic mechanisms. If we agree with this opinion, it should be acknowledged that not until now (and only in one country of the world) has the vision of Karl Marx, who defined the state as an institution serving to protect tangible interests of the owning class, fully materialised.

15.4 The compensation principle

In view of the above considerations, we can say that economic capital in the theoretical model outlined here, especially in the globalisation era, may be defined as the dominating capital and also as the key resource of the world's core regions. The contemporary centres are areas of a strong concentration of economic capital, and their social stratification system is characterised by the dominance of economic capital over other forms of capital as determinants of social status. In other words, the logic of economic capital may be described as the dimension of social inequities, prevailing today in the global scale, and at the same time of dominance, in particular the dominance of central areas over peripheries in geographical terms.

At the same time, it could be argued that the peripheries very often use the strategy of compensation for their weaknesses to offset their dependence on the centre, in the economic dimension taking the form of advantages given to other forms of capital. In particular, one may discuss the reference to cultural and social capitals, mentioned earlier. It is possible to distinguish many subforms depending on

the context, and indirect forms. Thus, for instance, in the paper quoted above (Zarycki 2004a), I described how various ideological concepts of the modernisation of Poland might be characterised in a theoretical language of various forms of capital as compensation models of the Polish economic capital deficit. Therefore, it is possible to distinguish, firstly, some concepts of strengthening the Polish state, which may be described as a programme of appreciation of its political capital. Secondly, one should mention the traditional concept of strengthening the role of religion as the basis of the Polish national identity, and of the Catholic Church as a substitute for the weak state system. They may be described also as a programme of the appreciation of social capital, however, not in its purely political but merely a communal and religion-related vision. At the same time, there is an aspect of cultural capital visible here as well, which is a significant factor of religious identity and an important resource of the Church.

A vision of the modernisation of Poland proposed by the intelligentsia, emphasising the role of a bottom-up process in the building of civic society under the leadership of the intelligentsia is even more underpinned by cultural capital. In general, Poland seems to be a country which attaches a relatively great deal of importance to cultural capital as a factor compensating for the weakness of the state and the society. The intelligentsia, defined first of all in terms of cultural capital, continues to play a significant role as the key fraction of the social elites and an important representative of the country in the external world. Culturally defined pictures of Poland are also considered to be an important asset of the country in its international politics (among others, the weight attributed to democratic achievements and the power of the First Republic of Poland, the suffering of Poland and the Poles in the period of partitions, in World War II, and in the communist period, the achievements of Polish artists, intellectuals and scientists as well as social and political activists and priests under the leadership of John Paul II). Thus, one may propose the thesis that in case of Poland cultural capital constitutes its key resource supposed to compensate for the peripheral status of the country and its deficit of economic capital in relation to the centre, coupled with a parallel weakness of political capital resources.

On the other hand, contemporary Russia seems to be a country where political capital still remains the key capital compensating for the peripheral status and dependence on the central countries. Both economic and cultural capitals in

contemporary Russia have rather secondary functions,subordinated to the dominant political capital,since both the key elites of the country and the logic of social processes where the state almost always wins with the big capital as well as a peripheral sense of dignity are defined in terms of the latter.In collo quial speech,they may be illustrated by the following statement:*We are not as wealthy and modern as countries of the West (centre),but our state is extremely powerful and ensures an appropriate status and influence in the world for our country* .In the case of a strategy based on the compensatory use of culturalcapital,an equivalent statement might read:*We are not as wealthy and modern as countries of the West (centre),but our noble history,education and achievements in the field of culture and science ensure universal respect for us and the right to belong to the communities of the West (core)*.

Here,one may again draw attention to two separate aspects of the compensatory privileges of individual forms of capital.Firstly,in the domestic aspect, they become the key dimensions of social stratification. Thus,the elites in peripheral countries and regions will be defined to a lesser extent in economic categories and to a larger degree –in social categories (e.g.political,clan-related, religious)and/or cultural (e.g.in terms of education and cultural competencies). Secondly,privileged capitals will play a key role in external relationships of the peripheries both with central areas and areas located lower in the global hierarchy.In particular,one may indicate cases where the subsequent forms and subforms of capital are used by the subsequent levels of peripheries in order to compensate for their weaknesses against stronger partners and domination over weaker,subordinated regions.Russia and earlier the Soviet Union may serve as an example,which,as it has been mentioned above,may be described

as a peripheral region in relation to the West,compensating for its weakness by an extremely strong privilege of the political capital position.By means of this capital,it subordinated,as it is known,a major part of Europe to itself, with individual countries in turn compensating for their weakness in relation to Moscow by their cultural capital.Poland is a particularly good example in this respect since it attempted to build its sense of independence in the communist period,and even of superiority over the Soviet Union,mainly in the cultural di mension.The trust in the power of the Polish

culture, its status as a high culture, at the same time being a part of the Western (central) circle, may be analysed here as an ideology of compensation for the dominance of political capital by means of cultural capital. Similar cases may be described in many other regions of the world, both at international and regional levels.

In this context, it is worth emphasising that classical compensatory capitals, that is cultural and social capitals, are characterised by a lower degree of liquidity in comparison to economic capital, as well as by limited possibilities of conversion and a longer accumulation period. This mainly refers to cultural capital whose acquisition usually requires a long time to develop formal knowledge or informal cultural competencies. A complete mastery of the latter is often possible only thanks to early family socialisation. Certain types of social capital such as being a member of nobility or aristocracy are also hardly exchangeable and are extremely stable (a noble title, just like education, once acquired is practically impossible to lose). Economic capital, in turn, is by definition characterised by a maximum degree of liquidity and an immediate potential for exchange. At the same time, according to many economists observing the way in the world economic system operates, peripheral areas are characterised not only by lesser resources of economic capital but also by a significant level of instability.

Perhaps even the stability of economic systems would be a better measurement of the position of the centre and the periphery in the hierarchy than the mere degree of economic affluence. This way or another, fluctuations of the world economic system cycles are perceived with a strength approximately proportional to the degree of peripherality of the world's regions. It seems that we can also speak of a mechanism of the centres' buffering the negative effects of financial crises by shifting their costs to peripheries. The effect of these regularities includes instability of economic capital resources in the peripheries, followed by an instability of the economic elites in these parts of the world. Therefore, a way to ensure the stabilisation of the social position in such a structure is reference to capitals which are significantly less exposed to crises and sudden devaluation: in particular to social capital (i.e. membership of institutionalised and nonformal social groups) and cultural capital (cultural competencies, e.g. manners and lifestyles, high artistic or technical culture). Elites in peripheral countries (regions), building their status on these forms of capital, can ensure its stability in a much better way, since they are not exposed to economic cycles.

15.5. The dual Social world of periphery

This strategy of the elites results in the creation of a dual social world in peripheral areas since the periphery creates its own systems of social hierarchies, which may be specifically described as systems privileging selected forms of capital with a compensatory function. At the same time, however, peripheries are in a constant interaction with central areas whose social organisation logic is a dominant point of reference for the periphery. Inhabitants of the periphery, and in particular peripheral elites, live in a social system which has at least two dimensions, often guided by a conflicting logic.⁵ In particular, the capitals that they have at their disposal offer a different status in various dimensions of their social world. Therefore, their social status in those dimensions is different. For instance, economic capital owned by a representative of the periphery may represent a significant resource in the context of his or her region, ensuring him or her the status of a member of the economic elite. The same capital in central countries may turn out to be relatively insignificant. Similarly, cultural capital, for example in the form of certain competencies or formal education, may prove to be almost useless in a peripheral context (e.g. lack of institutions which would be able to use persons with high qualifications), at the same time being extremely valuable in central areas. Other forms of cultural capital, corresponding to other competencies, familiarity with other traditions, cultural conventions or specific aesthetic tastes, may be found to be extremely valuable in specific peripheral areas and totally useless or even burdensome in central areas of various levels.⁶

This multi-dimensional social world of the periphery very frequently leads to social tensions between clashing systems of values and logics of social stratification. In the 'critical' perspective, most frequently connected with the leftwing social thought, such tensions are usually interpreted as an outcome of the dominance of the centre over the periphery, imposing the central system of values, institutions and language onto the peripheries. At this point, I would not like to go into deep ideological and normative contemplations, but to merely indicate the existence of the above-mentioned conflict of the social organisation logic. Its nature may be diversified and cause differences in evaluation, but its existence seems to be more or less inevitable to a smaller or lesser degree. As Sosnowska (1997) correctly demonstrated, the Polish

social sciences discourse can serve as an example of tension between periphery and central logic of the social world, with the majority of its representatives making attempts to describe the Polish peripheral social reality by means of a theoretical language developed in the centre. The example proves that the conflict in question usually does not manifest itself in the form of tensions between representatives of the centre and the periphery, but more often it takes the form of disputes among the inhabitants of the peripheries themselves, and more precisely – among all individuals who, irrespectively of the physical location, identify themselves or are identified with the social world of the periphery. Therefore, on the one hand, there are some members of the peripheral community who refer to local values, hierarchies and local language, not necessarily in a strictly linguistic meaning, but mainly in terms of the world of meanings and notions that they use. On the other hand, however, there are those who primarily refer to values, aesthetic and moral standards and culture codes coming from the centre. The latter are not only of crucial importance in interactions with representatives of central areas, but, firstly and foremostly, as a rule have a higher social status in the periphery and are used to enhance their status in a local social context.

In light of the above, we may conclude that the social world of the periphery is characterised by a constant tension between various types of competing social logic. This tension often results in a dysfunction of peripheral institutions, which are frequently structured on the basis of examples drawn from the centre, sometimes simply copied from the ‘central’ context. In the peripheral context, in a different logic of social hierarchies and values, they often turn out to be dysfunctional or will unexpectedly modify their mode of operation, adjusting it to the environment. It sometimes turns out that they serve totally different social groups and other interests than those which should theoretically be the beneficiaries of a given organisational type. Sometimes, despite their partial dysfunction, they are kept as important elements of integration with central areas which formally require their existence or informally force the peripheries to maintain institutions compliant with the central standards.

The disruption of peripheral elites

The consequences of the above phenomena for peripheral elites are particu

larly interesting since it is these elites that can best perceive the multi-dimensional nature of the periphery's social space. Lower social classes of the periphery may, to a large extent, ignore the symbolic world of the centre. They usually have no daily contact with the centre, rarely travel to the centre, their social status is low in general so they do not find it worthwhile to invest in the assimilation of the central culture and the acquisition of social status symbols that are valued especially in the centre, etc. The higher the status of the members of a peripheral community, the more important for them is the possibility of unconstrained functioning in the social sphere of the centre. Apart from the reasons including the usually higher social status of the central culture, an important reason for peripheral elites to become interested in the world of the centre is their specific social function. It consists, among others, in a comprehensive intermediation between the centre and the periphery. This intermediation refers to all dimensions of social life, and primarily to the economic dimension. In the critical discourse of the dependists, the negatively viewed economic elites which act as intermediaries in contacts with the global centres are commonly dubbed as 'comprador bourgeoisie'. This term refers to social groups which dominate in the peripheries and which in fact represent economic interests of the centre, at the same time betraying their indigenous communities and facilitating their exploitation by the global capital. This critical view of the Latin American elites could be regarded as one-sided; however, it shows the tension that is a part of life of the elites in peripheral regions. On the one hand, they act as the centre's representatives (and champions of its interests, according to left-wing intellectuals) in the periphery, and on the other – as representatives of the periphery in the centre. These functions are performed by economic, political and cultural elites in relation to the social fields which remain under their control. The periphery's cultural elites can also be described using Bauman's metaphor (1998) of 'translators', that is intermediaries in the explanation of the two worlds in question. They attempt to describe the world of the periphery in the language of the centre, and try to describe the social world of the centre to the residents of the periphery in a language that they can comprehend (and especially via the media that they have access to). As above, the notion of language should be primarily understood in an abstract sense, that is in a sense which in scientific literature is normally ascribed to the notion of 'discourse'. This does not necessarily mean a different national language, its variety or dialect, but a discourse that has a specific style, a sphere of social references and a certain linguistic

and conceptual complexity. In addition to their 'ancillary' role, the periphery's cultural elites can be accused –just as the 'comprador bourgeoisie'–of supporting the centre in achieving a symbolic domination over the periphery, that is, of imposing the centre's cultural values on the world's periphery. In this function, the peripheral elites could be termed using the second of Bauman's metaphors that he applied to intellectuals in the same work, that is, the 'legislators' who impose values and cultural norms onto the periphery in the name of the centre. According to critics of peripheral intellectual elites, the cultural norms and moral judgments forced by them on their own societies on behalf of the centre can have no lesser impact than legal norms laid down by formal legislators –the parliaments. In this way, the periphery can be perceived as an area which gives undue privileges to cultural capital and its 'usurpatory', 'aristocratic' elites as compared to the democratically elected political elites. This is one of the several reasons why democratic institutions in the periphery can have a much more 'window-dressing' nature than in the centre. Another aspect of this problem is enhancing the status of the 'compensatory' social capital in the periphery, especially in its informal aspects. This means giving more privileges to clans, castes, informal circles and other relatively closed, hierarchical and undemocratic social groups. Southern Italy can serve as an excellent example of a peripheral region strongly influenced by such social structures.

The choice of the orientation of individual fractions of the peripheral elites, between the role of the representative of the centre and its interests vis à vis the periphery, and the role of the representative of the periphery and its interests vis à vis the centre, seems to depend on many contextualised factors and as such would be rather difficult to forecast or model. On the one hand, we can distinguish elite's fractions with 'deep' orientations, that is the ideologies of 'serving' the centre which are strongly rooted in the system of values (for instance with a view to 'modernising' the periphery) or of 'serving' the periphery (for example to protect its threatened identity). On the other hand, the choice between the 'peripheral' and the 'central' option for some fractions of the elite will be more context-based and pragmatic. Therefore, their operation will largely be based on the principles of the 'rational choice theory' and on comparing the benefits and advantages connected with these two functions. Their roles can therefore vary: from protectors of the centre's interests, terrorising the periphery with slogans calling for a total subordination to the interests and the culture of the centre, to

leaders of peripheral rebellions, blackmailing the centre with the contemplated insurrection of the oppressed community.

It should be pointed out that peripheral elites seen in such a perspective can be depicted using the categories developed by Pierre Bourdieu to describe social groups in the middle of the social ladder. First and foremost, peripheral elites as a rule have the status of the 'dominated part of the dominant class'. This is the term Bourdieu used to describe well-educated classes, and highbrows in particular. On the one hand, all these groups belong to a broadly understood elite and take part in the strengthening of the existing system of social domination and as a rule derive profits from the existence of such a system. On the other hand, they have no access to the key resources of the system, mostly economic in character, which moves them away from the real centre of power and generates frustration arising from a sense of being underestimated and overwhelmed. Such a situation makes it easier for the cultural elites to identify with marginal - ised groups and creates the conditions for their claiming the right to represent the lowest social strata.

Another aspect of this ambiguous social status of peripheral elites, which can be found, though in a slightly different context, in Bourdieu's works, is the duality of the social world of the middle classes. As Bourdieu points out, members of the middle class, who in their majority come from the lower classes, at the same time aspire for an elite status. Among members of the middle class in well-developed countries, family socialisation in a different cultural context than the sphere of social aspirations can lead to a tension between two dimensions of social space, characteristic for peripheral elites. In both these instances, these dimensions clearly differ in terms of their social status. According to Bourdieu, the effect of such a duality is the division of the experienced world of the middle classes into two categories: 'home' and 'work'; 'private life' and 'life for show'; 'private aesthetic choices' and 'public aesthetic choices', 'really embraced values' and 'publicly declared values', etc. Such tensions are minimised by the upper classes which are socialised by high art and culture – that is, space where they spend all their later life, and by the lower classes that have no 'haute culture' aspirations. Seen in such a perspective, one of the major differences between the centre's elites and the periphery's elites would involve a high degree of the dichotomy of the social world of the latter. Therefore, for the representatives of peripheral elites, functioning

in the central context is as a rule a 'game' in the Goffmanian sense of 'presenting the self in everyday life'. Such people usually focus their energy on meeting the challenge, which is to convey an impression that they are fully-fledged members of the world of central culture. In effect, they are extremely sensitive to any possible suggestions or allusions to their 'peripheral', and not fully 'central', patterns of behaviour. Members of peripheral elites can frequently compete as to who better internalises the central culture, its aesthetic values, lifestyles, etc. Representatives of the central elites are usually blissfully unaware of this problem because they do not have to prove their special status to anyone. As a result, they have a much more casual and frequently nonchalant attitude to the cultural norms of the centre – that is, to their own indigenous world, as their affiliation with it cannot be challenged or questioned. At the same time, such norms represent an undisputable world of universal values and symbols of social status for the peripheral elites.

As has been pointed out earlier (Zarycki 2000), one of the practically inherent features of peripheral areas is the division into a pro-periphery and an anti-periphery orientation, prevalent in most of the dimensions of their social space. In particular, this division applies to peripheral elites and is especially well visible in the sphere of politics. Unlike the core areas, where the axes of political conflict are not so strongly based on the external context, in the peripheral areas disparities between social groups are defined in terms of the role of the external world (that is, the centre) in relation to the identification of their economic interests, cultural values and political concerns. In general terms, we could say that the 'anti-central' party in the periphery will by definition be a champion of enhancing the role of, and protecting those capitals which in a given region are regarded as the key resources, compensating for the region's weaknesses vis à vis the centre. On the other hand, the 'pro-central' party will be a more or less radical proponent of subordination to the social logic of the centre and recognition of the hegemony of the forms of capital prevailing in the centre. As mentioned above, in the global scale, this will usually mean the logic of economic capital, whereas political capital can be regarded as the dominating form of capital in other contexts; however, such a role is unlikely to be performed by cultural capital.

15.6 Communication of the centre and the periphery

We should bear in mind that tools which have been developed as part of the

so-called discourse analysis (e.g. van Dijk 2001) can be successfully used in the analysis of tensions between thus defined centre and the periphery (np. van Dijk 2001). As mentioned above, the 'languages' used by the centre and the periphery can be viewed as disparate codes of meaning. In such a context, and in the analysis of the discourse of peripheral elites in particular, the so-called code switching theory can be particularly useful (cf. Myers-Scotton 1993). The dilemma connected with the choice of language (i.e. code) in which members of peripheral elites are to communicate, quite well pertains to the area of this specific linguistic concept.

In view of the above, it is only natural that in the majority of contacts with representatives of the centre, members of peripheral elites will use the central code, and in contacts with representatives of lower social strata of the periphery, they will switch to the peripheral code as the only code which is understood by both parties of the interaction. However, when members of the peripheral elite communicate with each other, the choice of language is no longer obvious. On the one hand, it is possible to recourse to the central code. Its definite advantage is that it leaves aside social hierarchies of the periphery, especially those defined in terms of social and cultural capital. If the parties involved in the interaction are not fully-fledged participants of the interplay in the social field of the centre, then the social hierarchies of the centre which are encoded in its discourse do not have any immediate applications to them. In such a situation, the discourse becomes in a sense an abstract neutral plane for communication, which in many cases can be regarded as its asset. On the other hand, there may occur differences in the degree to which the centre's discourse has been mastered, or, more broadly speaking, the centre's culture because it extremely seldom comes as wholly natural for members of peripheral communities. The individual who achieves a better mastery of the centre's culture, and especially its communication code, will automatically gain an advantage over all other individuals. In many situations, this will be an unfavourable circumstance which will hinder reaching an accord. However, in other situations it may prove to be an asset, especially when individuals who are relatively better rooted in the central culture will want to emphasise their advantage. In extreme cases, a member of the peripheral elite may address representatives of peripheral lower classes (especially those who are defined in cultural terms) in a refined central code, even if the latter are not able to comprehend any of

the communicated message. The only pragmatic message conveyed will be the stressing of the cultural superiority of the speaker, and the fact that such a discourse is literally unintelligible will in this case be seen as an advantage.

Similar dilemmas appear when representatives of peripheral elites want to choose a familiar peripheral code for their internal communication. On the one hand, it can activate the entire spectrum of social and cultural indicators of social status in the local context. References to them, which are implied by the very use of the peripheral code, can create additional and unwelcome barriers to interaction. In certain circumstances, emphasising such social and cultural disparities may be intended in order to stress the social distance, especially when this is done by persons who are privileged in a given sphere. However, in many contexts the choice of the peripheral code may result in a reverse implication: it may reduce social differences and build a sense of community. It is so because reference to the peripheral code will automatically imply recognising the centre as the common 'meaningful alien', which is often perceived more or less negatively. On the other hand, the peripheral code is a natural and fully internalised code for all representatives of the periphery, including peripheral elites. For this reason, using the code does not create such barriers as when communication is based on reference to an external code, which in many cases will be internalised by the members of a peripheral community to a varying extent.

These reflections could be summed up by a conclusion that communication based on the use of the central code will normally imply negotiations concerning status, relating to the extent the central culture has been internalised by the interlocutors. Communication based on the peripheral code will imply the process of a mutual evaluation of its actors in relation to the fields of compensatory capitals, mainly social and cultural capital. In practice, communication (especially between sophisticated members of the peripheral elites) will frequently be characterised by constant changes of the code, thereby stressing both the freedom of movement in the two social worlds and the distance towards the speaker's own, multi-dimensional and ambiguous, social status. Due to the possibility of frequent code changes, the notion of contextual cues introduced by Gumperz (1982) can prove useful in the analysis of the discourse of peripheral elites; that is, such elements of discourse which specify the context addressed by the speaker, particularly the code in which an utterance is made. Such

signals, frequently hidden, which may render a part of a given utterance ironic (especially jokes about the ambiguous character of the speaker's own social status), are on many occasions indispensable for a full understanding of the nature of peripheral discourse.

15.7 Mutual centre/periphery perception

The theoretical model of the centre-periphery relationships outlined above offers tools for making some generalisations concerning their mutual perception. Below, we discuss some regularities which can be observed in the centre periphery and the periphery-centre perception.

The centre as seen by the periphery

For representatives of the periphery, the hegemony of dominant capitals (which in most situations means economic capital) in the centre has its advantages and disadvantages. Firstly, from the periphery's perspective, the centre is not riven by conflict between the many dimensions of the social world that the periphery has to cope with. It is perceived as a 'shallow' world, in the pejorative meaning of the word. Devoid of characteristic ambivalence and inconclusiveness so typical of the periphery, the centre lacks the lure of the familiar 'mysteriousness'. In addition, the relative character of the social world and its individual dimensions is not so obvious in everyday interactions, which can be seen by the periphery's residents, so well accustomed to moving from one dimension to another, as being 'trapped in one-dimensionality'. Secondly, due to the fact that normally economic capital is the dominant capital of the centre (at least its relative role in the centre is much greater than in the periphery), the centre is frequently viewed by the residents of the periphery as a ruthless world governed by the 'rule of money'. Judging people mainly on the basis of their usefulness for the economic system, referring primarily to the material and pragmatic dimension, which is a prevalent attitude in the centre, seems outright primitive from the peripheral perspective. Seen from the periphery, the world of the centre is viewed not only as brutal, materialistic and mercenary, but also as superficial and lacking a 'deeper', 'human' dimension. The relatively clear principles of social life which are much better defined than in the periphery, and a clear hierarchy of capitals, may be seen as manifestations of this 'shallowness'. On the other hand, when seen from the peripheral perspective, a relative subordination of the cultural field to the dominant field (mostly

the economic field) can be regarded as a sign of the 'barbarism' of the centre. In the periphery, some forms of cultural and social capital as a rule enjoy a great deal of autonomy as compared with economic or political capital. At the same time, some of them not infrequently acquire a sacral or para-religious status. Therefore, subordination of these field to the capitals which dominate in the centre may be viewed by the peripheries as a manifestation of moral decline cynicism and utmost materialism.

On the other hand, however, such ostensible simplicity of the principles governing the centre, where no one – as is frequently claimed by its representatives – is interested in the social background, culture or family connections of the departers from the periphery, may be found very appealing by the latter. Meritocratic ideology, a relatively open social system (by comparison with the periphery), with its willingness to offer equal treatment to all players of the economic (or political) game, offers unique opportunities for success and breaking free from the vicious circle of the periphery's 'connections', clans and other relatively closed social capital networks, as well as traditional, hierarchising cultural capital structures which inevitably leave its indelible and irreversible mark. Seen from such a perspective, the centre may become a *sui generis* 'promised land' for many residents of the periphery. The centre can fascinate not only by its wealth and power but also by its efficiency, effectiveness, frugal yet refined aesthetics and overall modernity.

Generally speaking, however, centres are very frequently perceived by the periphery as places of domination which force their values, aesthetics and broadly understood culture onto the subordinated periphery. We could say therefore that the periphery is not only extremely sensitive to political and economic, but also to symbolic domination of the centre. In most cases, representatives of the latter are simply unable to see this aspect of symbolic violence in their own behaviours, when they treat the centre's cultural values as universal ones, and their transmission to the periphery – as beneficial attempts at 'modernisation'. In effect, they are frequently viewed by the periphery as arrogant, insolent and cynical representatives of the 'better' world. This impression may be reinforced by the self-confidence and certainty of their social standing, manifested on many occasions by members of the centre's communities in confrontation with the inhibited and full of complexes representatives of the periphery. It

could also be pointed out that in addition to a feeling of being ‘violated’ by the centre in the symbolic sphere, the periphery usually believes that it has fallen victim to economic exploration owing to the conditions of trade exchange imposed by the centre. At the same time, demands for a compensation of economic domination and exploitation of the periphery are in most cases viewed by the centre as unjustified demandingness.

The centre’s very limited knowledge about the periphery is an important element of its negative perception by the periphery. What peripheral communities find extremely upsetting is the ignorance of the centre’s residents of their cultural and historical heritage. This heritage covers both the contribution of the region’s inhabitants to the universal culture as well as the region’s indigenous traditions and historical events, with a special emphasis on heroic moments in the history of the community and its sufferings – which altogether make up the regional identity. As a rule, it is the basic point of reference for the unique cultural capital of the periphery, which represents a significant, and frequently the main capital to compensate for the region’s weaknesses in other dimensions. This capital is the crucial element which the periphery’s inhabitants use to develop a sense of dignity. The lack of any knowledge about it or even the lack of references to it in the centre’s discourse is tantamount to the lack of recognition for its worth. It can also be interpreted as an expression of impoliteness or lack of respect of the centre towards the periphery. Therefore, the peripheral critique of the central discourse in this sphere can be analysed using tools offered by the linguistic ‘politeness theory’ (cf. Watts 2003).

The periphery as seen by the centre

As mentioned above, the centre will frequently profess its lack of prejudices or preconceptions vis à vis the periphery. In the centre, the domination of economic capital as a rule implies a much more impersonal attitude to fellow humans than in the periphery. This means that what matters in the centre is talent, skills and willingness for hard and competent work, and not social background. The centre, therefore, usually acts as a relative proponent of meritocratic ideologies and assesses the external world from the angle of economic capital. The centre’s special focus on the logic of its dominant capitals can lead to a specific bias in the periphery’s perception. In such a situation, the periphery is often viewed as obsessively clinging to its historical, cultural and social

traditions. These dimensions of social life, especially in their peripheral manifestations, are the least attractive and regarded as insignificant in the world of the centre. This could reinforce the view of the 'backwardness' of the periphery and its 'parochialism', and activate many other stereotypes traditionally associated with peripheral communities. One of the manifestations of such a perception of the periphery by the centre is the phenomenon which Edward Said (1978) termed as 'orientalism'. In the original meaning assigned to it by its author, the term denoted the perception of Near East countries as puzzling and exotic, that is – as alien and underdeveloped territories dominated by incomprehensible traditional cultures. Currently the notion extends to the perception of other peripheral areas by the broadly understood West.

The social hierarchies and divisions in the periphery based on cultural and affiliation criteria are very frequently regarded by representatives of the centre as expressions of Marx's 'false consciousness'. For the centre, the only 'real interests' are interests which are defined in the economic field, while other conflicts of interest tend to be perceived as aspects of the former. This is the reason why defining divisions in the political arena in cultural rather than economic terms, so frequent in the peripheries, is seen by the centre either as a manifestation of peripheral ignorance, naivety or 'backwardness', or as a sign of deliberate manipulation of the peripheral communities by the elites in their attempt to divert their attention from 'real', that is economic, interests.

We could speak about the phenomenon of the 'economisation' of the periphery coupled with its concurrent 'culturisation', manifested by the aforementioned orientalism. Whilst 'culturisation' would strive to focus the centre's attention on the cultural dimension of the periphery, yet depicting it in a disorganised manner as a certain 'curiosity' and an aspect of mysterious exoticism, 'economisation' is an attempt at a complete marginalisation of the cultural dimension. Such an approach may lead to the production of an utterly one-sided description of the periphery's social reality, created in the language of the centre. A well-known example of a study in one-sided analyses of the social world of the (semi)-periphery using the centre's language is the work by Mouzelis (1986). In it, Mouzelis points out that narrowing the phenomenon of domination to the merely economic dimension is particularly inadequate in relation to countries which are outside the world's core areas. In their case, other modes of domination

should be distinguished which could, arguably, correspond to Bourdieu's types of capital. Both authors concurrently called for expanding the Marxist analysis of social inequalities beyond the strictly economic dimension, and Mouzelis demonstrated that it was particularly necessary in the case of peripheral regions.

Even if the way the periphery is perceived by the centre is not overly fraught with 'economisation' or 'culturisation' (orientalisation), it can meet with critical reception in the periphery owing to the relativisation of the role of the periphery's social and cultural capitals, which turn the universally recognised values into objects of research and criticism. A particularly good example in the sphere of academic discourse involves works underpinned by the broadly understood postmodernist paradigm. On the one hand, these works, focusing mainly on culture and symbolic linkages, highlight the relationships which until now were rather unobvious, also those between the centre and the periphery, such as the 'orientalism' syndrome. They also help better appreciate the role of cultural capital (which is so significant for the periphery) in social science and beyond. However, while trying to enhance the status of the cultural field in academic studies or political debate, they do it in a way which mostly tends to relativise the periphery's cultural values and assets. It is so because although the 'deconstructed' peripheral identities attract more attention, they are usually portrayed in the context which strips them of the status of absolute values they enjoy in the periphery. For researchers working from the centre (or members of peripheral elites who refer to the central discourse), peripheral identities are as a rule interesting social phenomena. Nonetheless, they tend to treat them as attention-grabbing illusions rather than entities having a real existence, comparable to that of economic capital, which has a much more 'objective' nature in the centre, unlike cultural identities. For residents of the centre, financial assets are the criterion which determines their social status; in other words, either one has money or not. In such a context, the sphere of culture, as being of secondary importance, can be an arena of casual 'games' with identity, its deconstruction, reconstruction and mutations created at discretion and at will. Such 'games' are much more difficult in the peripheries, where cultural identity and group affiliation can be of a considerably more 'objective' nature than financial assets. In the periphery, one has financial assets 'once and then'; one can lose them suddenly and regain them and this will not significantly affect their social status of members of the peripheral community. In the long duration perspective, it is much more grounded in

the cultural and affiliation dimensions (i.e. the dimension of social capital).

We can say therefore that the habit of an ironic treatment of the one-dimensionality of the central social world by the periphery, and the reserve manifested by its representatives to the economic field as the key determinant of social status, are matched in the centre by the 'deconstruction' of peripheral identities. While the centre regards peripheral cultural identities as a secondary and relative reality, and they are seen as subjective social 'constructs' in the language of postmodernist social theory, the periphery – though it usually lacks its own independent and sophisticated language for social theory – tends to regard money as a relative social construct which tends to come and go, and yet the periphery's basic social structures last on, regardless of economic crises and 'ownership transformations

15.8 Sum up

In view of the above, representatives of the central elites, who live in a comparatively one-dimensional social world, not only are unable to understand the periphery's communication code, but also frequently have serious problems with grasping the very idea of the multi-dimensionality of the periphery's social world. This seems to be the crucial problem affecting the way the periphery is perceived by the centre. In consequence, they are often viewed as strange and mysterious areas, and this perception can also extend to the departers from the periphery. On the one hand, such mysteriousness can be regarded as a positive feature which attracts attention, one which is associated with a higher level of 'spirituality' and 'deeper' culture that can be encountered in the periphery. Sometimes the inhabitants of the centre, tired of their one-dimensional life, visit the periphery on a kind of pilgrimage, seeking an 'inner depth'. On the other hand, however, such mysteriousness can be associated with backwardness, irrationality of the peripheral world, premodernity and superstitiousness. Accusations of hypocrisy, distrust, insincerity, inconsistency and reticence voiced by the centre against the periphery's representatives can be seen as yet another consequence of the centre's inability to comprehend the multi-dimensionality of the social world of the periphery. At their best, the utterances and social behaviours of the periphery's inhabitants, referring to disparate communication codes, will be seen by the centre as incongruous. From such a perspective, the peripheral sense of humour will be particularly difficult to understand, being largely based on an ironic juggling of

the peripheral and central contexts, and appealing to their incompatibility. Naturally, this list does not exhaust all the communicative aspects of problems which can appear in contacts between representatives of the centre and the periphery. It is to be hoped, however, that the problems discussed above convincingly show the analytical potential of the theoretical proposition put forward in this paper.

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STRUCTURE

- 16.1 Objectives
- 16.2 Concept by Gunder Frank
- 16.3 Notion
- 16.4 Sum-up

16.1 OBJECTIVES

After going through this chapter you will be able to the notion & the theory of the development of underdevelopment thesis.

- concept of modernization.
- measures of pre-requisites
- impact of modernization.

16.2 THE DEVELOPEMENT OF UNDERDEVELOPEMENT THESIS- ANDRO GUNDER FRANK:

Andro Gunder Frank is probably the best known theorist working within the general marxist line. Frank's background is that of an economist turned political activist. The decisive event's in Frank's career centre upon his experience of Latin America. Out of a recognition of the long term foreign dominance of the area, in particular by the USA, and the experience of the Cuban revolution, and within the intellectual context of a rejection of orthodox economic approaches, Frank conceives the task of contributing to a revolutionary critique of orthodox theorizing of expectations. The available resources are threefold:

- (a) the neo-classical economics informed theories of modernization provide an object against which the new departure may be defined;
- (b) the analytical machineries are largely provided by the structuralist line associated with ECLA whilst the political reformsim of that organisation provides another negative defining element;and
- (c) a simple strategic metaphor which involves the crucial idea of surplus is borrowed from the marxism of Baran and we have the notion of the debilitating metropolitan extraction of economic surplus from the peripheral areas.

For AG Frank, the real problem was not of the development and underdevelopment but was of the development of underdeveloped. Frank was essentially a marxist and viewed the wider gap between the rich and the poor nations as originated from political and economic power relationship in a capitalist setup.

Raul Baran argued that the exploitation of new underdeveloped countries has played a vital role in the evolution of Western capitalism. Originally the concept of centre-periphery was developed by Raul Prebisch, the director of United Nations Economic Commission(UNEC).

Frank used the terms Satellite and Metropolis for under developed and developed respectively. He found transfer of wealth from periphery i.e. Satellite to centre i.e. Metropolis as the main cause of backwardness and under developement of third world countries.

16.3 THE “DEVELOPMENT OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT” NOTION

“The development of the underdevelopment notion’ is perhaps most sharply formulated by Andre Gunder Frank in his paper entitled “the Development” of Underdevelopment and his book *Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America*. This notion was the heart of the intellectual breakthrough that took us away from seeing societies separately and focussed upon the uneven development of the world economy as a whole. This notion is the product of the analysis of how the past economic and social history of underdeveloped countries gave rise to their present underdevelopment. Frank first criticizes the developmentalist theorists and historians for neglecting the historical aspect while analysing the underdeveloped societies and

then propounds his own views.

Frank has pinpointed several misconceptions about the real state of affairs due to ignorance of the underdeveloped country's history by most historians. First misconception is that the available theory "fails to reflect the past of the world as a whole only in part." Secondly, the misconceptions have led the theorists to assume that "their past and indeed their present resembles earlier stages of the history of the now developed countries." Thirdly, the ignorance of the economic and social history of underdeveloped countries is so deep that theorists "fall to take account of the economic and other social relations between the metropolis and its economic colonies throughout the history of world wide expansion and development of the mercantilist and capitalist system." Fourthly, the misconception about under-developed world leads them to assume that "economic development occurs in a succession of capitalist stages and that today's under-developed countries are still in a stage, sometimes depicted as an original stage, of history through which the now developed countries passed long ago." Fifthly, these faulty assumptions and beliefs that led the scholars to believe contemporary under-development of a country can be understood as the product or reflection solely of its own economics, political, social and cultural characteristics or structure." Sixthly, and finally, one erroneous view that emerged from these misconceptions is that the development of these underdeveloped countries, and within them of their most underdeveloped domestic areas, must and will be generated or stimulated by diffusing capital, institutions, values, etc. to them from the international and national capitalist metropolises."

Having shown the ignorance and erroneous viewpoints of developmentalists, Frank presents his thesis. He asserts that the underdevelopment is not the original or traditional but the necessary and inevitable outcome of centuries of internal capitalist development and of the contradictions of capitalism itself. Neither the past nor the present of the underdeveloped countries resemble in any important respect the past of the now developed countries." May be, the developed countries of the day were undeveloped but they were never *underdeveloped*. It is not possible to understand societies in isolation because "the contemporary underdevelopment is in large part the historical product of past and continuing economic and other relations between the satellite underdeveloped and the now

developed metropolitan countries. Furthermore, these relations are an essential part of the structure and development of the capitalist system on a world scale as a whole.” The development of underdeveloped countries can occur only independently of most of these relations of diffusion. The wherewithal will not trickle down from developed to underdeveloped countries, and if it will, it will be at the cost of latter’s detriment and former’s benefit. The concept of dual societies and economies in the underdeveloped countries is superfluous and false. Frank’s view is that the process of development is basically a dualism that can be understood only in terms of the relationships between the fully developed and underdeveloped sectors -a holistic concept. He says that “the expansion of the capitalist system over the past centuries effectively and entirely penetrated even’ apparently’ most isolated sectors of the underdeveloped world.” He further observes that” Analogous to the relation between development and underdevelopment at international level, the contemporary underdeveloped institutions of the so-called backward or feudal domestic areas of an underdeveloped country are no less the product of the single historical process of capitalist development than are the so-called capitalist institutions of the supposedly more progressive areas.”

Precisely put, Frank maintains that the satellite status of a country is a consequence of the developmental processes in which both metropolis and satellite are intertwined and not a consequence of the structural (or even individual) features. He takes the position that no satellite country that has been firmly tagged on the metropolis as a satellite through incorporation into the world capitalist system has ever become economically developed except by finally abandoning the capitalist system and network itself. He explains the process of development of underdevelopment through the contradictions of the imperialist capitalist system. Frank asserts that contradictions are the appropriation of economic surplus by the few and expropriation of many; the polarization of the capitalist system into metropolis and periphery; and the continuing of the capitalist system throughout the history of its expansion and transformation due to persistence or recreation of these contradictions everywhere.

Frank’s five hypotheses, which he seems to have found supported by facts, are verbatim as follows :

1. Within this world-embracing metropolis-satellite structure, the metropolis tend to develop and the satellites to underdevelop.
2. The satellites experience their greatest economic development and especially their most classically capitalist industrial development if any when their ties to their metropolis are weakest. A corollary of the second hypothesis is that when the metropolis recovers from its crisis and re-establishes the trade and investment ties which fully re-incorporate the satellites into the system or when the metropolis expands to incorporate previously isolated regions into the worldwide system, the previous development and industrialization of these regions is choked off or channelled into directions which are not self perpetuating and promising.
3. The regions which are the most underdeveloped and feudal-seeming today are the ones which had the closest ties to the metropolis in the past.
4. The latifundium, irrespective of whether it appears today as a plantation or a hacienda, was typically born as a commercial enterprise which created for itself the institutions which permitted it to respond to increased demand in the world or national market by expanding the amount of its land, capital, and labour and to increase the supply to its products.
5. The latifundia which appear isolated, subsistence-based, and semi-feudal today saw the demand for their products or their productive capacity decline and that they are to be found principally in the above named former agricultural and mining export regions whose economic activity declined in general.

Here are some suggestions given by Andro Gunder Frank for elimination of underdevelopment of the countries of the Third World :

1. The abandonment of capitalism or the elimination of that country from the world capitalist system and the substitution of socialism must constitute the most important essential of any real development policy for underdeveloped countries today.
2. Only the proletariat—and those already liberated by socialism—can do it.

3. The development strategy of the proletariat must be to destroy capitalism and unseat the bourgeoisie in its country and to substitute and develop a socialist structure instead.
4. All liberation movements which successfully emancipated their people from imperialism-capitalism and from the structure of underdevelopment have been political movements which have encountered but overcome the force and violence of the defenders of capitalism. History provides not a single example in which liberation from the structure of underdevelopment has been achieved without violence.
5. Any alliance with the bourgeoisie or its parts (metropolitan bourgeoisie, that is, imperialism—or its domestic comprador client agent and the so called national ‘bourgeoisie’), is very dangerous.
6. The history, and especially the development of underdevelopment do not permit us to start again at zero, but to start again where history has left us off.

16.4 SUM-UP

We began, our discussion with the circumstances in which the interests in the problems of the Third World countries became interesting. Three reasons, among others suggested themselves, decolonization, desire of development within emerging nations, and international tensions. Both the First and the Second World became very much concerned with the problems of underdeveloped countries during the postwar era. As a result of it, three theoretical modes, namely, social structural, social psychological and dependency perspectives gained currency. While first two perspectives were developed in the U.S.A. for export to, and use in, the underdeveloped countries, the third perspective—the dependency theory—was developed in the Third World itself—in Latin America—by scholars of the Marxist persuasion.

Three important, but diversified ideas seem to have been formulated by the contemporary Marxist scholars in course of Marxist discussion of development. One is the world systems and world economy approach linked via metropolis and satellite relations; second is the revival of the Marxist theory of imperialism, and third is the

post-colonial mode of production. In so doing the neo-Marxist scholars have followed many of the generic ideas of Marx but have also reversed some of them.

Dependencia scholars, Paul Baran, Immanuel Wallerstein, Arrighi Emmanuel, Andre- Gunder Frank and Samir Amin, whose views have been analysed, conceptualized the capitalist world economy as ‘a core-periphery division of labour,’ linked via ‘external exchange relations’. They saw core-periphery relations as one of unequal exchange. All of these scholars agree that capitalism has failed to spread the economic development wherever it has gone. However, they disagree on the causes for this failure.

STRUCTURE

- 17.1 Objectives
- 17.2 World System Theory
- 17.3 Central Theory
- 17.4 Criticism

17.1 OBJECTIVES

After going through this chapter you will be able to understand World System Theory & Critical Analysis

17.2 WORLD MODERN SYSTEM THEORY

World Modern System Theory was propounded by Immanuel Wallerstein in his pioneer work 'The Modern World System' published in 1977. He began in the 1960s as an Africanist and Marxist and has taught for many years at the State University of New York at Binghamton. His research in Africa convinced him that interdependence was such that a society or state could not be understood in isolation. He proposed an analytical framework that is worldwide, with the nation-state as but "one kind of organisational structure among others within this single social system".

Wallerstein was a neo-marxist but he has never abandoned the Marxist view of exploitation and oppression. He does not, however, speak of a final revolution, and his analysis of oppression does not focus on classes within nation-states, but primarily on the world capitalist system. He has stated more than once that he is doing "world-system analysis" not writing world system theory. However, his efforts at explanation from this perspective

justify treating it as a theory.

17.3 WALLERSTEIN'S CENTRAL THEORY AND METHODS

Wallerstein's multi volume historical project is still in progress. He began in 1974 with *The Modern World System*, a treatment of the emergence of capitalist agriculture and a European-dominated world economy in the sixteenth century. That his view involves change is seen in an essay published the same year, "The Rise and Future Demise of the World Capitalist System."

According to Wallerstein, three factors were essential to the establishment of a world economy during and after the sixteenth century:

- ◆ an expansion of the geographical size of the world in question
- ◆ the development of variegated methods of labour control for different products and different zones of the world economy
- ◆ the creation of relatively strong state machineries in what would become the core states of this capitalist world-economy.

Why did the world capitalist system emerge in Europe, instead of China, or, earlier, in Rome? In the sixteenth century, says Wallerstein, China had a population and technology equivalent to Europe's, and was equally involved in exploration. However, as a political empire, China's centralization discouraged entrepreneurship, and its focus was control of people, rather than Europe's concern with space and resources. This is, in short, the "structural advantage" of world economy over world empire.

Since then the world has increasingly become a single system, with an international division of labour. As one commentator describes Wallerstein's orientation, "the focus of political inquiry shifted from the narrower Durkheimian concept of the division of labour within a society to the division of labour on a larger, global scale and, as a corollary, from the concept of social stratification to stratification among national societies". This modern world system, notes Wallerstein, is capitalist meaning that it "is based on the priority of the ceaseless accumulation of capital, such a system is necessarily inegalitarian, indeed polarizing, both economically and socially".

According to Wallerstein, at the outset this was an economic system with fairly

independent subparts, not a political empire. However, it became a system in which different world regions played different roles, and still do so. Wallerstein was critical of the dependency theory and does not entirely agree with it, he like others was looking at economic disadvantages a country and region forces a part of a larger global system. He criticised the prevailing conception of dependency and argues that the world is too complicated to be classified as a bimodal with only a core and periphery. Therefore, Wallerstein has talked of trimodal system consisting of core, periphery and semi-periphery.

Core-The core area historically have engaged in the most advanced economic activities: banking, manufacturing, technologically advanced agriculture, and shipping building. The core comprises those economic interests and nation-states that control productive activities. They have money to invest, expect a large return on investment, involve a free floating labour force, and exploit the resources of the periphery.

Periphery- The periphery is the opposite. The periphery has provided raw materials such as minerals and timber to fuel the core's expansion. For much of its history it was neither economically nor politically independent. Its resources are controlled by the core, and its labour supply is controlled by either its own bourgeoisie or that of the core, or both. By trading with the core at a disadvantage, "the peripheral ruling class contributes to regional income disparity and undermines its own political position in the international system".

Semi-periphery- The semi-periphery is the half-way house between the other two, but it is more than that. It serves as a buffer between core and periphery, keeping the system from disintegrating. It is also a location to which production is transferred when costs increase in the core. It has capital of its own, but is nevertheless dependent on the core for much of its infrastructure. The semi-periphery also serves a number of other functions such as being an outlet for investment when wages in core economies become too high. Over time, particular regions of the world may gravitate between core, peripheral, and semi-peripheral status. Contrary to the liberal economic notion of specialisation as an advantage, Wallerstein points out that this division of labour requires as well as increases inequality between regions.

An interesting question is how a nation moves from periphery to semi-periphery, or even from semi-periphery to core. Wallerstein speaks of three mechanisms for moving

from periphery to semi-periphery:

Seizing-The first is “seizing the chance, “when an aggressive state “takes advantage of the weekend political position of core countries and the weakened economic position of domestic opponents of such policies”.

Invitation-The second is “by invitation,” when transnational corporation simply moves into a less developed part of the world, and in so doing brings that area into the semi-periphery.

Self-Reliance-The third, riskiest approach is “self-reliance”-distancing one’s economy from the world system, perhaps by nationalizing a resource, thereby chancing both the loss of foreign investment and core pressure for reincorporation into the periphery.

Wallerstein makes no secret of the fact that much of his analysis continues to have a Marxist orientation. He uses Marx’s terminology of exploitation, mode of production, conflict, bourgeoisie, and so on. The four Marxist ideas that he finds useful are class struggle, polarization, the socio-economic determination of ideology, and alienation as an evil to be eliminated. Worldwide class distinctions are between states as well as within them. Exploitation is an international phenomenon, but it is also overt in the periphery, “where the elites exercise and institutionalize it in order to extract surplus from their own populations and thereby to import luxuries”.

The mark of the modern world, says Wallertsein, “is the imagination of its profiteers and the counter-assertiveness (docility, fatalism) of the oppressed.” However, exploitation “and the refusal to accept... (it) as either inevitable or just constitute the continuing antimony of the modern era, joined together in a dialectic which has far from reached its climax in the twentieth century”.

At the same time, Wallerstein notes the inadequacy of Marxist analyses of racial, ethnic, and gender struggles. And he adds that his view of the avowedly socialist countries is quite un-Marxist: He sees them as semiperipheral, seeking access to the core. This view seems to have been corroborated by the collapse of the Soviet Union, the changes in Eastern Europe, and these countries’ desired incorporation into the capitalist “new world order.” However, Wallerstein does not agree with Dunayevskaya’s view that these countries have always been covertly capitalist. In fact, he speaks of 1917 to 1991 as “the period in

which there were states governed by Communist, or Marxist-Leninist, parties.” In his view, most dramatic, of the national liberation uprisings in the periphery and semi-periphery of the world-system”

Wallerstein and others have written thousands of pages on his world system analysis, but let us attempt to summarize its major tenets:

(1) The division of labour and of classes is a worldwide phenomenon. Although Marx and Engels noted this in the *Manifesto*, Wallerstein details its historical development, observation the expansion of the capitalist system, especially in the twentieth century.

(2) Economics is the predominant factor, not politics. Political divisions serve economic needs, and political dominance may even thwart development.

(3) The world system is made up of three types of units: core, semi-periphery, and periphery. Although these are agglomerations of nation-states, they are more regional than national.

(4) Change is continuous, but it is neither Marxist nor a matter of modernization. It is not unidirectional, or even directional, and is not likely to be revolutionary, in the traditional sense of the world.

17.4 CRITICISM

Marxists critics have argued that Wallerstein does not explain as well as Marx did the transition from feudalism to capitalism. They have also rejected his focus on production for the market, rather than on relations of production. Finally, they assert that “class is afforded only a peripheral role in Wallerstein’s conceptual apparatus, and is therefore, like the mode of production, of little importance as an analytical tool”. Some critics simply state that Wallerstein provides a world stratification analysis, not a class analysis.

In response to these critics, Wallerstein and his followers have “conceded that the concept can be used to study local historical developments, and that social class should be conceptualized as a dynamic historical process”

Another criticism of Wallerstein is that his theory has only one new idea: that the world is a single system. Everything else he presents is either borrowed or is descriptive detail. A final, quite intricate criticism comes from Theda Skocpol, who has propounded the theory of revolution.

CRITIQUE OF MODERNIZATION & DEVELOPMENT

STRUCTURE

- 18.1 Objectives
- 18.2 Introduction
- 18.3 Structure-Agent Reductionist
- 18.4 Operational critique

18.1 OBJECTIVES

The main objective of this lesson is to equip you with :—

- Critique of Modernization & development
- Concept of Development & Underdevelopment

18.2 Introduction

The critics have pinpointed several weaknesses in the dependency theory on theoretical grounds. Only the most important theoretical inadequacies suggested by critics are discussed here.

I Key Terms Lack the definitional and Conceptual Clarity:

The dependency scholars have made use of various terms most often, but their key terms, critics allege, lack definitional conceptual clarity. Some of the key terms made use of by the dependency scholars and the type of critique offered may be presented as an illustration, Dependency. The definition of the very term 'dependency' suffers from the fallacy of circularity. The adherents of the dependency theory try to define it in terms of a purely economic relationship between two national economics or between two aggregated

groups of national economies in which the economic development of the dependent nations was conditioned by the economic development of the metropolitan nations. Such a definition of dependency implies that the dependent nations lack autonomy. Recently O' Brien commented on the tendency to result in a circular argument: "... dependent countries are those which lack the capacity for autonomous growth and they lack this because their structures are dependent ones" . This confusion has resulted because dependency scholars treated the phenomenon of dependency as a relation between economies. The term 'dependency' came to mean no more than non-autonomous. The nature of dependent structures and differences between them and the structures of advanced nations remained unsolved.

Capitalism: The word 'capitalism' is often used by the dependency scholars in such a general sense that it loses its explanatory power. This is particularly the case in the works of Frank and Wallerstein. According to Mandle, the definitional clarity which Marx brought to the question of the expansion of the productive forces of society—the process of economic development—has been lost in the work of Baran, Frank and others.

The way the dependency scholars define capitalism has brought to the fore core as standard capitalism versus peripheral as distorted capitalism. The core capitalism is considered by the dependency scholars standard and the peripheral capitalism distorted. The peripheral capitalism is distorted in a way that it deviates from a standard, i.e., central capitalism. Two meanings may be deduced from these assertions. First, as if, the dependency scholars assume the central capitalism as correct type of capitalism, and capitalist developments not conforming to the standard capitalist development as distorted capitalism. If central capitalism is exemplified by the core, then it shows that there are differences between rational economies. If it is not so, then there is the question of homogeneity between centre (standard) and periphery (distorted) capitalism. Indeed a paradox, Amin holds that the essential features and mechanisms of any economy are determined by its membership of one of these two capitalism. The heterogeneity of each group conceals the unity. It implies that analyses of national economies are misleading since specific aspects of that economy are not determining. Thus, centre is said to have internal dynamic and periphery has no internal dynamic of their own. The differences between economies are considered to be not real, but appearance.

Smith observes: "It is clear that the location of a particular national economy within the world capitalist system has important effects upon the structure of that economy. It is absurd to argue that this is the only determination of that economy... the denial of national economies as units of analysis, the denial of differences among 'peripheral' economies as significant, and the denial of any 'freedom of manoeuvre' to 'peripheral' economies in relation to world capitalist institutions (markets, corporation, financial agencies etc.) are dangerous denials which discourage Marxists and Socialists from conducting analyses of national economies. The problems which particular economies face depend upon the structure of those economies as well as upon their location within the world capitalist system. This applies equally to 'centre' and periphery'-thus the problems of British capitalism are significantly different from those of D.S., Japanese or Swiss capitalism, and it is misleading and fruitless to assert that these differences are irrelevant.

Besides, or so to speak, above the issue of standard versus distorted capitalism, there are difficulties in the assumption of dependency scholars that the dominant mode of production in the dependent countries is capitalism. According to Roxborough, there are several questions linked with this assumption: whether the capitalism of the periphery is the same which is in the centre or the capitalism of the periphery is a specific kind of capitalism? Whether in different social formations, there are other modes of production which affect the capitalist mode of production or the peripheral dependent capitalism is a mode of production sui generis, with its own laws of motion? In case the capitalism of the periphery is not different from the capitalism of the core, why does it not follow one and the same law of motion of the capitalism? Furthermore, when it is assumed by the dependency scholars that social formations of the periphery are complex totalities making world economy, then is not the operation of the capitalist mode of production affected by the coexistence of other mode of production? If there is the primitive accumulation of capital by articulation between the capitalist and pre-capitalist sectors within the interior of the dependent social formation, why then that capital not produces internal capitalist growth? When there is articulation between capitalist and non-capitalist modes of production, then why does the value extracted from the non-capitalist sectors not initiate internal capitalist accumulation and instead the capital flows abroad? The dependency scholars have yet to reply.

Imperialism: The concept of imperialism has given way to a diverse and voluminous debate. Several scholars deny the existence of a close relationship between the metropolitan

economy and overseas expansion, basing their case on critiques of Hobson and Lenin. Gallagher and Robinson conclude that "attempts to make phases of imperialism correspond directly to phases in economic growth of the metropolitan economy are likely to prove vain". This controversy has led to two alternative explanations. One interpretation visualises imperialism as a consequence of conflict on the periphery rather than crises in the metropole. Remember: earlier Marx, and later Lenin and Hobson, considered the mechanism in terms of a push from the metropolis or a pull from the periphery; accounted for the continued growth of capitalism by focusing on the causes of imperialism in the metropolitan nations; and explained the absence of a profound crisis in the capitalist nations in the Western Europe. The critics drew attention to the conflict in the periphery. The second interpretation lays stress on non-economic aspects of the metropolitan impulse, such as the working of the "official mind" or the export of "surplus energy".

Although these 'extrinsic theories' suffer from their own weaknesses, the Marxist tradition has remained loyal to economic interpretation of imperialism. But the defects in analysis and historical practice obscure its merits, as even the sympathetic articles have acknowledged defect in Marxist-Leninist tradition. The recent statements of neo-Marxists regarding historical relationship between economics and empire suffer from serious weaknesses. Some of the shortcomings of these theories are that the key terms are too general to retain their explanatory power; the historical evidence is at times quixotic and the concern with the underdevelopment regions outside Europe leads to stereotyped treatment of the exploiting metropole." Furthermore, there are various interpretations of imperialism.

There have been tremendous structural changes whether labelled as "late capitalism" or "permanent arms economy", or anything else. Lenin's descriptions of imperialism no longer apply now.

Development and Underdevelopment: The Neo-Marxists have made use of the terms 'development' and 'underdevelopment' freely, but in some cases, as for example in the works of Tamas Szentes and Frank, on searches in vain for a working definition of either development or underdevelopment. What they do, they merely posit the existence of underdevelopment. Amin, on the other hand, defines underdevelopment in terms much broader than that employed by Marx. Amin lists three "structural features by which

underdevelopment is revealed", These are "(1) unevenness of productivity between sectors; (2) disarticulation of the economic system; and (3) domination from outside". Thus the concept remains confused and there is no unanimity among dependency scholars about its specific meaning.

Mandle further criticizes neo-Marxists for having skirted the issue of the delimited definition of 'economic development' implied by Marx's concern with the advance of forces of production. This omission has important implication for their argument. Weakness on this crucial definitional issue has allowed them to offer their pessimistic hypothesis without subjecting it to empirical test. They construct their argument assuming that development is not occurring. But the assumption of stagnation may be false. If so, then their conclusion, which rests upon that assumption would also be erroneous. We shall take up this point later on.

'Mode of Production': To some Marxist scholars, the term 'mode of production' carries no empirical referent whatsoever and they do not assign any function for it in the historical investigation. Others use this term to describe certain kind of occupational roles. A quite different usage of the term 'mode of production' is to use it to describe a social totality, a structured whole, embodying a class structure and a set of political structure which form a unity with economic base. Hamza Alavi, for instance, uses the term 'mode of production' to refer to a national unity. For Wallerstein too, the term denotes a systematic whole, but there is only one level of wholeness, that of the world system. All this shows that the 'mode of production' is an ill-defined concept.

Furthermore, the dependency theorists have avoided the issue of mode of production by treating the problem of underdevelopment as a question of the interrelationship between the component parts of a single world capitalist economic system. There is, therefore, little place in the dependency theory for a discussion of non-capitalist mode of production. By focussing only on capitalism and thereby excluding the non-capitalist mode of production from their analysis, dependency scholars seem to be avoiding the issue of mode of production. Whenever these scholars undertake the analysis of underdevelopment, they do so in terms of the articulation of capitalist and noncapitalist modes of production.

There is also confusion in the usage of the terms 'mode of production' and 'social structure'. The dependency theorists have used the 'capitalist mode of production' and the

'capitalist economic systems' as if they are identical. It hardly needs mention that these two concepts are not one but two distinct phenomena—a system is not a mode of production. Recently, Laclau has drawn our attention to the prevailing confusion between 'mode of production' and 'social formation'. Laclau pointed out that the notion of the capitalist economic system was not identical with the concept of a capitalist mode of production. By making the two concepts identical, the dependency scholars had confused the mode of production and the social formation which are, in fact, distinct. This was one of the fundamental sources of confusion and weakness in their analysis.

Marxists rely on laws and tendencies of the capitalist mode of production, Amin, for instance, says that one tendency of capitalism is the falling rate of profit: "The law of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall remains the essential, and therefore permanent, expression of the basic contradiction of the system". Another "dominant tendency in the world system is for the gulf between the centre and the periphery to get wider". Furthermore, "The general law of accumulation and of impoverishment expresses the tendency inherent in the capitalist mode of production, the contradiction between productive forces and productive relations, between capital and labor. This contradiction rules out an analysis of the capitalist mode of production in terms of harmony, and leads us to understand that the quest for an ever increasing rate of surplus value in order to compensate for the downward trend in the rate of profit makes a harmonious development impossible." These kinds of inevitabilities built in to the mode of production renders the theory sterile.

Social Class: There are two meanings of social class within Marxism and there is continuous tension between the two, One is the structuralist meaning of class,? The exponents of this method define class position solely in terms of position in the process of production. Here the class is taken in the sense of class-in-itself (class an sich) : ownership or non-ownership of the means of production.

The second meaning of class is in the sense Marx used the term: class-for-itself (*class fur sich*). This is historical meaning. The adherents of this approach argue that class-in-itself or structural location of the actors is not sufficient to define class. Class consciousness and class action must be included within the meaning of class along with structural location. Taken in this sense, classes are historical actors and formed in and through the class struggle. Classes are formed at the level of national state, or sub-national

level and, on occasions across national boundaries.

The dependency scholars ignore the historical concept of class struggle at the level of social formation. Instead they see it at the global level. Take one instance. Amin ignores the historical conception of class struggle and exploitation at the national level and stretches it to the international level. According to Amin, ".....capitalism has become a world system, and not just a juxtaposition of national capitalism". The social contradictions characteristic of capitalism are thus on a world scale, that is, the contradiction is not between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat of each country considered in isolation, but between the world bourgeoisie and the world proletariat". It transpires then that Amin wants to analyse the classes at national level with the assumption of economic system of capitalism at world level.

The concept of a world working class of the world economy perspective creates a further problem. The dependency theorists visualise one class of capitalist and other of proletariat. The argument that there is one law of motion of capitalism in the system as a whole, and that this law operates well within only one part of the world gives rise to the vision that in the rest, there is distorted capitalism exhibiting different patterns of growth. This shows a situation of non-correspondence between the capitalism of the world system and the nation-state; the latter having two subordinate classes. So even if there is an international pattern of labour, there remain at least two classes in each country.

It implies, then, that the conception of class has meaning at the national level though classes may be formed at both subnational and across-national levels. Classes as political actors are possible within national states. The class struggle between bourgeoisie and proletariat in the underdeveloped countries can be understood only at the national level. To deny class at national level, as Amin does, is in fact to confuse the two levels of analysis - world-wide and - national. The level of analysis of the economic system of capitalism at the global level cannot be equated with the analysis of capitalism in social formations at the national level. But the dependency scholars have made use of class differently.

The fact that the usage of the term class has been made differently may be documented. Whilst Frank and Cockcroft tend to use the concept of class in an imprecise and schematic manner to refer to class position, others, say Dale Johnson, talk in terms of

class projects meaning thereby that classes are formed by historical actors in the process of class struggle. Like Johnson, Poulantzas holds that classes have existence only in class struggle.

Let us look at the dependency scholars' concept of various categories of classes. It is interesting that the dependency writers use vaguely the terms 'bourgeoisie', 'proletariat' and 'class struggle'. For instance, it is seen that the peasantry is treated as the part of the proletariat. Theoretically, as it is well-known, this position is closer to populism than to Marxism. The study of class becomes further problematic when the abstract model of central-periphery is applied to it. It has serious theoretical implications for the study of class structure and inequality in Third World countries.

The analysis of the class structure in the underdeveloped societies is complex and nebulous due to which there is a tendency among dependency theorists towards neologisms. We have, therefore, various kinds of bourgeoisie-imperialist, comprador, national, internal; peasantry-serfs, sharecroppers, members of Indian community, minifundistas; and working class-rural proletariat, aristocracy of labour besides all the standard classes familiar to Marxist analysis. It is not the end of neologisms there are many others such as: 'marginalised masses', 'underclass', 'lumpen-bourgeoisie engaged in class struggle with lumpen-proletariat.

The dependency theorists have further confused the concept of social class by floating the concept of conflation of spatial entities and social class. For instance, Frank sees the relationship between land owner and peasant characterized as a form of metropolis-satellite tie exactly comparable to the links between spatial regions. It is in the analysis of class that the neoMarxists replace the Marx's concept of surplus value. Frank encompasses two phenomena-relations of exploitation among social classes and relations of transfer of value between economic regions – by the conflation of spatial entities and social classes and the metaphor of a chain of core-periphery links Frank not only linked the hinterland and proletariat-peasant of any country with the metropolis and capitalist of any country in the world but he also tied the metropolises and capitalists of anywhere with the hinterland and proletariat-peasantry of anywhere in the world.

One has to accept that the flow of value between geographical regions accounted for in terms of unequal exchange of surplus-value is different from the production of surplus

value through the exploitation of labour-power. In fact, the spatial distribution and redistribution of surplus-value can be adequately understood in terms of the relations of exploitation production and transfer of surplus-value among classes. Precisely put, the transfer of value from hinterland to periphery (unequal exchange) is not always the same phenomena as the 'direct exploitation of labour-power (class relations).

Due to preoccupation with exchange perspective in the world economy, the dependency scholars neglected the study of class relations. Some scholars, say Frank, utilized the idiom of a chain of exploitative relations between centre and periphery—an extraction and transmission of surplus through a series of metropolis-satellite links. At the global level this reflected the relationship between industrialized West and the non-industrialized rest and at the national level it was a relationship between advanced capital city and oppressed and backward hinterland. This was an attempt to break the dilemma of internal and external causation. But this logic resulted in the neglect of the class structure within a social formation.

2. *Notion of Dependency is a Paradigm, Not a Specific Theory* : The neo-Marxists try to posit dependency perspective the form of a theory, but its critics have refuted their claim. To them, "the notion of dependency defines a paradigm rather than a specific theory. Within the paradigm there are number of competing theories and explanations of the nature of dependency". Some scholars go a step farther to say that dependency does not define a paradigm, but 'conflicting paradigms'. Some have gone to the extent of suggesting that there is now need of a dialogue between dependentistas and nondependentistas.

3. *Not One but Various Theories of Dependency*: There are references in the literature which would suggest that there is a single theory of dependency. But in practice there seems to be various theories of dependency. Due to obsession with the assumption of there being a single theory of dependency, the neo-Marxists have failed to see that the term dependency is used in a variety of ways. This has led to considerable confusion to scholars engaged in arguments for or against the use of 'dependency perspective'. Let us take one example.

Bodenheimer, defined dependency as the obverse side of a theory of imperialism.

"The implicit in the formulation of dependency as other side of imperialism was a possible conclusion that, just as there were several theories of imperialism, so there would also be several theories of dependency." This view is further supported by Frank's observations that the dependency theorists are divided into two groups by numerous publicizers, summarizers and classifiers of the dependency theory: 'old right' group of developmentist dependence theorists and a 'new left' group. The latter group, according to Frank, distinguishes itself from the former by rejecting the former's dualism both internationally and nationally and replacing it by an insistent analysis of the total imperialist relations and the domestic economic/national politically active, conscious and voluntary participation of the neo-imperialists system under bourgeoisie.

4. *Dependency Theory Lacks Essentials of a Theory*: In fact, the concept of dependence, in order to be proper explanation of development and underdevelopment, must have analytical value. And, for this, says Sanjay Lall, it must "(1) lay down certain characteristics of dependent economies not found in independent ones and (2) these characteristics must be shown to affect adversely the course and pattern of development of dependent countries." Else, the concept of dependence remains not of much use in analysing underdevelopment. And, no dependency theorist would like to use it in such a narrow way.

The dependency approach lacks the logically interrelated propositions-the essential attribute of a theory. As per the critics, the theory refers to a 'historical vision, or 'socio-historical model' meant to explain plurality of situations. It can be applied mechanistically in the study of social phenomenon. Such a theoretical framework, says Portes, may at best help us to know the scope of study, priorities for empirical investigations and concrete hypothesis. But it lacks a system logically interrelated proposition that makes a theory.

5. *A Deus Ex Machina Explanation* Dependency theory is used pathgora's box for explanation of everything that is wrong with Third World countries. According to O'Brien dependency theory has become a deus ex machina explanation which serves solution to every difficulty faced by the underdeveloped world. Because of this attitude, the theory fails to explain the complexities and variants implicit in different situations. This smacks of the poor strength of the theory as an explanatory tool. However, this critique is common to both dependency theory and developmental theory. Earlier the developmentalist theory

argued that modernization and the virtues of modern is deus ex machina.

6. Built-in Immunities in Dependency Approach: According to Sheila Smith, there are built-in immunities in the dependency theory which make it difficult to criticize. Smith notes two such built-in immunities in Amin and for that matter in all dependency scholars. One, the dependency theorists claim that their analysis is concerned predominantly with 'essences' and those essences may well be hidden. Appearances, they say, may mislead the critics and underlying forces may be disguised. If the criticisms are labelled against them, the critics are accused of superficiality, that of concern with phenomena and appearances or of empiricism.

Let us take an example from Amin's writings, especially on the 'typology of underdevelopment'. He mentions three factors which account for diversity of peripheral economics: (1) the structure of the precapitalist formation at the moment of its integration into the world market; (2) the economic forms of international contact; and (3) the political forms which accompanied the integration. Amin then states that "The diversity of the real models of underdevelopment produced by the combined action of these three factors has led many economists to deny the unity of the phenomenon of underdevelopment, to consider that there are only underdeveloped economies, but not underdevelopment. The reality of the latter is nevertheless a fact, but the unity of the phenomenon of underdevelopment does not lie in the appearances shaped by the interaction of these different factors. It lies in the peripheral character that is common to all countries of the Third World today, in relation to the development of capitalism. This is why the exercise of constructing a typology of underdevelopment, while providing some interesting descriptive elements, remains superficial." The implication, according to Smith, "that the differences between peripheral social formations is superficial, disguising the essential unity, that is the 'peripheral' character of the underdeveloped countries. According to Amin, the analysis of national economies is pointless as it cannot be understood except at the 'world level' as they are truncated and have no internal dynamic of their own.

The second built-in immunity is the use of contradictions' and 'dialectics' to reconcile contradictory evidence or arguments.

Smith says that built-in immunities help provide the kind of argument which takes

the form of assertion-plus-threat'. Those who disagree are accused of Trotskyism, anarchism or revisionism, economism, Ricardianism or simply a failure to understand Marxism.

Due to built-in immunities, Amin's theory in particular, and dependency theory in general, have been charged as "tautological, uninformative and sterile." The whole analysis suffers from 'appearance-essence' dichotomy.

7. *Insufficiently Marxist* : The dependency scholars claim that the dependency theory has developed either in a close dialogue with Marxism or stemmed from Marxist theory. The critics charge that this body of theory is insufficiently Marxist in orientation which is one source of its weaknesses. The neo-Marxist's discussion of development is quite diversified and has failed to produce anything like 'orthodox' Marxist.

8. World Values : Sheila Smith criticizes Amin on the basis of the concept of world values. Smith says that according to structural-institutional constraints and agents practices. The same is described in non-Marxist sociology: the system-action or the system integration-social integration distinction. What follows is a brief account of each type of reductionism.

A. Voluntaristic Types of Reductionism

1. Agent-Agent Reductionism: One set of Marxist theories claims that the actions and policies or those directly exercising state power are invariably subjected to the pressures of an omnipotent bourgeoisie constantly operating at the back of politicians or the military. These assumptions lead the scholars to view the class-state relation as a relationship between the two economic groups and political groups. It, thus, posits a situation where political groups are described or seen as the passive instrument in the hands of those wielding economic power in their hands. According to Mouzelis, Poulantzas' conceptualization of the economic-political relation as "relation between agent and agent allows for an either "economist" or "politician" reductionism of the agent-agent. As Poulantzas puts it : in the former case "the dominant class absorbs the state by emptying of its own powers, in the latter case the state imposes its will (that of bureaucracy and political elites) on the divergent and rival interest of civil society."¹³⁶ The instrumentalist view of the state is characteristic of "vulgar" Marxism although writings of Mills or Miliband do not provide a clear-cut case of reductionism. However, if one relies on Poulantzas, then Mills and Miliband are also reductionist. According to Poulantzas, the conceptual framework employed by Miliband

and Mills centres predominantly on an agent relationship. Consequently the study of structural-institutional context of economic, political and ideological constraints are evaded setting severe limits of the practices of both political and economic agents.

2. Agent-Structure Reductionism : In this type of reductionism, state as an instrument is seen in terms of its institutional structure and in terms of its personnel. This group of Marxist scholars are of the view that; the bourgeoisie changes the mode of operation; it does not control and guide the political-decision making process by resorting to constant lobbying. Here the bourgeoisie operates by creating institutional framework which itself will ensure that the state personnel will generate policies that safeguard and promote bourgeoisie interests. In this case reductionism takes the form in which institutions are seen as the intended or unintended long-term outcomes of class struggles .

When the two types ; "reductionisms agent-agent and agent-structure are combined, there results the type of ultravoluntarism. It portrays dominant classes as omnipotent and omniscient entities controlling all practices and shaping all institutions within a given social formation. This vision posits bourgeoisie as a whole as running day to day management of the capitalist world. Wherever bourgeoisie is not portrayed as all powerful, it usually posits agencies as the Pentagon or the CIA as all powerful which are said to implement their wishes.

Note that in the voluntaristic types of reductionism, the major linkages between the economic and the political instances are in terms of actions, strategies, or practices of groups, or mere categories of agents which, more or less, deliberately, shape political institutions or directly control the political decision-making processes.

B. Structuralist Types of Reductionism

Before we proceed, let us be clear that voluntaristic types of reductionism differ much from the structuralist types of reductionism. In structuralist reductionist explanations, agent-actors are no longer central to the analysis; they either disappear altogether or play very peripheral role as the passive products of structural constraints or determinations. In it the emphasis shifts on functionalist linkages between the economic and the political spheres. The concepts such as policies, intended-unintended consequences, group pressures and, class struggles which were used in the voluntaristic reductionism are replaced by

systemic concepts such as functional requirements, structural constraints, tendential laws and contradictions in structuralist reductionism. In voluntarism, social processes are viewed in terms of the actors, in functionalism, the same social processes are seen in terms of the system and the requirements for its persistence-reproduction.

Let us append a short note on Marxist structuralism to take our discussion more clear. In recent years, there are several structuralism around. There are varieties of both Marxist and non-Marxist structuralism. The Marxist structuralism, owes its distinctive character to the work of Louis Althusser and modern structural anthropologists. The structuralist approach with some variation and differences of emphasis has inspired much recent Marxist analysis. These scholars derive inspiration from what Engels made a general observation on the "relative autonomy" of the superstructure.

Bottomore has summarized for us the basic assumption of Marxist structuralism which we would like to quote:

Marxist structuralists insist that the different structures which constitute any given social formation all have a certain autonomy and that while economic structure (the mode of production) has to be conceived as ultimately determinant, other structures may nevertheless be dominant in constituting and reproducing a particular form of society; furthermore, it is the development of contradictions both within and between the different structures, not simply the effects, conceived in a mechanical way, of purely economic contradictions, which lead eventually to the breakdown of, and existing social formation and the emergence of a new one. Hence it is argued, the state and the 'ideological apparatus' (through which a dominant cultural outlook is reproduced) undergo a partially- and even largely-independent development and have a major influence upon the evolution, the persistence or decline, of particular social formation. The Marxist notion of 'crisis' has been reinterpreted in accordance with these views, and Althusser has introduced the term 'overdetermination' to express the idea of a confluence of separate lines of development, and a conjunction of crises occurring more or less independently in different spheres of society, which result in a revolutionary transformation... Nevertheless, there remains a largely unresolved general problem concerning the exact degree of autonomy that is to be attributed to the various spheres of society, and the precise meaning of the claim that the functioning and development of a society as a whole are determined in the final analysis by

the economic structure."

1. Structure-Structure Reductionism: In this type of reductionism, the institutional features of the political system are derived from, or reduced to, economic structural constraints, or to the "laws of motion" of the capitalist mode of production. In its crudest form, the institutional structure of the state or the overall political system is conceptualized as an epiphenomenon, as a mere reflection of infrastructure. When changes occur in the infrastructures, they sooner or later make themselves felt in the superstructure in more or less automatic fashion. The crudest version of the structure-structure reductionism neither allows voluntaristic mechanisms such as group pressures, policies or strategies, nor functionalist ones, such as systemic constraints or functional requirements.

The crude type of epiphenomenalism, though out of fashion may be seen in the analysis of Offe. Offe offers the theory of the state and puts emphasis on the internal structure. He avoids dealing systematically with group influences and systemic constraints external to the state. Sardei-Diermann and his associates criticized Offe on the ground that he has wrongly assumed that the relationship state-economy is reflected only in the internal structures of the political system. They argue that their genetic development has to be examined in a sociohistoric context. There are several other Marxist scholars who follow Offe's type of reasoning.

A general criticism of this view is that scholars first of all prepare a list of the functional requirements for the maintenance and reproduction of an economic system. Once they have done so, then they try to argue that certain institutional features of the state seem to fulfill these requirements. An explanation of the specific form taken by these institutional features or of how they came about is faulty. The usage of such words as structural determination, 'over determination' (Althusser) by many structuralist theorists is nothing else but false attempt to transform functional requirement into causes—a teleological type of explanation adopted earlier by functionalist and recently by Marxist theorists. The teleologic bias of all structure-structure reductionist explanations fails to make linkages between structuralist and historical analysis.

18.3 Structure-Agent Reductionism: In this form of reductionism, terms similar to structure-structure reductionism are used to explain political practices. This type of reductionism emerges from the recent debates on the structural determination of classes

in capitalist societies. It differs from structure-structure reductionism in the sense that in the later the main features of political institutions are derived from the functional requirements of constraint imposed on it by economy.

Poulantzas, for instance, makes distinction between class "places" and class "positions". The class "places" refers to the objective location of agents in the technical and social division of labour and the class "positions" refers to such things as the political organizations of agencies representing a class, the strategies (positions) and policies it formulates in concrete conjuncture, etc. - According to Poulantzas, "What one means by class consciousness proper and by autonomous political organization, i.e." from the point of view of the working class, revolutionary proletarian ideology and an autonomous party, refer to class positions and to the conjuncture, they constitute the conditions for intervention of class as social forces," Poulantzas, however, fails to explain the linkages between "class places" and "class positions" (practices). The reductionism is implicit in one-way linkages between the two, Poulantzas would argue that class practices on the political level are derived and understood in terms of objective class-structures, i.e. in terms of objective places allotted to agents by the capitalist division of labour on the level of economy. Another argument will be that whenever political conflicts are not directly focussed on class cleavages but on regional, ethnic, racial, religious or clientelistic ones, then they are epiphenomenal and it will soon be evident that, in fact, class divisions are at the root of such conflicts. Thus, the scholars refuse to accept the importance of institutional structures other than economic ones. A more sophisticated argument Poulantzas will advance is that there is not one-to-one relation between class places and class practices or strategies (positions). Economic practices are not determined simply by the economic instance, but by the overall structuralist matrix which consists of a complex articulation of economic, political and ideological structures.

Classes are seen as effects rather than causes of structures and agents are simply supports of structures. Poulantzas defines the concept of class as a "concept which indicates the effects of all structures of a mode-of-production matrix or of a social formation on the agents who constitute the supports: this concept indicates, therefore, the effects of the global structure in the sphere of social relations." Thus Poulantzas feels that determining relations always develop from the structure to the agents, rather than other way round.

Such a view constantly shows how complex structural determinations shape the agent's practices: it is never shown how the agents in the form of collective agencies like political movements and parties etc., can maintain or transform the overall structural configurations. This denies all possibility of any autonomous collective action. An ultra-structuralism reduces all social analysis to the a-historical identification of a number of invariant elements and the study of their intricate articulation and combination.

These four types of reductionism neutralize the Marxist framework of holistic and dialectic character. The logic that it is possible to derive political practices institutional structures from the "laws" or functional requirements of the capitalist mode of production or the machinations of all powerful bourgeoisie, neglects the complicated linkages between economic and the political instances. The argument that collective agents are omnipotent denies the significance of structure. Both the extremes-ultra-voluntarism, i.e., treating agents as determinants, and ultra-structuralism, i.e., treating agents as mere effects of structural determination, emasculate Marxism's dialectical character-a view that collective agents are in a constant changing relation with environment which constructs actor; and presents them with a more or less large number of alternatives. The critics suggest the need to theorize the relation between economic and the non-economic sphere without falling into any of the reductionist traps. One has to construct specific concepts which can provide systematic guidance as to how structural-systematic indigenous capitalism" and concludes that "private investment in the Third World is increasingly creating the conditions for the disappearance of imperialism as a system of economic inequality between nations of the capitalist world system."

It is noteworthy that most of hard evidence presented by these studies tends to use economic data: balance of payments flows, industry structure and, behaviour and the like. Notice: while the intellectual frame work of radical and explicitly Marxist analysis integrates economic, social, and political causes and effects, empirical work often utilizes economic data. It is recognised that economic relations are not merely economic, they are rather enmeshed in the entire socio-cultural and political fabric of the satellite nations and acts as vehicle for inter50cietal contacts and functions as a cross-cultural change agent.

We must not, however, assume-even in face of the evidence given-that it gives complete picture. There are limitations of the data: it relates to some but not to all the poor

countries; it does not indicate the trend towards an increasingly equal world distribution of income; and it does not indicate that the growth that has occurred has been at the initiative of local residents in the poor nations. Despite all these reservations, these data do indicate that, taken as a whole, the spread of capitalist development has been quite substantial. As such they cast grave doubts on the neo-Marxist thesis concerning the potential for capitalist economic development. This indicates that capitalism still represents a mode of production capable of generating sustained expansion in productive capacity. Thus Marx and Lenin stand correct and the anticipation that capitalism is incapable of generating economic development in poor countries is not correct.

In recent years, however, a new wave of dependency analysts has sought to explain why multinational corporations have been actively fostering industrial expansion in a number of developing countries. This new dependent development school views the industrial development of Third World countries as merely a new form of economic exploitation by corporations from centre capitalist countries.

18.4 Operational Critique

Besides, or, so to speak, above these bases of criticism, there is one more ground on which dependency theory is criticized. It is the operational and policy making aspect of it. Some of the significant objections to the theory are presented below.

1. Wrong Conception of National Development: The critics allege that dependency scholars, while suggesting the ways of 'elimination'; underdevelopment, advise to liberate themselves from the capitalist-imperialist. Thus they equate the national development with liberation from foreign domination. Differently put, the dependency scholars' suggestion for development seems to convey the information that the elimination of capitalist-imperialist influence will automatically lead to progress. They do not tell the underdeveloped countries how they should move towards the attainment of the national goals. They seem to be suggesting a naive path of autarkic development by default. Thus there is no concrete solution for national development with them.

First of all the neo-Marxists, by and large, do not suggest alternative criteria for development. Whenever criteria for economic development are suggested by them, they are either non-existent or unsatisfactorily broad.

2. Marxist Experiments in Destratification: A Failure: The dependency scholars suggest to eliminate capitalism-imperialism, if need be, by revolution and replace it by socialism. While coming with such a bold advice, these scholars seem to be satisfied with the socio-political experiments done to make the quality of life better and results obtained. The model socialist society is the U.S.S.R., though there are other socialist countries.

For a long time, the reliable data was not available for the communist countries. This was true of the Soviet Union until 'the thaw' in the mid-nineteen-fifties and it is still true of several closed societies such as Albania, Cambodia, North Korea, and Vietnam, as well as the newer Marxist societies in Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Angola. However, now the data is available on certain significant domains of life which is worth considering.

There are various successes of Marxist societies. First, these societies have demonstrated that modern societies do not require the private ownership of production or free enterprise system to enjoy the benefits of rapid economic growth . Secondly , by largely eliminating the private ownership of the means of production, Marxist regimes have substantially reduced the degree of income inequality in their societies. The incme inequality has been reduced by expansion of the social wage and reduction of the range of wages and salaries.

Among rich countries of the First and Second World, incomes tend to be more equally distributed in socialist countries which have relatively homogeneous populations, for example in Denmark, Professor Kravis has on the basis of available data, concluded that socialist countries have more equality in income distribution than other say capitalist countries.

Despite these successes , the Marxist societies have failures on several fronts the failures outweighing their successes. One such failure is at the political level: Marxisir societies have not been able to eliminate or even substantially reduce political inequality. At the top there is near monopolization of power and at the bottom a large number of people has been made political prisoner.

A second major failure is the areas of work Marxist societies have failed to make subsetntial progress in reducing inequalities in the attractivness of different kinds of work

Marx talked of alienation resulting from the denial of opportunity for the expression of human creativity in work and found capitalist system as a basic source of alienation. Marxist societies have failed to provide work opportunity for people to express their creative tendencies, free from constraints of higher authorities and bureaucrats. The workers have adopted the course of riot and strikes and formed unauthorized trade union. They are still hired labour. The differences between manual and non manual work still persists in Marxist regimes. Even in Maoist China youth wanted to avoid work in farm and factories had to be forced to work in the countryside. The peasants have to face restriction in their migration to the cities. The students failing in tests in entrance examinations were persuaded to go back to their farms and factories which they did not like. Marxist societies preserve authority structures in the work place which is disliked by most people. They do not enjoy taking order from others.

Another, a third, failure is the traditional inequalities based on sex. The women enjoy inferior status than their men counterpart in socialist societies. The women physicians get poor pay-packets than men physicians. Hedrick Smith, summarizing the current situation, observed: "Russia, equal pay for equal work is an accepted principle, but getting the equal work is the problem. Millions of women are shunted into the lower-paying, less prestigious fields. Teaching and medicine are prime examples. These are practically the bottom of the pay and status scales and these are the professions in which women are most heavily represented. In industry women work mostly in the light consumer sector where, according to Soviet studies, pay and all other benefits are well below those in heavy industry (where men predominate). In farming, women provide the core of the low-paid, unskilled field hands while men operate the machinery and get better pay."

Next significant area of inequality throughout Marxist societies is between town and country.¹⁵¹ There is substantial differences in income, material possessions, health, education and cultural opportunities of every kind. To one's dismay, collective farm workers were, until 1975, denied the internal passports thus restricting even spatial mobility. Tied as they are to land in this forced manner, it smacks of earlier serfdom. They get pensions half of the national average till today.

Finally, the failure is reflected in the limited progress towards creation of "the new socialist man"-a precondition for the emergence of Marx's vision of communism. Marx

suggested that communism was a desirable goal, through which man would be free from estrangement. No egalitarian society is possible without the creation of "the new socialist men". Yet, "if anybody expects socialism to create a new man...he will have to wait out the next 200 years of socialism." 184 Absenteeism, negligence, and inadequate use of work-day is most common. Bribes and threats are directed at members of admission committee, of educational institutions from the members of new elite.

In Eastern Europe, people do not favor introduction of private enterprise again. Although Inkeles and Bauer 186 note a leaning towards introduction of private enterprise among Soviet refugees in West Germany after World War II, other studies note the occupational prestige of private entrepreneurs not very high seem to "accept socialist ideas. Even then American Marxist intellectuals, including Huberman and Sweezy, have given up the hope on Soviet Union. They looked towards Maoist China and to some extent towards Cuba.

To them, Marxist goal of equality with freedom and justice was not fulfilled in the U.S.S.R. Their argument was that China will avoid errors of that which blocked the full-flowering of Marxist ideals in Soviet society. After the death, even Mao's teachings became downgraded by the new leaders of the People's Republic 189 his followers and associates arrested and in some case executed, material incentives reinstated, traditional authority re-established in schools and universities and economic growth replaced equality and the formation of new men. Maoism's darker side are being brought into the open.

So the critics put the question: Whether the dependency scholars want the peripheral societies to emulate socialist countries of this type or they have any other model before them once they choose to abolish capitalism and imperialism from them? The answer has yet to come or a model socialist society is yet to emerge.

Political Implications: The insistence of the dependency scholars on essential unity despite obvious diversity has serious political implications. It implies that nothing can be done \ peripheral economies to foster their proper development and what is needed is that they must break out of the world capitalism system completely. They should pool their resources towards knocking out capitalism and establishing the socialist society.

4. Even Socialist Societies Cherish the Goal of Duplicating or Becoming Capitalist

Societies : What a paradox: dependency. scholars advise the peripheral countries to emulate socialist societies and liquidate capitalism from within but believe it or not the socialist societies themselves try to duplicate capitalist countries to a large extent.

In 1921 Maiakovskii, said, "At electrification his eyes bulged a bit, 'Utopia', he said, nothing will come of it." Just you wait, bourgeois, There will be New York in Tetiushi, there will be paradise in Shuia."196 Russians' liking for America may from such observations: "Ours is the only important Government which refuses to grant Russia political recognition 'any yet it is our country that Russia emulates and admires,' ., 'the word for industrialization is Americanization, and .. passion to Ford the Soviet Union is even stronger than the passion to communize it."

Ideologically too Russians were trying to mix-up Americanism with socialism, For instance, in 1918, Lenin elaborated: "Soviet power + the order of the prussian railroads American technique and the organization of trusts + American public education etc., etc. socialism."198 One of the party's chief theoreticians, Nikolai Eukharin declared in 1923 the requirement of advance towards socialism: "We need Marxism plus Americanism,- Stalin wrote: "The combination of Russian revolutionary sweep and American efficiency is the essence of Leninism in party and state work. The origins of Americanism go back to the eighteenth century.

Americanism is not only a goal for Russia but also a way reaching that goal through the inculcation of what Bendix termed an ethic of work performance. Backwardness, or what Russian Left prefer to call, the lack of culture and civilization, had declined that ethic Russians want to inculcate American ethic. So there is much appreciation for American education, office work and excessive specialization and the rank consciousness that went with it. So the critics put the question: Why do the dependency scholars advise underdeveloped countries to liquidate capitalism when they themselves are very much emulating America-the seat of capitalism? The answer has yet to come.

We can say a finish to this portion of our analysis from Frank's assertions themselves. In the last para of the 1971 Preface to his *On Capitalist Underdevelopment*, Frank frankly realizes the limitations of the dependency theory:

Alternative Development

STRUCTURE

- 19.1 Objectives
- 19.2 Introduction
- 19.3 Sum up

19.1 OBJECTIVES

The main objective of this lesson is to equip you with :—

- the concept of Alternative development.
- the need of Alternative development different from development practises

19.1 INTRODUCTION

Let now draw these ideas together to outline a truly alternative development , different from development practice as conventionally understood , yet drawing on the modern project of improving life by creating the material conditions for human contentedness and happiness. What can be extracted from developmentalism. What is wrong saving? The idea present even in liberal version of development theory , of using production to satisfy needs in a reasoned environment such as planning where the consequences of action are discussed before action is taken. Specifically that development means using production to meet the needs of the poorest people. Osmolarity if we reexamine socialism , not as a monolith represented by the Soviet Union , not as a political dinosaur but as a living tradition

of critical thought, what is wrong saving? The notion of reproductive democracy , that the people involved in an institution -the workplace , the university , or the family should collectively control that institution. Specifically that workers not only “participate” in management or research , or whatever tat they are the managers research and so on. Pouting the two notions together socialists development means transforming the conditions of reproduction under the control of directly democratic and egalitarian social relations so that the needs of the poorest people are met. This is an argument for a critical , democratic , Marxist developmentalism that engages post structural notions for example the analysis of discourse learns from them but continues to believe in structure , coherence , science reasoning and democracy in every sphere of life. and the use of productive resources to meet people’s desperate needs.

Let us put the case succinctly we want the crux of an alternative development to lie in the production of more goods to satisfy needs as part of a wider strategy of transforming power relations in society at large. Borrowing a term with deliberate sarcasm from the World Bank development for us primarily means building “ economic capacity” so that material life can be improved. Yet “economic is broadly interpreted to mean all activities employing labor organized through social relations whether productive in the existing restricted sense , or socially reproductive in the feminist and radical democratic senses. The model of labor comes not from the globe-trotting executives, forever scheming how to make more money , but from mothers, peasants , and artisans whose work is concerned with the direct reproduction of immediate life. Work is best when it involves senuous interaction with natural materials, yet work is also useful and necessary for the people who do it and for those around them: this means when separated by space as with the notion of community chains.

The second word in the above definition “capacity “ means not capatalist entrepreneurship , nor even just skills , but reproductive resources that is land , infrastructure, machine fertilizers and the like devoted to increasing the production of food, housing useful goods and basic services like clinics , hospitals schools water mains and toilets. Here we retain the notion of “economic growth “ to mean not the expansion of the global economy in general , for the world already produces too much in dangerous ways but growth of productive capacity in the hands of those

people who need more so they can live. Furthermore means of production have to be collectively owned, directly as cooperatives, partnerships, family enterprises, so that “development” does not continually recreate inequalities of income and power, and democratically controlled again in direct, immediate ways to ensure that “development” satisfies locally defined, but universally present needs.

19.3 Sum up

In the sense of critical modernism, the scientific and technical power of economic growth to underwrite development needs to be retained, but in the greater sense of democratic socialism, scientific, technical and economic powers have to be placed in the hands of the people, directly and cooperatively and not directed by state or market. In the sense of socialist feminism, development should combine, rather than separate reproductive activities considered as a totality rather than split into hierarchical types. In the sense of utopian thinking development has to be reconceptualized as a universal, liberating activity but with the best of materialist poststructuralism, new imaginaries of development have to come from popular discourses, including the new social movements but also the political ideas of the older, class based organizations and even radical reactions to the Western Enlightenment here we find Alatas’s notion of universal knowledge from universal sources persuasive. In the sense of poststructuralism, existing discourses of development have to be ruthlessly deconstructed to reveal conceptual and political inadequacies rooted in the utter prejudices of absolute power, but in the sense of critical modernism development has to be seen as project employing reasoning in processes of collective improvement. Critical developmentalism must be radical in the post structural sense of changing the meaning of a corrupted term. But far more importantly, critical developmentalism in the socialist sense, has to root material development in the transformation of society. Enormous resources are available for development, ranging from the \$60 billions in aid that still flows from First World to Third World, to the thousands of people’s movements organized to improve the lives of poor peoples the first (aid) should go to the second (peoples movement). Development remains a project deserving ethical respect, political support and the best of intellectual imagination and practical activism. Let us rethink, restructure and rework “development”

Development as Discourse

STRUCTURE

- 20.1 Objectives
- 20.2 Introduction
- 20.3 Critique
- 20.4 Power-knowledge discourse
- 20.5 Modernity and science
- 20.6 Power-truth knowledge
- 20.7 Post colonilism

20.1 OBJECTIVES

The main objective of this lesson is to equip you with :—

- The concept of Development as Discourse.
- The concept of Power-knowledge Discourse

20.2 Introduction

Escobar's claim that a growing body of scholars shared a similar position in postdevelopmentalism was a little ambitious. But eventually a set of ideas promoted by a linked group of people circulated in publications and were put into practice by alternative institutions. These ideas coexisted with some degree of ease, if not yet as a fully coherent counter discourse. These ideas stemmed from critics of development in Third World countries, especially in India poststructural social theorist and a few development economists and some political ecologists and

environmentalist critical of the effects of development on nature . In the Development dictionary, a manual of postdevelopment thought, the modern age of development was proclaimed over and done with:

The idea of development stands like a ruin in the intellectual landscape . Delusion and disappointment, failure and crimes have been the steady companions of development and they tell common story it did not work. Moreover , the historical conditions which catapulted the ideas into prominence have vanished development has become outdated . But above all the hopes and desires which made the idea fly are now exhausted development has grown obsolete.

For the contributors to the dictionary , the main development credos were historically inadequate and imaginatively sterile. Development was a blunder of planetary proportions, an enterprise to be feared not for its failure , but in case it proved to be successful. The authors of the Development Dictionary wanted to disable development professionals by destroying the conceptual foundations of their practices. They wanted to challenge grassroots initiatives to discard their crippling development talk.

Likewise Serge Latouche's *In the Wake of the Affluent Society* argued that the Western dream of *la Grande societe* (the great society , the open society, the affluent society) promised affluence and liberty for all. Yet these possibilities were like film star status . achievable only for a few, while the price measured in terms of the reduction of real solidarities was paid by everyone. Western civilization was confronted by the dark side of progress.

The Perception that power to create is also power to destroy that power over nature is often more imagined than real that market autonomy is often also an awful desolation , insecurity and simple nullity numbness in front of the TV, or Lotto , walkman , glue sniffing , or some other virtual reality. What in human life is truly richness and progress

For Latouche , the West had become an impersonal machine , devoid of spirit and therefore of a master, which put humanity to its service. For their own survival, Third World had to subvert this homogenizing movement by changing their terms of reference to escape the dismemberment inherent in underdevelopment. For Latouche,

human practice was primarily symbolic through the imaginary, material problems received distinctive definition and terms of resolution. Underdevelopment was primarily a culture form of domination. Lactouche saw the West coming apart and the development myth collapsing. His main theme was the post Western world an imagined future that could be explored via its early beginnings in the informal sectors of economies. The informal sector, for Latouche was part of a whole social context involving neotribal peoples with residual and newly reinvented culture identities people with metaphysical or religious beliefs, people whose ensemble of daily practice were conducted under a different rationality that appeared from the outside to be deviant or irrational. All this he interpreted as resistances that were pregnant with another society. Lactouche described this vision as pushing speculation to the brink of science fiction and in this lay a fundamental problem with many postdevelopment approaches.

Given that postdevelopmentalists are not just destructive cynics, hopelessly caught in endless deconstructions but do in fact believe in social change and political activism, the problem became “What do they propose? Based on reading *The post development Reader*, one of the main collections of essays in this field, three positions seem to recur.

1. Radical Pluralism. Drawing on the ideas of Wendell Berry Mahatma Gandhi, Ivan Illich, Leopold Kohr Fritz Schumacher and others often expressed in the journal *The Ecologist*, postdevelopmentalists believe that the true problem of the modern age seems to lie in the inhuman scale of contemporary institutions and technologies. While people are enmeshed in global structures they lack the centralized power necessary for global action. To make a difference, actions should not be grandiosely global, but humbly local. Thus Gustavo Esteva and Madhu Suri Prakash amended Rene Dubois’s Slogan” Think globally, act locally “to read Think and act Locally” in their view, people could only think wisely about things they actually knew well. Esteva and Prakash urged support of local initiatives by small, grassroots groups for example growing food in villages where collective or communal rights had priority over personal or individual rights. While local people needed outside allies to form a critical mass of political opposition, this did not call for thinking globally. Indeed the opposite was the case. Esteva and Prakash believed that people thinking and acting locally would find others who shared their opposition to the global forces threatening local

spaces and join in coalitions of thinkers and activists. Every culture had a cosmivision, an awareness of the place and responsibilities of human in the cosmos, but this should not be twisted into cosmic Power.

2. Simple living. This appeared in two related versions, the ecological and the spiritual. In the ecological argument demand made on nature by the industrial countries (20% of the world people consuming 80% of the energy and raw material) had to be reduced by between 70% and 90% in a half century. This required more than efficient resource management it required a sufficiency revolution. A society in balance with nature required both intelligent rationalization of means and even more importantly prudent moderation of ends. In the spiritual argument, the idea was that material pursuits should not be allowed to smother the purity of the soul or the life of the mind. Instead the simple life self consciously subordinated the material to the ideas as with Zarathustra, Buddha, Lao-Tse, Confucius and the Old Testament (Shi 1997). So, as set out by Gandhi (1997), a simple life entailed an economics of justice, decentralization, village life and human happiness combined with moral, spiritual growth. In both versions of the simple living idea, ecological and spiritual there was a notion of peace and harmony coming from simpler, less materially intensive ways of living where satisfaction and happiness derived from spiritual sources rather than consumption.

3. Reappraising noncapitalist societies. Here the basic idea was that life in the previous, non developed world had not been so bad after all.

They had no cars, no Internet and none of the consumer goods to which modern men and women are now addicted. They had no laws and no social security to protect them, no free press, no opposition party, no elected leaders. But they had no less time for leisure, or paradoxically were no less economically "productive" for the things they needed. And, contrary to the racist clichés in vogue they were not always governed by cannibals and tyrants. Effective personal and collective moral obligations often took the place of legal provisions.

Into such societies poisonous development introduced a paraphernalia of mirages that dispossessed people of those things that had given meaning and warmth to their lives. The often hidden message of every development project was that traditional

modes of thinking and practice doomed people to a subhuman condition from which nothing short of fundamental change could allow respect from the civilized world. The main argument in favor of development was that it as a generous response to million who asked fro help. But development had little to do with the desires of the “target” populations. The hidden transcript concerned geopolitical objectives. Request fro aid came from unrepresentative governments rather than from the people themselves . Thus postdevelopmentalism was not the end of searches for new possibilities of change . Post developmentalism , instead signified that the old self destructive , inhuman approach was over.

In general , postdevelopmentalism rejected the way of thinking , and the mode of living , produced by modern development , in favor of revitalized versions of nonmodern , usually non Western , Philosophies and cultures. From this view , modern Western development was destructive rather tha generative, a force to be resisted than welcomed . In a phrase development was exactly the problem , not the solution.

The question remains however , whether development can be both problem and solution?

20.3 Critique

What might we make of sweeping condemnations , that seek to undermine the knowledge basis of all established notions about development to deconstruct each optimistic expression of Western reasons intervention on behalf of the oppressed people of the world , to denigrate the accomplishments of modern life and construct an alternative which in many cases, celebrate mystical rather than rational understanding? Is reason to be rejected or rereasoned ? Is development outmoded , or merely misdirected? These questions are so important that the postdevelopmental discouse must itself be deconstructed , not to synthesize its arguments in mild sanitized forms into a recast conventional development model , ut through critique to draw notions for use in a practice that might even retain some aspects of the idea of development.

Poststructural and postmodern theory favors fragmentation and difference except in its own treatment of modern development theory, which it portrays in terms of a monolithic hegemony. Hence , for Escobar “ critiques of development by dependency theorists for instance , still functioned within the same discursive space of de

velopment , even if seeking to attract it to a different international and class rationality.” Thus critics gather under the rubric modern development theory notions regarded by their proponents as separate different even antagonistic. A typical statement lists , as essentially one contemporary development discourse, neoclassical growth theory, modernization and radical political economy. These are said to share the following general positions:

- 1 A linear view of history in which the west is further along a given path of progress than Third world countries.
2. An agreement that the proximate cause of development is the exercise of human rationality , especially the application of science to production.
3. Advocacy of values like freedom, justice and equality as experienced and defined in the West.
4. An instrumental assumption that means are separable from ends and that moral considerations apply more to ends than to means

These criteria describe an apparent similarity between what are taken to be merely different forms of enlightenment thought. Beyond a vague similarity deriving from the Enlightenment , however the question is whether the notion of a single development discourse creates an homogenous myth that destroys differences between and within , theories crucial to their contents visions and intentions. Take historical materialism as a cause in point.

This notion of a continuous modernist discourse sees Marx as direct descendent of the Enlightenment. Thus in his preface to a Critique of political Economy Marx argued that societal transformation is driven by development of the material productive forces which by coming into periodic conflict with the existing relations of production create revolutionary ruptures that move society from one mode of production to another. What caused the development of the social forces of production? What propelled history? A rationalist version of Marxism found that Marx’s development these rested on the proposition that humans were rational beings who used their intelligence to relieve material scarcity by expanding their productive powers that is by increasing their ability to transform nature. In this rationalist version , Marx theory of history

could indeed be read as an elaboration of a central notion of the Enlightenment history is the progressive achievement of human reason's control over nature.

But this is one reading of Marx not the only reading and not necessarily Marx final position. Historical materialism was conceived as a critique of the very idea of beginning explanation with consciousness even in the form of an experientially based human imagination. Instead argued that social analysis should begin with real active life that is with labor and social relations of production. Marx's Grundrisse set out a version of historical materialism in which social and natural relations were the basic categories of analysis production had neither a single logic nor a single objective (Such as capital accumulation) history took multilinear forms and reasoning was of multiple kinds depending on social relations Marx multilinear, social relational theory does not rest easily in a supposedly singular discourse of development focused on Reason as caused and stretching from the Enlightenment to the World Bank.

Much the same can be said about "developmentalism" as a hegemonic discourse. There may be similarities between capitalist and state authoritarian economic thought with regards to development. But developmentalism as a mode of progressive thought, has long contained critical versions which stem from various oppositions to the existing forms of development and emphasize the different trajectories development of dependent societies, advocate different logics of development for different societies and passionately favors empowerment of poor people (as with PAR). Lumping these critical notions and the radical practices guided by them, with neoclassical economics, modernization theory and World bank policy into a broad coherent "developmentalism" denies fundamental differences and denigrates the efforts of theorist-activists such as the dependency theorist Walter Rodney who have been far more dangerously involved in praxis (Rodney was assassinated for his troubles) than are the poststructural philosophers who meet in the salons of Paris or the postmodernists who debate at annual meetings of the Modern Languages Association (for what are admittedly ferocious encounters)

This prompts a first critical reaction to poststructuralism in general and to postdevelopmentalism in particular. Poststructural discourse theory argues for the social construction of meaning, elaborating the institutional bases of discourse, emphasizing the positions from which people speak and the power relations between

these positions. This conception indicates constellations of discursive positions that persist over the long term and take a multiplicity of forms. The problem is that in setting up a systems of expectations about a theory such that it may be part of a more general intellectual position, discourse analysis often denies what poststructural philosophy supposedly cherishes: differences of a fundamental kind.” Discourse “ then becomes capable of reconciling even opposing tendencies in theorization. Indeed there may be a kind of “ discursive idealism” a process of reification in which the category “discourse” becomes an active force marshaling reluctant ideas into quasi- coherent determining wholes. Perhaps , therefore we need a more discriminating critique than discourse analysis. Reconstituted Marxist theories of ideology as with Gramsci , might do a better job as might some other conception more directly rooted in social , rather tha discursive , relations.

The critical point is not to make the easy claim that poststructural critics of development theory overstate their position, but to argue that the analysis if discourse , with its linking of oppositional theoretical traditions because they “ share the discursive space”) i.e. oppose one another_ is prone to this kind of overgeneralization. Why ? Exctly because it diverts attention away from the “ international and class rationalities” and material contexts expressed in discourses , hence merging conflicting positions (PAR and World Bank) into a single development discourse , or condemning modernity as a whole rather than for example , capitalist versions of modern consumptive life. True to its word about differences , poststructural theory would instead see development as a set of conflicting discourses and practices based in positions that contradict one another. These would have a variety of potentialias rather than promoting a single copy of the experience of The West. In the following section this critique is extended into the Foucauldian concepts of power and knowledge.

20.4 Power -knowledge- discourse

In his later (genealogical) work Foucault tried to escape from a structuralist conception of discourses as lumps of ideas determinant in history (epistemes) and instead concetrate on the material conditions of discourse formation social practices and power relations. Similarly Foucauldian postdevelopemt , like Escobar are interested in the institutions that form and spread development theories , models and strategies. Yet the power -knowledge -discourse trilogy still has problems . It is never

clear what power is. "Power" alternates between a Nietzschean power, inherent in all human relations and specific powers, such as those cohering in particular institutions or even individuals. And the positive aspects of power, the ability to get things done, get short shrift on practice, compared with the negative aspects. Moreover there is the poststructural critique of modern knowledge as oppressive, disciplining, normalizing, totalizing, essentialist truth claiming, knowledge thought up in the pursuit of power all of which are caricatures that fail to discriminate between types of knowledge production, different motives for thinking the contestations between potentials and the depositing in knowledge in "discourse" Discourse (not capital) has to be abandoned; postdevelopmentalism attacks the discourse development. Poststructural analyses often forget in practice the agency behind discourse, or overgeneralize agency as "modernity" or "power" Even in analyses following the later Foucault, strong reminders of discursive idealism remain. There is an overemphasis on representations and the enframing of imaginaries at the expense of practicality and action. Actually, intermediate conceptions and yield more focused analyses. Let us take the power basis of development theory as an example.

As we have seen, the contemporary notions of "development" emerged most fully as western policymakers reassessed their positions relative to newly independent states in the Third World during the postWorld War II cold war. From the mid-1940 to the late 1950 the redefinition of foreign policy and the notions of development aid, assistance food for peace and so on, were repeatedly linked especially in the newly hegemonic United States -hence the restatement of international control in American terms of the "rights of man" rather than in European terms of the white man's burden" While initiated by Truman, the culminating triumph of this "development of development theory" is actually to be found in the various speeches of John F. Kennedy president of the United States from 1960 to 1963. As Sorensen correctly says" No president before or after Kennedy has matched the depth of his empathy for the struggling people of Latin America, Africa and Asia, or the strength of his vow to facilitate their Kennedy administration managed to contain a fierce anticommunism within an overall framework of western humanism in a development discourse that drew consciously on the latest in social science. Rostows Stages of Economic Growth (1960) is obviously present in Kennedy's (in Sorensen 1988: statement that "the

only real question is whether these new nations (in Africa) will look West or East -or Moscow or Washington - for sympathy help and guidance in their great effort to recapitulate in a few decades , the entire history of modern Europe and America

Thus it quickly becomes apparent that the Kennedy statements on the Third World must be deconstructed to reveal their knowledge sources , motives and power bases. There are excellent critical surveys by political scientists linking U.S positions on development to broader domestic and foreign policy objectives although this literature largely predates the spread of poststructural notions into North American social science and would benefit from Foucauldian technique of discourse analysis. While necessary , however the question remains : Is discourse analysis sufficient to the task? Take that culminating moment in postwar history , when an idealistic young president at last expressed the finest sentiments of American generosity towards the world in the one paragraph in Kennedy's Inaugural Address of 1961 dealing with U.S relations with the Third World.

To those peoples in the huts and villages of half the globe struggling to break the bonds of mass miser we pledge our best efforts to help them help themselves for whatever period is required-not because the communists may be doing it, not because we seek their votes , but because it is right. if a free society cannot help the many who are poor , it cannot save the few who are rich .

This speech initiated a renewed U.S emphasis on development using a modern rhetoric of equality , happiness and social justice. But Kennedy justified " helping the many who are poor as being morally right in terms of saving the few are rich " As Foucault would say the language of development helping and generous aid express power relations . Kennedys statements directly expresses class relations in the form of fundamental , modern beliefs. For Kennedy, scion of one of the richest families in the United States, representative of the New England liberal intelligentsia, supporter of the invasion of Cuba and the Vietnam incursion, development antipoverty programs and welfare are good philanthropic ideals but also at the same time preserve the continued possibility of wealth creation by the rich people of the world . Yet development in the Kennedy statement is not an expression of power in general , which universalizes the issue nor is it an expression of power employed by a specific

institution such as the U.S State Department which confines the critique. The critical analysis of development as discourse is far more revealing in terms of motive forces when it is cast not in terms of power in general, nor the power of a specific institutions but in terms intermediate between these class gender ethnicity and state on the one hand and beliefs ideals and politics on the other. In brief while there is much to learn from discourse analysis especially the serious attention given to statement and documents as symptoms of power relations there are some real problems with it. These problems might be resolved, in part through a dialogue with Marxism, Socialist feminism and other critical tradition which employ notions of class, gender and ethnicity and speak in the language of ideology, hegemony, and fundamental beliefs.

20.5 Modernity and Science

These, however are methodological skirmishes around the main issue poststructuralism's negative assessment of modernism, especially its skeptical attitude towards material progress the emancipation of humanity, empirical truth and modern science. Beginning with the critique of progress, the poststructural literature literature rejects western models of development altogether. As Escobar puts it, "rather than searching for development alternative speak about alternatives to development that is a rejection of the entire paradigm" In doing so, postdevelopmentalism denies the Third World what the first World already has yet we must note that many critics of Western modernity and enjoy their benefits while arguing that Third World people do not need them. In postdevelopmentalism, associating any trait with the West is sufficient to condemn it without further question as though Western people are unique in one respect only, everything we do is perverse. As with Rahnema, there are tendencies to deny that poverty originally existed in The Third world, to romanticize local alternatives to development to assume a reverse snobbery in which indigenous knowledge systems are automatically superior to Western science, to reveal in spiritual mysticism as though gods and goblins are true" as gravity. Crimes committed in the name of religion at least rival those perpetrated for the sake of reason although we would claim that many supposedly "modern" atrocities such as Nazi Germany were motivated primarily by mystical ideas try listening to Hitler's speeches.

Most fundamentally the question of modern science must be debated with rigor and insight. In the Development Dictionary Claude Alvares (1992-219-220) calls

modern sciences “an epoch -specific , ethnic (Western) and culture specific (culturally entombed) project , one that is a politically directed , artificially induced stream of consciousness invading and destroying and often attempting to take over the larger more stable canvas of human perceptions and experiences “ Gilbert Rist in a wonderfully iconoclastic argument about development dismisses scientific realism , the view that a world exists independently of the knowing subject and can be known with accuracy with a single overstated phrase: “ As for objectivity it is known to be a vain pursuit so long as we refuse to accept that the object is always constructed by the one who observes it” Yet even those who understand that objects assume shapes as ideas in the imagination through inexact representation processes refuse to accept that this mental shaping “ constructs” these objects. Realists and materialist believe instead that objects in the world are already “there” before being encountered in thoughts and shaped (inexactly) into ideas. Realistic science is an as yet incomplete project to found belief on evidences rather than faith. We can readily admit that evidence is inadequate , even misleading and that reliance on the evidentiary is a belief. But science is a different order , a new kind of belief that radically questions everything even the basis of its own knowledge claims (epistemology) rather than accepting the completely unknowable (God’s existence”) on faith Let it be clear that this is a response to Rist’s claim that Western beliefs in science and development are merely updated myths. Science conceived as evidence and radical questioning may advance understanding by enabling realistic appraisals of life and its circumstances _for example by showing that lightening is a giant electrical spark passing from sky to earth , rather than an expression of anger from the gods in heaven , hence lightening conductors save lives, while prayer is ineffectual without claiming omnipotence or total knowledge. Accuracy may be only the beginning of understanding as existential philosophy argues Accuracy may be a cultural invention of the West a poststructural philosophy argues. But accuracy and evidence have this great difference from mystical blind faith they liberate the mind from hallucinations of the supernatural . Science draws inspiration from a world of Knowledge (china , Egypt , the Middle East) , yet the West has contributed something that underlies technology , productivity and greater material certainty that some thing is evidence.

We who try to base our beliefs on evidence rather than faith should look carefully

at modernity's accomplishments the fact that science has yielded productivity has enabled back breaking labor to be performed by machines has yielded consumption above basic needs does provide a margin of safety against natural catastrophes . A critique of development should discriminate between real advances like modern medicine , on the one hand and the tragic misuse of scientific knowledge and technological productivity in support of frivolous consumption for a few rich people on the other hand. Western science has demonstrated its positive power in improving material living standards , albeit at great environmental and social expense. Indeed it is exactly the need for greater material security in the Third World countries that empowers Western images and developmental models. Drawing on this tradition , development contains a real quest for improving the human condition, but one perverted by class power and ruling ideologies. There should be a struggle to reorient this practice rather than dismissing the entire modern developmental project as a negative power play. Therefore we need more discriminating class and gender analyses that show how potentials come to be misused restricted , exploitative, and environmentally dangerous. We need to replace the critical category “ modernism” with the more discriminating more critical category “ capitalism as source of the perversion of the modern.

A more discriminating materialist poststructural critique sees development as discourse and system of organized practices produced under definite social relations. Social relations rather than anonymous epistemes guide the discovery and use of knowledge , the writing of documents and the structuring of practices. From this perspective , the social relations that undergird discourse themselves merely being deconstructed it takes more than changing words to change the world . In this view also development has unrealized potential, and radical analysis should be dedicated to extracting those notions from modern developmentalism that can be used to further the interests of peasants and workers, rather than dismissing the entire venture.

Let us give the final word, however to the Delhi Centre for the Study of Developing societies . In *Rethinking Development* , Rajni Kothari, director of the Delhi Centre , argues that unfettered economic growth propelled by modern science and technology engenders a deadly arms race, a wasteful , consumption driven civilization and a pernicious class structure all of which threaten democracy. The world's he says is becoming overly dominated by a single conception of life. Yet Kothari also warns

against simplistic versions of a counterview, like reactionary antimodernism, or rampant culture relativism, that neglect the inextricable entwinement of North and South. He favours principles of both autonomy and integration. In terms of specific strategies, Kothari recommends fostering alternative lifestyles to high consumptions and an ethic that discourages ostentations living in favor of frugal limitation. In terms of the political organization of space Kothari wants a Gandhi Style decentralization to promote a more equitable balance between urban and rural. He advocates a cultural attack on illiteracy and broad, popular participation in economic production and public life (a decentralized, participatory democratic structure that realizes social justice). For Kothari, the cultural and especially the religious, traditions of non-Western societies offer alternatives to Western scientific and technological mastery in the East for example, science was based on a search for truth and was regarded as a means of self realization and self control rather than as a means of dominations of nature. Yet rather than dismissing Western modernity, Kothari calls for a process of critical interaction between civilizational traditions.

Like wise, Ashis Nandy (1987), a senior associate at the Delhi Centre, argues for a critical traditionalism that tries to marshal the resources provided by inherited cultural frames for purposes of social and political transformation. For Nandy as with Gandhi, the recollection of cultural traditions has to recognize the fissures between oppressors and oppressed while privileging the voices and categories of victims. Nandy has a general distrust of the ideas of the powerless and marginalized are the way to freedom, compassion and justice.

In these views we find a postcolonial postdevelopmentalism open to dialogue with a critical modernism.

20.6 Power -truth knowledge

Foucault shared with Nietzsche a fascination with the power truth knowledge complex and with Husserl and Heidegger a critical attitude towards modern rationalism. Foucault saw reason saturating life, intruding the gaze of rationality into every nook and cranny of existence with science classifying and thereby regulating all forms of experience. Foucault launched two kinds of attack on the philosophy of modern, rational humanism. First he argued that modern reason metaphysically grounded an

image of universal humanity on traits that were culturally specific . Second he maintained that the values and emancipatory ideals of the Enlightenment were ideological bases for a normalizing discipline that imposed an appropriate identity” on modern people. Like the Frankfurt school Marxists Max Horkheimer and Theodore Adorno writing in *Dialectic of Enlightenment* , Foucault believed modern rationality to be a coercive force focused on the minds of individuals. In analyzing this rationality , he employed a method different from that of the Marxists which after Nietzsche he called “ genealogy”

Genealogy involved diagnosing relations of power knowledge , discourse and the body in modern society. Genealogy was opposed to most modern methods of inquiry in that it claimed to recognize no fixed essences or underlying laws , sought discontinuities rather than the great continuities in history avoided searching for depth and sought out and recorded forgotten dimensions of the past. The genealogist found hidden meaning , heights of truth and depth of consciousness to be shams of the modern imagination; instead genealogy’s truth was that things had no essence. Whenever genealogy heard of original truths , it looked for the play of power driven wills when talk turned to meaning value, goodness or virtue, the genealogist found abstract force relations worked out in specific instances. For the genealogist there was no conscious rational subject instances. For the genealogist , there was no conscious rational subject moving history forward. Instead , events came from the play of forces in any situation. History was not the progress of universal reason but rather , humanity moving from one form of domination to another.

Foucault was particularly interested in the careful rationalized organized statements made by experts what he called “ discourse” In the *Archaeology of Knowledge* Foucault saw the human sciences as autonomous rule -governed systems of discourse. Within these discourse, Foucault claimed to discover a previously unnoticed type of linguistic function the serious speech act,” or statement with validation procedures made within communities of experts . Foucault was interested in the various types of serious speech acts , the regularities they exhibited in “ discursive formations,” and the transformations these formations underwent. Discursive formations had internal systems of rules determining what was said about which objects. Foucault called the setting that decides whether statements count as real knowledge the epistemological

field , or episteme he meant the set of relations between discursive practice in a given period that created formalized systems of knowledge . Discourses had systematic structures that could be analyzed archaeologically and genealogically (how discourses were formed by nondiscursive , social practices especially by institutions of power)

Modern discourses were founded on appeals to truth. Yet , for Foucault modern Western knowledge was integrally involved in the clash of dominations. For Foucault knowledge did not detach itself from its practical , empirical roots to become pure speculation subject only to the demands of reason . Rather truth power and knowledge operated in mutually generative ways.

Truth is not outside of powerEach society has its own regime of truth , its general politics of truthThere is a combat for the truth or at least around the truth as long as we understand by the truth not those true things which are waiting to be discovered but rather the ensemble of rules according to which we distinguish the true from false and attach special effects of power to the Truth”

Foucault argued that “ biopower “ emerged as a coherent political technology in the seventeenth century when the fostering of life and the growth and care of populations became central concerns of the early modern state. Systematic empirical investigation of historical , geographical, and demographic conditions engendered the modern human sciences. Their aim for Foucault was not human emancipation , but the making of docile yet productive bodies.

In two lectures given in 1976 , Foucault stressed certain aspects of genealogy particularly interesting for the question of development. For Foucault , thinking in terms of totalities reflected an urge for theoretical unity , but it also curtailed and caricatured local research. Instead he favored autonomous , noncentralised theorization that did not depend upon for its validity on gaining approval from established regimes of thought. He favored local knowledge the “return of knowledge “ an insurrection of subjugated knowledge , blocs of historical knowledge usually disqualified as inadequate , naive mythical beneath the required level of scientificity. By resurrecting histories of local struggles and subjugated knowledges , Foucault thought that critical discourse could discover new essential forces. Genealogy undertook the re-discovery and reconstruction of the forgotten , a task that would not be possible

unless the tyranny of globalizing discourses was first eliminated. Genealogies then, were indehiscence, opposed not necessarily to the concepts of science, but opposed to the effects of organized scientific discourse linked to centralized power systems. In Foucault's words "It is really against the effects of the power of a discourse that is considered to be scientific that genealogy must wage its struggle". By genealogy, Foucault also meant "the union of erudite knowledge and local memories which allows us to establish a historical knowledge of struggles and to make use of this knowledge tactically today." In genealogy, Foucault examined a new the multiple relations of domination. For him, these were not global kinds of domination, that is one large group of people over other's centre over periphery, but multiple forms of domination, exercised in many different forms: power in its regional and local forms and institutions, power at level other than conscious intention power as something that circulated or functioned in the form of chains and networks power starting from the infinitesimal personal relation and then colonized by ever more general mechanisms into forms of global domination power exercised through the formation and accumulation of knowledge. In brief the interactions between power, knowledge, and discourse were the province of Foucaults genealogy.

According to Foucault, The control of space was an essential constituent of the modern disciplinary technologies. In modernity, space took the form of grids with slots or position on the assigned values individuals were placed in preordered, disciplinary spaces for example with military hostitals factories, classrooms with numbered desks, suburbs ranked by socioeconomic status or for that matter countries placed in tables according to GNP/ capita. Discipline "made" individuals through this kind of distribution in space, by training through hierarchical observation, through normalizing judgement, examination, documentation, with help from the human(social) sciences (i.e. psychology, anthropology, sociology geography). The phase" academic discipline" was no accident for Foucault, the academy was linked with the spread of disciplinary technologies in the same matrix of power.

Foucault believed all global theories such, as modernization theory Marxist mode of production theory or world systems theory to be reductionist(reducing complexity to a few tendencies), universalistic (making everyone and everything the same), coercive (implying force), and even totalitarian (implying total control). He attempted

to “detotalize history and society as wholes governed by a central essence, whether production in Marxism, world Spirit in Hegelian idealism, or progress in modernization theory. As opposed to existential phenomenology he decentered the subject as a consciousness constituting the world and instead are people as socially constructed identities. Society was understood in terms of unevenly developing discourses. Whereas modern theories of human emancipation drew on broad, essential themes to reach macropolitical solutions—for example, solving world poverty through Western intervention—Foucault respected difference and favored micropolitics, allowing people the freedom to define and solve their own problems (Best and Kellner 1991; Peet 1998)

20.7 Postcolonialism

This extreme skepticism about the Western project of reason, truth and purgers, formulated mainly in Paris, paradoxically at the center of the Enlightenment world, intersected with an increasing sophisticated critique coming from intellectuals from the previously colonial countries ironically often from scholars who had lived, or who had been partly educated in the West. These thinkers spoke from hybrid, in-between positions drawing on several traditions of thought, including Western reason and poststructural criticism, revealing a number of conflicting experiences in a critical that came to be known as “postcolonialism.”

Postcolonial criticism now occupies a prominent position in a number of disciplines such as, modern languages, literature history, sociology, anthropology, and geography. In the words of the Princeton historian Gyan Prakash the idea of Postcolonial criticism was to compel “a radical rethinking of knowledge and social identities authored and authorized by colonialism and Western domination.” According to Prakash previous criticisms of colonialism had failed to break free from Eurocentric discourses, for example, Third World nationalism attributed agency to the subjected nation, yet staked its own claim to colonialism’s order of Reason and progress. Or in another example, Marxist criticism was framed theoretically by a historical schema (modes of production) that universalized Europe’s experience. The postcolonial critique by comparison, sought to undo Europe’s appropriation of the Other (the non-European) within the realization that its own critical apparatus existed

in the aftermath of colonialism. Following Derrida, it could be said that postcolonial criticism “inhabited” the structures of Western domination it sought to undo. More completely, postcolonial literatures resulted from an interchange between imperial culture and the complex of indigenous cultural practices, the idea being that imperialism was, in part resisted, eroded and even supplanted in hybrid processes of cultural interaction.

Postcolonial criticism began with the writings of the West Indian/Algerian psychoanalyst of culture Frantz Fanon in his well-known book *The Wretched of the Earth* but also in the lesser known *Black Skin, White Masks* (1986). Fanon's bitter violent words forced European readers to rethink their experiences in relation to the history of the colonies then awakening from “the cruel stupor and abused immobility of imperial domination” (Said 1989:223). Fanon's challenges to fixed ideas of settled identity and cultural study of colonialism and a renewed interest in the recurring topic of subject formation— that is, how people's identities were formed. Here Fanon drew from the French Structural psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan the idea that the ego (conscious self) was permanently schismatic. The infant's mirror stage” (when the child saw its behavior reflected in the imitative gestures of other discovered “that is me”) was thought, by Lacan to be deceptive for the mirror was a decoy, producing mirages rather than images. Hence ego construction, for Lacan was an alienated process and the resulting individual was permanently discordant with himself or herself (Bowie 1991). Third World intellectuals turned Lacan's ego theory into a critique of the certainty of the Western rational identity. Thus Fanon thought that the black person, the other for the white European was unidentifiable and unassimilable, a confusing mirage, a hallucination rather than a confirming mirror image. Conversely, he maintained the historical and economic realities of colonialism formed the more accurate basis of the (white) Other for a more securely defined black identity (Fanon 1986:161). In the Postcolonial literature the argument was subsequently made by Homi Bhabha (1986) that Fanon too quickly named a singular Third World Other to the First World Same; but others countered that Fanon's conqueror-native relation was an accurate representation of a profound global conflict. From such differences derived a number of postcolonial positions all stressing contacts between Europe and the civilization of the rest of the world, but different

Culture and Politics

STRUCTURE

- 21.1 Objectives
- 21.2 Introduction
- 21.3 Commodification of culture
- 21.4 Supply creates demand
- 21.5 Limited Accomodation
- 21.6 Imperfect socialization

21.1 OBJECTIVES

The main objective of this lesson is to equip you with :—

- Concept of culture and politics
- both relation of culture and Politics

21.2 Introduction

In the academic social sciences, students are taught to think of culture as representing the customs and mores of a society, including its language, art, laws, and religion. Such a definition has a nice neutral sound to it, but culture is anything but neutral. Much of what is thought to be our common culture is the selective transmission of class-dominated values. Antonio Gramsci understood this when he spoke of class hegemony, noting that the state is only the “outer ditch

behind which there [stands] a powerful system of fortresses and earthworks,” a network of cultural values and institutions not normally thought of as political.¹ What we call “our culture” is largely reflective of existing hegemonic arrangements within the social order, strongly favoring some interests over others.

A society built upon slave labor, for instance, swiftly develops a racist culture, replete with its own peculiar laws, science, and mythology, along with mechanisms of repression directed against both slaves and the critics of slavery. After slavery is abolished, racism continues to fortify the inequitable social relations—which is what Engels meant when he said that slavery leaves its “poisonous sting” long after it passes into history.

Culture, then, is not an abstract force that floats around in space and settles upon us—though given the seemingly subliminal ways it influences us, it can feel like a disembodied, ubiquitous entity. In fact, culture is mediated through a social structure. We get our culture from a network of social relations involving other people: primary groups such as family, peers, and other informal associations within the community or, as is increasingly the case, from more formally articulated and legally chartered institutions such as schools, media, churches, government agencies, corporations, and the military.

Linked by purchase and persuasion to dominant ruling-class interests, such social institutions are regularly misrepresented as politically neutral, especially by those who occupy command positions within them or are otherwise advantaged by them. What Gramsci said about the military might apply to most other institutions in capitalist society: their “so-called neutrality only means support for the reactionary side.”²

When culture is treated as nothing more than an innocent accretion of solutions and practices, and each culture is seen as something inviolate, then all cultures are accepted at face value and cultural relativism is the suggested standard. So we hear that we should avoid ethnocentrism and respect other cultures. To be sure, after centuries in which indigenous cultures have been trampled underfoot by colonizers, we need to be acutely aware of the baneful effects of cultural imperialism and of the oppressive intolerance manifested toward diverse ethnic cultures within our own society.

But the struggle to preserve cultural diversity should not give carte blanche

to anyone in any society to violate basic human rights. Many patriarchal cultures, for example, are replete with “sacrosanct customs” that, on closer examination, promote the worst kinds of gender victimization, including the mutilation of female children through clitorrectomy and infibulation, and the sale of young girls into sexual slavery. I once heard an official from Saudi Arabia demand that Westerners show respect for his culture: he was addressing critics who denounced the Saudi practice of stoning women to death on charges of adultery. He failed to mention that there were people within his own culture—including, of course, the female victims—who were not enamored of such time-honored traditions.

For most of U.S. history, slaveholders and then segregationists insisted that we respect the South’s “way of life.” In Nazi Germany, anti-Semitism was an integral part of the ongoing political culture. Many evildoers might rally under the banner of cultural relativism. The truth is, as we struggle for human betterment, we must challenge the oppressive and destructive features of all cultures, including our own.

In academic circles, postmodernist theorists offer their own variety of cultural relativism. They reject the idea that human perceptions can transcend culture. For them, all kinds of knowledge are little more than social constructs. Evaluating any culture from a platform of fixed and final truths, they say, is a dangerous project that often contains the seeds of more extreme forms of domination. In response, I would argue that, even if there are no absolute truths, this does not mean all consciousness is hopelessly culture-bound. People from widely different societies and different periods in history can still recognize forms of class, ethnic, and gender oppression in various cultures across time and space. Though culture permeates all our perceptions, it is not the totality of human experience.

At the heart of postmodernism’s cultural relativism is an old-fashioned anti-Marxism, an unswerving ideological acceptance of existing bourgeois domination. Some postmodernists depict themselves as occupying “positions of marginality,” taking lonely and heroic stands against hoards of doctrinaire hardliners who supposedly overpopulate the nation’s campuses. So the postmodernists are able to enjoy the appearance of independent critical thought without ever saying anything that might jeopardize their academic careers.

Taught to think of culture as an age-old accretion of practice and tradition, we mistakenly conclude that it is not easily modified. In fact, as social conditions and interests change, much (but certainly not all) of culture proves mutable. For almost four hundred years, the wealthy elites of Central America were devoutly Roman Catholic, a religious affiliation that was supposedly deeply ingrained in their culture. Then, in the late 1970s, after many Catholic clergy proved friendly to liberation theology, these same elites discarded their Catholicism and joined Protestant fundamentalist denominations that espoused a more comfortably reactionary line. Their four centuries of “deeply ingrained Catholic culture” were discarded within a few years once they deemed their class interests to be at stake.

Generally, whenever anyone offers culturalistic explanations for social phenomena, we should be skeptical. For one thing, culturalistic explanations of third-world social conditions tend to be patronizing and ethnocentric. I heard someone explain the poor performance of the Mexican army, in the storm rescue operations in Acapulco in October 1997, as emblematic of a lackadaisical Mexican way of handling things: It’s in their culture, you see; everything is *mañana mañana* with those people. In fact, poor rescue responses have been repeatedly evidenced in the United States and numerous other countries. And more to the point, the Mexican army, financed and advised by the U.S. national security state, has performed brilliantly in Chiapas, doing the thing it was trained to do, which is not rescuing people but intimidating and killing them, waging low-intensity warfare, systematically occupying lands, burning crops, destroying villages, executing suspected guerrilla sympathizers, and tightening the noose around the Zapatista social base. To say the Mexican army performed poorly in rescue operations is to presume that the army is there to serve the people rather than to control them on behalf of those who own Mexico. Culturalistic explanations divorced of political-economic realities readily lend themselves to such obfuscation.

21.3 The Commodification of Culture

As the capitalist economy has grown in influence and power, much of our culture has been expropriated and commodified. Its use value increasingly takes second place to its exchange value. Nowadays we create less of our culture and buy more of it, until it really is no longer our culture. We now have a special term for segments of

culture that remain rooted in popular practice: we call it “folk culture,” which includes folk music, folk dance, folk medicine, and folk mythology. These are curious terms, when you think about it, since by definition all culture should be folk culture. That is, all culture arises from the social practices of us folks. But primary-group folk creation has become so limited as to be accorded a distinctive label.

A far greater part of our culture is now aptly designated as “mass culture,” “popular culture,” and even “media culture,” owned and operated mostly by giant corporations whose major concern is to accumulate wealth and make the world safe for their owners, the goal being exchange value rather than use value, social control rather than social creativity. Much of mass culture is organized to distract us from thinking too much about larger realities. The fluff and puffery of entertainment culture crowds out more urgent and nourishing things. By constantly appealing to the lowest common denominator, a sensationalist popular culture lowers the common denominator still further. Public tastes become still more attuned to cultural junk food, the big hype, the trashy, flashy, wildly violent, instantly stimulating, and desperately superficial offerings.

Such fare often has real ideological content. Even if supposedly apolitical in its intent, entertainment culture (which is really the entertainment industry) is political in its impact, propagating images and values that are often downright sexist, racist, consumerist, authoritarian, militaristic, and imperialist.³

With the ascendancy of mass culture we see a loss of people’s culture. From the nineteenth century to the mid-twentieth century, a discernible working-class culture existed, with its union halls, songs, poetry, literature, theater, night schools, summer camps, and mutual assistance societies, many of which were organized by anarchists, socialists, and communists, and their various front groups. But not much of this culture could survive the twin blows of McCarthyism and television, both of which came upon us at about the same time.

The commodification of culture can be seen quite starkly in the decline of children’s culture. In my youth, I and my companions were out on the streets of New York playing games of childhood’s creation without adult supervision: ringalevio, kick-the-can, hide-and-seek, tag, Johnny-on-the-pony, stickball, stoopball, handball, and

boxball. Today, one sees little evidence of children's culture in most U.S. communities. The same seems to have happened in other countries. Martin Large notes that in England, in the parks and streets that once were "bubbling with children playing," few youngsters are now to be seen participating in the old games. Where have they all gone? The television "has taken many of our children away" from their hobbies and street games.⁴

This process, whereby a profit-driven mass culture preempts people's culture, is extending all over the world, as third-world critics of cultural imperialism repeatedly remind us.

21.5 Limited Accommodations

There are two myths I would like to put to rest: first, the notion that culture is to be treated as mutually exclusive of, and even competitive with, political economy. A friend of mine who edits a socialist journal once commented to me: "You emphasize economics. I deal more with culture." I thought this an odd dichotomization since my work on the news media, the entertainment industry, social institutions, and political mythology has been deeply involved with both culture and economics. In fact, I doubt one can talk intelligently about culture if one does not at some point also introduce the dynamics of political economy. This is why, when I refer to the "politics of culture," I mean something more than just the latest controversy regarding federal funding of the arts.

The other myth is that our social institutions are autonomous entities, not linked to each other. In fact, they are interlocked by corporate law, public and private funding, and overlapping corporate elites who serve on the governing boards of universities, colleges, private schools, museums, symphony orchestras, the music industry, libraries, churches, newspapers, magazines, radio and TV networks, publishing houses, and charitable foundations.

New cultural formations arise from time to time, usually within a limited framework that does not challenge dominant class arrangements. So we have struggles around feminism, ethnic equality, gay rights, family values, and the like—all of which can involve important, life-and-death issues. And if pursued as purely lifestyle issues,

they can win occasional exposure in the mainstream media. Generally, however, the higher circles instinctively resist any pressure toward social equalization, even in the realm of “identity politics.” Furthermore, they use lifestyle issues such as gay rights and abortion rights, among others, as convenient targets against which to misdirect otherwise legitimate mass grievances.

The victories won by “identity politics” usually are limited to changes in procedure and personnel, leaving institutional class interests largely intact. For instance, feminists have challenged patriarchal militarism, but the resulting concession is not an end to militarism but women in the armed forces.

Eventually we get female political leaders, but of what stripe? We get Lynn Cheney, Elizabeth Dole, Margaret Thatcher and—just when some of us were recovering from Jeane Kirkpatrick—Madeleine Albright. It is no accident that this type of woman is most likely to reach the top of the present politico-economic structure. While indifferent or even hostile to the feminist movement, conservative females reap some of its benefits.

Professions offer another example of the false autonomy of cultural practices. Whether composed of anthropologists, political scientists, physicists, doctors, lawyers, or librarians, professional associations emphasize their commitment to independent expertise, and deny that they are wedded to the dominant politico-economic social structure. In fact, many of their most important activities are directly regulated by corporate interests or take place in a social context that is less and less of their own making, as doctors and nurses are discovering in their dealings with HMOs.

21.4 Supply Creates Demand

We are taught that the “free market of ideas and images,” as it exists in mass culture today, is a response to popular tastes. Media culture gives the people what they want. Demand creates supply. This is a very democratic-sounding notion. But quite often it is the other way around: supply creates demand. Thus, the supply system to a library can be heavily prefigured by all sorts of things other than readers’ preferences. Discussions of censorship usually focus on limited controversies, as when some people agitate to have this or that “offensive” book removed from the shelves.

Such incidents leave the impression that the library is struggling to maintain itself as a free and open system. Overlooked is the prestructured selectivity, the censorship that occurs even before anyone gets a chance to see what books are on the shelves, a censorship imposed by a book market dominated by six or seven conglomerates. There is a difference between incidental censorship and systemic censorship. Mainstream pundits sedulously avoid discussion of the latter.

Systemic repression exists in other areas of cultural endeavor. Consider the censorship controversies in regard to art. These focus on whether a particular painting or photograph, sporting some naughty thing like frontal nudity, should be publicly funded and shown to consenting adults. But there is a systemic suppression as well. The image we have of the artist as an independent purveyor of creative culture can be as misleading as the image we have of other professionals. What is referred to as the “art world” is not a thing apart from the art market; the latter has long been heavily influenced by a small number of moneyed persons like Huntington Hartford, John Paul Getty, Nelson Rockefeller, and Joseph Hirschorn, who have treated works of art not as part of our common treasure but, in true capitalist style, as objects of pecuniary investment and private acquisition. They have financed the museums and major galleries, art books, art magazines, art critics, university endowments, and various art schools and centers—reaping considerable tax write-offs in so doing.

As trustees, publishers, patrons, and speculators, they and their associates exercise influence over the means of artistic production and distribution, setting ideological limits to artistic expression. Artists who move beyond acceptable boundaries run the risk of not being shown. Art that contains radical political content is labeled “propaganda” by those who control the art market. Art and politics do not mix, we are told—which would be news to such greats as Goya, Degas, Picasso, and Rivera. While professing to keep art free of politics (“art for art’s sake”), the gatekeepers impose their own politically motivated definition of what is and is not art. The art they buy, show, and have reviewed is devoid of critical social content even when realistic in form. What is preferred is Abstract Expressionism and other forms of Nonobjective Art that are sufficiently ambiguous to stimulate a broad range of aesthetic interpretations, having an iconoclastic and experimental appearance while remaining politically safe.

The same is true of the distribution of films and their redistribution as videos.

Some are mass-marketed while others quickly drop from sight. Capitalism will sell you the camera to make a movie and the computer to write a book. But then there is the problem of distribution. Will a film get mass exposure in a thousand theaters across the nation, or will the producer spend the next five years of his or her life toting it around to college campuses, union halls, and special one-day matinee showings at local art theaters (if that)?

So it is with publications. Books from one of the big publishing conglomerates are likely to get more prominent distribution and more library adoptions than books by Monthly Review Press, Verso, Pathfinder, or International Publishers. Libraries and bookstores (not to mention newsstands and drugstores) are more likely to stock Time and Newsweek than Monthly Review, CovertAction Quarterly, or other such publications. A small branch library will have no room or funds to acquire leftist titles but will procure seven copies of Colin Powell's autobiography or some other media-hyped potboiler.

It is not just that supply is responding to demand. Where did the demand to read about Colin Powell come from? The media blitz that legitimized the Gulf War also catapulted its top military commander into the national limelight and made him an overnight superstar. It was supply creating demand.

21.6 Imperfect Socialization

One hopeful thought remains: socialization into the dominant culture does not operate with perfect effect. In the face of all monopolistic ideological manipulation, many people develop a skepticism or outright disaffection based on the sometimes evident disparity between social actuality and official ideology. There is a limit to how many lies people will swallow about the reality they are experiencing. If this were not so, if we were all perfectly socialized into the ongoing social order and thoroughly indoctrinated into the dominant culture, then I would not have been able to record these thoughts and you could not have understood them.

Years ago, William James observed how custom can operate as a sedative while novelty (including dissidence) is rejected as an irritant.⁵ Yet I would argue that after awhile sedatives can become suffocating and irritants can enliven. People sometimes hunger for the uncomfortable critical perspective that gives them a more

meaningful explanation of things. By becoming aware of this, we have a better chance of moving against the tide. It is not a matter of becoming the faithful instrument of any particular persuasion but of resisting the misrepresentations of a thoroughly ideologized bourgeois culture. In class struggle, culture is a key battleground. The capitalist rulers know this—and so should we.

Politics of Post Development

STRUCTURE

- 22.1 Objectives
- 22.2 Introduction
- 22.3 Critique
- 22.4 Analyzing post development
- 22.5 Conculsion

22.1 OBJECTIVES

The main objective of this lesson is to equip you with :—

- have the glimses of critique of post development
- Analyzing post development

Exploring Post-Development: Politics, the State and Emancipation.

This paper explores whether there is any value to post-development. The central argument is that there is if the engagement with Michel Foucault is informed and accurate, and only if post-development can have helpful practical implications. The paper makes a distinction between post-development that is ‘influenced’ by Foucault and the one that stems from a more thorough use of Foucauldian concepts. This distinction has prompted an exploration of post-development theory that shows how an informed Foucauldian treatment of post-development adds value to the analysis and allows for relating post-development concerns to the practice of development. From this foundation it has been possible to identify a number of unanswered questions, but also to demonstrate the potential post-

development holds for uncovering possible alternatives to development. Additionally the analysis is revealing to the implications of these alternatives for development practice, but also in relation to politics, emancipation and the State.

Introduction

Post-development articulates a dissatisfaction with the concept and practice of 'Development' that lead not to the search for alternative versions of it, but to dismissing it altogether and calling for alternatives *to* development (Esteva 1992; Escobar 1995; Rahnema 1997). The idea of moving 'beyond development' may seem unduly radical and unrealistic when contrasted with a well-established and accepted modernist worldview that has long since informed and justified powerful economic and political interests in the pursuit of 'Development' (Andreasson 2010 p.88). Not surprising then, post-development ideas have been the target of extensive critique that will be taken into consideration in the following chapters. This paper intends to show however, through a close engagement with the critiques put forward by post-development thinkers, that there are indeed some fundamental problems with the way that 'Development' has been pursued in the post-World War II era, and to argue, in spite of the critics claims to the opposite; that post-development can inform practice and reveal the direction in which potential alternatives are heading.

Post-development has its roots in postmodern critique of modernity. It has also been greatly influenced by the work of Michel Foucault. Attempts at the deconstruction of the concept of development has been undertaken (Escobar 1995) in order to reveal the operations of power and knowledge in development discourse and practices. This paper is an exploration of post-development and through re-evaluating the use of Foucauldian methodology the core arguments of post-development will be revealed; discarding the more arbitrary and unsophisticated post-development arguments found in some instances of the early writings (Sachs 1992; Rahnema 1997; Esteva and Prakash 1998b).

An ambivalence has hence been identified in post-development thinking where a significant difference exists within and between the writings and it appears as though there are two conflicting discourses to be found within post-development (Ziai 2004). Although a further enquiry into this important distinction will feature in Chapter One it would serve to highlight that this paper intends to bring to light

the discourse in post-development that is informed by a more sophisticated application of Foucauldian concepts to 'Development'. This paper has been motivated by the belief that post-development has not received adequate attention in mainstream debates owing to the number of critics that have dismissed the approach, arguably having been distracted and preoccupied with the less constructive discourse that relates to a poor use of Foucauldian analysis which is distinguishable within post-development thinking. Critics have also tended to assign a limited use to post-development theory; as being able to offer a critique of development but lacking instrumentality in relation to practice. This paper intends to explore the ways in which post-development critique can offer insights into alternatives to development, while also addressing the implications of post-development theory for the practice of development. There is a crucial emphasis to be made to the meaning of the term development employed in the post-development critique. What is actually referred to when an 'end to development' (Lummis 1994) is called for? What is envisioned in is not, according to Rahnemna, 'to be seen as an end to the search for new possibilities of change' (1997 p.391.)

Rather, it is

'Development' which refers to the various ideas and practices that have been undertaken in post-World War II era, attempting to engineer particular changes in the so-called 'Third World' and that are premised on the belief that some areas of the world are 'developed' and that others are 'underdeveloped' (Matthews 2004 p.376), which is to be abandoned. 'Development as we know it is interventionism' and it is difficult to imagine development without intervention: no feasibility studies, no teams of experts, no projects or programmes or even participatory workshops and World Bank policies (Maiava 2002 p.1). The type of 'development' rejected by post-development theorists is the form of development that has been a response to the problematization of poverty that occurred in the years following World War II, and can be seen as 'an historical construct that provides a space in which poor countries are known, specified and intervened upon' (Escobar 1995 p.45). It is necessary to emphasise that the purpose in the following discussions is not to evaluate post-development theory in relation to other existing development approaches, nor to use it as a tool to evaluate or dismiss the efforts made in the name of development in the post-

World War II era, but rather to maintain a focus on post-development and critically engage with its theory in order to explore the potentials and shortcomings therein as well as the implications of a post-development analysis for politics, the role of the state and the issues that arise when attempting to relate their idea of alternatives to development to current development practice. To this effect, the paper is divided into two parts. Part One: Theory, intends to correct the shallow engagement with Foucault which in turn allows for setting up Part Two: Practice, that addresses the problem of political ‘silence’ of post-development by exploring how it can inform development practice. Chapter One introduces the post-development critique of ‘Development’ while Chapter Two provides an analysis of the theory and the use of Foucauldian concepts, which will be the more substantial section of this paper as it enables advancing post-development theory so as to explore what is envisioned in alternatives to development and allow for discussing it in relation to practice; something which has been found lacking and close to absent in post-development literature. Chapter Three will discuss post-development and the call for alternatives to development, assessing the role awarded to new social movements and the implications for social change. A final discussion including critiques of post-development, the problems identified and some implications for the future role of international development institutions and the state will feature in Chapter Four, which attempts to relate post-development theory to practice. This has hardly been dealt with by post-development theorists and hence the objective here is limited to identifying a number of problems and questions for further study as well as highlighting potential benefits; ways in which a post-development analysis can improve the practice and pursuit of social change.

22.3 The post-development critique of ‘Development’

Although declaring a total failure of the post-World War II project of development in the South (Sachs 1992; Rahnema 1997) might appear to be a controversial claim in the light of UN statistics on the progress made for instance in terms of life expectancy and infant mortality since the 1950s, the two most fundamental hypotheses put forward by post-development writers are hardly contested even by the sharpest critics (Ziai 2007 p.8). Firstly, the traditional concept of ‘development’ is seen as a Eurocentric construct where the West is

labelled 'developed' and the rest of the world is perceived as 'underdeveloped'. This constitutes one society as the ideal norm and others as deviations of that norm and neglects numerous other possible conceptions and indicators for a 'good life' or a 'good society' as the different ways of measuring 'development' are modelled upon the European experience of progress. According to post-development theory these values of 'development' should not be taken as universal (Ziai 2007 p.8). Secondly, it is argued that the traditional concept of development has authoritarian and technocratic implications. Whoever gets to decide what 'development' is and how it can be achieved, usually some kind of 'development expert', is also in a position of power, which has been described as a 'trusteeship'. Post-development critique emphasises that any position that 'relies on universal standards for classifying and evaluating societies in fact subordinates countless different perceptions and values of other people', and that such a position becomes dangerous when coupled with political power to transform societies according to supposedly universal standards (Ziai 2007 p.9). What is key to these post-development arguments is that development discourse is based on Western ideas of progress and as such cannot help but take the form of an imposition of those ideas on the South and hence repressing local cultures and interests (Parfitt 2002 p.7). Post-development writers seek to dismiss the post-World War II concept of development by reference to its top-down authoritarian form, as directed by intrusive state mechanisms and international development agencies (Escobar 1995; Esteva and Prakash 1998b). Development was - and continues to be for the most part - a top-down ethnocentric, and technocratic approach, which treat people and cultures as abstract concepts, statistical figures to be moved up and down in the charts of "progress". Development was conceived not as a cultural process (culture was a residual variable, to disappear with the advance of modernization) but instead a system of more or less universally applicable technical interventions intended to deliver some "badly needed" goods to a "target" population. It comes to no surprise that development became a force so destructive to Third World cultures, ironically in the name of people's interests. (Escobar 1995 p.44). As a result of this discursive formation of development, the succession of various development strategies and approaches up to the present, are always made within the same discursive space.

(Escobar 1995 p.42) It is to a considerable extent on these grounds that the whole development paradigm is dismissed by post-development writers, along with alternative development, because it will invariably be a project of “modernisation” based on western ideas of “progress” leading to cultural and social homogenisation, threatening people’s autonomy. Indeed, one fundamental objection to ‘development’ is that all the successive schools of development thinking envisage a process of development through ‘the exercise of trusteeship over society’ (Cowen and Shenton 1996 p.ix-x). Trusteeship has been defined as ‘the intent which is expressed by one source of agency, to develop the capacities of another’ (Cowen and Shenton 1996 p.ix-x). Cowen and Shenton arrives at an objection to trusteeship in development through identifying both a ‘distance and disjunction between the intent to develop and the practice of development’ as it entails an ‘exercise of power in which the capacity to state the purpose of development is not accompanied by accountability’ (1996 p.454). This issue of trusteeship has been further emphasised in the work of contemporary post-development theorist Mark Duffield in relation to security, where he relates it to a ‘culturally coded racism’ that effectively decides the boundary between the ‘included and excluded’ (Duffield 2007 p.227). However, it has been pointed out that a level of trusteeship is unavoidable in the pursuit of development, whether it is through the policies of the State or international development agencies (Parfitt 2002 p.43). The objection to trusteeship might have little to do with the question of agency, but rather that the project of development rejected by post-development has involved an act of power over a target population that has had little to no ability to call the agency to account (Parfitt 2002 p.42). Cowen and Shenton related these concerns to Amartya Sen’s work and his conception of ‘development as freedom’, which they find best accords with their vision of development, quoting Sen to the effect that ‘the process of development is best seen as an expansion of people’s “capabilities”’ (Sen cited in Cowen and Shenton 1996). The fundamental post-development position arguably shows that if authoritarian and ethnocentric elements for development are to be avoided, it would be impossible to define development in normative terms as the state of a ‘good society’. Such a definition can only legitimately be reached through a

democratic process by the people concerned (Ziai 2004 p.1056). The aims of the post-development perspective is effectively a transfer of power, the power to define the problems and goals of a society; from the hands of outside 'experts' to the members of the society itself, which adds up to a radical democratic position (Ziai 2004). Before moving on to locating this position within post-development, it is necessary address some of the critiques that have been raised against post-development in order to distinguish between two readings or discourses within post-development. The 'sceptical post-development' discourse (Ziai 2004) as it has been referred to is found to be based on a more sophisticated use of Foucauldian methodologies and holds a constructive potential in that it is revealing of the nature of the alternatives to development. Critiques of post-development theory and the distinction between 'sceptical post-development' and 'anti-development' A number of serious critiques have been raised against post-development theory. These will have to be addressed in order to move forward to explore the implications and possibilities of post-development alternatives to the post-World War II project of development. For this purpose it is necessary to make a clear distinction between two different discourses inherent to the post-development school of thought. The call for the 'end of development' (Lummis 1994) in post-development thinking, does not according to Rahnema (1997 p.391) amount to an end to the search for new possibilities of change but rather that a transformation must occur at the level of the people, and that what they seek is change that will enhance their 'inborn and cultural capacities' which would allow them to be free to change the content and rules of change according to their culturally defined aspirations (Rahnema 1997 p.384). Other post-development writers have signalled what they refer to as 'the inevitable breakdown of modernity' that is being 'transformed by the non-modern majorities into opportunities for regenerating their own traditions, their cultures, their unique indigenous and non-modern arts of living and dying' (Esteva and Prakash 1998ap.290). Comments of this nature have prompted critics to discredit post-development for romanticising the community and the local as well as advocating anti-modernist ideas (Schuurman 2000; Nederveen Pieterse 2000). Nederveen Pieterse argues that the 'quasi-revolutionary posturing of post-development reflects both a hunger for a new era and nostalgia for a politics of romanticism,

glorification of the local, grassroots and the community with conservative overtones' (1998 p.366). Post-development is also criticised for attributing to development a single and narrow meaning, suggesting its homogeneity and consistency, and for Nederveen Pieterse this essentialising of development, equating it with 'Development' (earlier referred to as the post-World War II development project) 'is necessary in order to arrive at the radical repudiation of development' (2000 p.183). The claim that post-development fails to address whether there are alternative conceptions of development which might involve less domination (Storey 2000) is hardly on target, as post-development writers frequently make clear that it is a certain form of development - as a global project which is to be abandoned. Furthermore it is made clear why 'alternative development' or 'participatory development' are also dismissed and even deemed more 'insidious', the new 'siren songs' of development as Serge Latouch (1993) describes them, as they give a new lease of life to 'Development' by providing a new friendly exterior through mainstreaming sensibilities put forward by alternative thinkers, while really amounting to little more than the pursuit of the same ends by different means (Latouch 1993 p.149). Nevertheless, Nederveen Pieterse argues that the problem is not with the critiques put forward by post-development 'which one can easily sympathise with', but with the accompanying rhetoric, exaggerated claims and anti-positioning (2000 p.188). He further argues that there is no positive programme, only critique and no construction as he claims that "alternatives to development is a misnomer because no such alternatives are offered' (Nederveen Pieterse 2000 p.188). This paper will take issue with these claims and argue that a closer reading of the core hypotheses of post-development coupled with a more sophisticated understanding of the methodological and intellectual basis in Foucault's work can give a good idea to what is implied in the pursuit of alternatives to development.

It is necessary however at this point, to make a connection to one of the main concerns of this exposition, which regards the connection between development or aspirations for social change with politics. The question is also a concern for Nederveen Pieterse as he finds post-development to offer no forward politics, which he attributes to the use of Foucault's conception of power which he perceives as 'an imagination without an exit'. In this vein it is argued that

post-development's political horizon is limited to that of resistance rather than emancipation characterised by 'local struggles *à la* Foucault' (2000 p.186). This position arguably reflects more on Nederveen Pieterse's understanding of Foucault's analysis of power, and his views on the politics of post-modernism and his conclusions stand in sharp contrast with the post-development critique itself which takes issue with and criticises what is perceived as the "de-politicising effects" of the post-World War II development project as well as the fact that post-development calls for a re-politicisation of development and poverty and for these issues not to be reduced to "technical problems" (Fergusson 1990; Nustad 2007; Nakano 2007; Munck 1999). The point to make here is that when treating post-development as a coherent school of thought, many critics fail to differentiate between the heterogeneous positions subsumed under the heading of 'post-development', and have accordingly not fully grasped their political implications (Ziai 2004 p.1058). In order to further explore the ways in which post-development can be constructive and offer insights into the search for alternatives to development and to discuss the implications of post-development theory for development practice it is therefore important to draw a distinction between two competing discourses within post-development. This paper dismisses the 'neo-populist' or 'anti-development' discourse which tends to romanticise traditional culture, portraying culture as static and rigid and thus rejects modernity promoting a return to subsistence agriculture and vernacular ways of life (Ziai 2004 p.1054). It is this conception that is most susceptible to the critiques of post-development as discussed above, and the political implications of which can 'invite political impasse and quietism' (Nederveen Pieterse 2000 p.187). A cultural critique that is linked with a static conception of culture risks amounting to a conservative or reactionary anti-modern position, a danger that should not be ignored (Ziai 2004). This is particularly apparent in Rahnema's idea of development where he compares it to AIDS, where development is depicted as a virus that colonises the mind and is internalised. The change that occurs to the culture of a people from contact with Western modernity is seen as an illness, in other words, culture is seen as something static and something that must be preserved as it is (Rahnema 1997b p.119). This speaks of the neo-populist or anti-development strand of post-development thinking that has

prompted critics like Nederveen Pieterse to claim that post-development shows no regard for the progressive dialectics of modernity or for democratisation and technologies (2000 p.187). The preoccupation of critics with this strand of post-development arguably distracts from the potential of the ‘sceptical post-development’ discourse, grounded in a thorough ruse of Foucauldian concepts; this approach is considerably more sophisticated when critically under mining and engaging with the post-World War II development project, and is where a forward politics can be found. When the critique of the Eurocentrism and cultural imperialism of ‘Development’ is combined with a constructivist and anti-essentialist perspective post-development has been claimed to hold an emancipatory potential through the project of radical democracy (Ziai 2004). From this point, a deeper analysis of the theoretical underpinnings of the ‘sceptical post-development’ discourse, which holds constructive potential, will be undertaken and used to develop an understanding of what is implied through, and envisaged in the alternatives to development that post-development proposes.

22.4 Analysing post-development theory and the use of Foucauldian concepts

Development as discourse: post-development’s theoretical foundation and use of a Foucauldian analysis Foucault has been the single greatest intellectual influence on post-development theory. Development is seen as constituting ‘a specific way of thinking about the world, a particular form of knowledge’ and in the Foucauldian sense it does not reflect reality but instead constructs reality, and as such ‘it closes off alternative ways of thinking and so constitutes a form of power’ (Kiely cited in Story 2000 p.40). Escobar has undertaken a Foucauldian deconstruction of the development discourse (Escobar 1995) revealing how pursuing Foucault’s analysis of power, knowledge and discourse in relation to development can show how Western disciplinary and normalising mechanisms have been extended to the Third World and how the production of discourses by Western countries about the Third World becomes a means of effecting domination over it (Munck 1999 p.205). ‘Development discourse’, from this perspective is about disciplining difference – establishing what the norm is and what deviance is, indeed creating ‘underdevelopment’ as Other to the West’s ‘development’ (Munck 1999 p.205). This “invention” of development which occurred in the

post-World War II era involved the creation of an institutional field from which discourses are produced and put into circulation. This institutionalisation of development, which took place at all levels from the international organisations like the IMF, the World Bank and the UN to the national planning agencies of states in the Third World to local development agencies and community development committees and NGOs – all together constitute an apparatus that organises the production of knowledge and the deployment of forms of power. This “development apparatus” overlaps with the process of professionalization of development that started post-World War II in the mid-1940s (Escobar 1995 p.46). To understand the development discourse and how it operates, one must look at the system of relations established among these institutions and practices, and to the systematisation of these relations to form a whole that ‘defines the conditions under which objects, concepts, theories and strategies can be incorporated into the discourse’ (Escobar 1995 p.40-41). The objects that development began to deal with post-World War II were numerous and varied, some which stood out clearly like poverty, insufficient technology and capital, rapid population growth, inadequate public services and agricultural practices (Escobar 1995). ‘Everything was subjected to the eye of the new experts: the poor dwellings of the rural masses, the vast agricultural fields, cities, households, factories, hospitals, schools, public offices, towns and regions, and, in the last instance the world as a whole’ (Escobar 1995 p.41). By deconstructing development through analysing it as a form of discourse, Escobar sees ‘Development’ as: the result of the establishment of a system that brought together all those elements, institutions, and practices creating among them a set of relations which ensured their continued existence. ‘Development’ as a mode of thinking and a source of practices, soon became an omnipresent reality. The poor countries became the target of endless number of programs and interventions that seemed to be inescapable and that ensured their control (Escobar 1988 p.430). Through the professionalization of development it also became possible to remove Third World is different, inferior or “behind” in relation to the accomplished West against which success is measured and where from this privileged position it is allowed to continue to provide guidance and identify the “anomalies” of the ‘underdeveloped’ (Escobar 1995).

The idea of “progress” – a genealogy of the development paradigm Other post-development writers have made use of other Foucauldian concepts in order to criticise ‘Development’. The development project has been analysed through a genealogy of the paradigm (Shanin 1997) – paradigm being taken here as the sum of the underlying assumptions, beliefs and world-views underpinning the concept (Rahnema 1997 p.xiv). Foucault’s analysis of power can uncover historically specific systems of norm-governed social practices which he refers to as power/knowledge regimes that define and produce distinctive subjects and objects. Genealogy is a kind of historiography that can chronicle the emergence and disappearance of such systems of practice and can describe their function. Genealogy is ‘an analysis which can account for the constitution of the subject within a historical framework’ (Foucault 1980 p.117). Shanin (2007) examines the genealogy of the development paradigm, which goes as far back as to the idea of progress. The Enlightenment of the 16th and 17th centuries, with its scientific advances provided the basis for the secular notion of progress in which science and reason are the driving forces behind societal advancement. The core of the concept of progress sees all societies as ‘advancing naturally “up”, on a route from poverty, barbarism, despotism and ignorance to riches, civilisation, democracy and rationality, the highest expression of which is science’ (Shanin 1997 p.65). It is important to acknowledge the extent to which the ideas of progress have penetrated all strata of contemporary societies and ‘become the popular common sense, and as such resistant to challenge’ (Shanin 1997 p.66). The language has evolved with fashion: ‘progress’, ‘modernisation’, ‘development’, ‘growth’ and so on, and likewise did the legitimisations: ‘civilising mission’, ‘economic efficiency’ and ‘friendly advice’ (Shanin 1997p.66). The impact of the idea of progress is substantial, involving modernisation theory, development strategy, the goal of economic growth, and can be categorised as being threefold: ‘as a general orientation device, as a powerful tool of mobilisation, and as ideology’ all problems, including poverty from the political and cultural realms and to recast them in terms of the apparently more ‘neutral’ realm of science. In this way, ‘Development was conceived not as a cultural process’, but instead as a ‘system of more or less universally applicable technical interventions’ intended to deliver solutions on identified problems to

“target”populations (Escobar 1995 p.44). ‘Development’ has contributed to the understanding of social life as technical issue, as a matter of rational decisions and management to be entrusted to those whose specialised knowledge makes them qualified – the development professionals in international organisations, national governments and specific development programmes. Inherent to the post-World War II development project is the assumption of a teleology to the extent that all societies are assumed to be moving along the same path of “progress” towards the same end goal of “development” that is modernisation. It endlessly reproduces the separation between reformers and those to be reformed by relying on the premise that the (Shanin 1997 p.68). It has enabled social planning due to its claims to being founded in “objective” patterns of history, and ‘endless planning disasters’ have followed (Shanin 1997p.69) The most significant concrete representation and instrument of the idea of progress has been the modern state as it provides a legitimate representation of the nation with its claims to bureaucratic rationality and as it reiterates the understanding that it is necessary to manage people as a means to achieving societal advancement (Shanin 1997 p.69). ‘Progress’, ‘development’, ‘growth’ and so forth became the main ideological *raison d’être* for statehood’ and ‘the governability of people’ (Shanin 1997 p.69). The blueprints of “progress” and ‘Development’ have given legitimisation to repressive bureaucracies, both on a national and international level, to act on behalf of science, presenting as technical problems and objective matters those which are essentially political and thereby taking away choice from those influenced the most by the decisions taken by these institutions (Shanin 1997). The central role of the state in the development process has been one of the main characteristics of the post-World War II development paradigms, which is epitomised in the construction of the welfare state in the Western industrialised world (Schuurman 2000). Post-development critiques of the role of the modern state in ‘Development’ and the question of autonomy efficient management and disciplining of the population so as to ensure its welfare and ‘good order’ (Escobar 1992a p.146). Escobar’s arguments here, hold a close affinity to what Foucault contends in *Power/Knowledge* (1980) as he suggests that the governmental management involved to ensure that the path of progress and development was pursued allowed for poverty, health, education, hygiene, and

unemployment and so on to be constructed as 'social problems' which in turn required detailed scientific knowledge about the population and society, and extensive social planning and intervention in everyday life (Escobar 1992a). 'The management of the social has produced modern subjects who are not only dependent on professionals for their needs, but are also ordered into realities (cities, Exploring the ways that the idea of progress ties in with the role of the modern state as the main agent of development - through being managerialist and primarily concerned with engineering social change and economic growth - is imperative for understanding why the post-development critique of 'Development' logically also entails a similar critical engagement with the state. Understanding how this critique relates back to the core concerns of post-development might shed light on what is envisioned in the call for alternatives to development. 'As the state emerged as the guarantor of progress, the objective of government became the health and education systems, economies, etc.) that can be governed by the state through planning' (Escobar 1992a p.147). Planning inevitably leads to what Foucault has termed normalisation and occurs through a standardisation of reality by subjecting people to the dominant norms, and as to its more insidious effects it entails a disavowal and erasure of difference and diversity (Escobar 1992a). As a result of the close relationship between the idea of progress and development, post-development critics are targeting the teleological concept of history inherent in development. It is argued that because societies are self-instituting this closed off imaginary inherent in the concept of 'Development' negates the self-instituting power of society. 'Since the teleological concept of development excludes the creation of something radically new, any attempt to pursue autonomy must necessarily criticise development' (Sauviat 2007 p.104). Since the social imaginary of development is tied to Western ideas of progress it stands in contradiction with the social imaginary of autonomy, because autonomy means that all the institutionalised social traditions can be questioned, and the goals redefined at any time (Sauviat 2007). Central to this meaning of autonomy is the idea of an autonomous subject and always when discussing autonomy and certainly when thinking about autonomy in an intercultural dimension, one has to pay attention to power relations. For the moment, the 'West' is still in a superior position of power and thus has more means to export

its imaginary, and its ideology. This is identified as a problem by post-development thinkers as autonomy has to be made a practical reality and to be struggled for, and by definition cannot be imported from the outside. (Sauviat 2007). Thinking about development along these lines brings to mind Rahnema's argument - that the development project was flawed to begin with because of the very premises and assumptions that it was based on. The issue here is not that 'development strategies or projects could or should have been better implemented' but rather that 'development as it imposed itself on its 'target populations', was basically the wrong answer to their true needs and aspirations' (Rahnema, 1997a p.379). When discussing the African experience of development, Stefan Andreasson suggests that the 'development-as-modernisation discourse' becomes so focused on that which has worked elsewhere, that it neglects the importance of finding what may be conducive to a better future in African experiences and values themselves (2010 p.82). He finds that post-development challenges this mindset by 'making the simple assumption that the quest for a way forward out of the quagmire begins at home' (Andreasson 2010 p.83). Depoliticising poverty and the State: findings from Ferguson's case study of development interventions in Lesotho James Ferguson's analysis of how the development apparatus have been employed in the context of the involvement of development agencies in Lesotho provides this discussion with empirical examples of the pathologies of conventional development by looking at the unintended "instrumental effects" of planned interventions. Ferguson has found the "instrumental effects" to be twofold: 'alongside the institutional effect of expanding bureaucratic state power is the conceptual or ideological effect of depoliticising both poverty and the state' (Ferguson 1990 p.256). Ferguson (1990) adds to post-development theory by analysing the 'development discourse' on Lesotho and the ways in which the development agencies presented the country's economy and society. He furthermore examines the effects that the underlying assumptions and misrepresentations have had on development projects there in practice focusing mainly on the unintended side-effects, the 'instrumental effects' as the history of the development projects in Lesotho is one of almost unremitting failure. In 1975 the World Bank issued a report on Lesotho that was used to justify a series of

major World Bank loans to the country. Ferguson exposes what he refers to as myth-making about Lesotho, as the World Bank report is filled with inaccurate representations of the country such as claiming Lesotho to be a ‘traditional peasant society’ and that agriculture provides the livelihood for 85% of the people, while in reality something like 70% of average rural household income is derived from wage labour in South Africa (Ferguson 1997 p.225). The argument put forward by Ferguson highlights several underlying assumptions and representations of Lesotho that were not based on the reality of the country. The knowledge that was produced by the development apparatus necessarily had to construct a reality in which Lesotho “could” be “developed” – as an appropriate target for intervention (Ferguson 1990). Lesotho had to be represented as agricultural so that it could be “developed” through agricultural improvements and technical inputs. A representation in which Lesotho appeared as a labour reserve for the South African mining industry, where migrant wage labour was recognised as the basis for Basotho livelihood would leave development agencies almost without a role to play. The subsequent deployment of a development project according to the false assumptions constructed by the development apparatus unsurprisingly failed in its goal of commercialisation of livestock as this proved to be the wrong answer to Lesotho’s problems which turned out not to be simple matters for a technical solution. The Thaba-Tseka Project failed to effect transformation in livestock practices because of the presumed characteristics of the “target” population and by ignoring the traditional political and economic structures that govern livestock keeping in Lesotho including a mystique glorifying cattle ownership where non-commercial livestock practices support local power relations (Ferguson 1990). The development projects in Lesotho reveal another striking feature of the development discourse on Lesotho that concerns the way that the State is portrayed; as an impartial instrument for implementing plans. Development agencies presented the country’s economy and society as lying within the control of a neutral government perfectly responsive to the blueprints of planners seeing ‘the government as a machine for providing social services and engineering growth’ (Ferguson 1997 p.226). Ferguson argues that this misrepresentation of the role and power of the state contributes to the failure of development projects in general but more interestingly also to the instrumental

effects of the expansion of bureaucratic state power and de-politicisation. These instrumental effects may also lead 'Development' to effectively squash political challenges to the system through the enhancement of the powers of administration and repression, but also through reposing political questions of land, resources, jobs or wages as technical "problems" responsive to technical development interventions (Ferguson 1990 p.270). By uncompromisingly reducing poverty to a technical problem, and by promising technical solutions to the sufferings of the powerless and oppressed people, the hegemonic problematic of "development" is the principal means through which the question of poverty is de-politicised in the world today (Ferguson 1990 p.256). The project of 'Development' is for Ferguson capable of pulling a good trick, that of the 'suspension of politics from even the most sensitive political operations' leading him to refer to the "development project" as 'the anti-politics machine' (Ferguson 1990). There are further observations made by Ferguson that are worthy of note here. According to Foucault's account, the development and spread of techniques for the disciplining of the body and the optimisation of its capacities, making the population an object of control and knowledge, has enabled in the modern era, a new form of power, one that does not simply imply domination, but is instead a normalising "bio-power" that is productive (Ferguson 1990). Bio-power watches over, governs and administers the very "life" of society and in this process the state occupies a central role – coordinating, managing and optimising, according to its own calculus, the productive forces of society (Ferguson 1990 p.274). Ferguson finds however, that this understanding does not fully explain what he has observed in Lesotho. Instead of expanding capabilities of the state, the instrumental effects have only served to extend the reach of a particular kind of exercise of power where power relations must increasingly be referred through bureaucratic circuits and hence it has only contributed to the ossifying or 'coagulation' of power (Ferguson 1990 p.274). Expanding on the core arguments of post-development through a closer engagement with Foucault This section intends to reiterate the main post-development critiques and further clarify the post-development position – "sceptical" post-development, that has been found the more constructive discourse within post-development so as to take its sensibilities forward to the next section on post-development theory in relation

to development practice. This will be done through a closer engagement with Foucault's conception of power, and from this analytical standpoint reassess some of the post-development claims as a way of advancing the post-development critique of development. Foucault has been the single greatest intellectual influence on post-development theory. However, it has also been noted that some post-development writers limit their use of Foucault to a rather impoverished version of Foucault's discourse analysis, and employing a 'somewhat vulgar use of Foucauldian concepts' (Ziai 2004 p.1048). This has been 'characterised more by decrying of Eurocentrism and injustice of development than a Foucauldian analysis of the operation of power through development' (Brigg 2002 p.422). The criticism of the improper use of Foucault can be limited to some of the authors that have been referred to, Rahnema (1997), Esteva (1992) and in part also Sachs (1992), whilst other post-development writers like Escobar (1995) and Ferguson (1990) have been found to base their work on a more thorough reading of Foucault (Ziai 2004). As previously mentioned, it is possible to distinguish two distinct discourses within post-development – a sceptical and a neo-populist or anti-development one – and most of the criticisms here are only valid for the latter (Ziai 2004). This is observable in Morgan Brigg's otherwise lucid analysis (2002) as he reproaches post-development as a coherent paradigm, claiming post-development theory to bestuck within a sovereign, repressive concept of power rather than making use of Foucault's conceptualisation of power by recognising the operation of "bio-power". Here Brigg is at best only partly accurate as this largely only applies to the neo-populist reading of post-development (Ziai 2004 p.1048). Nevertheless, to take the post-development critique seriously and to move forward with it requires, according to Brigg the moving away from a colonising metaphor to a deeper understanding of the operation of power through development, including its productive modality of "bio-power" (Brigg 2002) which confirms the need to discard of the neo-populist discourse of post-development as a way of advancing post-development, which has been the approach taken in this paper. It is necessary then, to highlight how Foucault's analysis of power makes a distinction between power in its negative sense as constrictive and power in its positive sense as enabling or productive. The first meaning implies power as coercion and domination by another and the second

refers to the constraint of being limited by one's identity, implying a degree of self-subjection. (Simons 1995 p.31) Whereas the paradigm of the pre-modern sovereign power was 'the right to take life', modern power is exemplified by the right of the social body to maintain the development of its life and is now concerned with the generation of life through regulation of the population as a whole, or a bio-politics. (Simons 1995 p.33) The developmentalist character of bio-power as it fosters, organises and optimises life by administrating life in order to manage it in a calculated way, is immediately apparent (Brigg2002).

The issue of overcoming using a colonising metaphor in post-development writing is part of abroad trend in post-development that tends to equate development with Westernisation of the world. Rahnema writes of the 'colonising of the mind' (1997) and Escobar refers to the 'colonising mechanisms of development' (1992a) and the colonisation of reality (1995). The problem here lies in the maintenance of a conception of power that operates through a singular intentional historical force such as "the West" which adheres to an anachronistic sovereign notion of power. Ascribing agency to the West in this way, and by viewing development as a Western imposition or hegemony (Sachs 1992 p.4) 'ossify force relations in development discourse in ways that have implications for the relative agency of actors within the development project' (Brigg 2002 p.425). Analysing development as a powerful discourse has led post-development into an ambiguous relationship with agency (Sande Lie 2007). 'Too strict of a conception of discourse and its formative power has implications for the general view of actors and their agency' (Sande Lie 2007 p.54). A rather static account of actors and their agency in relation to discourse is for instance found in Ferguson's account where actors are seen as mere representatives, carriers and producers of the development discourse (Sande Lie 2007 p.54). There is also a tendency in Ferguson's analysis to fall into an understanding of development as a tool of Western hegemony assigning a measure of intentionality to the West, which sometimes gives a conspirational and fatalistic tone to his conclusions. This tendency to omit agency is a major weakness of post-development theory and has great implications for the view of the free subject in relation to larger structures (Sande Lie 2007 p.55). In this way, post-development theory might be seen to

offer a valuable approach and critique to the systemic and structural (macro) level of development but has shortcomings in its relation to practice and agency. Post-development should, according to Sande Lie, be supplemented by an actor-orientated approach (2007 p.59). However, the ambiguous relationship between post-development accounts and agency can arguably also be attributed to the narrow and eclectic use of Foucault's analysis of power, as post-development generally ascribes only to the sovereign modality of power dismissing the more relational aspect of how power operates (Sande Lie 2007 p.55). This questions the necessity to supplement post-development theory with an actors-orientated approach as recasting post-development within a more thorough understanding of Foucault's analysis of power might be a sufficient corrective to forward post-development both in relation to practice and in order to gain a better understanding of what the desirable alternatives to development are without a disregard for the agency of actors involved. Addressing the shortcomings of post-development requires doing away with the outdated sovereign conceptualisation of power and engaging more closely with Foucault's more productive and positive analytics of power that is bio-power (Brigg 2002). The challenge here is to make appropriate use of Foucault's analytical concepts for understanding the post-World War II development project. Brigg finds the use of Foucault's notion of a *dispositif* with a macro-level application of his concept of normalisation to have a lot of purchase assisting us in understanding the operations of power through development.

The concept of a *dispositif*, or concrete social apparatus is an 'ensemble of discursive and material elements – for example, discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements' and so on – and the 'system of relations... established between these elements' (Foucault cited in Brigg 2002 p.427). This conceptualisation is appropriate to the post-World War II development project which involved the establishment of a range of institutions, where the desirability of social change modelled upon the West, professional development practitioners, scientific efforts and governmental and non-governmental organisations dedicated to development have emerged (Brigg 2007). The ways in which overall governing effects occur through a *dispositif* can be understood through a macro-level operation of the

mechanism of normalisation. By 1945 the broad institutional framework for this scale of operation of normalisation had been laid through the foundation of three major international institutions, all of which hold “development” as one of their goals; the formation of the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank saw the emergence of an international developmentalist whole (Brigg 2007 p.429). These international institutional together with discursive developments allowed for the emergence of a *dispositif* ‘on a scale not seen before’ and allowed for the insertion of nation-states as component elements to an overall apparatus (Brigg, 2002 p.427). These events – the establishment of an inclusive single international social field and of the norm of development – constitute the field of differentiation and a basis for a massive operation of power in which entities, from individual subjects to nation-states, are acted upon and act upon themselves in relation to the norm development (Brigg 2002 p.429). The operation of bio-power differs from traditional domination forms of power and it is important to acknowledge that power is not exercised by the state, but rather through the state which acts as a fulcrum for operations of power in the *dispositive*, while recognising also, that diffuse micro-techniques of power support or give rise to the state so that there is a continuity in both upwards and downwards directions. A more sophisticated employment of Foucault’s analysis of power would hence allow a lot more room for the agency of actors at all levels of insertion in the development apparatus, and for resistance. Foucault emphasises subjects’ ability to yield resistance ‘because power is relational and cannot exist without the possibility of resistance’ and as indicated by his concept of governmentality there is a reflexivity attached as the subject governs itself ‘defined as the conduct of conduct’ (Sande Lie 2007 p.55). A post-development approach that does not fully take into account Foucault’s analysis of power, including bio-power and its productive modality of governmentality through normalisation and discipline tends to omit agency and would even have a hard time accounting for or understanding local resistance in the forms of the new social movements that post-development writers pin their hopes to in the struggle for alternatives to development.

3. Post-development and ‘alternatives to development’

The post-development call for ‘alternatives to development’ What sets post-

development apart is that while it shares a lot of its critiques of the post-World War II development project with other critical schools of thought, post-development arrives at dismissing the whole paradigm, arguing that what is called for is not ‘development alternatives’ but ‘alternatives to development’ (Escobar 1995 p.215). Some authors (Nederveen Pieterse 2000; Schuurman 2000) have evaluated post-development and find that although their critiques are sensible post-development is flawed as no alternatives can be derived from it. This has been identified as a major weakness of post-development theory. It is argued that while post-development offers an interesting and convincing critique of the development apparatus, it lacks instrumentality for development practice as it does not point to a way forward (Nustad 2007). Other critics do not agree on this reading. Brigg (2002) has for instance insisted that post-development has been unduly dismissed for lacking a programme for development and should not be limited to helping us understand why so many development efforts fail. By addressing post-development’s shortcomings it can certainly contribute to much more than this (Brigg 2002 p.421). This chapter will consequently build on the insights gained from the closer engagement with Foucault and the post-development critique of development in the previous chapters, focusing on the more constructive ‘sceptical’ discourse identified in post-development in order to discern what is implied when calling for alternatives to development. Post-development analysis awards new social movements a central role in achieving various emancipatory projects (Parfitt 2002 p.117) and in finding ‘alternatives to development’. Esteva and Prakash have declared that ‘an epic is unfolding at the grassroots’ (Esteva and Prakash 1998a p.287), where ‘pioneering social movements’ are struggling for liberation from the ‘Global Project’ of development being imposed upon them by ‘creating new freedoms to sustain their autonomous spaces’ (Esteva and Prakash 1998a p.287-288). New social movements can be seen as attempts by people at the grassroots to exert control over unaccountable power centres. They seek to deconstruct the dominant culture as defined by the power centres and to reinstate excluded cultures and interests so as to have a voice in the ongoing definition of society and the political system (Parfitt 2002 p.121). In this way, the call for alternatives to development should not be interpreted as a belief that bettering of social organisation is impossible, nor as a

return to earlier ways (Matthews 2004 p.376), but what is rejected is rather the attempt by the post-World War II development project to ‘engineer particular changes in the so-called “Third World”’ in order to bring about changes deemed more desirable by development experts – and what is called for is ‘a new way of changing, of developing, of improving, to be constructed in the place of the ruin of the post-World War II development project’ (Matthews 2004 p.377). To gain a fuller understanding of what is implied in alternatives to development, it is necessary to locate it in the wider context of critical thinking that post-development is part of. Post-development is a vein in post-modern critical theory, and has at times been conflated development vision casts new social movements to challenge and ‘problematize the definition and control of the “needs” of diverse communities by the state and international forces’ and thereby uncovering spaces for autonomous local action (Blaney 1996 p.478). In this way, post-development calls for a new political vision that protects the autonomy of political communities and requires a space for self-determination and for the capacity to control one’s own destiny in the face of external forces, and according to Sachs (2002); this demands the revitalisation of local communities. Post-development and new social movements: the implications for social change In order to meditate on what a post-development future would look like, or more importantly what it would imply for social change and peoples’ lives, it might be revealing to ask what role the new social movements have been awarded by post-development theorists, and the kind of change post-development expects them to be able to contribute towards. Critics assessing post-development thought tend to divide around the issue of transcendence, of moving ‘beyond development’ or as referred to earlier, Escobar’s (1992b) vision of ‘alternatives to development’ which have been rejected by some critics for being vacuous while others have welcomed it as a genuine possibility for radical social change (Nakano 2007 p.63). Some have identified as a central theme in post-development that of an emancipatory politics (Nakano 2007 p.64). Nakano finds - through an advanced philosophical unpacking of the alternatives to development, drawing on the work of Serge Latouch (1993) and contrasting it with the post-Heideggerian theme of emancipatory politics - that post-development thought opens up for ‘plural possibilities of the political beyond the grammar of development’ (Nakano 2007

p.65). This transformation, the opening up of the imaginary of development, can best be achieved by building on the practices of new social movements, especially those in the South that have emerged as a response to the hegemony of the post-World War II development apparatus (Escobar 1992b p.22). ‘These grassroots initiatives, although still clearly limited, are nevertheless significant. They provide the means for an alternative to development by means of political practice’ (Escobar 1992b p.27). Esteva and Prakash meditate upon the use of the term ‘grassroots’, which they admit is an ambiguous word, but which they still dare to use because of its important political connotations in this context, as they identify it with initiatives and movements emanating from ‘the people’, ‘ordinary men and women who organise themselves to cope with their predicaments’ (1998ap.290).with a more radical critique of modernity. This point of view is symptomatic of a narrow reading of post-development, adhering only to the anti-development discourse, and does not hold up in the face of ‘sceptical post-development’ that reveals a more nuanced engagement with modernity. However, critics have argued that we are now in a time of paradigmatic transition in relation to modernity in general and development in particular (Munck 1999 p.206). It is within this context that the role of new social movements have been identified both as symptomatic of and the driving forces behind this process of reinvention of democracy, of community and development. Boaventura de Sousa Santos claims that ‘the goal of postmodern critical theory is, therefore, to turn into a new common sense, an emancipatory common sense’ (Santos 1995 p.x). As such, ‘postmodern emancipatory knowledge aims at the global repoliticisation of collective life’ (Santos 1995 p.51) and for post-development theorists, new social movements offer the possibility of a radical reclaiming of the political which is considered necessary in the field of development and in the broader arena of social transformation (Munch 1999). It is argued that through the vitality of these movements, the development apparatus will be challenged and the coming of a new era ‘more pluralistic and less oppressive, can be visualised’ (Escobar 1988 p.439). This post-Implicit then in the notion of alternatives to development is a search for an emancipatory politics through creating spaces where people can reclaim their autonomy with regards to articulating and pursuing goals of social transformation that correspond to their ideas of a “good life”, and their cultural

norms and values. The necessity of this move is further highlighted by Escobar through his consideration of the Latin American 'dependent' case, where 'the state intervenes in all aspects of life so that actors are above all actors in the development process, a process which is often led by exogenous forces' (Escobar 1992b p.36). What is at stake here is the measure of control people have over their own destinies and a greater participation in determining the shape of the political system. However, post-development insights call for further critical reflection on the politics of knowledge and to the role of the state as part of transforming our understanding of new social movements and development. Although new social movements are thought of in connection with the state, they stand in a relation of exteriority to the state and the development apparatus (Escobar 1992b p.43). This exteriority is crucial, and to fully understand why this position is necessary one needs to be reminded that not only does post-development reject the post-World War II development project but it also provides a challenge to and a critique of the role of the modern state. The new social movements can arguably only be understood when placed in context of the great inequality of relationships within the country of origin, where the groups that are penalised by development policies are often marginalised politically in the sense that their interests are not represented in the decision-making bodies of the State, as well as in the wider international context of the inequality of relationships between countries and the international organisations - the countries in the North and transnationals' alike - which influence the orientation of national policies (Polet 2007 p.7). Theresa S. Encarnacion Tadem writes in relation to the efforts led by Philippine social movements to counter the development policies of their government -that as a result of the transnational character of economic policy-making the state has been made more accountable to the institutions of global governance such as the IMF and the WB and the World Trade Organisation, than to its citizens (Encarnacion Tadem 2007 p.193). Post-development furthermore highlight the role that new social movements have to play in the re-politicisation of issues that have been depoliticised through the development apparatus and the state treating for instance poverty as a technical problem to be solved by the plans of development experts'. Expert discourses have repositioned groups as "cases" for the state and the development apparatus

and is in that way depoliticising needs. Popular actors like new social movements are challenging expert interpretations and goals with varying degrees of success; for instance, rural development programmes have provoked numerous movements for the recuperation of land (Escobar 1992b p.46). Another interesting example of the role new social movements have to play to counter-act a situation where the state have allowed major social issues to become depoliticised through the growing influence of the institutions of the international development apparatus like the WB and the IMF on the policy-making process, is found in Niger. A number of movements came together in Niger in the beginning of 2005 to create the 'Equity/Quality of Life Coalition against the Cost of Living' (Tidjani Alou 2007 p.119). This new structure of the political arena allowed for bringing forward the different visions of the people on the management of public affairs and enabled them to organise themselves and pressure their government for change and the government was after negotiations forced to take the social demands for a reduction in the price of electricity, water and oil products into account. These civil society activists re-injected politics into public life and involved the re-politicisation of development issues which concerned their lives by organising effective demonstrations. They launched 'dead town' and even 'dead country' operations that meant that for a whole day, the population stayed at home. The 'dead country' operation more or less involved the whole country and thus proved very effective by causing a situation of general standstill (Tidjani Alou 2007). What is highlighted through the activities of these new social movements, in addition to the post-development analysis is a recognition that 'existing actors and institutions must be transformed to work for different purposes: i.e. if states and markets are to remain relevant, they must support rather than direct social needs' (Andreasson 2010 p.10). However, imagining a post-development era cannot ignore questions of the future role of the development apparatus; the institutional structures are not likely to be abandoned, and neither are the good intentions of development practitioners to whom the dire situations of the poor cannot be ignored, and to whom doing nothing is just as unacceptable as imposing external goals and ideas through interventions are to post-development writers. The implications for development practice of a post-development analysis and the emancipatory politics that the new social movements are contributing towards

will be discussed in the coming and final chapter. However, arguing from a post-development perspective it can be assumed that for the existing development institutions, and the development apparatus as a whole to remain relevant, these must support rather than direct social goals and needs, which must be recognised as existing in the plural reflecting the diversity of peoples local histories, cultures and aspirations.

4. Relating post-development theory to development practice

What ‘alternatives to development’ could mean for practice, problems and further objections to post-development When simultaneously considering the post-development critique as well as their alternatives to development one is confronted with an implicit contradiction within the post-development analysis. Post-development has been identified as offering a sophisticated macro-level critique of the post-World War II development project and of the functioning of the development apparatus (Sande Lie 2007) while the post-development alternatives to development are found on the most local level in communities, and through the initiatives and activities of new social movements which stand in a relation of exteriority to both the state and the development apparatus (Escobar 1992b). The question of whether or not there is an acceptable role for international development institutions and for development professionals in a post-development future has hardly been addressed in post-development literature. This final chapter shall address some of the critiques that have been raised against a potential post-development paradigm and alternatives to development as well as assess the approaches that have been taken by post-development writers, and develop the theoretical and instrumental arguments in the previous chapters to further highlight the value of a post-development analysis for practice and the implications that this entails for the role of the state, international development institutions and a possible politics of emancipation for people in the an ‘end to development’ because it is inherently anti-democratic, and this is arguably the case as post-development points out that nowadays, development managerialism not only involves states but also international development and financial institutions and the ‘new managerialism of NGOs’. (Lummis cited in Nederveen Pieterse 2000 p.182). Those critical of post-development like Corbridge however, have found that ‘an unwillingness to speak for others is every bit as foundational a claim as

the suggestion that we can speak for others in an unproblematic manner' (Corbridge cited in Nederveen Pieterse 2000 p.182). Post-development thinking has thus also been criticised for being profoundly conservative, and although post-development critique arises from a radical democratic and anti-authoritarian questioning of social engineering and the faith in progress, the political implications according to Nederveen Pieterse (2000), turn out to be more or less an endorsement of the status quo. Another criticism touched upon in the previous chapters is that the use of Foucault's analysis of power is said to leave post-development without a forward politics, and hence it has been argued that post-development invites quietism and political impasse and in the end offer no politics besides the self-organising capacity of the poor, 'which actually lets the development responsibility of states and international institutions off the hook' (Nederveen Pieterse 2000 p.187). It is clear that the practical implications of a post-development analysis, and of the alternatives to development favoured by this paradigm poses a number of unanswered question in regards to future development practice not only at the level of the international development institutions, but also at state level. The implications for practice have not been sufficiently dealt with in post-development literature and thus what follows here is an attempt to identify potential issues and questions with regards to the relation of post-development theory to practice.

One major criticism raised against post-development and their alternatives to development is that the political project of post-development has been entrusted to new social movements that are far from guaranteed to be politically progressive (Storey 2000 p.44). Furthermore, post-development falls on the same grounds as other postmodern theorising in relation to practice: by denying universal normative grounds, they are left with no satisfactory basis for distinguishing emancipatory from non-emancipatory practices. Parfitt maintains that Foucault leaves us unable to make distinctions between movements such as the Ku Klux Klan and the South. Development thinking has been criticised by post-development theorists for being permeated by social engineering and the ambition to shape economies and societies modelled on the "developed" West, which makes it an interventionist and managerialist discipline. 'It involves telling other people what to do – in the name of modernisation, nation building, progress,

mobilisation, sustainable development, human rights, poverty alleviation and even empowerment and participation' (Nederveen Pieterse 2000 p.182). Douglas Lummis declares women's movements, and that this clearly represents a problem for post-development observers (2002 p.52). This all adds up to what Ray Kiely has termed a Pontius Pilate politics, which signals the danger of falling in to a "cultural relativist trap" and political paralysis (Storey 2000 p.44). This ethical problem has been overlooked, together with the problems that would arise if we were to take a relativist position, following the arguments of post-development and taking it one step further by arguing that the characteristics of all cultures are to be valued equally and regarded as legitimate (Parfitt 2002). However, most post-development writers give clear indication that this is not the idea, as Esteva and Prakash for instance dismisses Islamic fundamentalist movements while proclaiming the Zapatistas of Mexico to be a genuine post-development emancipatory movement without being able to give reasons for doing so (Parfitt 2002 p.9; Esteva and Prakash 1998a p.290). The difficulties raised by the post-development 'alternatives to development', a scenario of emancipation led by new social movements, is essentially an ethical problem (Parfitt 2002 p.8). The problem arguably arises most acutely in the context of figuring out an acceptable role for the North and the international development institutions in the struggles of a post-development South. One potential way out of the maze would have been by taking a cultural relativist stance and allow projects and movements to be evaluated within their own cultural perspective characterised by indigenous norms and values. Nevertheless, it is evident that a dilemma enters the picture when considering which initiatives are to be supported by external institutions and actors, and on what basis these are to be evaluated or judged as legitimate. In post-development 'the designated agents of change' – the new social movements – are not guaranteed to be 'anti-authoritarian and democratic in their structures', and even concepts such as "bottom-up" can work to conceal and perpetuate relationships of inequality and domination (Storey 2000 p.43). Cautions have thus been raised, that while the shift towards cultural sensibilities that accompanies the post-development analysis is a welcome move it can lead to 'ethno-chauvinism' and 'reverse orientalism' or to a reification of both people, locality and culture (Nederveen Pieterse 2000 p.188). Post-development also

appear to ignore that ‘many popular organisations are concerned with access to development’, and are working towards achieving conventional development goals (Nederveen Pieterse 2000 p.185). Critics of the post-development paradigm are uncomfortable with how this theorising, although providing a potent critique of the post-World War II development project has left many concerns for development practice unanswered. The lack of another blueprint or clear agenda for future change has been interpreted as a call for complete abandon, prompting critics to respond that ‘doing ‘nothing’ comes down to an endorsement of the status quo’ and is morally unacceptable for the North and implies a compartmentalised world presumably split along the lines of the Westphalian system (Nederveen Pieterse 2000 p.182). Ferguson (1990) concludes his book *The Anti-Politics Machine* with some very effective questions. He argues that any form of the question “what is to be done?” implies both a subject and a goal and an actor that strategizes towards that aim. The first aim from a post-developmentperspective should be to reformulate the question somewhat more politically, as the issues of concern are inherently political. If the question is to make any sense, it concerns a real-world tactics and “what is to be done?” requires first of all an answer to the question “by whom?” (Ferguson 1990 p.280). The subsequent question of “what should the ‘development agencies’ and ‘donors’ do?” falsely implies, according to Ferguson, ‘a collective project for bringing about empowerment for the poor’ (Ferguson 1990 p.282), but he also highlights that any answer to any of these questions must entail an understanding or a theory of how economic and political empowerment comes about (Ferguson 1990 p.283). The analysis of post-development theory and “alternatives to development” have found that it is indeed possible to discern a constructive discourse in post-development (sceptical post-development) which can reveal the core problems that post-development find within the post-World War II project of development, and subsequently holds a potential to show what the alternatives would need to avoid, and in what direction the new social movements are taking us. This analysis has shown that the issues at the heart of development are fundamentally political, and that any attempt to move past the dominant development discourse must beinherently political.

Bringing politics back in? Implications for development practice and the State In

order to discuss potential implications of post-development theory to practice it is arguably necessary to trace the roots of post-development back to its methodological foundations in the works of Foucault, as well as acknowledge that it as an extension of postmodernism. What is fundamental to the postmodern critique of modernist social theory is the undermining of the universalist pretensions of the Enlightenment, which is also found in post-development critique of the post-World War II development project. Ronaldo Munck argues that taking a postmodernist perspective will allow us to bring politics back into the debate on the development discourse, pointing out that the notion that the world can be analysed according to objective universal criteria looks particularly shallow from a Third World perspective (Munck 1999 p.204). It has been argued that the most extensive and exciting interaction between theory and practice has occurred between feminism, postmodernism and development. Chandra Mohanty, among others, rejected the image of the Third World woman as uniformly poor and powerless in contrast to the modern ideal of Western women; this critique of essentialism in feminist theory represented a genuine methodological breakthrough (Munck 1999 p.206) and we now accept much more readily that there are multiple and fluid identities involved in the development process. The new social movements are a sign of the fragmented postmodern society that we live in and have contributed to laying to rest the myth of totality. They are contributing towards emancipation from the homogenizing global project of development by repoliticising collective life, which from a post-development perspective is necessary in the field of development and in the arena of social transformation in general (Munck 1999 p.206). Post-development thus implies a reclaiming of the practice and imaginary of development and firmly relocating it within a radically democratised political process which at a local level provides a means of emancipation for people by taking back a measure of control over shaping their lives. Chantal Mouffe highlights that many of these struggles do in fact renounce any claim to universality, showing that in any such claim there lies a disavowal of the particular and a refusal of specificity (1988 p.35). It is argued that the reformulation of the democratic project in terms of radical democracy requires giving up the Enlightenment universalism as it demands that difference is acknowledged (Mouffe 1988 p.36). This challenge ties in with the principal

critique put forward by post-development writers and the emphasis here makes it clear that the politics of emancipation that is implied in post-development theory, in practice leads to yet further questions as the proliferation of political spaces demand that we abandon the idea of a unique constitutive space of the constitution of the political (Mouffe 1988). Nakano has argued that the transition towards a post-development order can be conceived as the complication of the social field and the pluralisation of the universal (2007 p.73). ‘ The pluralisation of the universal, though it may sound contradictory, is a necessary condition of the emancipatory politics in post-modernity...in post-modern politics, the location of the universal and the manner of emancipation becomes, in essence, plural’ (Nakano 2007 p.76). Hence, it is further pointed out that it cannot be assumed that this multi-polar politics is based on state politics, and so post-development envisions a possibility of a political community that can be explored beyond the state system (Nakano 2007). The new vision that can be discerned in post-development thinking is put to practice as new social movements problematize the definition and control of the ‘needs’ of diverse communities by the state, and by external international forces and there by uncovering spaces for autonomous local action and hence a politics of emancipation (Blaney 1996 p.478). Post-development, in this way, raises questions of the appropriate sites of collective life and political community. What is involved in the alternatives to development - the seeds of which are found at the grassroots and in the various struggles of new social movements - is the idea of a new way of thinking about politics, a re-imagining of the role of the state and an emancipation of people from the imperatives of the development apparatus to pursue their own objectives. ‘For an initiative to be considered post-development it should contribute to the dismantling of the physical and discursive hegemony of development so that new locally grounded futures may be imagined and pursued. This includes freeing bodies, minds and community processes from the pursuit of development and opening up new socio-political spaces in which local imaginaries can be enacted and empowered. Crucially, in the context of foreign aid, locally based communities should have control over the actions and initiatives of external actors operating in their locality’ (McGregor 2007 p.161). Blaney (1996) however, highlights a very important issue that remains to be explored by post-development writers,

namely that quite complicated relations might be called for between autonomy and sociality in a global community of self-realising communities if that global community is to respect both difference and equality. Post-development thinkers hold that the language of equality/inequality are constructs of the ‘development imaginary’, and in their view implies speaking about different stages of development, relative growth rates, standard of living or comparisons of global competitiveness (Esteva 1992; Latouch 1993). In this way post-development has been seen as to refuse demands of equality since this implies some common basis for evaluation and making claims (Blaney 1996 p.482). By giving up an appeal to a common moral language they risk a general “inaudibility” or incapacity to condemn injustice, violence and suffering (Blaney 1996 p.482). The question of where one is left in terms of development practice after having followed through with post-development’s demands to abandon abstract universalism, the essentialist conception of social totality and the myth of the unitary subject (Mouffe 1988) arguably comes down to a concern for legitimacy and a problem of judgment and of the evaluation of various projects which will have to occur - and not only at a local level - if there is to be an acceptable role for the development practitioners and experts of the international development institutions in supporting the poor in their initiatives.

22.5 Conclusion

This paper set out to explore the ways in which post-development critique can be constructive as well as offer insights to the search for alternatives to development, and for initiating a discussion on the implications of post-development theory for development practice. It has been found that the core arguments of post-development theory can be discerned by making a distinction between two conflicting discourses within post-development, and that a ‘sceptical’ reading of post-development, which employs a more sophisticated application of Foucauldian concepts to development, can indeed be constructive and illuminate what is implied in post-development alternatives to development. From a closer engagement with Foucault the discussion has found that addressing the shortcomings of post-development requires doing away with the outdated sovereign conceptualisation of power and instead incorporate Foucault’s concept of bio-power when analysing the development apparatus. A post-development

approach that does not fully take into account Foucault's analysis of power tends to omit agency and would have difficulty accounting for local resistance in the forms of the new social movements that post-development writers claim as the seeds of alternatives to development. The analysis indicates that the issues at the heart of development are fundamentally political, and that any attempt to move past the dominant development discourse must be inherently political. The grassroots initiatives, although still clearly limited, play a significant role as the new social movements provide the means for an alternative to development by means of political practice. A genealogy of the development paradigm reveals that which is being increasingly challenged: the way that the Western experience and ideas of progress have become the universal goal and trajectory of development, and so constitutes the norm against which any attempts at social change is being measured. Post-development theory objects to the universal standards of "progress" and "development", and how these have given legitimisation to the management of people as a means to achieve societal advancement. This professionalization of development made possible the removing of problems, including poverty, from the cultural and political realms and to recast them as technical issues responsive to more or less universally applicable technical interventions. In the light of a Foucauldian analysis, the alternatives to development can be seen as providing an opportunity for people to reinvent the state, create new spaces for autonomy and entails an emancipatory politics through radical democracy. This post-development vision casts new social movements to challenge the definition and control of the "needs" of diverse communities by the state and international forces. For post-development theorists development as defined in normative terms, as the aspirations to a "good life" or a "good society" means that it can only legitimately be reached through a democratic process by the people concerned. From this point of view it makes sense to argue that for existing development institutions to remain relevant, these must support rather than direct social needs which must be recognised as existing in the plural reflecting the diversity of people's culture and aspirations. It has been noted that post-development writers have not adequately dealt with the implications of their analysis for the practice of development. It has been argued that what is highlighted through the activities of the new social movements, and

post-development theory is that existing actors and institutions must be transformed and that this transformation ideally should involve a transfer of power - the power to define the problems and goals of a society - from the hands of outside “experts” to the members of the society itself. The question of whether or not there exists in such a model, an acceptable role for the international development institutions and for development professionals has been found to be a complicated issue, telling of the ambiguous relationship that post-development theory bears in relation to development practice. Not only does post-development theory imply a new way of thinking about politics, a reclaiming of development issues by firmly relocating them within a democratic process, but a need to reinvent this process which might not necessarily involve the politics of the State, in order to make room for peoples autonomy.

The principal problem of relating post-development theory to practice is not just that the alternatives to development envisioned operate according to a different rationality than the formally institutionalised order of the development apparatus but that the rejection of universal normative grounds which hereto has provided the basis for the post-World War II project of development, has further elevated the problem of legitimacy. Post-development has been found to leave many questions pertaining to development practice unanswered. The most profound of which is the problem of judgement. Some form of evaluation will have to occur, and not only at a local level, if there is to be an acceptable role for the development institutions and practitioners in supporting the poor in their initiatives. The challenge for future study will be to connect the post-development analysis to a theory of justification that does not require a foundation in a universality that undermines the project of emancipation, which is in essence plural. It might also be useful to further explore the ways that post-development connects to Amartya Sen’s conception of ‘development as freedom’ as a possible means of evaluating development initiatives which ought to expand peoples capabilities.

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